Jean Edward Smith

by FDR

  Informality prevailed. “Everything was so relaxed it did not seem possible that the three most powerful men in the world were about to make decisions involving the lives and fortunes of millions of people,” said Bohlen.73 Roosevelt opened on a light note: as the youngest member present, he wished to welcome his elders. Churchill pointed out that they held the future of mankind in their hands. Stalin, as host, welcomed his guests. “History,” he said, “has given us a great opportunity. Now let us get down to business.”74

  After a tour d’horizon the discussion turned to Germany. During the plenary session and at dinner that evening, conversation focused on the postwar period. Roosevelt several times suggested that Hitler was mentally unbalanced and had led the German people astray. Stalin demurred. Hitler was a very able man, he thought. “Not basically intelligent, lacking in culture, and with a primitive approach to political problems, [but] only a very able man could accomplish what Hitler had done in solidifying the German people whatever we thought of the methods.”75

  Stalin believed Germany should be dismembered. The Germans, he said, were a very talented people and could easily revive within fifteen or twenty years. Disarmament was insufficient. Furniture and watch factories could make airplanes and shell fuses. He preferred dismemberment—“as Richelieu had done three hundred years ago.”76

  Churchill said he was primarily interested in seeing Prussia—“the evil core of German militarism”—separated from the rest of Germany.77 Roosevelt proposed the division of Germany into five parts, plus two regions, Hamburg and the Ruhr, placed under international control. Stalin said he preferred the president’s plan to Mr. Churchill’s, but “if Germany is to be dismembered, it should really be dismembered.”

  “Germany had been less dangerous to civilization when divided into 107 provinces,” Roosevelt responded.

  “I would have hoped for larger units,” said Churchill.78

  At one point Stalin wryly suggested that 50,000 officers of the German general staff should be summarily executed at the end of the war. Bohlen saw that Stalin was smiling sardonically as he spoke, and so did FDR. “Not fifty thousand, but perhaps forty-nine thousand,” the president shot back. Churchill was not amused. He did not perceive that Stalin was goading him and rose to the bait. Britain would never tolerate such an outrage, he passionately responded. “I would rather be taken out in the garden here and be shot myself rather than sully my own and my country’s honor by such infamy.”79

  Dinner the first evening was hosted by Roosevelt. As during “children’s hour” at the White House, the president commenced proceedings by mixing martinis for his guests. Over the years FDR’s martinis had become increasingly heavy on the vermouth, often both sweet and dry. Stalin accepted a glass and drank without comment until Roosevelt asked him how he liked it. “Well, all right, but it is cold on the stomach.”80 Bohlen noted that Stalin was not a heavy drinker. He took vodka sparingly and much preferred wines from his native Georgia. Roosevelt was much impressed. Stalin is a very interesting man, he told Frances Perkins. “They say he is a peasant from one of the least progressive parts of Russia. But let me tell you he had an elegance of manner that none of the rest of us had.”81

  After dinner Churchill raised the question of Poland. “It would be very valuable if here at Teheran the representatives of the three governments could work out some agreed understanding on the question of Polish frontiers.” Stalin said he did not feel any necessity to discuss the Polish question just yet but was curious what the prime minister had in mind. Churchill said that Great Britain had gone to war with Germany in 1939 because Poland had been invaded. The British government was committed to the reestablishment of a strong Polish state—“an instrument needed in the orchestra of Europe”—but was not attached to any specific frontiers. He suggested moving Poland west. The Soviet Union would retain what it took in 1939, and Poland would be compensated by shifting its border westward to the Oder, taking the German provinces East Prussia, Silesia, and Pomerania. To illustrate his point, Churchill placed three matchsticks representing Germany, Poland, and the Soviet Union on the table. He then moved them east to west “like soldiers at drill executing ‘two steps left, close.’ ”82

  Roosevelt, who had retired earlier, took no part in the discussion. Later he met privately with Stalin to discuss the Polish issue. He said he did not object to moving the Polish border westward to the Oder, but for political reasons he could not yet endorse it. A presidential election was coming up in 1944, and although he did not wish to run again, he might have to if the war was still going on. “There are from six to seven million Americans of Polish extraction in the United States and as a practical man I do not wish to lose their vote.”83 Having alienated many Italian-American voters with his stab-in-the-back speech in 1940, FDR did not want to antagonize the Poles as well.

