John Bell Hood: The Rise, Fall, and Resurrection of a Confederate General

by Hood, Stephen

  In his portrayal of events, Connelly made the ludicrous accusation that Hood “totally disobeyed orders” after the fall of Atlanta by moving away from north Georgia and into northeastern Alabama in preparation for an invasion of Tennessee. Connelly ignored the fact that President Davis fully sanctioned the movement, and that Hood’s march toward Tennessee and the eventual invasion of the state were so broadly known that even the Federal high command was aware of what was about to transpire. Sherman wrote in his memoirs that his spies informed him of Jefferson Davis’s statements in a speech to Hood’s army outside Atlanta that “Forrest was already on our roads in Middle Tennessee; and that Hood’s army would soon be there…. He [Davis] promised Tennessee and Kentucky soldiers that their feet should soon tread their ‘native soil’ … and thus gave us the full key to his future designs.” Connelly knew full well that if Hood had “totally disobeyed orders” by marching his 40,000-man army anywhere against Davis’s wishes, the president would have relieved Hood of command and perhaps have called for his court-martial.36

  Connelly also accused Hood of being “blatantly dishonest” in the explanation of his Tennessee Campaign strategy in his postwar memoirs. Connelly’s justification for challenging Hood’s integrity is difficult to explain. He cited Hood’s postwar statements that in mid-October, he could defeat enemy forces gathering to defend Tennessee, to support his contention that Hood could not have known at the time that the Federals were actually gathering troops to defend Tennessee. Apparently Connelly believed that Hood should have assumed that the Lincoln administration would have surrendered Nashville and Middle Tennessee without a fight!37

  Wiley Sword surpassed Connelly in his depth of criticism, investing several pages to create a dramatic rivalry between Hood and Beauregard that is nearly all fiction sprinkled with bits of fact. Casting Hood as the villain and Beauregard as the victim, Sword wrote of Hood’s performance in the days before the Tennessee invasion: “Beauregard … now began to fully perceive Hood’s woeful indiscretion and careless planning in the management of his army.” Sword went on to accuse Hood of being “rash and careless with operational details.”38

  Producers of the documentary film The Battle of Franklin: Five Hours in the Valley of Death used Sword’s book as a primary resource for their script. The film criticizes Hood for constantly changing locations in northern Alabama during the days and weeks preceding the invasion of Tennessee. “It is becoming abundantly clear that Hood hasn’t adequately planned for the campaign,” explained the narrator, who goes on to lecture viewers that Hood considered Beauregard “nothing more than a highly ranked supply clerk.”39

  Often overlooked by authors and historians is the complicated and convoluted command and logistics structure that Hood confronted. Beauregard had just been appointed commander of the newly created Military Division of the West and was Hood’s immediate superior. Both the organizational structure and areas of authority of the new theater command were being developed concurrent with Hood’s planning of the campaign. As late as early November, even the most fundamental structure and areas of authority remained yet unknown, which obliged Beauregard to ask Davis exactly what specific command authority he held when present with the armies in his region.40

  Although portrayed by Sword as independent and indifferent, Hood attempted to keep in touch with his multiple and changing superiors as much as possible. The army was in nearly constant motion, dictated by circumstances often beyond Hood’s control—including the absence of his cavalry, Sherman’s nearby forces, flooded rivers, Federal gunboats, and unreliable and sometimes nonexistent telegraph service.

  During the last week of October, communications between the Army of Tennessee and the various branches of the overall command structure of the Confederate armies of the West broke down. Hood’s army was often out of touch with the authorities because telegraph offices in Courtland, Decatur, Athens, Mooresville, Huntsville, Bridgeport, and Stevenson, Alabama, had fallen into Federal hands. This compelled Beauregard to organize a courier network between Taylor’s headquarters in Selma and Wheeler’s cavalry headquarters in Gadsden, Alabama. Any dispatches Wheeler received from Taylor had to be forwarded to the rear of Hood’s army. This arrangement of communicating via couriers proved complicated and ineffective, and by October 22, when Hood’s army began marching west in preparation to cross the Tennessee River, couriers became totally useless. As a result, communication between Hood and Beauregard was difficult, and sometimes nearly impossible. In fact, Beauregard was so out of touch at this time that he instructed Gen. Howell Cobb to issue all necessary orders “when difficult to communicate with me.”41

