Some doubt the presence of the true hoplite phalanx in Tyrtaeus (fl. probably ca 650 BC), but also in Callinus (fl. 700–650 BC), Mimnermus (fl. end of seventh century), and even Alcaeus (ca 620 to
after 580 BC).43 Certainly new elements appear: heavy infantry (panoploi) and light infantry without armor (gymnetes) have distinct functions. The latter skirmish with missiles under the protection of the fully armored or run forward from the main body of the panoploi, which seems reserved for close combat.44 Furthermore, Tyrtaeus repeatedly emphasizes unified effort and maintaining formation; promachos now means a 'fighter in close combat,' not one in advance of the main body.45 The fragments strongly imply a learning process, a lesson from Tyrtaeus the alleged 'schoolmaster' (cf. Paus. 4.15.6; schol. in Pl., Leg. 1.629A)—not just for inexperienced youth, but development of a new method of battle for all.
Tyrtaeus' panoploi, however, lack unified armament: some carry a full-body shield and others a smaller one, a diversity of equipment which corresponds to that in battle scenes on Late Geometric vases and which does not per se negate use of a phalanx.46 More serious is fr. 11.35–8, where the most natural interpretation of the Greek indicates that the gymnetes are integrated alongside the hoplites, not deployed separately on the flanks or behind the heavy infantry.47 Indeed, decisive against a fully developed phalanx in the seventh century is the total absence in both Tyrtaeus and the vase paintings of mutual support between men in files and any indication of the othismos—the great shoving match of the classical hoplite battle.48 Tyrtaeus' references to shield-to-shield combat (e.g. 11.11–14, 29–34; 19.18–21 West) give no hint of mutual support within files. Likewise, the best representation of the 'phalanx' among the vase paintings, the Chigi vase of ca 650 BC or later, shows only a succession of parallel ranks with remarkable distance between them.49
Tyrtaeus' fragments, in comparison to Homeric battle, reveal a definite shift toward mass formation, close order of ranks (but not necessarily files), and a more sophisticated organization, but the classical hoplite phalanx has not yet evolved in the seventh century. With the spread of hoplite equipment throughout the Greek world and the re-emergence of the state, available manpower perhaps also increased, as the warrior function was extended beyond the aristocracy—that is, if theories of a connection between the rise of tyrants and the phalanx have any validity.50 Nevertheless, the rate of progress in military development need not have been identical or even consistent in all areas. Fragments of Archilochus (680–40 BC) and Alcaeus indicate perhaps a more fluid, open style of warfare in the Aegean area than that of Tyrtaeus in the Peloponnese, and one which preserved the Homeric warrior's tenet that success in combat
measured prestige and fame regardless of the means employed (Schwertfeger 1982:262–4, 273–80). Even for the sixth century the occurrence of general mobilization by poleis for major battles can be questioned (Connor 1988:6–7).
In contrast, Tyrtaeus' transvaluation of the heroic ethos emphasized another aspect of the Homeric warrior, the noble death in battle (esp. fr. 10 West), and had a more significant influence on the ethos of the hoplite and his commanding officer. The 'Spartan imperative' 'to conquer or die' could, at least by the late fourth century, be traced to Tyrtaeus.51 A general's desire for a heroic death would be by no means limited to Spartans in the age of the hoplite phalanx.
During the phalanx's continued evolution in the seventh century specific references to the combat role of commanders vanish in the poverty of the contemporary sources. Logic dictates, however, that if the Homeric promachos, now in hoplite armor, yielded advanced skirmishing to the gymnetes and reserved himself for close combat, the place of distinction became the front rank of the ordered mass formation in Tyrtaeus. Social as well as military considerations shaped this development, for not only did this formation offer maximum benefit from the hoplon, but also the extended single line (however deep) permitted more participants to share simultaneously in the opportunity to display their arete and win glory than a line of individual units with intervals between them. Analogy with the Roman phalanx of the Servian constitution would also indicate placement in files according to birth and/or wealth, i.e. ability to equip oneself, with the richest and the hereditary aristocracy in the front rank.52 In fact the names of some special units (epilektoi) in phalanges of the Classical Period, such as the Heniochoi and Parabatai (Charioteers and Chariot-fighters) at Thebes (a city known for its archaism) and units or social classes called Hippeis (cavalrymen but fighting as hoplites) at Sparta and Athens, could represent a tradition linked to the earliest days of the transitional phalanx, although membership in such units/classes in the fifth and fourth centuries was no longer a hereditary privilege.53
Nevertheless, placement of aristocrats in the first rank of the phalanx does not necessarily solve the problem of where the phalanx commander stood or what he did. Tyrtaeus and other archaic poets write from the perspective of the individual soldier and offer little explicitly about commanders. A later tradition making Tyrtaeus a general in the Second Messenian War lacks credibility, since Spartan
armies before the fifth century always served under one of the two Spartan kings or a royal relative.54
Tyrtaeus' only direct reference to a commander, the lacunose fr. 19.11 West laconically states: 'we shall obey (our) leader(s)' (peisometh' hegem[o). Tyrtaeus may refer (depending on whether hegemon is restored in the singular or plural) to one or both Spartan kings, occasionally called hegemones,55 but their place in the first rank of the phalanx is not so definite as often assumed (see pp. 147–52). Restoration in the plural could alternatively indicate the file leaders (protostatai), who could be termed archontes (Xen., Lac. Resp. 11.5, cf. Thuc. 5.66.4). The latter view, of course, assumes (contrary to Tyrtaeus' evidence) both the existence of files and some form of the Spartan organization seen in Thucydides and Xenophon. Yet Spartan mobilization by obai and tribes, most probable in Tyrtaeus' day, in no way proves a fully developed phalanx in use.56 Tyrtaeus' hegem[o is probably best taken as a reference to the Spartan king(s) and could signify another innovation—a definite command system quite unlike the Homeric basileis and their hetairoi, for Tyrtaeus' hegemon seems to require obedience.
