The Downing Street Years

by Margaret Thatcher

  I felt that I had done as much as was humanly possible — without firm support from the United States for the line I really wanted — to stop our sliding into another ‘zero’. I could live with the text which resulted from the tough negotiations which took place in Brussels. But I had seen for myself that the new American approach was to subordinate clear statements of intention about the alliance’s defence to the political sensibilities of the Germans. I did not think that this boded well.

  President Bush’s remarks in his speech in Mainz on 31 May 1989 about the Germans as ‘partners in leadership’ confirmed the way American thinking about Europe was going. When the President came to London he sought to deal with the problems those remarks had caused by saying that we too were partners in leadership. But the damage had been done. Now, as 1989 wore on, the march of events in eastern Europe and the prospect of German reunification added a new element, inclining the United States to take German issues still more seriously.

  THE FALL OF COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE IN 1989 AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

  In the late summer of 1989 the first signs appeared of the imminent collapse of communism in eastern Europe. Solidarity won the elections in early June in Poland and General Jaruzelski accepted the result: I congratulated him on this when he came to London a few days later. Liberalization proceeded in Hungary, which opened its borders to Austria in September across which flooded East German refugees. The haemorrhage of population from East Germany and demonstrations at the beginning of October in Leipzig led to the fall of Erich Honecker. The demolition of the Berlin Wall began on 10 November. The following month it was the turn of Czechoslovakia. By the end of the year Vaclav Havel, the dissident playwright who had been gaoled in February, had been elected President of Czechoslovakia and the evil Ceauşescus had been overthrown in Romania.

  These events marked the most welcome political change of my lifetime. But no matter how much I rejoiced at the overthrow of communism in eastern and central Europe I was not going to allow euphoria to extinguish either reason or prudence. I did not believe that it would be easy or painless to entrench democracy and free enterprise. Some of the liberalizing and liberated countries had stronger traditions of freedom to draw upon than others. But it was too soon to be sure precisely what sort of regimes would emerge. Moreover, central and eastern Europe — still more the Soviet Union — was a complicated patchwork of nations. Political freedom would also bring ethnic disputes and challenges to frontiers, which might have moved several times in living memory. War could not be ruled out.

  The welcome changes which were happening had come about because the West had remained strong and resolute — but also because Mr Gorbachev and the Soviet Union had renounced the Brezhnev doctrine. On the continued survival of a moderate, reforming Government in the USSR would depend the future of the new democracies. We had seen in the past — in 1956 in Hungary and 1968 in Czechoslovakia — what happened when democrats took to the streets believing that the West would ultimately step in to help them against the Soviets and then found themselves abandoned. It was too early to assume that the captive nations were permanently free from captivity: their Soviet captors could still turn ugly. It was therefore essential to go carefully and avoid actions which would be deemed provocative by either the Soviet political leadership or the military.

  This led directly on to the third consideration — the future of Germany. For nothing was more likely to stir up old fears in the Soviet Union — fears which the hardliners would be anxious to exploit — than the prospect of a reunited, powerful Germany, possibly with renewed ambitions on its eastern flank.

  THE GERMAN PROBLEM AND THE BALANCE OF POWER

  There was — and still is — a tendency to regard the ‘German problem’ as something too delicate for well-brought-up politicians to discuss. This always seemed to me a mistake. The problem had several elements which could only be addressed if non-Germans considered them openly and constructively. I do not believe in collective guilt: it is individuals who are morally accountable for their actions. But I do believe in national character, which is moulded by a range of complex factors: the fact that national caricatures are often absurd and inaccurate does not detract from that. Since the unification of Germany under Bismarck — perhaps partly because national unification came so late — Germany has veered unpredictably between aggression and self-doubt. Germany’s immediate neighbours, such as the French and the Poles, are more deeply aware of this than the British, let alone the Americans; though the same concern often leads Germany’s immediate neighbours to refrain from comments which might appear insensitive. The Russians are acutely conscious of all this too, though in their case the need for German credit and investment has so far had a quiescent effect. But perhaps the first people to recognize the ‘German problem’ are the modern Germans, the vast majority of whom are determined that Germany should not be a great power able to exert itself at others’ expense. The true origin of German angst is the agony of self-knowledge.

  As I have already argued, that is one reason why so many Germans genuinely — I believe wrongly — want to see Germany locked in to a federal Europe. In fact, Germany is more rather than less likely to dominate within that framework; for a reunited Germany is simply too big and powerful to be just another player within Europe. Moreover, Germany has always looked east as well as west, though it is economic expansion rather than territorial aggression which is the modern manifestation of this tendency. Germany is thus by its very nature a destabilizing rather than a stabilizing force in Europe. Only the military and political engagement of the United States in Europe and close relations between the other two strongest sovereign states in Europe — Britain and France — are sufficient to balance German power: and nothing of the sort would be possible within a European super-state.

