John Bell Hood: The Rise, Fall, and Resurrection of a Confederate General

by Hood, Stephen

  In Fame’s eternal volume of the history of war there will always remain one bright, shining page, which neither criticism nor calumny can tarnish or obliterate, on which has been inscribed with his own good sword and trusty right arm, the autograph of John B. Hood.

  That as a man we have known him in the trial that have followed our unsuccessful struggle, manifesting as a quiet citizen the same lofty character, the same high principles that had actuated him in more conspicuous places. Modest and unpretentious, courteous and affable, conciliating the love of all who knew him, achieving victories no less renowned than those of war; a man who, having given his youth and his blood for his country, has ended his days among his people in integrity and in honor—a career for the historian to dwell upon; a noble example for posterity to follow.

  Geo. A. Williams, Chairman

  C.L. Walker

  F. L. Richardson

  Akfred Bertus

  Frank Herron

  Appendix 3

  Jefferson Davis on Joe Johnston: Excerpt to the Confederate Congress1

  RICHMOND, VA., March 1, 1865

  Col. JAMES PHELAN, Meridian, Miss.:

  I received your friendly letter of the 17th of January only about a week ago, and do not see that I can answer it more appropriately than by sending you the annexed copy of a paper which I had prepared for transmission to Congress. As it would, how ever, have been necessary to accompany it, if sent, with a protest against any Congressional interference with the function, exclusively executive, of assigning officers to command, I determined to withhold it rather than, under existing circumstances, to send it to Congress with such a protest as I should have felt bound to make. The paper will fully explain my views and Johnston in the matter. I may add that since the accompanying paper was written General Lee has asked that General Johnston should be ordered to report to him for duty, and that I have complied with his wish in the hope that General Johnston’s soldierly qualities may be made serviceable to his Country when acting under General Lee’s orders, and that in his new position those defects which I found manifested by him when serving as an independent commander will be remedied by the control of the general-in-chief.

  Very truly and respectfully, yours,

  JEFFN DAVIS

  *

  [Enclosure]

  The joint resolution of Congress and other manifestations of a desire that General Joseph E. Johnston should be restored to the command of the Army of Tennessee have been anxiously considered by me, and it is with sincere regret that I find myself unable to gratify what I must believe to have become quite a general desire of my countrymen. The expression of this desire has come to me in forms so imposing and from sources so fully entitled to my respect and confidence that I feel it to be due to the people, to justice, and to myself to take the unusual step of discussing matters which would otherwise for public consideration have been passed over in silence and of presenting the reasons which make it impossible for me to assign him again to an important and independent command.

  At the commencement of the present war there were few persons in the Confederacy who entertained a more favorable opinion of General Johnston as a soldier than I did. I knew him to be brave and well informed in his profession. I believed that he possessed high capacity for becoming a successful commander in the field. Our relations under the former Government were of a friendly nature and so continued in the new sphere of duty opened to both by the change in the political condition of the country. At different times during the war I have given to General Johnston three very important commands and in each case experience has revealed the fact that with the high qualities above referred to as possessed by him are united defects which unfit him for the conduct of a campaign. When he was relieved from command in July last it was believed that this action on my part would be accepted in its plain and only real significance, as an indication that his conduct of the campaign was disapproved, and that apprehension was entertained that the grave losses already sustained would be followed by still further disasters if he continued in command. Any criticism on this action, however harsh and unjust to me personally, I was prepared to bear in the same silence which the interest of my country has imposed on me, as a duty, in many other instances during the war.

  The disclosure of the ground of my conduct it would have been preferable to postpone to a future and more fitting occasion. But it has recently been apparent that there exists in some quarters a purpose, not simply to criticize the past, but to arraign me before the bar of public opinion, and to compel me to do what my judgment and conscience disapproved, or to destroy my power of usefulness by undermining the confidence of my fellow citizens. It is better to lose that confidence than to retain it at the expense of truth and duty. Yet no man can conduct public affairs with success in a Government like ours unless upheld by time trust and willing aid of the people. I have determined, therefore, now to make the disclosure of the causes which have forced on me the unpleasant duty of declining to gratify the desire of a large portion of the people, as well as the expressed wish of Congress.

