The Israel-Arab Reader

by Walter Laqueur

  10. Pursuant to Annex I, Article IX of this Agreement, Israel confirms that the permanent checkpoints on the roads leading to and from the Jericho Area (except those related to the access road leading from Mousa Alami to the Allenby Bridge) will be removed upon the completion of the first phase of redeployment.

  11. Prisoners who, pursuant to the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, were turned over to the Palestinian Authority on the condition that they remain in the Jericho Area for the remainder of their sentence, will be free to return to their homes in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip upon the completion of the first phase of redeployment.

  12. As regards relations between Israel and the PLO, and without derogating from the commitments contained in the letters signed by and exchanged between the Prime Minister of Israel and the Chairman of the PLO, dated September 9, 1993 and May 4, 1994, the two sides will apply between them the provisions contained in Article XXII, paragraph 1, with the necessary changes.

  13. a. The Preamble to this Agreement, and all Annexes, Appendices and maps attached hereto, shall constitute an integral part hereof. a. The Parties agree that the maps attached to the Gaza-Jericho Agreement as: i. map No. 1 (The Gaza Strip), an exact copy of which is attached to this Agreement as map No. (in this Agreement “map No. 2”); ii. map No. 4 (Deployment of Palestinian Police in the Gaza Strip), an exact copy of which is attached to this Agreement as map No. 5 (in this Agreement “map No. 5”); and iii. map No. 6 (Maritime Activity Zones), an exact copy of which is attached to this Agreement as map No. 8 (in this Agreement “map No. 8”; are an integral part hereof and will remain in effect for the duration of this Agreement.

  14. While the Jeftlik area will come under the functional and personal jurisdiction of the Council in the first phase of redeployment, the area’s transfer to the territorial jurisdiction of the Council will be considered by the Israeli side in the first phase of the further redeployment phases.

  Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin: Speech at Peace Rally (November 4, 1995)

  Allow me to say, I am also moved. I want to thank each and every one of you who stood up here against violence and for peace. This government, which I have the privilege to lead, together with my friend Shimon Peres, decided to give peace a chance. A peace that will solve most of the problems of the State of Israel. I was a military man for twenty-seven years. I fought as long as there were no prospects for peace. Today I believe that there are prospects for peace, great prospects. We must take advantage of it for the sake of those standing here, and for the sake of those who do not stand here. And they are many among our people. I have always believed that the majority of the people want peace, are prepared to take risks for peace. And you here, by showing up at this rally, prove it, along with the many who did not make it here, that the people truly want peace and oppose violence. Violence is undermining the very foundations of Israeli democracy. It must be condemned, denounced, and isolated. This is not the way of the State of Israel. Controversies may arise in a democracy, but the decision must be reached through democratic elections, just as it happened in 1992, when we were given the mandate to do what we are doing, and to continue to do it. I want to thank from here the President of Egypt, the King of Jordan, and the King of Morocco, whose representatives are present here, conveying their partnership with us on the march toward peace. But above all the people of Israel, who have proven, in the three years this government has been in office, that peace is attainable, a peace that will provide an opportunity for a progressive society and economy. Peace exists first and foremost in our prayers, but not only in prayers. Peace is what the Jewish People aspire to, a true aspiration. Peace entails difficulties, even pain. Israel knows no path devoid of pain. But the path of peace is preferable to the path of war. I say this to you as one who was a military man and minister of defense, and who saw the pain of the families of IDF soldiers. It is for their sake, and for the sake of our children and grandchildren, that I want this government to exert every effort, exhaust every opportunity, to promote and to reach a comprehensive peace. This rally must send a message to the Israeli public, to the Jewish community throughout the world, to many, many in the Arab world and in the entire world, that the people of Israel want peace, support peace, and for that, I thank you very much.

  Israel and Palestinian Authority: Hebron Accords (January 15, 1997)

  The following “Note for the Record,” prepared by U.S. Special Middle East Coordinator Dennis Ross and appended to the Hebron Accords, set the agenda for the peace process during the next three years.

  The two leaders [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Chairman Yasir Arafat] agreed that the Oslo peace process must move forward to succeed. Both parties to the Interim Agreement have concerns and obligations. Accordingly, the two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to implement the Interim Agreement on the basis of reciprocity and, in this context, conveyed the following undertakings to each other:

  ISRAELI RESPONSIBILITIES

  The Israeli side reaffirms its commitments to the following measures and principles in accordance with the Interim Agreement:

  ISSUES FOR IMPLEMENTATION 1. Further Redeployment Phases The first phase of further redeployment

  2. Prisoner Release Issues Prisoner release issues will be dealt with in accordance with the Interim Agreement’s provisions and procedures, including Annex VII.

  3. Issues for Negotiation. Outstanding Interim Agreement Issues Negotiations on the following outstanding issues from the Interim Agreement will be immediately resumed. Negotiations on these issues will be conducted in parallel: a. Safe Passage

  b. Gaza Airport

  c. Gaza port

  d. Passages

  e. Economic, financial, civilian and security issues

  f. People-to-people

  4. Permanent Status Negotiations Permanent status negotiations will be resumed within two months after implementation of the Hebron Protocol.

