but were content to leave the important matters of generalship to the most capable men (Ps.-Xen., Ath. Pol, 1.3).
As the progress of Athenian democracy and imperialism converted the Delian League into Empire, the sophistic movement attempted to revolutionize education, turning knowledge into a collection of technai, Homer into an encyclopedia, and crafty rhetoric into the key to a political career. War itself became a techne, when first maintenance of the Empire, then the Peloponnesian War (431–04 BC) reinforced the military functions of Athenian strategoi (also the chief civil magistrates after 487/6 BC) and demanded increasing professionalism. Until his death in 429 BC Pericles the aristocrat, friend of sophists and skillful strategist, astutely guided Athenian democracy, but his death left a power vacuum in Athenian politics, exacerbating an issue probably already debated—who should be elected a strategos? How to define the good general?
In a sense the debate had raged since 501/500 BC, but conservatives first demonstrably raised military competence as a criterion for the strategos in response to high casualties after Cimon's ostracism (461 BC) and again in the 420s, when non-aristocratic demagogues began to manipulate the ecclesia.79 The radical Cleon, however, could sling the same mud at the strategos Nicias for not actively supporting the Athenians at Pylos (425 BC): 'if our strategoi were men (andres)' (Thuc. 4.27.5). Euripides joined the debate in 422 BC, interspersing his Suppliants with aphorisms about the good general. Indeed the eulogies of the seven heroes who died at Thebes offer a composite description of the ideal general's traits of character, that is temperance, unselfishness, endurance of hardships, and devotion to the state.80 Similarly, Thucydides turned the new genre of history into a textbook for strategoi (as both politicians and generals) to study—especially the models of Themistocles the astute general and Pericles the wise statesman.81 Xenophon's Agesilaus and his fictitious Cyrus the Great, just as Isocrates' portrait of Timotheus (15.107–28), continued the concern for defining the good general into the fourth century.
As war became a techne, significant changes occurred. First, Achilles, the traditional ideal warrior, no longer satisfied the new complexities of generalship. The wily Odysseus emerged as an alternative model stressing intelligence, cleverness, and trickery instead of brute force and open confrontation. Themistocles, the master of stratagems, came to represent the first Odyssean general, whose trickery in war corresponded to the skillful craftiness of
sophistic rhetoric.82 Sophocles would indirectly discuss the ideal general in 409 BC with the contrast of Odysseus and Achilles as a major theme of the Philoctetes. Second, techne denoted a teachable skill. Hence generalship could be learned from Homer, lessons from hoplomacboi, or by digesting this skill from didactic handbooks, a genre the sophists developed.83 Thucydides sought to teach strategoi their craft through the medium of history, but Xenophon in such works as the Hipparchikos and the Cyropaedia and Aeneas Tacticus in his Strategika, a military encyclopedia, founded the new genre of military theory.84 Third, these changes affected not only strategoi but also the hoplites. Courage (arete, andreia) could now be taught as well as inherited, and excessive emphasis on bravery alone could be disastrous (Eur., Supp. 161–2). A basic tenet of the hoplite's ethos established by Tyrtaeus was being questioned.85 Aristotle (EN 3.7.13–8.9) continued this discussion in his tripartite distinction of courage, whereby he rejected the new military trends: courage through fear and discipline and courage through the mercenary's professionalism were morally inferior to the citizen-hoplite's desire for honor and avoidance of cowardice—the shame culture which constituted the hoplite's Homeric inheritance.86
Definition of the good general, growing military professionalism, and the emergence of a new type of commander preferring intelligence to bravery, all form the background for the transition from phalanx general to the battle manager. Still another trend, however, also comes into play—the rise of great individuals, all commanders at one time or another, who resisted or refused to be bound within the restraints of the polis. Pausanias and Themistocles in the Persian wars, Alcibiades and, to a lesser extent, Brasidas and Lysander in the Peloponnesian War, the famous mercenary commanders of the fourth century, and the tyrants Dionysius I and Jason of Pherae mark stages in a progression toward military monarchy, often seen as a trend divorcing civil from military functions within the polis, and culminating in the greatest of all the 'great individuals,' Alexander the Great, and subsequently the apotheosis of the charismatic in Hellenistic ruler-cult.87