  Stalin replied that he now understood the president’s dilemma and would not complicate the problem for him. Later he told Churchill that he earnestly wanted Roosevelt reelected and believed it would be much to the world’s advantage if he were.84 FDR’s mention of the 1944 election to Stalin at Teheran is the first indication the president gave that he might seek a fourth term.

  Roosevelt also alluded to the Baltic states. There were a number of people in the United States of Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian origin. The United States was not going to war with the Soviet Union to protect the independence of the three Baltic states, he joked, but he hoped Stalin would permit some type of plebiscite to express the will of the people. The right of self-determination was a moral issue for most Americans. Stalin said there would be abundant opportunity under the Soviet constitution for the Baltic people to express themselves. Roosevelt replied that it would be very helpful to him personally if some public declaration of future elections could be made.85

  The principal issue at Teheran was the second front. At the first plenary session of the Big Three, Stalin, in an almost matter-of-fact tone, confirmed that Russia would join the war against Japan once Germany was defeated. Soviet forces in Siberia would be reinforced and then take the offensive.86 This was a significant Russian commitment and drastically reduced the importance of China to the Pacific war effort.87 But the Soviet Union expected a quid pro quo. When were the Allies going to land in France?

  Roosevelt believed that at Quebec he had received Churchill’s absolute assurance for a cross-Channel invasion no later than May 1, 1944. But Churchill evidently had reservations. Employing his vast reservoir of rhetoric, the prime minister dissembled. He spoke at length about the virtues of alternative approaches—Italy, Turkey, the island of Rhodes, the Balkans—and the shortage of landing craft for an invasion of France.

  Stalin replied bluntly. From the Russian point of view Turkey, Rhodes, Yugoslavia, and even the capture of Rome were irrelevant. “If we are here to discuss military matters, Russia is only interested in OVERLORD.”88 Roosevelt came down hard on Stalin’s side. “We are all agreed that OVERLORD is the dominating operation, and that any operation which might delay OVERLORD cannot be considered by us.”89 The president said he favored sticking to the original date set at Quebec, namely the first part of May.90

  For all practical purposes the issue was settled. As Hopkins recalled, Stalin looked at Churchill as if to say, “Well, what about that?”91 He then pressed on: “I do not care if it is the 1st of May, or the 15th, or the 20th. But a definite date is important.”

  He turned to Roosevelt. “Who will command OVERLORD?” The president was caught off guard.* It was widely assumed that General Marshall would be named, but FDR apparently had second thoughts. He told Stalin no decision had been made. “Then nothing will come out of these operations,” said Stalin. The Soviet Union had learned that in military matters decisions could not be made by committee. “One man must be responsible and one man must make decisions.”92

  Churchill fought a rearguard action. The Mediterranean ought not be neglected. Once again he argued the case from every conceivable angle.
Stalin allowed that such operations might have value but were diversions. “Do the British really believe in OVERLORD or are they only saying so to make us feel better?”93

  Churchill glowered, chomped on his cigar, and suggested that his Mediterranean proposals be considered by the military staffs. “Why do that?” asked Stalin. “We are the chiefs of government. We know what we want to do. Why turn the matter over to subordinates to advise us?”94

  With the mood at the table turning testy, Roosevelt adjourned the meeting for dinner. That evening Hopkins called on Churchill at the British Embassy. Whether FDR sent him is unclear. Hopkins told Churchill he was fighting a losing battle. Roosevelt was determined to hold to the May date for the cross-Channel attack, and the Russian view was equally firm. Hopkins told Churchill there was little he could do to prevent it, and he advised the prime minister to yield gracefully.95

