Hoplites: The Classical Greek Battle Experience

by Victor Davis Hanson

  NOTES

  I would like to thank Victor Hanson for his very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. The fieldwork discussed below was made possible by grants from the Research Office of Montana State University.

  Works referred to by author alone or with short title or date are cited in full in the Bibliography to this volume.

  1. For a review of the literature on this well-known problem, see Will 1975; Cartledge 1977:18, 23–4; Holladay 1982:97–9; Ober 1985a: 33–5, 191–2.

  2. On history of Greek wall-building, see Winter 1971; Lawrence 1979.

  3. Aymard 1967; Garlan 1974:125–34, 145–7; P.B.Kern, 'Military technology and ethical values in ancient Greek warfare: the siege of Plataea,' War and Society 6.2 (1988) 1–20; Ober 1985a: 43–5, 207–18.

  4. In the Athenian retreat from Syracuse in 413 BC, the hoplites exceptionally carried their own rations because of a lack of attendants and distrust of those they did have (Thuc. 7.75.5). Rations and attendants: D.Engels, Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army (Berkeley, 1978), 123–30; Pritchett, War 1, 30–52.

  5. Pack-animals and carts: Engels (supra n.4) passim (emphasizing pack-animals); N.G.L.Hammond, 'Army transport in the fifth and fourth centuries,' GRBS 24 (1983) 27–31 (emphasizing carts); Pritchett, Topography 3. 181–96; Engels (supra n.4) 12–24. My student, John MacLeod (Montana State University), points out in a paper based partly on personal experience and interviews with horse and mule packers that a significant percentage (in his experience one to three animals in twenty) will be lame or sore at any given time, and thus suggests that Engels' estimates of the number of pack animals needed by an army may be somewhat low.

  6. Hammond 1954; Vanderpool 1978; Pritchett, Topography vols 3 (with bibliography of earlier work), 4, 5; Van de Maele 1987.

  7. For a preliminary discussion see Ober 1982; Ober 1985a: 111–29, 181–8.

  8. Wheel ruts are found, for example, on the Coastal Pass Road from Megara to Eleusis: Ober 1985a: 128. See Pritchett, Topography 3.167–81, for full discussion.

  9. On which see, for example, J.J.Coulton, The Ancient Greek Architects at Work (Ithaca, 1982).

  10. This is the opinion of John Slonaker, a civil engineer with extensive experience in road surveying, who worked with me on ancient Greek roads in 1983–

  11. Cf. J.B.Salmon, Review of Pritchett, Topography 3 and 4, CR n.s. 35 (1985) 100–3, who suggests that the Hysiai-Tegea may have been built to facilitate metal imports into Tegean territory.

  12. Cf. the remarks of K.Hopkins, 'Models, ships and staples,' in P.Garnsey and C.R.Whittaker, (eds) Trade and Famine in Classical Antiquity, Cambridge Philological Society Supp. 8 (Cambridge, 1983) 84–109. Hopkins attempts to bring a nuance to the argument against large-scale ancient trade in bulk goods, but concludes that even at the height of the Roman empire, most trade was short-haul, from farm or village to the nearest market-town. While challenging the universal validity of the famous comment of A.H.M.Jones (The Later Roman Empire 1964:841) that 'it was cheaper to ship grain from one end of the Mediterranean to the other than to cart it 75 miles,' Hopkins acknowledges the relatively greater cost of land transport (104–5) noting that 'going over a mountain pass cost much more than going over level ground.'

  13. Cf. Plut. Tim. 28; Thuc. 6.70; Dem. 50.23; Plato, Resp. 3.404; Xen. Hell. 4.5.3.

  14. Cf. Thuc. 7.4.6 and esp. the ghastly scene described at 7.84 in which the Athenian army completely disintegrates when the thirsty hoplites reached a river. The Vathychoria area on the Athenian-Megarian border, along the Road of the Towers, is a good example of an area without a ready water supply: Ober 1985a: 167; Ober 1987a: 592–3.