  PALESTINIAN RESPONSIBILITIES

  The Palestinian side reaffirms its commitments to the following measures and principles in accordance with the Interim Agreement: 1. Complete the process of revising the Palestinian National Charter

  2. Fighting terror and preventing violence a. Strengthening security cooperation

  b. Preventing incitement and hostile propaganda, as specified in Article XXII of the Interim Agreement.

  c. Combat systematically and effectively terrorist organizations and infrastructure

  d. Apprehension, prosecution and punishment of terrorists

  e. Requests for transfer of suspects and defendants will be acted upon in accordance with Article II(7)(f ) of Annex IV to the Interim Agreement

  f. Confiscation of illegal firearms

  3. Size of Palestinian Police will be pursuant to the Interim Agreement.

  4. Exercise of Palestinian governmental activity, and location of Palestinian governmental offices, will be as specified in the Interim Agreement. The aforementioned commitments will be dealt with immediately and in parallel.

  OTHER ISSUES

  Either party is free to raise other issues not specified above related to implementation of the Interim Agreement and obligations of both sides arising from the Interim Agreement.

  U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher: Letter to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (January 15, 1997)

  Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

  I wanted personally to congratulate you on the successful conclusion of the “Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron.” It represents an important step forward in the Oslo peace process and reaffirms my conviction that a just and lasting peace will be established between Israelis and Palestinians in the very near future.

  In this connection, I can assure you that it remains the policy of the United States to support and promote full implementation of the Interim Agreement in all of its parts. We intend to continue our efforts to help ensure that all outstanding commitments are carried out by both parties in a cooperative spirit and on the basis of re
ciprocity. As part of this process, I have impressed upon Chairman Arafat the imperative need for the Palestinian Authority to make every effort to ensure public order and internal security within the West Bank and Gaza Strip. I have stressed to him that effectively carrying out this major responsibility will be a critical foundation for completing implementation of the Interim Agreement, as well as the peace process as a whole. I wanted you to know that, in this context, I have advised Chairman Arafat of U.S. views on Israel’s process of redeploying its forces, designating specified military locations and transferring additional powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian Authority. In this regard, I have conveyed our belief, that the first phase of further redeployments should take place as soon as possible, and that all three phases of the further redeployments should be completed within twelve months from the implementation of the first phase of the further redeployments but not later than mid-1998.

  Mr. Prime Minister, you can be assured that the United States’ commitment to Israel’s security is ironclad and constitutes the fundamental cornerstone of our special relationship. The key element in our approach to peace, including the negotiation and implementation of agreements between Israel and its Arab partners, has always been a recognition of Israel’s security requirements. Moreover, a hallmark of U.S. policy remains our commitment to work cooperatively to seek to meet the security needs that Israel identifies. Finally, I would like to reiterate our position that Israel is entitled to secure and defensible borders, which should be directly negotiated and agreed with its neighbors.

  Alessandra Antonelli: From the Battlefield to the Table (February 27, 1998)

  Marwan Barghouti, Husam Khader, Hisham Abdul Razik all belong to the same past of struggle, weapons and jail detentions, and all of them, once wartime was over, left the battlefield to sit in the designated place where statebuilding was to occur: the Palestine Legislative Council.

  The battle began when they were very young. Husam Khader was 10 years old when his friend, Khader Daoud, held his hand in Balata Camp and took him to a demonstration. At 14, he entered prison for the first time. He was to go through those prison doors another 22 times. Abdul Razik was 16 when he was first jailed. His first incarceration, under administrative detention, was short, but the second, because of the bomb he was carrying in his car, (which exploded and injured him) lasted two decades. Marwan Barghouti’s personal memories also count many years in and out of prison, starting from school age, and a lengthy deportation.

  The peace talks shifted the struggle from weapons to a democratic parliament, from the battleground to the table and from stone and violence to peaceful rallies. The struggle, indeed, is not over, yet. We are still striving to regain the human rights which have been stolen from Palestinians. We are still working for peace, and want to support it in this difficult time, says Hisham Abdul Razik. Marwan Barghouti feels the same. He points out that, in the past years, during, before and after the intifada, we were fighting to end the occupation. We got an agreement in 1993, but the occupation still persists. We change our way of fighting, but the goal is the same. If there is disappointment because of the continuing dispute with the Israelis, there is also disappointment from the Palestinian reality. We have been given the opportunity to start a new country, but we haven’t done it well. Some people misinterpreted the power they were given; they have forgotten the honesty and loyalty of the years of the struggle for independence, so the battle now is also to stop corruption, says Husam Khader. Sometimes it is extremely hard because you confront people you shared important resistance moments with.

  In some ways, it was easier to oppose a well-defined, external enemy before than to deal with political adversaries now.

  Opposition is a natural part of a democratic society. We should worry if there wasn’t any. But it has to express itself in the Parliament. And respecting each other the majority and the minority should join together in a common effort to establish a Palestinian state and a lasting and fair peace, says Hisham Abdul Razik.

