The Downing Street Years
Page 54
In the end Dr FitzGerald managed to pass his legislation, but with the proviso that it would not come into effect unless the Dáil passed a further resolution a year later, which stored up trouble for the future. Shortly afterwards, in January 1987, his Coalition Government collapsed and the subsequent election brought Charles Haughey back to the office of Taoiseach. This heralded more difficulties. Mr Haughey and his Party had opposed the agreement, though his formal position was now that he would be prepared to make it work. I knew, though, that he felt much less commitment to it and I suspected that he would be prepared to play up to Republican opinion in the South more than had his predecessor.
The security position in the province had also worsened. I received a report from George Younger on the strength of the IRA north and south of the border which convinced me that a new drive against them was necessary. There was a rising trend of violence, particularly against personnel in the security forces, and cross-border co-operation was still not effective. The scale of the supplies of arms being received by the IRA, on which we already had a good deal of intelligence, was confirmed by the interception of the Eksund… with its hoard of Libyan arms…by French customs in October.
IRA ATTACKS AND EXTRA SECURITY
MEASURES, 1987–1990
I was at the reception which follows the Remembrance Day Service at the Cenotaph when I received news that a bomb had exploded at Enniskillen in County Fermanagh. It had been planted yards away from the town War Memorial in an old school building, part of which collapsed on the crowd which had assembled for the service. Eleven people were killed, and more than sixty injured. No warning was given.
The next day (Monday 9 November) I met a delegation of Jim Molyneaux, Ken Maginnis, the local MP, and people from Enniskillen. They wanted me to go much further in tightening security, by ending the present 50 per cent remission available to sentenced terrorist prisoners,* by proscribing Sinn Fein, by tightening control of the border, by ending the so-called ‘right to silence’ (the provision whereby the refusal to answer questions cannot be adduced as evidence of guilt in court) and by bringing back internment.** I too believed that there must be a new review of security: indeed, I had already initiated one. I would see which if any of these was practicable.
At least I felt that I could make one personal gesture which would be appreciated. On Sunday 22 November I flew to Northern Ireland to attend a Remembrance Service at St Martin’s Cathedral, Enniskillen. It was a cold, wet day. After the service I talked briefly to the bereaved, including Mr Gordon Wilson whose daughter Marie had died beside him in the explosion and who had publicly forgiven the murderers in terms which inspired…perhaps shamed…those who heard him.
From now on the requirements for practical improvements in security, reviewed after each new tragedy, increasingly dominated my policy towards both Northern Ireland and the Republic. It slowly became clear that the wider gains for which I had hoped from greater support by the nationalist minority in Northern Ireland or the Irish Government and people for the fight against terrorism were not going to be forthcoming. Only the international dimension became noticeably easier to deal with as a result of the agreement. My reluctant conclusion was that terrorism would have to be met with more and more effective counter-terrorist activity; and that in fighting terror we would have to stand almost alone, while the Irish indulged in gesture politics.
Nonetheless, I kept up the pressure on the Irish for effective extradition arrangements of terrorists suspected of offences committed within the United Kingdom. Predictably, the Haughey Government was unwilling to confirm the Extradition Act that Dr FitzGerald had passed at the end of his administration without trying to exact a price. We heard the familiar plea for three-judge courts, followed by a new demand for our Attorney-General to provide his Irish counterpart with a note confirming his intention to prosecute founded on a sufficiency of evidence…a note that could be scrutinized by the Irish courts. This was an impossible scheme and we rejected it. The upshot was new Irish legislation that for a time brought extradition to a halt altogether.
In the meantime our own review of security had come to a number of conclusions, principally the redeployment of the army to strengthen anti-terrorist operations and to patrol in areas close to the border. As a matter of courtesy I wrote to Mr Haughey in January 1988 informing him of what we were doing. But it soon appeared that a more far-reaching review of security was required…and that we could rely only on a thoroughly unhelpful attitude from the Irish in the course of it.
On Sunday 6 March three Irish terrorists were shot dead by our security forces in Gibraltar. There was not the slightest doubt about the terrorists’ identity or intentions. Contrary to later reports, the Spanish authorities had been extremely co-operative. The funeral of the terrorists was held in Milltown Cemetery, Belfast. From the thousands attending you would imagine that these people were martyrs not would-be murderers. The spiral of violence now accelerated. A gunman attacked the mourners, three of whom were killed and 68 injured. It was at the funeral of two of these mourners that what was to remain in my mind as the single most horrifying event in Northern Ireland during my term of office occurred.