  15. Co-workers: R.H.Randall, The Erechtheum workmen,' AJA 57 (1953) 199–210. On the question of the labor required to build a military highway, cf. Polybius (3.54–5) on Hannibal in the Alps. A usable road across the mountains already existed, but it was washed out in one section. Polybius claims that Hannibal spent one day rebuilding the 1.5-stade stretch so that it was usable for horses and pack-animals; three days to make it ready for elephants. Hannibal's men were working at top speed (he feared being caught by autumn storms) and Polybius emphasizes the greatness of the toil. It thus seems unlikely that this building rate would be exceeded by a classical Greek army. I would guess that a mile a week would be about as fast as Greek road-builders could hope to proceed through difficult terrain—but this is only a guess and many factors would affect the actual speed of building operations.

  16. Hanson 1983; Ober 1985a: 20–3; E.M.Wood, Peasant-Citizen and Slave: The Foundations of Athenian Democracy (London, 1988).

  17. Cf. the ease with which the Syracusans were able to use their knowledge of the roads, fords, and passes, to defeat the retreating Athenian army in 413 BC (Thuc. 7.73–85). Examples could easily be multiplied.

  18. The raid by Spartan harmost Sphodrias into Attica in 378 BC was detected by rural residents: Xen. Hell. 5.4.21. The watchpost and border fortification system of Attica may have been elaborated in part as a reaction to this raid: Ober 1985a: 211–13.

  19. Cf. the Syracusan destruction of the Athenian army in 413 BC, esp. Thuc. 7.78.5–7.79.2. For a list of examples, see G.E.M.de Ste Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War (Ithaca, 1972), 190–5.

  20. The issue of whether specific sections of given pass-roads were built by different state authorities must remain up in the air until more detailed studies of roads across borders have been carried out. It may turn out to be the case that there are polis-specific 'specifications' (cf. the detailed specifications on Athenian building contracts) as to grade and width; if so, a large enough corpus of measured roads could address the issue of who built a given road.

  21. Athenian city wall: R.E.Wycherley, The Stones of Athens (Princeton, 1978), 7–25; on early city walls generally: Winter 1971:54–8; Lawrence 1979:30–7.

  22. Decoration: wall of Thasos: C.Picard, Etudes Thasiennes 8: Les portes sculptées (Paris, 1962). Construction technique, and relative merits of stone and brick: Lawrence 1979:208–20.

  23. The Athenian reputation for skill at assaults: Thuc. 1.102.2. Rarity of assaults before and during the Peloponnesian War: Garlan 1974:125–34. According to Plutarch (Per. 27–8, cf. Thuc. 1. 116–17), when besieging Samos in 440 BC, Pericles preferred to spend money and time (in a siege that lasted eight or nine months) rather than risk the lives of citizens by attempting an assault. Failed assaults on small fortifications during the Peloponnesian War: Oinoe (Thuc. 2.18–19), Plataia (Thuc. 2.75–8). The

  Spartan disaster at Pylos in 425 BC was set up by their unwillingness to assault frontally even a makeshift fortification (Thuc. 3.3–41).

  24. Assyrian siegecraft: Garlan 1974:138 n. 5; Ferrill 1985:74–6; Roman siegecraft: G.Webster, The Roman Imperial Army3 (London, 1985) 239–54.

  25. Cf. Lawrence 1979:40. The Peloponnesian-Boiotian army at Plataia attempted to build a siege-ramp against the Plataian wall. This project took the entire army (assuming the text is correct) seventy days of 24-hour shifts to build, and ultimately failed (Thuc. 2.75–8). The experiment was not repeated by later Greek armies. Mobile siege-towers were apparently unknown in the Greek world before the Carthaginians used them at Selinus in 409 BC. The technology was adopted by Dionysius of Syracuse at Motya in 397 BC (Lawrence 1979:42–3); by the mid-fourth century siege-towers were sufficiently well known to be mentioned by Aeneas Tacticus (32.8).

  26. Frieze II, Block 872. See W.A.P.Childs, The City Reliefs of Lycia (Princeton, 1978), 22–31, esp. 27; fig. 11, Pl. 10.2.

  27. Towers: Winter 1971:152–203; Lawrence 1979:376–98.

  28. When the Plataians broke out of their besieged city in winter 428/7 BC, they used ladders to get over the Spartan wall of circumvallation (Thuc. 3.20, 22–3). Notably, the Plataian troops were light-armed and they took the enemy by surprise: first up the ladders were twelve men armed only with daggers and wearing breastplates; next came more light-armed men carrying spears; shields were carried
only by the men who came up in a third wave. Of course, this system would not work if the ladder assault had been contested.