  General Johnston, on his entering into the Confederate service, was assigned to the command of the Army of the Valley of Virginia, which was then confronted by the enemy in position on the north side of the Potomac. At Harpers Ferry there was a large quantity of materials and machinery for the manufacture of small-arms of the greatest value to the Confederacy. Their removal to places of greater safety was commenced as soon as the necessary arrangements could be made. During the progress of the work General Johnston insisted upon the evacuation of the place, and finally retired from it, as I then thought, and still think, prematurely. The correctness of this opinion is sufficiently shown by the fact that after his withdrawal the working party remained without interruption by the enemy, and removed much valuable property including the heaviest part of the machinery. When General Beauregard was threatened at Manassas by a large column of the enemy, his numerical inferiority and the inactivity of the enemy in the Valley, under General Patterson, evinced the necessity, propriety, and practicability of a prompt march of our Valley army to his aid. General Johnston made serious objections to and expressed doubts as to the practicability of such a movement; and only after repeated and urgent instructions did he move to make the junction proposed. The delay thus occasioned retarded the arrival of the head of his column until after the first conflict had occurred, and prevented a part of his troops from getting into position until the victory had been won. Indeed, we were only saved from fatal defeat at the battle of Manassas by the promptness of General E. Kirby Smith, who, acting without orders, amid moving by a change of direction, succeeded in reaching the battlefield in time to avert disaster. After the battle the forces of General Johnston and General Beauregard remained united. General Johnston, who was in command of the combined forces, constantly declared his inability to assume offensive operations unless furnished with re-enforcements, which, as he was several times informed, the Government was unable to supply, and in the fall of 1861 put his troops in entrenched lines covering Centerville.

  During the winter he declared that his position was so insecure that it must be abandoned before the enemy could advance, but indicated no other line of defense as the proper one. He was therefore summoned to Richmond in February, 1862, for conference. On inquiry into the character of his position at Centerville he stated that his lines there were untenable, but when asked what new position he proposed to occupy, declared himself ignorant of the topography of the country in his rear. This confession was a great shock to my confidence in him. That a general should have been for many months in command of an army, should have selected a line which he himself considered untenable, and should not have ascertained the topography of the country in his rear, was inexplicable on any other theory than that he had neglected the primary duty of a commander. Engineers were sent by me from Richmond to examine the country and to supply him with the requisite information. General Johnston had announced, however, that his pos
ition was favorable as a point from which to advance, if he could be re-enforced. It was, therefore, agreed that he should mobilize his army by sending to the rear all heavy guns and all supplies and luggage, so as to be able to advance or retreat, as occasions might require. The Government was soon afterward surprised by learning that General Johnston had commenced a hasty retreat without giving notice of an intention to do so, though he had just been apprised of the improved prospect of re-enforcing him, and of the hope entertained by me that he would thus be enabled to assume the offensive. The retreat was without molestation or even demonstration from the enemy, but was conducted with such precipitation as to involve a heavy loss of supplies. Some valuable artillery was abandoned, a large depot of provisions was burned, blankets, shoes, and saddles were committed to the flames, and this great sacrifice of property was so wanting in apparent justification as to produce a painful impression on the public mind, and to lead to an inquiry by a committee from Congress, which began an investigation into the subject, but did not report before Congress adjourned.

  During his retreat General Johnston telegraphed to Richmond to ask at what point he should stop, and afterward admitted at a conference the same want of topographical information previously confessed. When the enemy, instead of pursuing General Johnston in his rapid retreat, changed their base to Fortress Monroe, and made the York River and the Peninsula their line of approach, he was ordered to Yorktown with his army, where General Magruder had for many mouths been actively constructing defensive works to resist an advance up the Peninsula. General Johnston soon pronounced the position untenable, and made another hasty retreat, and with another heavy loss of munitions and armament. He gave notice of his movement, and of the necessity of evacuating Norfolk to the general in command there only after his own retreat had actually commenced. The Secretaries of War and of the Navy had started (the former to Yorktown, the latter to Norfolk) to prevent a hurried evacuation and the consequent loss of the material of war. Too late to restrain General Johnston, they arrived in Norfolk in time to delay General Huger’s compliance with his notice until much valuable property was saved. But Norfolk could not long be held after the Peninsula was in the hands of the enemy, and with it were lost large supplies of all kinds, including machinery which could not be replaced in the Confederacy.

  General Johnston halted in his retreat near the Chickahominy, but after spending some days in selecting a position for defense against the advancing enemy, suddenly crossed that stream without notice to the Government and retreated upon Richmond. He remained inactive in front of Richmond, making no entrenchments to cover his position, which might enable him to assume the offensive with the greater part of the army. He again neglected the proper reconnaissance, and failed to have the roads laid down on topographical maps a want of foresight sorely felt by our army, when afterward, under General Lee, endeavoring to cut off McClellan’s retreat. He suffered the enemy to bring up their heavy guns, supplies, and troops, without molestation; to build bridges across the Chickahominy, and to cross a portion of their army and make entrenchments, not only without resistance, but without his knowledge of these important military operations. When, on a sudden freshet in the Chickahominy, a body of the enemy’s troops was found to be on this side of the stream, an attack was made under the impression that they were cut off by the flood from reinforcements and entirely at our mercy. The battle was disastrous, because the enemy was rapidly re-enforced across bridges the existence of which had not been ascertained by our commander, and because our troops attacked an enemy whom they did not know to be entrenched assailed the front of a position which might have been easily turned by cross-roads which were in constant use by the people of the neighborhood, but which were unknown to our officers. The general fell severely wounded in this engagement, in which he was conspicuous for personal daring. But this gallantry could not redeem the want of that foresight which is requisite for a commander, and the battle was, as I have said, a failure. His wound rendered him unfit for further service in the field for some months, and terminated his first important command, which he had administered in a manner to impair my confidence in his fitness to conduct a campaign for a Government possessed of only very limited material resources, and whose armies are numerically so inferior to those of the enemy as to demand from its generals the greatest vigilance and activity, the best discipline amid organization with careful provision and rigid economy. The loss of supplies during the time he was in command had been great, and our difficulties for the want of them so distressing as to cripple our military operations to a far greater extent than can be appreciated.