  The effect of Hopkins’s visit cannot be measured for certain. But the next day the British announced their agreement to OVERLORD. The Combined Chiefs set the invasion date for May 1944 in conjunction with supporting landings in southern France (ANVIL). Stalin pledged a simultaneous Soviet offensive to pin the Germans down and prevent the transfer of any divisions to the West. Churchill suggested they needed a cover plan to confuse and deceive the enemy. “The truth,” he said, “deserves a bodyguard of lies.”96

  “I thank the Lord Stalin was there,” wrote Stimson when he learned of the discussion at Teheran. “He saved the day. He was direct and strong and he brushed away the diversionary attempts of the Prime Minister with a vigor which rejoiced my soul.”97

  November 30, 1943, the third day of the conference, was Churchill’s sixty-ninth birthday, and dinner that evening at the British Embassy was a gala celebration. “This was a memorable occasion in my life,” wrote Churchill. “On my right sat the President of the United States, and on my left the master of Russia. Together we controlled practically all the naval and three-quarters of all the air forces in the world, and could direct armies of nearly twenty millions of men, engaged in the most terrible of wars that had yet occurred in human history.”98

  Bohlen reports that the table was set with British elegance. The crystal and silver sparkled in the candlelight.99 “The speeches started directly we sat down and continued without interruption until we got up,” Lord Ismay recalled.100 Churchill praised Roosevelt, whose courage and foresight had “prevented a revolution in the United States in 1933,” and followed with a toast to Stalin, “who would be ranked with the great heroes of Russian history.”

  Stalin responded that the honors heaped upon him belonged to the Russian people. “The Red Army has fought heroically, but the Russian people would have tolerated nothing less. Persons of medium courage and even cowards become heroes in Russia. Those who do not are shot. It is dangerous to be a coward in Russia.”101

  The conviviality continued all evening. “I felt that there was a greater sense of solidarity and good-comradeship than we had ever reached before,” wrote Churchill.102 “Uncle Joe enjoyed himself as much as anybody,” said the prime minister’s secretary, John Martin.103

  At one point Churchill remarked, “England is getting pinker.”

  “It is a sign of good health,” Stalin responded.

  “I drink to the proletarian masses,” said Churchill.

  “I drink to the Conservative Party,” replied Stalin.

  “I believe that God is on our side,” said Churchill. “At least I have done my best to make him a faithful ally.”

  “And the devil is on my side,” Stalin, a former seminary student, rejoined. “Everyone knows the devil is a Communist—and God, no doubt, is a good Conservative.”104

  As Churchill raised his glass for the concluding toast, Stalin requested the privilege of proposing one more toast—to the president and people of the United States:

  I want to tell you, from the Russian point of view, what the President and the United States have done to win the war. The most important thing in this war are machines. The United States has proven it can turn out 10,000 airplanes a month. Russia can turn out, at most, 3,000 airplanes a month. The United States is a country of machines. Without the use of those machines, through Lend-Lease, we would lose this war.105

  Stalin’s generous and unexpected tribute to American aid prompted Roosevelt to request the last word. He compared the Grand Alliance to a rainbow of many colors, “each individualistic, but blending into one glorious whole. Thus with our nations, we have differing customs and philosophies and ways of life. But we have proved here at Teheran that the varying ideas of our nations can come together in a harmonious whole, moving unitedly for the common good of ourselves and of the world.”106

  Roosevelt had been concerned at Teheran to break through to Stalin. “For the first three days I made absolutely no progress,” he told Frances Perkins. On the final day

  I began to tease Churchill about his Britishness. [FDR had forewarned the PM.] It began to register on Stalin. Winston got red and scowled, and the more he did so the more Stalin smiled. Finally Stalin broke into a deep, hearty guffaw, and for the first time in three days I saw light. I kept it up until Stalin was laughing with me, and it was then I called him “Uncle Joe.” He would have thought me fresh the day before, but that day he laughed and came over and shook my hand. The ice was broken and we talked like men and brothers.107

  The president need not have tried so hard. Stalin had bugged FDR’s suite and knew the details of every conversation. The eavesdropping was entrusted to Sergo Beria, the nineteen-year-old son of secret police head Lavrenti Beria. (Sergo and Stalin’s daughter Svetlana were the same age and as children had often played together.) “I want to entrust you with a mission that is delicate and morally reprehensible,” Stalin told the young Beria on the eve of the conference. “You are going to listen to the conversations that Roosevelt will have with Churchill, with the other British, and with his own circle. I must know everything in detail, be aware of all shades of meaning.”

