The Downing Street Years

by Margaret Thatcher

  And so the communiqué was issued and the customary press conference held. The most important decision made had nothing to do with checking oil consumption. It was that, despite the inclinations of several G7 governments, we were not going to fall into the trap of trying to achieve a co-ordinated reflation of demand. It was a useful signal for the future.

  From Tokyo I flew to Canberra, arriving the following morning. This was my third visit to Australia, though it was to be only a brief one. There was time to see my daughter, Carol, who was working as a journalist there, but my main purpose was to talk to Malcolm Fraser, the Australian Prime Minister. I briefed him on what had taken place at Tokyo. But even more important, we discussed the forthcoming Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka at which Rhodesia would inevitably be the main issue. Over the next eight months, Rhodesia was to take up a great deal of my time.

  THE RHODESIAN SETTLEMENT

  Rhodesia had been a long-standing source of grief to successive British governments, and an acute problem since Ian Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965. It had caused particular difficulties for the Conservative Party, a large section of which believed that the economic sanctions imposed against the illegal regime were futile and damaging and insisted on voting against them when they came up for annual renewal. Both the Conservative and Labour front benches had long been committed to seek a settlement on the basis of the so-called ‘six principles’ whose fundamental purpose was to lay down the conditions for a transition to black majority rule, while upholding the rights of the white minority and ensuring true democracy, the rule of law and an end to discrimination. But this degree of common ground between the leaders of both parties was not necessarily shared by their supporters.

  The elections of April 1979 in Rhodesia fundamentally changed the whole position. Under the new constitution, worked out under the ‘internal settlement’ with Ian Smith, Bishop Muzorewa was elected as head of a black majority government, in a 64 per cent turn-out of a black majority electorate. The ‘Patriotic Front’ parties — the guerillas of Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo — had not, of course, taken part in the elections. Viscount Boyd of Merton — a former Conservative Colonial Secretary — had attended as an observer and reported back to me, as Leader of the Opposition, that the elections had been fairly conducted. It was generally considered that all of the six principles had now been fulfilled and there was wide expectation that we would recognize the new government when we took office.

  However, I was well aware that what the people of Rhodesia needed above all was peace and stability. It was the war, relentlessly carried on by the guerillas, which had forced the white minority government to make concessions: that war had to be ended. To bring peace we had either to win international acceptance for the new regime or bring about the changes which would win such acceptance.

  The first and most immediate problem was the attitude of the neighbouring ‘front line’ African states. They must, if at all possible, be won over. We sent Lord Harlech, another former Conservative minister and an ex-Ambassador to Washington, for talks with the Presidents of Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana, Malawi and Angola. He also went to Mozambique and Nigeria. I was not at all keen at this stage that he should even talk to the leaders of the Patriotic Front, Mr Mugabe and Mr Nkomo: their forces had carried out atrocities which disgusted everyone and I was as keen to avoid dealings with terrorists abroad as I would be at home. However, unpleasant realities had to be faced. Peter Carrington’s view was that it was essential to secure the widest possible recognition for a Rhodesian regime, since that country held the key to the whole South African region. He turned out to be right.

  Accordingly, Lord Harlech did see the Patriotic Front leaders as well as Bishop Muzorewa and others. His mission at least made clear how large were the obstacles to achieving an end to the war. In July the Organization of African Unity (OAU) endorsed the Patriotic Front as the sole legitimate authentic representative of the people of Zimbabwe. Nigeria, with which Britain had important economic ties, was bitterly hostile to the Muzorewa Government. Black African states insisted on viewing Bishop Muzorewa’s Government as nothing more than a façade for continued white minority rule. The fact that this greatly underrated the change which the internal settlement had effected did nothing to reduce the consequences of their attitude for Rhodesia.

  Although we did not intend to continue the joint Anglo-American approach pursued by Labour, which had got nowhere, the attitude of the United States was of vital importance. President Carter was under strong political pressure from US black and liberal opinion. The Administration would soon have to say whether Bishop Muzorewa’s Government met the conditions set by Congress, without which recognition and the lifting of sanctions by the US would not be possible. It was likely that the conclusion would be that it did not meet those conditions.

  Yet the situation did offer opportunities, if we were able to grasp them. First, nearly everyone considered that it was Britain’s responsibility to solve the problem, and even though this frequently made us the object of criticism it also gave us a relatively free hand if we knew how to use it. Second, there was a great weariness among the parties involved and not just the Rhodesians themselves. The surrounding African states were finding it costly, disruptive and dangerous to play host to the two guerilla armies, themselves the target of the well-trained and effective Rhodesian army. Nkomo’s forces in Zambia were said to outnumber Zambia’s own army. There was a real desire for a settlement. But how to reach it?