A contemporary of Tyrtaeus offers a parallel development from his mercenary experience in the north Aegean. Archilochus (fr.114 West) states his preference for the 'down-to-earth' commander lacking pretensions and capable of empathy with his men, rather than the conceited officer fastidious about his personal appearance. From the standpoint of military literature Archilochus' contrast gives a pro-totype of the miles gloriosus and the first attempt to define the ideal general, here seen as the commander establishing kinship with his men—bridging the gap between commander and commanded (cf. Hanson 1989:110–11). This fragment first attests the term 'strategos,' which then vanishes until Aeschylus about 150 years later (LSJ9 s.v.), although (less strictly) the word certainly became prominent in the late sixth century BC, the period of Cleisthenes' reforms at Athens. Indeed nothing guarantees that strategos in Archilochus denotes a 'general,' i.e. the highest ranking officer, rather than simply a commander of unspecified rank. Terminology for officers no doubt evolved over the centuries (cf. the terms stratelates and anax: Eur., Supp. 162, 688).
The novelty of the term 'strategos' requires examination, for which an anchor derives from the Athenian reform of 501/500 BC, creating a board of ten strategoi as tribal commanders, elected one from each Cleisthenic tribe.57 This innovation should be viewed
against the background of Greek constitutional development in the Archaic Period when, as the polis developed from monarchy, military command became institutionalized in civic magistrates, and only Sparta retained hereditary kings, a peculiar collegial monarchy with limited domestic powers but full command of field armies.
In the seventh century a magistrate called the polemarch first appears at Corinth, Sicyon, Athens, and probably also Sparta. The title implies military command and (except at Sparta) seems to indicate delegation of
a king's military functions to a non-royal magistrate. Aristotle attributes the establishment of the post at Athens to the effeminacy of kings. Thus (in the Athenian tradition) Ion, the mythical eponymous founder of the Ionians and their customary four tribes, was summoned to become stratarches (polemarch). Although perhaps originally an ad hoc post, the polemarch became one of the annually selected nine archons by the second half of the seventh century.58 In contrast, the Spartan polemarch remained strictly a military commander (eventually numbering six—each in command of a mora), the second level of field command, closely associated with the kings, and serving in the council of war.59 Sources drawing upon Ephorus assert that Cypselus at Corinth (ca 657–25 BC) and Cleisthenes at Sicyon (ca 600–570 BC) were polemarchs before becoming tyrants—hence theories of a connection between tyrants and the phalanx—although no evidence of their military activity as polemarchs is known.60
Anachronistic and imprecise language in Herodotus and Aristotle impedes tracing the relationship between the office of polemarch and the term strategos at Athens between the seventh century and the polemarch's replacement in the top military command by the board of strategoi in the reforms of 487/6 BC.61 Some believe the pre-Cleisthenic army consisted of contingents from the four tribes, each commanded by a strategos subordinate to the polemarch. These tribal leaders, probably not elected and imprecisely called phylarchs in Herodotus (5.69–2), were most likely tribal kings (phylobasileis).62 To deny, however, that an Athenian army scarcely if ever mobilized before Cleisthenes' reforms seems, despite Peisistratid reliance on mercenaries, too extreme and renders the 'new' but inexperienced Athenian army's twin victories of ca. 506 BC over the Boeotians and Chalcidians too accidental.63 Peisistratus' need to disarm the Athenian people, particularly those of the asty, points (contrary to Frost's (1984) arguments) in a different direction, and emphasizes the slow
mobilization of the rural population which Cleisthenes' reforms attempted to correct.64
Certainty about the Cleisthenic title of the ten new tribal leaders (whether phylarch as Hdt. 5.69.2 or strategos as Arist., Ath. Pol. 22.2) is elusive, but Callimachus the polemarch still functioned as commander of the Athenian army at Marathon in 490 BC, where in the tradition of the king's military function he held the place of honor on the right flank.65 Before the reforms of 487/6 BC the strategoi served as tribal commanders and consulted with the polemarch (cf. Hdt. 6.109–10). Taxiarchs, first attested in Aeschylus, were then created to replace the strategoi when they took over the polemarch's military function and taxis replaced phyle as the designation for the tribal contingents of hoplites. The existence of both taxiarchs and strategoi before 487/6 BC would involve an unnecessary duplication of func-tion.66