No one who saw the film of the lynching of the two young soldiers trapped by that frenzied Republican mob, pulled from their car, stripped and murdered, will believe that reason or goodwill can ever be a substitute for force when dealing with Irish Republican terrorism. I went to be with the relatives of our murdered soldiers when the bodies were brought back to Northolt; I shall not forget the remark of Gerry Adams, the Sinn Fein leader, that I would have many more bodies to meet in that way. I could hardly believe it when the BBC initially refused to supply to the RUC film which might have been useful in bringing to justice the perpetrators of this crime, though they later complied. But I knew that the most important task was for us to use every means available to beat the IRA. On the same day as the news came in of what had happened I told Tom King that there must be a paper brought forward setting out all the options. I was determined that nothing should be ruled out.
On the afternoon of Tuesday 22 March I held an initial meeting. The policing of funerals was already under review. I said that the security forces must take all necessary steps, including extensive searches in nationalist areas, to apprehend those responsible for the murder of the British Army corporals. Measures to improve the chances of securing convictions in Northern Ireland courts…such as the use of DNA finger-printing, and the ending of the ‘right to silence’ and measures to seize the finances of groups which practised or supported violence…should be investigated. Cross-border security cooperation must be strengthened and security on the border itself must be improved. We must examine whether the instructions about the circumstances in which the security forces could use their weapons (the ‘yellow card’) should be reviewed in case they were too restrictive. In addition, I said that more far-reaching measures must now be considered. Perhaps Sinn Fein should be banned. We should consider the introduction of selective internment, which would be much more effective if it were introduced simultaneously in the Republic. I wondered whether the introduction of identity cards in Northern Ireland might enable us to control more easily the movements of suspects. Should the numbers of soldiers in Northern Ireland be increased? Should the present doctrine of so-called ‘police primacy’ be reversed to give the army control in security matters? Could we do more to deprive the terrorists of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ (a phrase I borrowed with permission but without attribution from the Chief Rabbi)? In fact, many of these possibilities would have to be jettisoned on one ground or another. But I felt that I owed it to those two soldiers and their families to ensure that nothing which could save other young lives was overlooked.
This far-reaching security review continued during the spring. Mr Haughey added to the problem of restoring confidence and stability in Northern Ireland by an astonishing speech which he made in the United States in April. This listed all of his objections to British
policy, lumping together the Attorney-General’s decision not to initiate prosecutions following the Stalker-Sampson Report into the RUC,* the Court of Appeal’s rejection of the appeal of the so-called ‘Birmingham Six’**(as if it was for the British Government to tell British courts how to administer justice), the killing of the terrorists in Gibraltar and other matters. There was no mention in his speech of IRA violence, no acknowledgement of the need for cross-border co-operation and no commitment to the Anglo-Irish Agreement. It was a shabby case of playing to the American Irish gallery.
I wrote to Mr Haughey on Wednesday 27 April to protest in the most vigorous terms. I took him to task not only for what he had said but for what he had failed to deliver on cross-border security co-operation. In spite of an ill-judged speech by Geoffrey Howe in which he said that he did not ‘underestimate the hurt felt by the Irish in recent months’, I let it be known that there was no possibility of ordinary relations with Dublin resuming until I received a reply to my letter…a reply which was not forthcoming until Wednesday 15 June. The reply, when it came, was short and noncommittal. But I felt that my sharp letter had done some good when I received a long message from Mr Haughey prior to my meeting with him at the end of the European Council in Hanover on Tuesday 28 June. In this he reaffirmed in the strongest terms his opposition to terrorism, repeated his commitment to the Anglo-Irish Agreement and conveyed his personal support for security co-operation. But the statement also showed what we were up against; for he made clear that his whole approach was based on the objective of a united Ireland and that he saw the Anglo-Irish Agreement as a staging post to that. That was utterly unacceptable to us.
At the next European Council in Hanover I took up the question of security co-operation, which was of far more importance to me than any personal differences. I said that though Mr Haughey had affirmed that he had difficulties with Irish public opinion about this, I had difficulty myself about bombs, guns, explosions, people being beaten to death and naked hatred. I had had to see ever more young men in the security forces killed. We knew that the terrorists went over the border to the Republic to plan their operations and to store their weapons. We got no satisfactory intelligence of their movements. Once they crossed the border they were lost. Indeed, we received far better intelligence co-operation from virtually all other European countries than with the Republic. If it was a question of resources, then we were ready to offer equipment and training. Or if this were politically difficult, there were other countries who could offer such help. There was no room for amateurism.
Mr Haughey defended the Irish Government’s and security forces’ record. But I was not convinced. I said that I wondered whether Mr Haughey realized that the biggest concentration of terrorists anywhere in the world save Lebanon was to be found in Ireland. The border was virtually open so far as terrorists were concerned. I accepted that the Republic’s resources were limited, but I was not satisfied that they were using them to best effect. I said that the results of the Anglo-Irish Agreement so far had been disappointing. Nor was I any less disappointed by the attitude of the SDLP. As for the suggestion that all would be peace and light if there were a united Ireland, as Mr Haughey’s recent message had suggested, the reality was that there would be the worst civil war ever. In any case, most nationalists in the North would prefer to continue to live there because they were much better provided for than in the Republic. Indeed, there continued to be a substantial flow of Irish immigrants to the UK, who were a significant burden on the welfare system.