  “I have never done anything with such enthusiasm,” Sergo confessed. He briefed Stalin at eight every morning. “It’s bizarre,” said the Soviet dictator. “They say everything in the fullest detail. Do you think they know we are listening to them?” Beria doubted it. The microphones were so well hidden that his own team could not spot them. “I was able to establish from my eavesdropping that Roosevelt felt great respect and sympathy for Stalin. Admiral Leahy tried several times to persuade him to be firmer with the Soviet leader. Every time he received the reply: ‘That doesn’t matter. Do you think you can see further than I can? I am pursuing this policy because I think it is more advantageous. We are not going to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for the British.’ ”108*

  Roosevelt departed Teheran for Cairo in the early-morning hours of Thursday, December 2, 1943. The president had promised Stalin and Churchill to name a commander for OVERLORD within a week but had not reached a decision. Originally Roosevelt had planned to name Marshall. “I want George to have the big Command,” he told Eisenhower in Tunis. “He is entitled to establish his place in history as a great general.”109 Hopkins and Stimson backed the choice of Marshall vigorously, and both Churchill and Stalin believed he would get the nod. Marshall may have assumed so as well. Although he refused to express any views on the appointment, Mrs. Marshall had quietly begun moving the family’s personal belongings out of Quarters One at Fort Myer to Lexington, Virginia, and there were stories that Marshall had crated his large Pentagon desk that once belonged to General Philip Sheridan for shipment to London.110

  Yet there was good reason for Roosevelt to hesitate. General John J. Pershing, who knew both Marshall and Eisenhower, wrote the president from his bed at Walter Reed Hospital to caution against transferring Marshall to Europe. Both the command structure in Washington and the command structure in Europe were working well, said Pershing. “It would be a fundamental and very grave error in our military policy to break up working relationships at both levels.”111 />
  Marshall’s colleagues on the Joint Chiefs also voiced concern. Leahy, King, and Arnold believed it essential to retain Marshall as a member of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, where he could fight for American concepts of Allied strategy.112 “None of us, least of all myself, wanted to deny Marshall the thing he wanted most,” wrote Leahy. “On the other hand, he was a tower of strength to Roosevelt and to the high command.”113

  Roosevelt was also concerned about the carping of the conservative press in the United States, some of which saw Marshall’s transfer to Europe as a left-wing plot to elevate General Brehon Somervell or Eisenhower to chief of staff. That could make them possible running mates if FDR sought a fourth term. Somervell, who headed the WPA in New York under Hopkins, was considered an ardent New Dealer (which surely would have astonished Somervell), and Eisenhower was believed to be a closet Democrat. Above all, however, there was the problem of dealing with the fractious Seventy-eighth Congress. As far as most members of Congress were concerned, George Marshall could do no wrong, and Roosevelt wondered if a new chief of staff would enjoy similar credibility.

  On the other side of the ledger, Roosevelt had taken Eisenhower’s measure during the two days he spent in Tunis and liked what he saw. Ike had proved his ability to command large multinational coalitions in battle, had defeated the Germans in North Africa and Sicily, and had successful working relationships with Montgomery, Bradley, and Patton, who would likely command the forces on the ground in France. He worked well with the British high command—General Sir Harold Alexander, Air Marshal Tedder, and Admiral Cunningham were unanimous in their praise—and he had demonstrated a unique ability to underplay American special interests for the benefit of the common cause—an essential ability that George Marshall may not have possessed, or that may have been substantially eroded after two years of making the case for the United States on the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Said differently, Roosevelt had come to believe that Eisenhower might actually be a better fit to head the cross-Channel attack, although the job was Marshall’s if he wanted it.