  29. Stone-throwing: Aeneas Tacticus 38.6. A frieze from the Heroon of Trysa (Interior West Wall, Blocks A 7/8, B 9=Childs (supra n.26) pl. 14) illustrates defenders on walls and towers, hurling stones and javelins at defenders huddling beneath their shields at the foot of the wall. For a discussion of other artistic evidence (sixth-century François vase, fourth-century Nereid Monument), see Childs, (supra n. 26) 77. Use of stones, javelins, arrows, slings, and fire by defenders: Garlan 1974:135–47, esp. 135–6; Lawrence 1979:39–40.

  30. Earlier shields with straps for hanging shield across the back: Greenhalgh 1973:64–74; Snodgrass 1964b: 37–68. The hoplites depicted on the Nereid Monument are carrying their shields on their arms, as usual in combat, and climbing 'one-handed.'

  31. On the vivid description of siegecraft in Euripides' play, see Y.Garlan, 'De la poliorcétique dans les "Phéniciennes" d'Euripide,' REA 68 (1966) 264–77.

  32. Childs (supra n. 26), 31–6, 72–3, fig. 9, pl. 5.1.

  33. Childs ibid., (68) notes that the motif of the city wall is little used in classical Greek art and that when walls are depicted, it is 'only in set mythological cycles and not in general battle contexts.'

  34. Slaves in mining: S.Lauffer Der Bergwerkssklaven von Laureion, 2 vols (Wiesbaden, 1955–6).

  35. The Plataian defenders undermined the Spartan ramp (Thuc. 2.76). Aeneas the Tactician (37) discusses the use of defensive counter-mines.

  He also recommends ways that enemy miners can be killed by forcing smoke into their tunnels, or pestered by the introduction of bees and wasps! Mining and counter-mining were also common assault tactics in the Near Eastern tradition: Garlan 1974:131–2, 143–5; Lawrence 1979:41.

  36. Olympia ram: Garlan 1974:137–40 with pl. 2; Lawrence 1979:42 (dating it to ca 440 BC). Use of rams in fifth-century Greek warfare: Kern, (supra n. 3), 10–11.

  37. On gates: Winter 1971, 205–33; Lawrence 1979:302–42; and especially the article by J.-P.Adam in S. Van de Maele (ed.), Ancient Fortifications (Amsterdam, forthcoming).

  38. Early Greek town layout: L.Martin, L'urbanisme dans la Grèce antique (Paris, 1956), 75–96.

  39. Aeneas on traitors: Garlan 1974:179–83. Treason and concern with traitors generally in the late fifth century: L.A.Losada, The Fifth Column in the Peloponnesian War, Mnemosyne Suppl. 21 (Leiden, 1972).

  40. Cf. Thuc. 2.75.1–2: timber for the ramp at Plataia; 2.78, 3.21: construction of the counter-wall at Plataia; Athenians at Syracuse: Thuc. 6.99.1.

  41. The Peloponnesian/Boiotian force at Plataia had a special force of 300 men detailed to counter attempted sallies, but these proved ineffective in the event: Thuc. 3.22–3.

  42. Campaigning season: Thuc. 2.57 notes that the longest occupation of Attica during the Archidamian War lasted not more than forty days; difficulties involved with circumvallation: Lawrence 1979:41–2.

  43. M.Munn, 'Agesilaos' Boiotian campaigns and the Theban stockade of 378–377 BC,' Classical Antiquity 6 (1987) 106–38.

  44. Attica: Ober 1985a, Ober 1987b. The definitive publication of the fortification system of Boiotia by John Fossey is forthcoming. Surveys of the fortifications of the Corinthia and Aitolia by (respectively) G.Gauvin and J.Scholten are producing evidence for what may turn out to be fortified lines. Macedonia (where the fortifications are not easily dated): A.Rizakis, 'Une forteresse macédonienne dans I'Olympe,' BCH 110 (1986) 331–46.

  45. Philip's military reforms: Cawkwell 1978:150–65; G.T.Griffith, 'Philip as a general and the Macedonian Army,' in M.B.Hatzopoulos and L.D. Loukopoulos (eds) Philip of Macedon, (London, 1981) 58–78.

