Hess, Hitler and Churchill

by Peter Padfield

  Can one green defended knoll [Britain]

  Make the spreading desert whole [Europe]?

  Can those locusts of the soul

  Fail? Can God Almighty trust

  Us to save his work from dust?

  Yes. He can because we must.60

  Continuing their conversation, Kelly had agreed with Hohenlohe that Britain’s position was serious and scarcely any other choice remained to her but to continue fighting for the honour of the Empire until in a position to conclude a reasonable peace. The conversation turned to inner political divisions in Britain; Hohenlohe said he could not believe that such an unserious person as Churchill, so often under the influence of alcohol, embodied the English people. Kelly agreed, Hohenlohe reported, insomuch as to say, ‘Churchill was a bull running his head into a wall, but the attitude of Butler and Halifax and also Vansittart was not the same.’61

  Hohenlohe soon ended the conversation, he reported, because of the obvious suspicion that Kelly was merely trying to gain time with talks – which is exactly how Kelly described it in his post-war memoirs: Hohenlohe, he wrote, brought the message that the Führer had no desire to harm Britain or the British Empire; his sole condition was that we should leave him a completely free hand in Europe. ‘Knowing the vital importance of gaining time, I made a show of interest.’62

  Gaining time was the obvious strategy for Churchill. If Hitler could be convinced that behind the government’s belligerent façade cooler heads were prepared to make peace, the less importance he would attach to invading England; and if invasion were deferred past the present summer and Roosevelt were to succeed in winning a third term, he would surely bring America into the war. Harold Nicolson, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Information and man about town, wrote to his wife on 19 June, ‘I think it practically certain that the Americans will enter the war in November, and if we can last till then, all is well.’63

  Churchill’s other presumption was that Hitler would turn against his real enemy, Soviet Russia. ‘Should he [Hitler] be repulsed here or not try invasion,’ he wrote in a memorandum on 8 July, ‘he will recoil eastward.’64 This was three weeks before a Führer conference on plans for the invasion of Britain during which Hitler expressed extreme pessimism about the chances of success and mooted the idea of smashing Russia instead.65

  * * *

  While Churchill played for time, Hitler and Göring launched a serious peace offensive. One message came through Squadron Leader Carl Aschan, assistant Air Attaché at the British Legation in Stockholm. He was a Swede with British nationality whose post was a cover for intelligence work in enemy-occupied Norway and Denmark. That July he was visited by a Swedish friend, Carl-Gustav von Rosen, whose late aunt on his mother’s side had been Göring’s first wife, Karin. Carl-Gustav had an urgent mission. His uncle, Göring, had given him a vitally important message for the British government. It was long and detailed but Göring had not been prepared to commit it to paper; Carl-Gustav had memorised it. He dictated the message to Aschan, who then took it to the British Minister in Stockholm, Victor Mallet. A summary was sent to London by radio, followed by the complete text in the diplomatic bag.66

  The gist of it was hardly new: if Britain would allow Germany a free hand on the European continent, Germany would guarantee and if necessary help to defend the British Empire against Russia or Japan.67 As Aschan recalled, there were no penalties for Britain – except, of course, for her pride and influence. Nevertheless, under the circumstances, with Hitler master of western Europe – and Mussolini had thrown in his lot with the Führer the previous month when he saw France collapsing – it appeared to be a generous offer. Similar offers were received through Berne, Lisbon, Dublin and Washington, where the British Ambassador was Lord Lothian, one of Albrecht Haushofer’s contacts before the war and a prominent supporter of appeasement.