  One obstacle to achieving such a balance of power when I was in office was the refusal of France under President Mitterrand to follow his and French instincts and challenge German interests. This would have required abandoning the Franco-German axis on which he had been relying and, as I shall describe, the wrench proved just too difficult for him.

  GERMAN REUNIFICATION

  Initially, it also seemed likely that the Soviets would be strongly opposed to the re-emergence of a powerful Germany, particularly one reunited on the West’s terms and accompanied by the discrediting of communism. Of course, the Soviets might have calculated that a reunited Germany would return a left-of-centre government which would achieve their long-term objective of neutralizing and denuclearizing West Germany. (As it turned out — and perhaps with a clearer idea than we had of the true feelings of the East German people — the Soviets were prepared to sell reunification for a modest financial boost from Germany to their crumbling economy.)

  These matters were at the forefront of my mind when I decided to arrange a stop-over visit in Moscow for talks with Mr Gorbachev on my way back from the IDU Conference in Tokyo in September 1989. In fact, my VC10 stopped first for refuelling in the Siberian town of Bratsk. I had two hours of conversation with the local Communist Party leaders over coffee in a chilly barn-like building. They seemed enthusiastic about perestroika, but I found the conversation flagging after an hour had been spent on the subject of the local beetroot crop. Stardom came to the rescue. John Whittingdale came in to ask if Oleg, the KGB guard outside the door, could have a signed photograph. I at once obliged. My hosts conferred in rapid Russian and then said that they too wanted signed photographs. The ice was broken.

  In Moscow the following morning and over lunch Mr Gorbachev and I talked frankly about Germany. I explained to him that although NATO had traditionally made statements supporting Germany’s aspiration to be reunited, in practice we were rather apprehensive. Nor was I speaking for myself alone — I had discussed it with at least one other western leader, meaning but not mentioning President Mitterrand. Mr Gorbachev confirmed that the Soviet Union did not want German reunification either. This reinforced me in my resolve to slow up
the already heady pace of developments. Of course, I did not want East Germans — any more than I would have wanted anyone else — to have to live under communism. But it seemed to me that a truly democratic East Germany would soon emerge and that the question of reunification was a separate one, on which the wishes and interests of Germany’s neighbours and other powers must be fully taken into account.

  To begin with the West Germans seemed to be willing to do this. Chancellor Kohl telephoned me on the evening of Friday 10 November after his visit to Berlin and as demolition of the Berlin Wall began. He was clearly buoyed up by the scenes he had witnessed: what German would not have been? I advised him to keep in touch with Mr Gorbachev who would obviously be very concerned with what was happening. He promised to do so. Later that night the Soviet Ambassador came to see me with a message from Mr Gorbachev who was worried that there might occur some incident — perhaps an attack on Soviet soldiers in East Germany or Berlin — which could have momentous consequences.

  However, instead of seeking to rein back expectations, Chancellor Kohl was soon busily raising them. In a statement to the Bundestag he said that the core of the German question was freedom and that the people of East Germany must be given the chance to decide their own future and needed no advice from others. That went for the ‘question of reunification and for German unity too’. The tone had already begun to change and it would change further — though in private Foreign minister Genscher was still assuring Douglas Hurd that the Germans wanted to avoid talk of reunification.

  This was the background to President Mitterrand’s calling a special meeting of Community heads of government in Paris* to consider what was happening in Germany — where Egon Krenz, the new East German leader who was, the Soviets had told me, a protégé of Mr Gorbachev, was looking precarious. Before I went I sent a message to President Bush reiterating my view that the priority should be to see genuine democracy established in East Germany and that German reunification was not something to be addressed at present. The President later telephoned me to thank me for my message with which he agreed and to say how much he was looking forward to the two of us ‘putting our feet up at Camp David for a really good talk’.

  Almost equally amiable was the Paris meeting on the evening of Saturday 18 November. President Mitterrand opened by posing a number of questions, including whether the issue of borders in Europe should be open for discussion. Then Chancellor Kohl began. He said that people wanted ‘to hear Europe’s voice’. He then obliged by speaking for forty minutes. He concluded by saying that there should be no discussion of borders but that the people of Germany must be allowed to decide their future for themselves and that self-determination was paramount. After Sr. Gonzalez had intervened to no great effect, I spoke.

  I said that though the changes taking place were historic we must not succumb to euphoria. The changes were only just beginning and it would take several years to get genuine democracy and economic reform in eastern Europe. There must be no question of changing borders. The Helsinki Final Act must apply.* Any attempt to talk about either border changes or German reunification would undermine Mr Gorbachev and also open up a Pandora’s box of border claims right through central Europe. I said that we must keep both NATO and the Warsaw Pact intact to create a background of stability. Whatever reservations Chancellor Kohl may have had were not voiced. Whether he had already decided on his next move to accelerate the process of reunification I do not know.

