The Israel-Arab Reader

by Walter Laqueur

  They will live in a free, unoccupied country. The Israelis want everything: Peace, security, stability, the settlements, and a Palestinian state without Jerusalem and without real sovereignty. That is impossible. They must leave the territories, and there will be no more confrontations. . . .

  There will never again be either a 1948 or a 1967; they will not be able to expel us en masse. The Israelis will eventually realize that the occupation also works against them. I am very optimistic.

  U.S. President Bill Clinton: The Clinton Plan (December 23, 2000)40

  TERRITORY:

  Based on what I heard, I believe that the solution should be in the mid-90 percents, between 94-96 percent of the West Bank territory of the Palestinian State. The land annexed by Israel should be compensated by a land swap of 1-3 percent in addition to territorial arrangements such as a permanent safe passage. The parties also should consider the swap of leased land to meet their respective needs. . . . The parties should develop a map consistent with the following criteria:

  -80 percent of settlers in blocks;

  -Contiguity;

  -Minimize the annexed areas;

  -Minimize the number of Palestinians affected.

  SECURITY:

  The key lies in an international presence that can only be withdrawn by mutual consent. This presence will also monitor the implementation of the agreement between both sides. . . .

  My best judgment is that the Israeli presence would remain in fixed locations in the Jordan Valley under the authority of the international force for another 36 months. This period could be reduced in the event of favorable regional developments that diminish the threat to Israel.

  On early warning stations, Israel should maintain three facilities in the West Bank with a Palestinian liaison presence. The stations will be subject to review every 10 years with any changes in the status to be mutually agreed.

  Regarding emergency developments, I understand that you will still have to develop a map of the relevant areas and routes. . . . I propose the following definition:

  Imminent and demonstrable threat to Israel’s national security of a military nature that requires the activation of a national state emergency.

  Of course, the international forces will need to be notified of any such determination.

  On airspace, I suggest that the state of Palestine will have sovereignty over its airspace but that the two sides should work out special arrangements for Israeli training and operational needs.

  I understand that the Israeli position is that Palestine should be defined as a “demilitarized state” while the Palestinian side proposes “a state with limited arms.” As a compromise, I suggest calling it a “non-militarized state.” This will be consistent with the fact that in addition to a strong Palestinian security force, Palestine will have an international force for border security and deterrent purposes. . . .

  JERUSALEM:

  The general principle is that Arab areas are Palestinian and Jewish ones are Israeli. This would apply to the Old City as well. I urge the two sides to work on maps to create maximum contiguity for both sides.

  Regarding the Haram Temple Mount, I believe that the gaps are not related to practical administration but to symbolic issues of sovereignty and to finding a way to accord respect to the religious beliefs of both sides.

  I know you have been discussing a number of formulations. . . . I add to these two additional formulations guaranteeing Palestinian effective control over the Haram while respecting the conviction of the Jewish people. Regarding either one of those two formulations will be international monitoring to provide mutual confidence.

  Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram and Israeli sovereignty over a) the Western Wall and the space sacred to Judaism of which it is a part or b) the Western Wall and the Holy of Holies of which it is a part. There will be a firm commitment by both not to excavate beneath the Haram or behind the Wall.

  Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram and Israeli sovereignty over the Western Wall and shared functional sovereignty over the issue of excavation under the Haram and behind the Wall such that mutual consent would be requested before any excavation could take place.

  REFUGEES:

  I sense that the differences are more relating to formulations and less to what will happen on a practical level. I believe that Israel is prepared to acknowledge the moral and material suffering caused to the Palestinian people as a result of the 1948 war and the need to assist the international community in addressing the problem. . . .

  The fundamental gap is on how to handle the concept of the right of return. I know the history of the issue and how hard it will be for the Palestinian leadership to appear to be abandoning the principle.

  The Israeli side could not accept any reference to a right of return that would imply a right to immigrate to Israel in defiance of Israel’s sovereign policies and admission or that would threaten the Jewish character of the state.

  Any solution must address both needs. The solution will have to be consistent with the two state approach. . . . the state of Palestine as the homeland of the Palestinian people and the state of Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people.

  Under the two-state solution, the guiding principle should be that the Palestinian state should be the focal point for the Palestinians who choose to return to the area without ruling out that Israel will accept some of these refugees.

  I believe that we need to adopt a formulation on the right of return that will make clear that there is no specific right of return to Israel itself but that does not negate the aspiration of the Palestinian people to return to the area.

  I propose two alternatives: 1. both sides recognize the right of Palestinian refugees to return to historic Palestine,

  2. both sides recognize the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland.