  It is not so simple to fully adopt a democratic system at the drop of a hat. Palestinians under occupation looked at and dreamt of the Israeli near democracy; those in the Diaspora experienced life in democratic nations. But to implement democracy within such a short period has turned out to be quite a complicated matter.

  I would like to see more respect for political pluralism, more respect for the political institutions and for the Parliament’s activities, says Marwan Barghouti. And also greater freedom of press. The point is, according to Khader, that the Palestinian Authority does not take into enough consideration the decisions and recommendations of the Legislative Council. Often, they simply put our suggestions away in a drawer. He also suggests the establishment of a Council of Ministries, a clearer definition of their powers and the creation of a steering committee to oversee political activities and procedures.

  The Oslo agreement underlined the fact that, for these three, Palestinians had achieved a certain historical maturity which called for a change in our minds and in the means we were using. Or, as Abdul Razik puts it, “Palestinians have been living with slogans for 100 years. But with peace the time came to put them aside, because we realized that peace would be the only solution to getting some of our rights back and to be able to start living like any other nation.” Since then, the same hands that held guns and threw stones have been holding briefcases and signing papers. It was easy to have unconditional respect from people when I was a freedom fighter, says Barghouti. But now it is much more difficult. At that time, we were only focused on the war against the occupiers. I didn’t pay too much attention to the needs of the people, to the disastrous situation of electricity, sewage system, roads. But as a politician, I need to be aware of the people’s priorities, of their needs. And sometime it’s hard to meet all their expectations, to earn their full trust and understanding.

  From the 74 meetings he held last year, Barghouti says Palestinians’ biggest concerns are—in that order—the confiscation of lands which is still going on to expand and ensure the presence of settlements; the lack of jobs; and the inadequacy of the infrastructure. The close contact with people makes them aware that this is the vital moment to create a social and economic environment that responds to the demands of the population. This has became a must for this generation of fighters transformed into politicians by historical reasons. The best tools they can put to work in the service of Palestine are the tolerance, the patience, the respect of the people, and the stubborn will to reach a goal that they acquired during the occupation years, as Barghouti says. But they must also possess the ability to listen carefully, because there is a changing ground swell that needs to be heard, says Khader, who believes that the PLO’s political system, which fit in the intifada period, is no longer suitable to these new circumstances.

  And all of them are striving to guarantee a true democracy that grants everyone rights, and freedom of expression, and which is able to protect any person in the society, beginning with the family, as Abdul Razik puts it. Obstinate activists and efficient leaders during their youth, all three men are now husbands and fathers. Their striving for a better Palestine assumes then a deeper meaning, because to accomplish the agenda they set to free the country before, and to fairly build it later, will become part of the precious heritage they will leave to their sons and daughters.

  The picture they have of a future Palestine is one that is no longer in flames, no longer watered with blood, but a country resting in peace, the real peace that the land which hosts three religions deserves, as Abdul Razik vividly and poetically describes it. More concretely, they want a Palestine where the values of respect, for individuals, for ethnic, religious or political minorities, for established social, legal and economic institutions as well as those being built, and respect for a multi-party parliament. That respect is the only way for the values of freedom and peace to take root, the only ground on which a truly independent country can blossom.

  Hasan Asfour and Ma
hmoud Abbas (Abu Mazin): Reflections on the Oslo Agreement’s 5th Anniversary (September 11, 1998)

  We cannot give up on these accords because we paid a price for this agreement when we agreed to partition Palestine into two states. The Palestinians made historic concessions in order to achieve specific national goals. . . . The agreement could work with an Israeli partner, and has not worked because of the lack of an Israeli partner. We lost the one partner who participated in setting up the accords with the PLO, and later with the PA. . . . We did have problems with the Labor government in terms of implementation; these problems stemmed from attempts to change portions of the agreement but were nonetheless still within the framework of the agreement. The real obstacle arose with the arrival of a government which from the very beginning did not believe in a peace agreement with the Palestinians. It does not believe that there is a Palestinian people and Palestinian land, or that this people has legitimate political rights. However, because it can’t say this openly, it goes around the agreement by making verbal commitments to all the while trying to kill it. This is the real political problem. It is not the text of the agreement itself that is the problem, but the lack of an Israeli partner willing to stick to the peace process and reach the political goal “a historic reconciliation” guaranteed by the accords on the principle of mutual recognition of political rights.

  It constituted a huge turning point on the road to establishment of a Palestinian state, an adjustment to the path of the Palestinian political movement, and a reassessment of the sociopolitical status and entity of the Palestinian people after their long journey of desolation and dispersion, the Palestinian revolution, the PLO and Palestinian armed struggle. The struggle now has a legitimate political role far beyond the importance of the PLO, which is still considered the spiritual nation. However, the Palestinian land remains under occupation, and hopes are still centered on the land and people. The accords helped to make this adjustment, and the dynamics of the Oslo process served as the basic foundation for this new perspective on the Palestinian entity and nation.