  On General Johnston’s fall General Lee assumed the command of the army. He at once made an entrenched line by which the city could be covered with part of his forces, and was thus enabled to cross the Chickahominy with the main body, and, with the aid of the troops from the Valley, under General Jackson, to attack the enemy in flank and rear, achieving the series of glorious victories in the summer of 1862, which made our history illustrious. As soon as General Johnston reported himself fit for duty he was again entrusted by me with an important command, for, though my confidence in him had been much shaken, it had not yet been destroyed. He had been tested in the immediate command of an army, and in that position had not justified the high opinion I had previously entertained of him. He was now assigned to a different class of duties to the general supervision and control of several armies, each under an immediate commander, to whom was entrusted the direct duty of organizing, disciplining, and supplying his own troops. His department included the Districts of Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi, with power to command in person wherever he should consider his services most needed, and to transfer troops at discretion. He thus controlled the army under General Bragg in Tennessee, those of Generals Pemberton and Gardner at Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and that of General Forney at Mobile and other points in Alabama. The new assignment was of higher grade, and to a more enlarged sphere than the former, embracing within its limits my own home and those of my nearest relatives and friends. It is, therefore, apparent that I felt no disposition to depreciate the merits of General Johnston, or to deprive him of an opportunity of rendering such conspicuous service as would secure military fame for himself if private considerations were needed, in addition to a sense of public duty, in order to insure my earnest support of all his efforts for the good of the country, the motive of personal interest was not absent. Few were exposed to a more total loss of property than myself in the event of his disastrous failure in this new command.

  When General Grant made his demonstration on Vicksburg General Johnston failed to perceive its significance and did not repair to that vital point in his department until ordered from Richmond to do so. He arrived, as he reported, too late. He did not proceed to the headquarters of the forces in the field, but stopped at Jackson and undertook from there to direct the operations of the army, though, as was shown by subsequent events, he was not well informed of the situation. After the investment of Vicksburg, General Johnston remained inactive near Canton and Jackson, stating his inability to attack Grant, notwithstanding very urgent requests to do so. He was thereupon pressed to attack the forces of Banks at Port Hudson and rescue the army of General Gardner, but declined on the ground that he feared Grant would seize the occasion to advance upon Jackson, which place he considered too important to be exposed. Grant was then investing Vicksburg. After both Vicksburg and Port Hudson had been captured without one blow on his part to relieve either, a detachment was sent by General Grant from Vicksburg to capture Jackson. The enemy, it appears, was surprised to find the place held in force, and sent back to Vicksburg for re-enforcements. No attempt was made by General Johnston to improve the opportunity thus presented by attacking the isolated detachment of the enemy in his front. He remained within his lines and permitted Grant again to concentrate a large force against the third and last section of that army. Not once during the entire campaign did he act on the maxim of attacking th
e foe in detail, a rule peculiarly applicable when an army is contending against an enemy superior in numbers. The familiar historical example of the war conducted by Frederick the Great against three armies, the junction of any two of which would have caused the downfall of his State, illustrates the value of this maxim, and serves to show how much, under the most adverse conditions, may be achieved by a general who, to professional skill, unites genius and energy.

  No sooner had the enemy commenced investing Jackson than General Johnston pronounced it untenable. He had been there for many weeks, and to insure the successful defense of the place left Gardner’s army at Port Hudson to its fate. Yet when the moment of trial came he decided that the lines of defense had been badly located, and that the works were so imperfect and insufficient as to render the position untenable. Weeks had been passed by the general commanding in the town with an army of between 20,000 and 30,000 men under his orders, and he had neither remedied defective location of lines nor given the works time requisite strength. Jackson was evacuated, and General Johnston withdrew his army to Eastern Mississippi. The evacuation of Jackson, as of Centerville, was marked by one of the most serious and irreparable sacrifices of property that has occurred during the war a loss for which, in my judgment, no sufficient explanation has been given. The railroad bridge across the Pearl River at Jackson had been broken. It was necessary to rebuild it sufficiently to remove cars across, and there was a very large accumulation of rolling-stock on the western side of the stream which, without the bridge, could not be saved if Jackson were evacuated. Under these circumstances General Johnston, with over 20,000 men, suffered this gap to remain without an effort to fill it, although the work could with little difficulty have been completed in a manner to answer the requirements of the occasion. In consequence of this neglect a very large number of locomotives, said to be about ninety, and several hundred cars, were lost. We have never recovered from the injury to the transportation service occasioned by this failure on his part.