  Our best chance of a breakthrough was likely to be at the forthcoming Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka. This would be the first regular Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting held in Africa. Zambia adjoined the Rhodesian war zone. It was also land-locked, so that the Queen, who is traditionally present during the first days as Head of the Commonwealth (though she does not open or attend the meeting) could not use the Royal Yacht Britannia. There were, accordingly, some worries about Her Majesty’s safety, on which it was my responsibility to advise. My feeling was that there was no reason why her visit should not go ahead, and I gave that advice shortly before the start of the Queen’s African tour, from which she went on direct to Lusaka where she received an enormous welcome. I, by contrast, was far from being their favourite person, when, late in the evening of Monday 30 July, I arrived in Lusaka to face, without prior notice, a hostile and demanding press conference.

  We had put the long flight out to good use, working through the precise approach we should take. I had a first-class team of advisers, and, of course, a first-class Foreign Secretary — with whom I had a lively exchange when he suggested that our mission was really a ‘damage limitation exercise’, at that time (as I told him) a phrase I had never even heard. I said that I wanted to do better than that; and between us in the end we managed to do so.

  Our strategy was to take full responsibility ourselves for reaching a settlement. The task in Lusaka was to persuade the Commonwealth leaders to accept this, and to acknowledge that the Rhodesian problem was not the responsibility of the Commonwealth as a whole. To obtain that result we had to make it clear that Britain would be ready to resume authority in Rhodesia and to hold fresh elections. We knew also that there would have to be significant changes to the present constitution of Rhodesia if, after elections, the new government was to receive international recognition and acceptance. Those changes could only be brought about by some kind of Constitutional Conference bringing together all sides. The decision whether or not to hold such a conference would very much depend on how matters went at Lusaka.

  My arrival in Zambia coincided with an announcement by the Nigerian Government that it was nationalizing BP’s Nigerian oil assets. This was not a good start, but I went on to have an extremely useful day of talks with other heads of government before the conference officially began on the Tuesday. There was, in fact, a high turn out: 27 heads of government were present and all 39 full Commonwealth members were represented. Our host was President Kenneth Kau
nda. At the closed session, the opening speech — one of the best of the conference — was given by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore who reviewed international political developments. But much serious business was done ‘in the margins’, as the diplomatic jargon has it, of the larger meetings. For example, the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka asked me whether a substantial sum of British overseas aid was still available for the construction of the massive Victoria Dam in his country. I confirmed it on a postcard — undoubtedly one of the most expensive I have ever written.

  However, it was the situation in Rhodesia which had to be the real priority. In my opening public statement at the conference on the Wednesday I said that we would ‘listen with the greatest attention to what is said at this meeting in Lusaka’. But on Friday, at the conference’s closed session to discuss Rhodesia, I was able to be much more specific. I said that everyone should recognize just how much had changed as a result of Bishop Muzorewa’s election even though ‘there are those who seem to believe that the world should simply go on treating [him] as if he were Mr Smith.’ I drew attention to the extensive international consultations we had undertaken to identify a solution. I acknowledged that from these we had learned the strength of the view ‘that the constitution under which Bishop Muzorewa has come to power is defective in certain important respects’, in particular the provisions whereby the white minority could block all unwelcome constitutional change. We had also observed that those consulted criticized the composition and powers of the various service commissions, and I noted ‘it is clearly wrong that the Government of [Rhodesia/Zimbabwe] should not have adequate control over certain senior appointments.’ We had been told that it was essential that the the Patriotic Front should be able to return and take a full part in politics. Finally, we had been impressed by the general conviction that any solution must derive its authority from Britain as the responsible colonial power.

  I summed up our intentions:

  The British Government are wholly committed to genuine black majority rule in Rhodesia … We accept that our objective must be to establish … independence on the basis of a constitution comparable with the constitutions we have agreed with other countries … We will therefore present our proposals as quickly as possible to all the parties, and at the same time call on them to cease hostilities and move forward with us to a settlement.

  It had been agreed to hold back the debate on southern Africa until the Friday so that after it the heads of government could go straight to their customary informal weekend retreat for private discussions on Rhodesia’s future. My task was to win the support of the key figures there. A small group was set up consisting of myself and Peter Carrington, Mr (now Sir) Sonny Ramphal, Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, President Kaunda of Zambia, President Nyerere of Tanzania, Messrs Fraser and Manley, the Prime Ministers of Australia and Jamaica and Mr Adefope, the representative of Nigeria. Sir Anthony Duff, who was part of my team, drafted the heads of agreement. It all went remarkably smoothly until the very end. Our meeting ended successfully at Sunday lunch time and the full version of the agreement was to have been discussed and endorsed by the full conference on Monday morning. However, on Sunday afternoon Malcolm Fraser chose to brief the Australian press. This required some rapid and unconventional action.