  After Beauregard and Hood’s initial conference on October 9, while Beauregard was en route to Jacksonville, Alabama, Hood kept Confederate authorities informed of his movements. “Headquarters will be tomorrow at Gadsden, where I hope not to be delayed more than forty-eight hours, when I shall move for the Tennessee River,” Hood wired Bragg and Secretary of War James Seddon on October 19. The next day Hood wired Taylor: “I will move tomorrow for Guntersville on the Tennessee.” To impede any Federal movements from the west, Hood asked Taylor to “please place all the garrison you can at Corinth, and have the railroad iron from there to Memphis taken up as close as possible to Memphis.” Rather than avoid Beauregard, as Hood’s critics assert, Hood added, “Have not yet seen General Beauregard. Give all the assistance you can to get my supplies to Tuscumbia.” Beauregard’s exact whereabouts were unknown, so Hood sent his request for supplies directly to Taylor. Although this act technically bypassed Beauregard in the command structure, Hood had little choice in the matter. Had he done otherwise, critics would have charged him with being irresponsible for ignoring his supply requirements to wait for Beauregard’s appearance.42

  Beauregard finally caught up with the army in Gadsden on October 21 and met with Hood for two days. The generals consulted closely on details of the upcoming campaign, which Beauregard as well as the Richmond authorities approved. Hood recalled the particulars in his memoirs:

  I proposed to move directly on to Guntersville, as indicated to General Taylor, and to take into Tennessee about one-half of Wheeler’s cavalry (leaving the remainder to look after Sherman), and to have a depot of supplies at Tuscumbia, in the event that I met with defeat in Tennessee. Shortly after my arrival at Gadsden, General Beauregard reached the same point; I at once unfolded to him my plan, and requested that he confer apart with the corps commanders, Lieutenant-Generals Lee and Stewart and MajorGeneral Cheatham. If after calm deliberation he deemed it expedient we should remain upon the Alabama line and attack Sherman, or take position, entrench, and finally follow on his rear when he should move south, I would of course acquiesce, albeit with reluctance. If, contrariwise, he should agree to my proposal into Tennessee, I would move immediately to Guntersville, thence to Stevenson, Bridgeport, and Nashville.43

  Sword and subsequent writers claimed Beauregard had grown weary and impatient, even to the point of becoming angry with Hood for moving ahead without prior notification and for changing his plans as it suited him. There is little evidence that Beauregard was resentful of Hood’s constant movements; but even if this were true, Hood’s reasons for advancing quickly and, in Beauregard’s absence, maintaining communication with Bragg, Seddon, and Taylor, were fully justified. Sword was at his most animated when asserting the existence of an acrimonious relationship between Hood and Beauregard, repeatedly accusing Hood of disrespect and discourtesy. Sword floods several pages of his book with dramatic and hyperbolic descriptions of Beauregard’s disgust, not one of which is supported by any primary source materials if Sword’s cited records are read objectively. Although Sword provides footnotes, comparison of the actual records with his paraphrasing often reveals gross inaccuracies and the frequent insertion of harsh and unwarranted personal interpretations.

  In addition to inaccurately paraphrasing Beauregard’s correspondence, Sword liberally cited Beauregard’s biographer Alfred Roman. The
descriptions offered of Beauregard’s emotional reaction to these events were Roman’s and not Beauregard’s, but Sword uses those expressions extensively, relying on Roman’s version even when contemporary primary source evidence does not support the portrayal.44 The simple and obvious truth is that if General Beauregard was as miffed as Sword and Connelly asserted, he would have been much madder with Hood than the tenor of the words that appear in “Roman’s” book indicate. Sword and Connelly took whatever slight irritation Roman hinted at and turned it into a Hatfield and McCoy feud.