A few examples will suffice to demonstrate the growth of the general's personal importance. After Marathon Miltiades desired to claim sole credit for the victory by having his name inscribed on the depiction of the battle on the Stoa Poecile. The Athenians refused this honor, although they compromised by allowing Miltiades' figure a prominent place in the painting. Similarly, Pausanias had the tripod
dedicated at Delphi from the Persian spoils at Plataea inscribed with a couplet attributing the victory to himself alone. The Spartans were outraged, erased the couplet, and added a list of all the Greek allies. A few years later, the Athenians also refused Cimon the privilege of inscribing his name on three stone herms set up in the Stoa of Hermae to commemorate his capture of Eion from the Persians. In all these cases victory was still believed to be the fruit of collective action, but a century later Iphicrates would be distinguished as the first strategos to have his own name instead of his city's inscribed on the spoils of war.88
Likewise the anonymity of individuals and the collective glory of the polis characteristic of the Athenian epitaphios logos yielded to a new prominence for generals in Hyperides' speech for the dead of the Lamian War (323–22 BC): a city could be praised for its policy and the dead for their andreia, but Leosthenes the strategos authored the policy and led the army as hegemon. Thus praise of Leosthenes denoted praise of his soldiers and praise of the victory was to honor the general and his men simultaneously, for the general's responsibility lies in good planning and ensuring that his army wins. For Hyperides arete belongs to the strategos alone.89 The general of the hoplite phalanx has turned into the Hellenistic strategos.
If the general outline of the transition from Homeric warrior to battle manager is now clear, the details of that process in the age of the hoplite phalanx remain clouded. To view the problem schematically, the individualism of the Homeric warrior's physical leadership blended into the anonymous collective action of the phalanx, which as a group shared the laurels of arete. Subsequently the commander as an individual re-emerged, now to direct more than to participate in the group's action and once again to claim the most glory. It can be posited a priori that the warrior chieftain never lost his distinction within the group: his immersion into the phalanx and apparent obscurity are an illusion of scanty sources. Hanson (1989:107–16) has strongly argued, however, a view of 'the soldier's general' who inspired his men by becoming one of them and equally enduring the risk of personal combat. To what extent does the phalanx commander as a 'soldier's general' represent the true state of affairs, or is this simply an aspect of a general's 'mask of command'?
In the democratic phalanx of 'interchangeable parts' social distinctions had no place, since qualification to serve depended on the ability to furnish one's own equipment. Except for mercenaries, inclusion in the phalanx or relegation to the light infantry (psiloi, peltasts,
archers, etc.) resolved the social question. Hoplites belonged to the middle or upper class until the fourth century (cf. Diod. 18.10.1) and usually had the means for their own servants to carry their equipment on campaign. In the Spartan army, where perioikoi could be hoplites, Spartiate could not be discerned from perioikic dead on the battlefield.90 An officer class simply did not exist in classical Greek cities. By at least the late fifth century BC Spartan high commands were open to talent (e.g. Lysander), and Athenian strategoi and taxiarchs were annually determined posts: hoplites held these commands, then returned to non-officer positions (if not re-elected) the following year.91
/> Nevertheless, lack of an officer class did not mean that men in positions of command and authority were only distinguished by their physical place in the formation and did not wear special armor or clothing as a mark of rank (Anderson 1970:39–40). By the fourth century, if not the fifth, national uniforms became common, for example, the famous Spartan red tunics and cloaks or the white shields of the Argives. Similarly, family or clan emblems on shields known from archaic vase paintings gave way to lambda's on Spartan shields, Poseidon's trident on Mantineian, sigma's on Sicyonian, and mu's on those of the Messenians.92 The level of available technology and practical experience also dictated a certain uniformity in the absence of 'government issue' equipment, but shield devices could remain a matter of personal preference—at times with disastrous results, as when the Athenians at Delium (424 BC) killed each other in the confusion of battle.93 The type of helmet and/or crest may also at one time have differentiated friend from foe (cf. a Corinthian crater of ca 600 BC: Ducrey 1985:49 pl.28).