  The agreement will define the implementation of this general right in a way that is consistent with the two-state solution. It would list the five possible homes for the refugees: 1. The State of Palestine

  2. Areas in Israel being transferred to Palestine in the land swap

  3. Rehabilitation in host country

  4. Resettlement in third country

  5. Admission to Israel

  In listing these options, the agreement will make clear that the return to the West Bank, Gaza Strip and area acquired in the land swap would be right to all Palestinian refugees, while rehabilitation in host countries, resettlement in third countries and absorption into Israel will depend upon the policies of those countries.

  Israel could indicate in the agreement that it intends to establish a policy so that some the refugees would be absorbed into Israel consistent with Israel sovereign decision.

  I believe that priority should be given to the refugee population in Lebanon. The parties would agree that this implements Resolution 194.

  THE END OF CONFLICT:

  I propose that the agreement clearly mark the end of the conflict and its implementation put an end to all claims. This could be implemented through a UN Security Council Resolution that notes that resolutions 242 and 338 have been implemented and through the release for Palestinian prisoners.

  Yoel Marcus: “If They Want It, They’ll Take It” (December 26, 2000)41

  The Palestinian leaders are starting to get on people’s nerves. These leaders, who negotiate while shooting their six-guns, are getting things that they never even dreamed of getting. Yet they incite their public to attack us, while they never stop whining and complaining. Purposely overlooking what they have already obtained or what is already within their grasp, they are never satisfied. They just want us to keep on trying and making concessions—otherwise, they threaten, they’ll refuse to sign a peace treaty with us. They remind many people of the legendary Hershel of Ostropol who threatened that, if he were not given a free meal, he would have to do what his father used to do—namely, go to bed hungry. Israel is a strong nation that has emerged victorious from every
war it has ever fought. Furthermore, Israel can live with the status quo for many years and with much less trouble than the Palestinians. They need our approval if they want to set up an independent state and they need us as partners in every possible sphere. Who knows, one day they might find themselves needing our military umbrella to protect them from their own Arab brothers and sisters. In our generation, more Arabs have been killed by other Arabs than by Jews.

  In the Oslo agreement and in the White House lawn parties, it was Israel that resurrected a Yasser Arafat who had become a pariah among the leaders of the Arab world for his support of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and it was Israel that freed him from the status of persona non grata. The Oslo agreement, which returned Arafat to his homeland from his life of exile and ceaseless wandering, was designed to bring about conciliation between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

  However, to this day, Arafat has not managed, has not wanted or has not been able to break the habit of constantly using the slogan about Palestine being redeemed only through blood and fire. Instead of leading his people down the road to conciliation with Israel, he is leading them down the road to terrorism, murder and anti-Semitic incitement.

  Has a speaker of the Knesset ever walked upon the Palestinian flag? Yet Abu Ala, speaker of the Palestinian Parliament, his head held erect, walked on a “carpet” consisting of Israeli flags. Arafat missed his chance with Yitzhak Rabin, and he missed his chance with Shimon Peres.

  Now the only Israeli leader with whom Arafat can arrive at an agreement is Prime Minister Ehud Barak. “After me, the flood!” seems to be Arafat’s motto.

  The Palestinians have been offered things that the Labor Party, in its various historical metamorphoses and in all its election campaigns, promised never to give to them. From Arafat’s standpoint, this is a golden opportunity that might never recur in his lifetime.

  He should pay attention to what the leaders of the Likud are saying. They want an immediate halt to the Palestinian-Israeli talks and they also want to sabotage the anticipated peace treaty right now, so that if their party wins the next general election, it will not be forced to honor that agreement. Their solution is an iron-fist policy and war on the Palestinians.

  Arafat would have to be out of his mind not to grab with both hands what he is being offered. Barak has gone to the very limits of the concessions he is prepared to make. Even Peres admits that Barak has conceded too much. Yet what was Arafat’s reaction after Israel’s major concession at Camp David? He instructed his people to launch an Intifada and thus he planted among the members of Israeli society the seeds of distrust. “What,” Israelis began asking themselves, “after declaring ourselves ready to make such concessions, we’re being ‘rewarded’ with the deaths of our fellow Israelis?”

  Politically speaking, Barak could have taken the easy way out: He could have set up a national unity government with Likud chief Ariel Sharon, thereby saying, in effect, “To hell with the peace process!” Instead, he risked his political skin, lost his partners in the coalition and has reached the point where his reelection is in doubt.

  Barak has repeatedly warned the Israeli public that failure to arrive at a peace treaty with the Palestinians could ultimately plunge Israel into a regional war where non-conventional weapons will be used. Why is Arafat not broadcasting a similar message of urgency and catastrophe to his own people?

  The Palestinians could not ask for a better time to get the best possible peace treaty than right now. But they want more. They want sovereignty. More than anything else, they want the right of return to be recognized and fulfilled. The Palestinian refugee problem was not caused by Israel; it was caused by the Arab states, which have tried, time and again, to use brute force to wipe us off the map. Israel bears no responsibility whatsoever for the tragic plight of the Palestinian refugees.