  On 19 July Hitler made a long-awaited triumphal speech to the Reichstag in the Kroll Opera House, listing the achievements of his military commanders, conferring the title of Reichsmarschall on Göring, praising Hess, Ribbentrop and Goebbels for their political work, and finally appealing to ‘reason and commonsense in Great Britain’ to end the war.68 He left this public appeal deliberately vague. His terms had been spelled out through countless clandestine channels; it was up to Britain to respond. A flat rejection came within the hour. This was amplified in a speech by Halifax three days later – despite frantic calls from Lothian in Washington begging him not to say anything which might close the door to peace. Goebbels noted: ‘Halifax’s speech is a much sharper rebuff than one could assume from the shorter version … The Führer sees it as England’s final rejection. The die is cast … Now the great attack on England will not long be delayed.’69

  Yet Hitler still hesitated. A report had come in via Berne from the Swiss Ambassador in London that Churchill’s cabinet was running into increasing opposition from court and financial circles and a section of the Conservative Party. ‘These circles are no longer willing to follow Churchill and Eden [Secretary of State for War] unconditionally,’ read the report. ‘The Prime Minister sees his following limited to Conservative diehards and the Labour Party, who desire to continue the war on ideological grounds.’70 Goebbels had also noted in his diary ‘some voices of reason’ reported via the neutrals, ‘above all the Duke of Windsor and Lloyd George.’71 Earlier, on 17 July, Goebbels had entered, ‘Duke of Windsor … lets us know if he were King he would immediately conclude peace.’72

  THE DUKE OF WINDSOR

  After the death of King George V in 1936 his eldest son reigned briefly as Edward VIII before being forced to renounce the throne. Ostensibly this was because of his determination to marry Mrs Wallis Simpson, a divorcee; a deeper underlying cause was government alarm about his openly pro-Fascist views and belief that the peace of Europe depended on an Anglo–German alliance. It was feared, with reason, that he might precipitate a constitutional crisis.

  On abdicating he had become His Royal Highness the Duke of Windsor. He had married Mrs Simpson the following year, 1937, but the Royal family had refused to grant her the style of Royal Highness, a rejection which cut them both deeply. Later that year he had advertised his admiration for Nazism by accepting an invitation to visit Germany, during which he and his Duchess had been received by Hitler and other leading figures of the regime.

  Hess had entertained them at his Munich-Harlaching home. Ilse Hess, hugely apprehensive beforehand about playing hostess to ‘the most elegant and mondaine woman of the century’, found her fears groundless, and described the Duchess afterwards as ‘a very lovable, charming, warm and clever person’ whose affection for the Duke had captivated them all.73 Hess himself, despite his natural reticence, engaged in animated discussion with the Duke about their shared vision of an Anglo–German understanding;74 at one point he had taken him up to the attic to show him his collection of model warships and re-fight the Battle of Jutland.

  The Duke had hoped to balance his German tour with a visit to the United States afterwards, but his public approval of Nazism – a movement which had smashed German Trade Unions and rendered Jews non-persons – raised so much hostility from American Labour and Jewish organisations the tour had been called off.

  On the outbreak of war he had accepted a post in the British Military Mission to French Headquarters, designed principally to keep him out of Britain. His subsequent reports from across the Channel had pointed to defects in French defensive strategy and morale, and when in May 1940 these had proved all too accurate the Military Mission became one of the casualties of the rapid German breakthrough. He had retired with the Duchess to their villa, La Croë on Cap d’Antibes, thence after the French armistice and Mussolini’s entry to the war, the couple had made a hurried evacuation in a convoy with other British evacuees across the Pyrenees into neutral Spain. They had arrived in Madrid on 23 June and booked into the Ritz Hotel. The British Ambassador, Sir Samuel Hoare, calle
d on them that evening.75

  Hoare, a distinguished politician who had occupied all the great government offices apart from that of Prime Minister, had been on the ‘appeasement’ wing of Chamberlain’s War Cabinet and a particular critic of Churchill’s stance. Churchill, on becoming Prime Minister, had dismissed him, and subsequently appointed him Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary on Special Mission to Spain. The special mission was to keep the Spanish dictator, Generalissimo Francisco Franco, from entering the war on the side of his perceived natural allies, Hitler and Mussolini. With consummate diplomatic and social skills – combined with financial inducements for Spanish generals and officials, and the pressure of the British naval blockade – Hoare was ultimately successful.