Officers did not necessarily wear more armor than their men (cf. Bugh 1986 (supra n. 53): 92 n. 41), but they were distinguished by differences in helmet/crest, clothing, and ornateness of armor. According to Thucydides the size of a Spartan army could be determined by applying a basic knowledge of their military organization to the view that the front rank of their phalanx offered. Thucydides implies that the individual subunits of the phalanx from enomotia to lochos were discernible to an observer. A distinction of subunits by spacing seems unlikely, given the phalanx's dependence on close continuity of files, so Thucydides must mean that commanders of at least some of these subunits were conspicuous by appearance in the front rank.94 In fact a late archaic statuette shows a Spartan warrior wrapped in a military cloak and wearing a helmet
with transverse (ear-to-ear) crest. This deviation from the normal front-to-back crest of Greek helmets and analogy with the transverse crests of Roman centurions would indicate an officer.95 A peculiar, excessively plumed helmet seen on another Spartan statuette might also designate an officer (Sekunda 1986 (supra n. 93): 28). At Athens taxiarchs were known by their triple-plumed helmets and bright red clothing (whether tunics or cloaks is uncertain), and strategoi in the fourth century BC continued to wear Corinthian helmets as a sign of rank long after Phrygian helmets for hoplites of the rank and file came into vogue.96
Brilliantly shining and extremely ornate armor had characterized the Homeric warrior chieftains at Troy: Hector's conspicuous shining armor during the attack on the Achaean ships has been mentioned, and Achilles' equipment forged by Hephaestus (Il. 18.456–616, 19.367–91) merits note. Numerous examples attest that commanders of the fifth and fourth centuries continued this tradition, which Alexander, Pyrrhus, and other Hellenistic generals perpetuated. Nicias' elegant purple and gold shield was hung as a trophy in a Syracusan temple and Alcibiades' golden shield emblazoned by an Eros armed with a thunderbolt aroused conservative comment. Xenophon while with the Ten Thousand fastidiously prided himself on his armor. In Sicily Dionysius I had elaborate armor manufactured for his officers, cavalry, and personal bodyguard of mercenaries. Later Dion's brilliant armor also attracted attention.97 Of course any wealthy citizen could equip himself with elaborate armor, but the sources emphasize that generals in particular were conspicuous by their dress and arms.98
Onasander's account of the ideal general (33.6) specifies that the strategos should be mounted, and the Hellenistic/Roman general usually would be on horseback during battle. Not until the fourth century BC, however, do references occur to a mounted general of infantry, but even these few are episodic. The mercenary general Clearchus occasionally rode a horse—not unusual, since his command included Thracian cavalry (Xen., Anab. 1.5.12–13). During the retreat of the Greeks after Cunaxa (401 BC), Xenophon relates that while mounted he tried to lead a sortie of peltasts and hoplites against the Persians, only to dismount after a hoplite's criticism for being on horseback (Xen., Anab. 3.4.46–9). In the Cyropaedia the young Cyrus fights the Assyrians in the Persian front ranks on foot, but immediately after the battle curiously he appears on a horse. At Thymbrara Cyrus definitely was mounted as
commander of the cavalry on the right wing.99
Although evidence from mercenary practice in the Near East and the testimony of a didactic novel might be questionable for phalanx commanders on the Greek mainland, Xenophon implies that Agesilaus rode as well as marched on campaign, and Plutarch has him lead a cavalry charge against the Pharsalians at Mt Narthacium. Most problematic, however, is the contradiction of sources concerning Pelopidas' death at Cynocephalae (364 BC): in Plutarch he dies leading an infantry attack, while Nepos recounts a cavalry charge.100 The mounted general became more or less a fixture from Macedonian influence in the second half of the fourth century, when cavalry became more than an auxiliary arm in battle. Thereafter battle management required the elevated view a horse provided and the speed to bolster morale at any threatened point on the battleline (cf. Polyaenus 6.4.1). Perhaps the episodic notices of mounted generals in the early fourth century anticipate another distinction of strategos from stratiotai yet to become customary.