  That evening we all attended a Commonwealth service in Lusaka Cathedral, where we had the benefit of a long polemical sermon from the Archbishop. I had been told already that the press knew the substance of what had been decided. Sonny Ramphal and I were sitting together; he was to read the first lesson, and I the second. After he had read his I showed him a note I had received from Peter Carrington about Malcolm Fraser’s intervention, suggesting that we must now brief the British press on what had taken place, subject to the Secretary-General’s approval. On the back of my hymn sheet, while I was reading the second lesson, Mr Ramphal wrote an alternative suggestion. The heads of government had been invited to a barbecue that evening at Malcolm Fraser’s conference villa: we could hold a meeting there and settle a communiqué to be issued at once. This seemed to me an excellent idea. I agreed to telephone Kenneth Kaunda immediately after the service to warn him of what we had in mind. And so the meeting came about. It took an hour and there were some very pointed comments. I was none too pleased with Malcolm Fraser myself. But the conclusion was satisfactory. Indeed, most of us were relieved that it had all been so amicable and that our proceedings could therefore end a day early.

  I returned home on Wednesday morning. I was well pleased with what had been achieved, so much of it by Peter Carrington and Tony Duff. Many had believed that we could not come out of Lusaka with an agreement on the lines we wanted. We had proved them wrong. We had incidentally proved the Zambian press wrong too: they had so convinced themselves beforehand of the truth of their own propaganda about me that it was clearly a shock to find that they were dealing with a real person rather than a colonial cardboard cut-out. I had no illusions about the scale of the task ahead: it was never going to be easy to steer Rhodesia to independence, legitimacy and stability. But after Lusaka I believed that it could be done, and that we had won the African good will to carry it through successfully.

  Britain accordingly called a Constitutional Conference for the interested parties at Lancaster House in London in September. Its purpose was emphasized as being not just to talk but to reach a settlement. Peter Carrington arranged the agenda to take the most difficult questions last, so that the first item to be agreed was the new constitution; only then would come the question of the transitional arrangements; and finally the calling of a cease-fire. We calculated that the longer the conference continued, the less any of the interested parties would be willing to take responsibility for breaking it up. We reserved to ourselves the task of putting forward final proposals in each phase and we required the parties to respond, even if these proposals did not meet all their objectives. At each stage we had to exert pressure — direct and indirect — on the two sides to reach a satisfactory compromise. Peter Carrington chaired the conference with great skill and took charge of its day-to-day work. My role lay outside it. The heads of the ‘front line’ states came to London in person or sent in High Commissioners to see me for a progress report. President Machel of Mozambique was especially helpful in putting pressure on Robert Mugabe. I also gave dinner for President Nyerere, another strong backer of Mr Mugabe. His concern was how to blend the three separate armies — the two guerilla armies and the Rhodesian army — into one, a task which in fact would fall to the British army to achieve. The Lancaster House proposals could not have got through without the support of the Presidents of the ‘front line’ states and, indeed, many other Commonwealth countries.

  Just after the conference concluded, all three rival leaders — Bishop Muzorewa, Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo — came to see me together at No. 10. We talked upstairs in my study. They were in contemplative mood, pondering the future. I had the clear impression that each of them expected to win. Perhaps that was just as well.

  Probably the most sensitive aspect of our approach related to the transitional arrangements: it was clear to me that, both for constitutional and practical reasons, Britain must resume direct authority in Rhodesia until the elections were over, though for as short a period as possible. On 15 November a bill was introduced to provide for the appointment of a Governor and for sanctions to be removed as soon as he arrived in Rhodesia. Christopher Soames accepted the post. The decision to send him, as Governor, to Salisbury on 12 December, even before the Patriotic Front had accepted the cease-fire proposals, certainly involved some risk and was much criticized at the time. But we were clear that the momentum had to be maintained. Moreover, Christopher was an ideal appointment: not only did he have the authority of a Cabinet minister and wide diplomatic experience, he and his wife, Mary, had precisely the right style to carry off this most delicate and demanding job. Heavy pressure from the US and the ‘front line’ states finally led the Patriotic Front to accept th
e proposals for the cease-fire on 17 December, and the agreement was finally initialled on 21 December. I telephoned the Soameses in Salisbury on Christmas Day to wish them the season’s greetings and ask how things were. The reply was that in spite of several severe breaches of the cease-fire and some clear intimidation by the supporters of Mr Mugabe, the situation looked increasingly hopeful.

  The outcome of the elections is well known. Mr Mugabe’s party, to most people’s surprise, won an overwhelming victory. On 18 April Rhodesia, as the Republic of Zimbabwe, finally received its independence.

  It was sad that Rhodesia/Zimbabwe finished up with a Marxist government in a continent where there were too many Marxists malad-ministering their countries’ resources. But political and military realities were all too evidently on the side of the guerilla leaders. A government like that of Bishop Muzorewa, without international recognition, could never have brought to the people of Rhodesia the peace that they wanted and needed above all else. From the British point of view the settlement also had large benefits. With the Rhodesian question finally solved, we again played an effective role in dealing with other Commonwealth — and especially African — issues, including the pressing problem of the future of Namibia and the longer-term challenge of bringing peaceful change to South Africa. Britain had demonstrated her ability, by a combination of honest dealing and forceful diplomacy, to settle one of the most intractable disputes arising from her colonial past.