  The credibility of Sword’s interpretations is further called into question by the close relationship the former generals maintained after the war. Both men later resided in New Orleans and by all accounts were firm friends. In fact, Beauregard arranged for the posthumous publication of Hood’s memoirs and served as chairman of the Hood Relief Committee, which was established to care for Hood’s ten surviving children who were orphaned when Hood and his wife died in August 1879.45

  Regarding Hood’s movements in northern Alabama, Sword boldly posited that on October 19, “Beauregard was thoroughly shocked” at Hood’s conduct, and that the “exasperated Beauregard” resented Hood’s disrespectful behavior, and was “very much disturbed.” To support this claim Sword cited a telegram from Beauregard to Jefferson Davis, a page in Beauregard’s biography by Roman, and Beauregard’s official report of his tenure as commander of the Military Division of the West. None of these sources say anything of the sort.46

  In an extraordinary distortion, Sword informs his readers that Beauregard, “fuming about the callous treatment by Hood,” sent a message to President Davis “seeking to determine if he might actually run the forthcoming campaign.” The source cited by Sword for this is an innocuous and unemotional inquiry Beauregard sent to Davis seeking clarification on his specific authority as the first commander of the newly created Military Division on the West. In fact, Beauregard questioned Davis about the limits of his authority when physically present with any Confederate force in the Western Theater—not just Hood’s Army of Tennessee. Here is what Beauregard actually wrote the president:

  To prevent confusion, please inform me whether my presence with any army in the field imposes on me the necessity of assuming command, and whether in that case it relieves from duty the immediate commander. Should not my orders pass merely through that officer, without destroying the existing system of the organization?47

  Not only was Beauregard’s correspondence devoid of animosity, but Sword also ignored or disregarded his later official report, which was equally unremarkable in tone and content. Of Hood’s movements in northern Alabama, Beauregard wrote that after “conferring with him in regard to his future movements,” he learned on two occasions that Hood had moved ahead, heading west “without advising me.” Beauregard simply stated that he had not received notification of Hood’s route changes and revealed the difficulty in communications, explaining that as of October 9, Richard Taylor had not yet even provided him (Beauregard) with a staff or horses. According to Beauregard, he was en route to meet with Taylor in Jacksonville, Alabama, when he learned of Hood’s change in plans, at which time he simply turned around and met Hood at Gadsden. Beauregard did not censure Hood for the change in plans, nor did he express any personal offense at Hood’s actions. As discussed earlier, when Hood learned of the presence of enemy forces at his proposed crossing point, he justifiably and reasonably changed his plans but was unable to immediately communicate this to Beauregard, whose own whereabouts were unknown to Hood because he was on the way to Jacksonville to meet with Taylor. Nonetheless, Sword characterizes this activity as “callous treatment” by Hood that angered Beauregard.48

  Here is what Beauregard wrote of the Gadsden meeting:

  In an interview with General Hood he informed me that he was then en route to Middle Tennessee, via Gunter’s Landing, on the Tennessee River. At Gadsden I had conversations during two days with him in relation to the future operations of the army, in the course of which he stated that his general plan had been submitted to and approved by General Bragg, then commanding the Armies of the Confederate States. In view of existing condition of affairs the movement then in progress met my approval.

  Sword used these three sentences to support a description of a “thoroughly shocked” Beauregard who was “exasperated” at the October 22-23 Gadsden meeting. Characterizing Hood as “rash and careless,” and speaking “with insistence” to Beauregard, Sword asserted that Hood “felt contempt for Beauregard’s nitpicking.” For these bold and harsh assertions, Sword cited a single page in the Official Records, which offers nothing to support any of Sword’s claims.49

  Even Thomas Connelly, hardly a firm Hood supporter, admitted that Beauregard’s correspondence to the Confederate capital regarding the Gadsden meeting with Hood was not contentious. According to Connelly, Beauregard’s tone with the government in Richmond explaining his decision to send Hood into Tennessee “seemed almost enthusiastic.”50

  In yet another attempt to portray Hood as disrespectful and insubordinate, Sword wrote that Beauregard, via his aide, sent a “curt note” to Hood asking for a summary of the army’s past actions and a statement of future plans. The note, which Sword did not reproduce verbatim, reads as follows:

  General Beauregard desires that you will forward him for the information of the War Department a brief summary of the operations of your army from the date of its departure from Jonesborough, Georgia, to the present time; also a concise statement of your plans for future operations, intended for the same office.51