Surprisingly, perhaps, though we were both pretty outspoken, neither of us, I believe, left our meeting with any ill will or rancour. Mr Haughey knew where I stood. He had, as it turned out, taken seriously at least some of what I had said about the shortcomings of Irish security co-operation. I, for my part, felt that I understood him better than I had before…and better perhaps than I ever did Garret FitzGerald.
There was a surge in IRA violence from early August. It began with an IRA bomb at an Army Communications Centre in Mill Hill in North London. One soldier was killed. This was the first mainland bomb since 1984. I was at Alice Springs on a visit to Australia when I learnt the news. Irish Republican sympathizers…on the streets and in the media…did their best to disrupt my tour. There were some particularly awkward moments in Melbourne where crowds of both opponents and well-wishers were funnelled into an overcrowded shopping precinct by Australian police, inexperienced in dealing with such situations. But I took every opportunity to express my contempt for the IRA. In a television interview I said that ‘they should be wiped off the civilized world.’
The bombing campaign continued. I was on holiday in Cornwall when I was woken very early on Saturday 20 August to be told of an attack at Ballygawley in County Tyrone on a bus carrying British soldiers travelling from Belfast back from a fortnight’s leave. Seven were dead and twenty-eight injured. I immediately decided to return to London and helicoptered into the Wellington Barracks at 9.20 a.m. Archie Hamilton (my former PPS, who was now Armed Forces minister) came straight in to No. 10 to brief me. He told me that the bus had not been on its designated route at the time of the explosion but on a parallel road some three miles away. A very large bomb, wire-controlled, had been laid in wait for the bus and then detonated. I questioned whether this could be a safe way of moving our troops around the province. But I accepted that perhaps there was no such thing as a ‘safe way’.
Ken Maginnis MP, whose constituency was yet again the scene of this tragedy, came in to see me over lunch, accompanied by a local farmer who had been first on the scene and a surgeon at the local hospital who had operated on some of the wounded. Then that evening I held a long meeting with Tom King, Archie and the security forces chiefs for the province.
Although the bus had been travelling on a forbidden route this did not seem to be material to what had happened. The IRA had from 1986 acquired access to Semtex explosive material, produced in Czechoslovakia and probably supplied through Libya. This substance was extremely powerful, light and relatively safe to use and as a result had given the terrorists a new technical advantage. The device could, therefore, have been planted very quickly and so the attack could have occurred on either route. It was also clear that the IRA had been planning their campaign for some time. The RUC reported that the terrorists were well prepared and had been successful in bringing large quantities of arms and explosives from the South. We then went on to discuss the co-ordination of intelligence, security co-operation with the Republic, the need to control the availability of fertilizers (which could be used as a basis for making bombs), the position on sentencing and remission and other matters. I called for more papers on all these subjects and for a vigorous follow-through on all the issues of security which I had raised after the murder of our soldiers in West Belfast earlier in the year.
Later that month I held several meetings to go through in detail what further action we should take. On the evening of Tuesday 6 September I chaired a meeting of the ministers and officials concerned. I noted that the expected IRA offensive had materialized. We had a number of possible proposals for action. But we would not be announcing a package of measures. Some would become public knowledge as they were implemented or introduced in Parliament. But in other areas I wanted to keep the terrorists guessing. Consequently it would not be possible to brief the Irish Government on our intentions, although we would inform them of individual measures shortly before their introduction.
Then we went through the possibilities one by one. Some measures…like the proscription of Sinn Fein or the removal of British citizenship from undesirables with British/Irish dual citizenship,* or the introduction of minimum sentences for terrorist offences…looked less promising the more they were discussed. But others…cutting back on the 50 per cent remission for all prisoners in Northern Ireland, ensuring that those convicted of certain terrorist offences would serve consecutively with a new sentence the unexpired portion of an earlier remitted sentence, measures to deal w
ith terrorist finance, improvement of intelligence co-ordination…all these required further work.
I continued to go through the possibilities with ministers at a second meeting on the afternoon of Thursday 29 September. At this meeting I particularly concentrated on the army’s role. It was important to reduce the number of unnecessary commitments of army manpower in Northern Ireland in order to allow them to concentrate their efforts where they were most required.
One measure which we announced publicly in October was the prohibition of broadcast statements by Sinn Fein and other Northern Irish supporters of terrorism. This immediately provoked cries of censorship: but I have no doubt that not only was it justified but that it has worked, and there is some reason to believe that the terrorists think so too. Measures to cut Northern Ireland remission and to change the ‘right to silence’ in Northern Irish courts were also introduced, as was action against terrorist finance.