  46. Philip's siegecraft: Cawkwell 1978:160–3; Griffith (supra n. 45), 59, 62. Olynthus bullets: Lawrence 1979:39. Garlan 1974:202–11, sees Philip as inaugurating a new age of effective siegecraft. Philip's record as a besieger of cities was, however, far from perfect; cf. his failure at Byzantion and Perinthos in 340 BC.

  47. Torsion artillery and its use in siegecraft: Marsden 1969:16–24, 99–108, 116–17; cf. Ober 1987a:570, 597–9.

  * * *

  8

  SACRIFICE BEFORE BATTLE

  Michael H.Jameson

  It is with the gods' help that wise commanders launch an attack, never against their wishes. (Euripides Erechtheus Fr. 352 (Nauck TGF2))

  For the Greeks no undertaking was without its appropriate ritual, giving assurance of approval or, at the least, the withholding of hostility on the part of the supernatural. In war, where human life, pride, and prosperity were uniquely at risk, ritual was so conspicuous that it became the paradigm for other human activities. So Xenophon has Socrates say 'You see men at war appeasing the gods before they engage in battle and asking by means of sacrifices and omens what they ought to do. Do you think we should propitiate the gods any the less when we come to engage in farming?' (Oec. 5.19–20). Indeed, every stage of the process that led up to a clash of hoplite phalanxes on the field of battle was marked by attention to the gods. Victor Hanson (1989), writing on the Greek way of war, has brought out vividly the grim reality of the fighting, but he chose not to treat there the supernatural dimension. The aim of this essay is to complete the picture, in colors that will perhaps seem no less lurid than those used to describe combat itself.1

  For the earliest stages in the sequence of rites we look to the Spartans who offer the fullest examples of religious practice in warfare, though other cities certainly followed the same procedures, no doubt less rigidly and with their own distinctive practices. Once the Spartans had reached a decision on a campaign, the king, who was to lead the expedition, sacrificed in his house to Zeus Agetor ('Who leads out') and other gods associated with him. If the signs observed in this sacrifice were favorable, the 'fire-bearer' (purphoros) carried fire from the altar to the border of the land where the king sacrificed to Zeus

  and Athena and, if the signs once again permitted, crossed the border with the army.2 When the army marched out it was accompanied by a flock of sacrificial sheep, led by goats (Paus. 9.13.4). These were the most common sacrificial victims and could keep up with the army in its march over the mountainous borders of Greece. Before crossing any river or the sea, sacrifices were made and favorable signs looked for in order to continue.

  On the march sacrifices were performed frequently, perhaps every morning and certainly before every important undertaking such as building a fort (Xen. Hell. 4.7.7) or attacking a town (ibid. 3.1.17), but no more than three victims a day could be assayed (ibid. 6.4.16 and 19).3 The advisability of meeting the enemy at any particular place and time was always verified through signs derived from sacrifice. When the two forces were drawn up and facing each other, a final sacrifice was made in front of the battle-line. As the lines advanced against each other, the chant known as the paian was raised, to the accompaniment—at least for the Spartans—of the shrill reed instrument, the aulos (Pritchett, War 1. 105–8). After victory, the winning side (no specific ritual is mentioned for the defeated) set up a trophy and performed thanksgiving and victory sacrifices to which might be joined athletic contests (Xen. An. 5.5.5, Arrian An. 5.29.1, 6.28.3, 7.14.1). The Spartans are said to have limited the victims at their victory celebrations to a single, symbolic rooster (Plut. Ages. 33, Marc. 22).

  Clearly, we know a great deal about what was done but there is disagreement on its meaning. The ostensible purpose of all rites before victory was achieved was to obtain from the gods favorable signs (kallierein, from the phrase kala ta hiera) for the next step in the campaign. Modern commentators, after a period when sceptical rationalism prevailed, have tended to be impressed by the Greeks' faith, their strict adherence to the signals they received through sacrifices and the rarity of cases in which the gods' advice was ignored or proved false.4 However, examples of successful action contrary to negative signs are not likely to be reported in our sources. Most often both sides began fighting in the belief that, as far as the gods w
ere concerned, there were no obstacles to their success (cf. Diod. Sic. 15.85.1) and, since few engagements ended in a draw, one side was almost always doomed to disappointment. Our sources describe dramatic delays while waiting for the signs to be favorable, and the disastrous error of proceeding when the signs were unfavorable is noted (Xen. Hell. 4.8.36), but we are never given an explanation of