  Sword continued slamming the Army of Tennessee’s commander when he alleged that “Hood remained silent, ignoring this request for three days.” Sword failed to inform his readers that Hood did reply via a message sent by his inspector general to Richmond the following day, in which he clearly explained the reasons why reports and routine administrative functions were being delayed:

  I beg leave respectfully to report that it is impracticable to render any inspection reports for the army of Tennessee for the month of October, 1864. Since the 29th of September this army has been marching from fifteen to twenty miles a day. The campaign is still going on. General Hood unites with me in saying that these reports cannot be rendered, and hopes that this statement of facts will satisfy you that it is impracticable to do so. When you hear from me next, I hope that it will be in the heart of Tennessee, after Sherman has been whipped and the state reclaimed. The army is a unit, buoyant with hope.52

  Notwithstanding Sword’s dramatic portrayal, Beauregard’s request to Hood clearly was not “curt,” and Hood did not defiantly ignore the request.

  Bypassing Decatur, Hood moved the army on to Tuscumbia to await Forrest and his cavalry and receive much-needed supplies. Sword continued to create the illusion of a conflict between Hood and Beauregard: “Within ten days Hood was back to his routine of ignoring Beauregard,” who again was forced to endure “callous treatment by Hood with smoldering resentment until finally another heated confrontation occurred.” Sword, who did not provide a primary source for these claims, explained the absence of historical evidence by claiming that both Beauregard and Hood hid their conflict from Richmond, “muted by a mutually advantageous” agreement, and as cover Beauregard sent a “syrupy note” to Jefferson Davis regarding the state of affairs at Tuscumbia.53

  Another mischaracterization by Sword involves an event in Tuscumbia on November 11, when Hood suggested changing his supply base to Purdy, Tennessee. In response, Beauregard (according to Sword) not only rejected the idea but was “determined to retaliate.” The retaliation, continued Sword, was a review of A. P. Stewart’s corps arranged by Beauregard without informing Hood, who “responded to the perceived challenge like a petulant child,” sending an “acid-laced note to Beauregard.” It is unknown how Sword could interpret Beauregard’s request to review one of Hood’s corps as revenge for suggesting a change of supply bases. In any event, none of the language in the note from Hood t
o Beauregard described by Sword as “acid-laced” is out of the ordinary.54

  Beauregard’s reply to Hood was equally benign. In it, the department commander explained to the army commander that he and General Stewart had mutually agreed to an informal troop review, and by an innocent oversight Hood had not been informed. (According to Beauregard, he thought Stewart would naturally inform Hood, but had failed to do so.) Sword injected even more melodrama into this non-event, writing, “Beauregard had Hood’s dander up, and he pushed even further … as soon as circumstances permitted, Beauregard said, he would separately review the corps of Cheatham and Lee.” In fact, Beauregard closed his reply by politely expressing his desire to also review Cheatham’s and Lee’s corps, adding courteously, “As soon as circumstances permit… provided it will not interfere with the movements of the army.”55

  Sword’s version of these events continued. He informed readers that “to rub salt in Hood’s wounds,” Beauregard sent a note to Hood “about alleged mistreatment of [black] prisoners” being used as laborers on the railroad and fortifications around Corinth. Although Beauregard’s adjutant had indeed sent Hood a note inquiring about the medical treatment of the black laborers, on the same day Beauregard also sent Hood a request for the repair of some nearby bridges. Sword’s conclusion that correspondence over routine administrative matters was vengeful retaliation by Beauregard is baseless and inconsistent with Beauregard’s own words.56

  According to Sword, a “livid” Beauregard would ultimately “fully perceive Hood’s woeful indiscretion and careless planning in the maintenance of his army.” Considering Sword’s allegation that a “frustrated” and “exasperated” Beauregard was wary of Hood’s ineptitude and disregard for operations, observers might reasonably wonder why the senior general would depart on November 16 and leave the Confederacy’s Western army under Hood’s exclusive care for two full months. Beauregard would spend the next eight weeks personally overseeing affairs in Richard Taylor’s and William Hardee’s departments—and not visit the Army of Tennessee again until January 13, 1865.57