  The following Friday — 24 November — I was discussing the same issues at Camp David with President Bush — though not exactly ‘with my feet up’. Although friendly enough, the President seemed distracted and uneasy. I was very keen to persuade him of the Tightness of my approach to what was happening in the crumbling communist bloc. I reiterated much of what I had said in Paris about borders and reunification and of the need to support the Soviet leader on whose continuance in power so much depended. The President did not challenge what I said directly but he asked me pointedly whether my line had given rise to difficulties with Chancellor Kohl and about my attitude to the European Community. It was also clear that we differed on the priority which still needed to be given to defence spending. The President told me about the budgetary difficulties he faced and argued that if conditions in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union had really changed, there must surely be scope for the West to cut its defence spending. I said that there would always remain the unknown threat which must be guarded against. Defence spending was like home insurance in this respect. You did not stop paying the premiums because your street was free from burglaries for a time. I thought that the US defence budget should be driven not by Mr Gorbachev and his initiatives but by the United States’ defence interests. Perhaps I was insensitive to his difficulties with Congress. In any case, the atmosphere did not improve as a result of our discussions.

  Shortly after my return to Britain I learned that without any previous consultation with his allies and in clear breach of at least the spirit of the Paris summit Chancellor Kohl had set out in a speech to the Bundestag a ‘ten-point’ plan about Germany’s future. The fifth point was the proposal of the development of ‘confederative structures between the two states in Germany with the goal of creating a federation’. The tenth point was that his Government was working towards ‘unity, reunification, the reattainment of German state unity’.

  The real question now was how the Americans would react. I did not have to wait long to find out. In a press conference briefing Jim Baker spelt out the American approach to German reunification which, he said, would be based on four principles. Self-determination would be pursued ‘without prejudice to its outcome’. Another element was that Germany should not only remain in NATO — with which I heartily agreed — but that it should be part of ‘an increasingly integrated European Community’ — with which I did not. The third point was that moves to unification should be peaceful, gradual and part of a step-by-step process, which was fair enough. I entirely agreed with the final point — that the principles of the Helsinki Final Act particularly as they related to borders must be supported. What remained to be seen, however, was whether the Americans were going to give most weight to the notion of Germany’s future in an ‘integrated’ Europe or to the thought that reunification must only come about slowly and gradually.

  It was left to President Bush himself to provide the answer in his speech at the NATO heads of government meeting staged at Brussels in early December to hear his report on his talks with Mr Gorbachev in Malta. He made an obviously carefully prepared statement on Europe’s ‘future architecture’, calling for a ‘new, more mature relationship’ with Europe. He also restated the principles Jim Baker had laid out as regards reunification. But the fact that the President placed such emphasis on ‘European integration’ at a predominantly European meeting in Brussels was immediately taken as a signal — which was perhaps not far from the truth — that he was aligning America with the federalist rather than my ‘Bruges’ goal of European development. There was no reason for journalists, who knew perfectly well of the direction of State Department background briefing, to take the President’s remarks otherwise. The President telephoned me to explain his remarks and say that they just related to the Single Market rather than wider political integration. I hoped that they did — or that at least from now on they would. The fact remained that there was nothing I could expect from the Americans as regards slowing down German reunification — and possibly much I would wish to avoid as regards the drive towards European unity.

  AN ANGLO-FRENCH AXIS?

  If there was any hope now of stopping or slowing down reunification it would only come from an Anglo-French initiative. Yet even were President Mitterrand to try to give practical effect to what I knew were his secret fears, we would not find many ways open to us. Once it was decided that East Germany could join the European Community without detailed negotiations — and I was resisting for my own reasons treaty amendment and any European Community aid — there
was little we could do to slow down reunification via the Community’s institutions. I placed some hopes in the framework offered by the ‘Four Powers’ — Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union — which were responsible for the security of Berlin. But with the United States — and soon the Soviets too — ceasing to regard this as anything other than a talking shop for discussion of the details of reunification, this framework too was of limited use. The CSCE — on which I was to develop my ideas the following year — would provide a basis for restricting any unwelcome attempts to change borders in eastern Europe as a whole; but it would not stand in the way of German reunification. So the last and best hope seemed the creation of a solid Anglo-French political axis which would ensure that at each stage of reunification — and in future economic and political developments — the Germans did not have things all their own way.

  At the Strasbourg European Council in December 1989 President Mitterrand and I — at his suggestion — had two private meetings to discuss the German problem and our reaction to it. He was still more concerned than I was. He was very critical of Chancellor Kohl’s ‘ten-point’ plan. He observed that in history the Germans were a people in constant movement and flux. At this I produced from my handbag a map showing the various configurations of Germany in the past, which were not altogether reassuring about the future. We talked through what precisely we might do. I said that at the meeting he had chaired in Paris we had come up with the right answer on borders and reunification. But President Mitterrand observed that Chancellor Kohl had already gone far beyond that. He said that at moments of great danger in the past France had always established special relations with Britain and he felt that such a time had come again. We must draw together and stay in touch. It seemed to me that although we had not discovered the means, at least we both had the will to check the German juggernaut. That was a start.