  In the meantime, his reputation as an appeaser and the appearance of the Windsors in Madrid had been exploited by German propaganda. Rumours spread that Hoare and the Duke were conspiring for a negotiated peace. The Duke did nothing to dispel the notion, openly expressing his conviction, even to pro-Nazi Spaniards, that the war should be ended without delay before thousands more lives were lost to save politicians’ faces.76 Thus on 2 July, as he was about to leave for Lisbon, where he and the Duchess were supposed to board a flying boat for return to England, the German Ambassador in Madrid, Eberhard von Stohrer, was able to wire his Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop:

  [Spanish] Foreign Minister communicated that Duke of Windsor travels to Portugal today or tomorrow … Windsor has told the Foreign Minister that he will only return to England if his wife is recognised as a member of the Royal family and if he receives an influential post of military or civil type. Fulfilment of these conditions is as good as out of the question. He intends, therefore, to return to Spain, where the Spanish government has offered him the Palais des Kalifen in Ronda as a residence. Windsor has spoken out to the Foreign Minister and also to other local acquaintances sharply against Churchill and against this war …77

  Stohrer’s information about the conditions on which the Duke was insisting before he would return to England was accurate;78 it can be assumed, therefore, that the Duke was indeed intending to disregard his instructions and return to Spain. Hoare had reported his demands to Churchill, and on arrival in Lisbon the Duke found a telegram from Churchill reminding him that he had taken active military rank and refusal to obey orders ‘would create a serious situation’.79 He hardly had time to digest this court martial threat before another telegram arrived from Churchill offering him a post as Governor of the Bahamas. It was an extraordinary appointment for a former king: the Bahamas was among the least important of Britain’s colonial territories, but like his original posting to France, it was a way of avoiding the embarrassment he might cause if he were to return to England. On the other hand he had to be removed from the Iberian peninsula, where he was a focus for German intrigue.80

  While apparently accepting the Bahamas post, it was not long before Windsor sent a message to the Spanish Foreign Minister asking for a confidential agent to come to him in Lisbon, and repeating his earlier intention to return to Spain.81 Learning of this, Ribbentrop wired instructions for the confidential agent to invite the Duke and Duchess for a short one- or two-week visit to Spain; once there, they were to be persuaded or forced to stay, the intention being that

  the Duke must then be told at a given time in Spain that Germany desires peace with the English people, that the Churchill-clique stands in the way and that it would be advantageous if the Duke held himself ready for the further development. Germany is resolved to compel Britain to peace with all means of force and would in this case be prepared to meet the Duke’s every expressed wish, especially in regard to smoothing the Duke’s and Duchess’s path to the English throne.82

  The idea of ascending the throne astonished the Duke and Duchess when it was put to them, since it would be impossible under the English constitution. When told that the course of the war might bring about a change in the constitution they became very thoughtful, especially the Duchess, so the confidential agent reported. Meanwhile, they again expressed themselves very happy to return to Spain.83

  The couple were staying at the villa of a wealthy Portuguese banker just outside Lisbon, under the closest surveillance by the British authorities. Churchill was kept fully informed of German machinations, and while Ribbentrop had a second confidential emissary sent to the Windsors and despatched Himmler’s counter-intelligence chief, Walter Schellenberg, on a special mission to return them to Spain, Churchill engaged the Duke’s legal adviser during the abdication crisis, Sir Walter Monckton, to fly to Lisbon to persuade the Duke to take up his post. Churchill eventually won the contest. The pair sailed on S.S. Excalibur for the Bahamas on 1 August.

  The next day, the German Ambassador to Portugal sent Ribbentrop a report on the reasons the Duke had given his host, the banker – also a German agent – for this choice:

  First of all the Duke praised the Führer’s desire for peace, which fully accorded with his own feelings. He is firmly convinced that if he had been King it would never have come to war. To the appeal made to him to co-operate on the peace-work at a given time, he concurred. To be sure, he asked for it to be understood that at present he had to follow his government’s instructions: insubordination would uncover his intentions prematurely, provoke a scandal and rob him of prestige in England. Also he is convinced that at present his engagement would be premature since as yet there is no inclination in England for approaches to Germany. As soon as this mentality changes, however, he is ready to return immediately. He gave two possibilities for this. Either that England called him, which he believed absolutely possible, or that Germany declared a desire to negotiate with him. In both cases he was prepared for any personal sacrifice and would make himself completely available without the least personal ambition. He would remain in constant touch with his former host [the banker] and had agreed with him the key word on which he would immediately come over …84