Besides armor, arms, and (after 400 BC) occasionally a horse, the general surpassed other hoplites in pay and the proportion of booty he received. At Athens military pay, probably introduced about the same time as jury pay ca 462 BC, followed the principles of fifth-century democracy in opening the higher magistracies to all classes. Strategoi and hipparchs received a per diem wage, which wealthy aristocrats probably refused to draw. Campaign pay for taxiarchs and phylarchs tripled that of the simple hoplite and lochagoi received a double rate.101 In mercenary service strategoi might get quadruple, and lochagoi double the pay of the rank and file.102 If victorious, a general could expect to receive a superior amount of booty and even outright gifts from allies. After Plataea Pausanias was awarded perhaps ten times the amount distributed to other participants, and Spartan kings customarily (according to Phylarchus) claimed a third of all booty.103 Gifts to victorious generals from their men and allies ranged from gold crowns and panoplies to the property of enemy commanders, but gifts to generals (whether before or after battle) could also lead to corruption or charges of treason and bribery.104
Generals, however, not only received greater rewards, but could also grant them (cf. Keegan's concept of sanctions supra). Agesilaus awarded prizes to motivate training, and Jason of Pherae promised mercenaries double, triple, or even quadruple pay for good performances. Iphicrates before battle encouraged his mercenaries with honors and a larger share of booty to those displaying the most
valor as hoplites, cavalry, and peltasts.105 The Homeric competition between warrior chieftains for each to prove himself the best fighter was perpetuated in the ethos of the hoplite whether mercenary or citizen. After battle, awards of aristeia to individuals and/or cities could be granted. The bonds of patriotism, friendship, and kinship which united citizen-hoplites competed with a drive for individual distinction and doing the most for one's city, including a desire to claim having killed the most of the enemy.106 Yet the phalanx had replaced the fury (lyssa) of the Homeric warrior with sophrosyne: foolhardy daring could neither be tolerated nor rewarded with aristeia, as the Spartan Aristodamus at Plataea, and Isidas defending Sparta against Epaminondas discovered. Heroic death in battle had to be accepted without overtly seeking to be a kamikaze.107
Furthermore, officers as well as their men sought aristeia. In a skirmish with the Drilae near Trapezus, Xenophon notes that the lochagoi competed with lochagoi for distinction and junior officers with their superiors (Anab. 5.2.11, 13). Generals, too, contended for aristeia in battles from Salamis (480 BC) to the Granicus (334 BC).108 Officers felt a greater drive for valor than the rank and file—the old obligation that privileges demanded greater exertion as recompense.109
A strategos' distinction from stratiotai in dress, arms, pay, and proportion of allotted booty undercuts the idealistic notion of the hoplite phalanx as an anonymous
mass of equals sacrificing themselves for the glory of the polis—the general picture of Athenian epitaphioi logoi—especially since the agonistic spirit of Greek civilization maintained its vitality in the competition of hoplites and officers to prove themselves the best. Even the democratic basis of the phalanx at Athens comes into question from the realization that, except in a levy of the whole people (pandemei), levies by the taxiarchs before ca 375 BC aimed at drafting the best men available (even if they had previously served), rather than drawing the net of service indiscriminately among males of military age.110 Nor is the anonymity of generals in epitaphioi logoi reflected in inscribed documents: the tribal casualty lists from the mid-fifth century to the time of Chaeronea (338 BC) show that generals killed in the line of duty were distinguished from other dead by inclusion of their office, and lists from the last years of the Peloponnesian War show designation of taxiarchs, a phrourarch, trierarchs, and a mantis.111 Certainly the distinction of command also had its drawbacks: after the Syracusan debacle only the Athenian generals Nicias and Demosthe
nes were marked for immediate execution, while their hoplites were sold as slaves, died in the quarries, or saved themselves by reciting Euripides to their drama-starved captors.112
If the concept of the phalanx as a military form of democracy in action breaks down upon analysis, the fault lies not with Greek democracy but in the demands of war for a hierarchy of command. For the most part distinctions of strategos from stratiotai followed the pre-state tradition of the warrior chieftain, whose greater risks in battle justified social privileges and whose notable costume served the tactical function of easy recognition of the group leader in combat. Only commanders abusing this unwritten social contract encountered criticism. Archilochus' parody of his strategos (fr. 114 West) reflects a lack of confidence in an officer too fastidious and conceited to be trusted under combat stress. A hoplite's rebuke of Xenophon for being mounted in an infantry attack (Anab. 3.4.46–9) seems the common soldier's protest against officers enduring fewer hardships. Yet the other soldiers verbally and physically abused the protester. Furthermore, Aristophanes' lampoon of the taxiarch Lamachus, probably a displaced jab at Cleon, was intended not to ridicule officers but the war, symbolized by the officer's uniform, although calling Lamachus mistharchides ('a seeker of pay') may be an objection to higher pay for officers.113 Outside the context of combat a Greek army could maintain the democratic functions of a polis, and even Spartan discipline permitted rank-and-file criticism of a commander's tactical decisions during battle.114
Hoplites: The Classical Greek Battle Experience Page 20