Why did the term 'strategos' not attested since Archilochus become the name of the new Cleisthenic tribal commanders? A theory that strategos signified an ad hoc commander for campaigns outside Attica is attractive, but lacks detailed support: an Athenian strategos in the First Sacred War is as mythical as the war itself, and Peisistratus' strategic in the capture of Megarian Nisaea before 561/60 BC must surely be an anachronism for the post of polemarch.67 Terminology for commanders was certainly in flux, if stratarches really was the original term for polemarch (Hdt. 8.44.2, cf. Arist., Ath.Pol. 3.2), and Archilochus (fr. 114 West), the only secure occurrence of strategos before the fifth century BC, probably refers to the commander of a mercenary band. Furthermore, if Cleisthenes' reforms aimed to eliminate aristocratic influence in Athenian government,68 it is plausible that strategos was chosen to designate the ten new tribal commanders because this relatively obscure term lacked aristocratic taint.69
Emergence of the strategoi as a new civic magistracy at Athens in the late sixth and early fifth centuries corresponds to the date of the earliest attestations of the term 'hoplite' (Snodgrass 1964b:204). The twin subjects of this paper have at last achieved their initial union. Despite the absence of detailed accounts for pitched battles in the sixth century, a fully developed Athenian phalanx faced the Persians at Marathon with no hint in Herodotus (6.111–14, cf. 7.9B.1–2) that the formation was new. But the date of the Athenian phalanx's initial appearance should be queried.
Certainty on the matter is not possible. Reorganization of the
Athenian army in Cleisthenes' reforms may have perfected use of this formation, although the Zeugitai class at Athens, if indeed a term for middle-class hoplites, dates at latest from Solon's reforms in the early sixth century, and the Zeugitai possibly existed earlier.70 Components of the army at Marathon were still phylai (not yet taxeis), and subtribal units, such as the lochos (under a lochagos) are first attested at Plataea. Plato, however, knew the term trittyarches, a subtribal officer who, like the term trittyes, could antedate Cleisthenes.71 Despite the infrequency of references to subtribal units in the Athenian army, both the Cleisthenic and old Ionian tribes were too large to be the sole unit of military organization, and kin groups, the basis of the pre-Solonian constitution, must have also shaped army organization at some point, although as seen in Homer and Tyrtaeus, existence of subunits does not guarantee use of a true phalanx of the Classical Period.72 Perhaps the best evidence comes from law, in which the state institutionalizes practice. Athenian military law on desertion, thought to derive from Solon, defined cowardice as refusal to serve (astrateia) and abandonment of one's rank in battle (lipotaxia). Punishment of desertion, which in the phalanx could prove disastrous for the whole army, must surely imply the fully developed phalanx in use. Unfortunately, Athenians of the late fifth and fourth centuries were inclined to attribute inaccurately all sorts of laws to Solon, but a law on desertion would fit the context of Cleisthenic military reforms.73 At latest, the Cleisthenic Athenian army probably deployed as a classical phalanx.
Thus Marathon, the earliest Greek battle for which a reconstruction can be attempted (cf. n.18 supra), affords the first opportunity to study the general as hoplite in the classical phalanx. Herodotus' tactical account provides no explicit reference to the role of the commanders until after the rout of the Persians, when Callimachus the polemarch met a heroic death proving his arete in the assault on the Persian ships (perhaps an indication that he personally led the charge), and Stesilaus, one of the strategoi, also perished in this stage of the battle.74 Both died, however, in the melée after the enemy's rout when the phalanx often had lost its pristine order of ranks (Pl., Lach. 182A-B). Of course Herodotus' language may be no more than a rhetorical eulogy of Callimachus, devoid of significance for where the polemarch/strategos stood in the phalanx. Parallels from later battles suggest that generals often were wounded or killed in the rout stage of a hoplite battle—therefore no support for a view that the commander always stood in the front rank.75 Furthermore, despite the apparent
double envelopment of the Persians who broke the Athenian center, the tradition on Marathon provides no hint that Callimachus, Miltiades, or anyone else in the role of battle manager planned this maneuver. Except for occasional heroics, the Homeric warrior would seem to have faded into the anonymity of the democratic phalanx.
II
The age of the fully developed hoplite phalanx extends to the battle of Chaeronea (338 BC). So far this study has traced chronologically the development of the phalanx and the combat role of its commander from a period of pre-state warrior chieftains in Homer to the institutionalized positions of Spartan king and Athenian strategos. The relative abundance of evidence for the fifth and fourth centuries now necessitates a more analytical approach to the transition from phalanx commander to the Hellenistic/Roman battle manager—essentially a change of emphasis from the warrior's physical leadership to the verbal and mental requirements of a commanding general. Although the term strategos rapidly spread throughout the Greek world in the fifth century,76 the available primary sources (predominantly Athenian) permit a glance at the social and intellectual milieu of the transition at Athens, which probably applied in varying degrees to many other poleis of the fifth and fourth centuries.
Hoplites: The Classical Greek Battle Experience Page 19