  The previous day Goebbels had noted in his diary, ‘[Peace] Feelers from here to England fruitless. Also via Spain. London wants the catastrophe. Duke of Windsor visibly distances himself from the London clique. The Führer now sees no possibilities apart from war.’85

  CHAPTER SEVEN

  Clandestine approaches

  ON 1 AUGUST, as the Windsors sailed for the Bahamas, King Gustav V of Sweden sent a telegram to King George VI offering to act as a channel of communication for peace discussions with Germany. Churchill drafted an uncompromising rejection detailing some of the ‘hideous crimes’ committed by Germany against the countries on her borders: ‘His Majesty’s Government see in them not the slightest cause to recede in any way from … their intention to prosecute the war against Germany … until Hitlerism is finally broken, and the world relieved from the curse which a wicked man has brought upon it.’1 Before any proposals for peace could even be considered, he concluded, they needed guarantees ‘by deeds not words’ that Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium and France would be restored to independent life. Halifax toned down the more colourful phrases and, after consultation with the Dominion governments, sent Gustav a formal rejection.

  This did not prevent further approaches. The Foreign Office assumed they were co-ordinated in Berlin, but German Foreign Ministry files suggest they were actively encouraged by the British Minister in Stockholm, Victor Mallet. Thus a report from Himmler’s Security Service stated, ‘It was learned through our Swedish connections that the English Minister in Stockholm has declared in the closest circles in unmistakeable terms that his government would possibly be prepared to ascertain unofficially whether Germany is prepared for peace negotiations.’2 On the strength of this Dr Ludwig Weissauer, a top Security Service V-Mann (confidential agent) with high-level contacts in Sweden and Finland was sent to Stockholm to test the reports. He had previously held talks about Swedish foreign and economic policy with the president of the Swedish High Court of Appeal, Dr Birger Ekeberg, a
confidant of King Gustav,3 and he now told Ekeberg of his wish to meet the British Minister.

  Ekeberg accordingly saw Mallet, who reported the approach to the Foreign Office the same day, 5 September, adding, ‘Weissauer is understood to be a direct secret emissary of Hitler’. He had, he went on, told Ekeberg that in view of His Majesty’s Government’s views on continuing the war he could see no useful purpose in meeting Weissauer, but requested instructions ‘most immediately’ as to whether or not he should.4

  Weissauer’s account in the German Foreign Ministry archives gives a different slant on the conversation. Ekeberg, Weissauer reported, had learned from Mallet that the British government was divided on peace negotiations. Churchill strove to continue the war with all means, but was hard pressed by his cabinet colleagues. Churchill had expressed himself prepared to consider negotiations provided England’s prestige was not compromised, the starting point for which had to be cultural autonomy for Poland and the other occupied countries.5

  The Foreign Office wired Mallet the following day, 6 September, instructing him not to meet Weissauer: ‘Attitude of His Majesty’s Government has been made quite plain in reply to King of Sweden … in which we emphasised necessity of words being effectively guaranteed by deeds.’6 The same day, Sir Robert Vansittart sent Halifax a memorandum on this latest approach. Besides indicating Vansittart’s continuing involvement in the highest level of British foreign policy, the note mirrors Churchill’s views, and its extreme language appears designed to stiffen Halifax’s backbone:

  URGENT

  Secretary of State.

  I hope that you will instruct Mr. Mallet that he is on no account to meet Dr. Weissauer. The future of civilisation is at stake. It is a question of we or they now, and either the German Reich or this country has to go under, and not only under, but right under. I believe it will be the German Reich. This is a very different thing from saying that Germany has got to go under; but the German Reich and the Reich idea have been the curse of the world for 75 years, and if we do not stop it this time, we never shall, and they will stop us. The enemy is the German Reich and not merely Nazism, and those who have not yet learned this lesson have learned nothing whatever, and would let us in for a sixth war even if we survive the fifth. I would far sooner take my chance of surviving the fifth. All possibility of compromise has now gone by, and it has got to be a fight to a finish, and a real finish.