  Israel has never demanded compensation for the thousands of Israeli citizens killed because of Arab aggression and has not received even one penny in compensation for the integration of hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees from the Arab states and for the Jewish property that those states confiscated. Fulfillment of the right of return would mean the end of Israel as a Jewish state, and thus Israel will never agree to this demand.

  If the Palestinians have included the clause on the right of return as a ploy intended simply to enhance their bargaining position, they would be wise to withdraw it right now—because time is running out. Even the most patient of suitors gives up trying to capture a hard-to-get virgin. Arafat lost his virginity a long time ago, and we’ve had it with his game-playing and with his arm-twisting attempts. If they want it, they’ll take it.

  If they fail to grab hold of these offers now, instead of Barak, they’ll get Sharon, Limor Livnat, Avigdor Lieberman and Natan Sharansky. Already, instead of Bill Clinton, they’ll get George W. Bush, who will first have to learn to find Palestine on the map.

  Palestinian Negotiating Team: Remarks and Questions Regarding the Clinton Plan (January 2, 2001)

  . . . . We wish to explain why the latest United States proposals, taken together and as presented without clarification, fail to satisfy the conditions required for a permanent peace. As it stands now, the United States proposal would: 1. divide a Palestinian state into three separate cantons connected and divided by Jewish-only and Arab-only roads and jeopardize the Palestinian state’s viability;

  2. divide Palestinian Jerusalem into a number of unconnected islands separate from each other and from the rest of Palestine;

  3. force Palestinians to surrender the right of return of Palestinian refugees. It also fails to provide workable security arrangements between Palestine and Israel, and to address a number of other issues of importance to the Palestinian people. The United States proposal seems to respond to Israeli demands while neglecting the basic Palestinian need: a viable state.

  The United States proposals were couched in general terms that in some instances lack clarity and detail. A permanent status agreement, in our view, is not merely a document that declares general political principles. It is, rather, a comprehensive instrument that spells out the details, modalities, and timetables of ending the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. For such an agreement to be effective, it must be backed by clear, effective international implementation guarantees. We believe that a general, vague agreement at this advanced stage of the peace process will be counterproductive. This conviction has resulted from our past experiences with vague agreements and from Israel’s history of noncompliance with signed agreements. The permanent status agreement must be a truly final agreement rather than an agreement to negotiate.

  The United States side presented proposals regarding four primary issues: territory, Jerusalem, refugees, and security.

  TERRITORY OF THE PALESTINIAN STATE

  On the issue of territory, the United States proposed that Israel annex 4 to 6 percent of the West Bank; that the annexation be compensated through a “land swap” of 1 to 3 percent; and that the Parties also consider a swap of leased land. The United States recommended that the final map be drawn in a manner that would place 80 percent of Israeli settlers in annexed settlement blocs, but that would nevertheless promote territorial contiguity, minimize annexed areas and minimize the number of Palestinians affected.

  This proposal poses a number of serious problems. As the proposal is not accompanied by a map, and because the total area from which the percentages are calculated is not defined, it is difficult to imagine how the percentages presented can be reconciled with the goal of Palestinian contiguity. This is especially worrisome in light of the fact that the Israeli side continues to insist, and the United States has never questioned, that Jerusalem, as defined by Israel, the “no-man’s land,” and the Dead Sea are not part of the total area from which the percentages are calculated. Moreover, the United States proposal calls for the “swap of leased land.” It is not entirely clear if Palestinian interests are served by such a swap since the Palestinian side has no territorial needs
in Israel, except for a corridor linking the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which will be covered in a land swap. This proposal, taken together with the map presented by the Israeli side in the most recent round of negotiations in Washington (see attached map), provides Israel with control over large swaths of land, rendering the Palestinian state unviable and lacking direct access to international borders.

  Without a map clarifying the above ambiguities, the United States proposal does nothing to foreclose a return by Israel to its proposals at Camp David which leaves 10 percent of the West Bank under Israeli sovereignty and an additional 10 percent under Israeli control pursuant to ill-defined security arrangements. It is important to bear in mind that all of the settlements in the West Bank currently occupy approximately 2 percent of the West Bank.

  In this context, the Palestinian side rejects the use of “settlement blocs” as a guiding principle as recommended by the United States proposal. The use of this criterion subordinates Palestinian interests in the contiguity of their state and control over their natural resources to Israeli interests regarding the contiguity of settlements, recognized as illegal by the international community. It also contradicts the United States proposal’s criteria concerning minimizing annexed areas and the number of Palestinians affected. In addition, the Palestinian side needs to know exactly which settlements Israel intends to annex.