Four March Brigades containing 469,000 troops had to replace the 82 percent infantry losses by the end of 1914.14 This resulted in multitudes of inexperienced and inadequately trained soldiers being rushed into battle, which resulted in incredible numbers of troops perishing. There were many problems with such March Brigades, or Ersatz units. Most importantly, they often lacked professional officers, and, if supplied with it, their artillery was antiquated. The units possessed no machine guns or signal or technical equipment. As the Carpathian Winter War approached, the question of the reliability of particular replacement troops such as Czech, Romanian, Italian, and Ruthenian became a major factor as anti-Habsburg and antimilitary propaganda from specific areas of the Dual Monarchy increasingly appeared at the front. Often, reserve officers helped carry this propaganda to the front lines.
The nationality problem came to the forefront before the war, but some signs appeared even during mobilization. One problem was that the national groups listed above made unwilling soldiers. In particular, the Ruthenians (Ukrainians) resented that they were fighting the Russians, because they shared the same religion as Russians and understood the Russian language. The fact that two-thirds of the officers in the army at mobilization were German made matters worse. Slavic troops did not understand why they should fight their fellow Slavs, the Serbs and Russians. Desertions began fairly quickly, and in 1915, Czech desertions became quite frequent. Slavic troops grew increasingly unreliable, which caused the army structure to break down. The Germans feared that the Austro-Hungarian army was on the verge of collapse and could only be maintained if they intervened. Italian, Romanian, and Czech upper classes shunned military service before the war. A combination of national and social unrest was matched by military mismanagement on the other side, a major factor in the unreliability of various troops.
Moreover, Austria-Hungary was the only major power without a reserve army. Consequently, inexperienced Landsturm reserves comprised some two-thirds of its troops deployed in August 1914, the majority having undergone little basic training long before the war erupted. The unsuspecting new soldiers became cannon fodder in the desperate attempts to halt the overpowering Russian attacks. However, the practice raised another problem. How would field commanders fill the ever-widening gaps in the front lines?
Furthermore, Ersatz troops proved undisciplined and lacked physical fortitude. They arrived completely unprepared for the physical and mental demands of a winter mountain campaign. Desertion developed as a major problem, and it became obvious that replacement units should not enter the front lines without additional training. The early shortage of replacement troops forced the sick and wounded to return more rapidly to the front lines. At the beginning of 1915, 90 percent of the ailing soldiers, reputedly recovered, were deployed into Ersatz units.
No investigation of the Carpathian Winter War would be complete without providing insight into its mastermind, Conrad von Hötzendorf. The tremendous suffering endured by troops he commanded stemmed partly from Conrad’s inability to accurately assess his army’s capabilities. Throughout his tenure as chief of the General Staff of Austro-Hungarian forces on the Eastern front from 1914 to 1917, Conrad devoted much of his time to his mistress, and later his wife, Gina von Reininghaus. A self-proclaimed avid mountain climber, Conrad failed to consider important terrain features such as rivers, mountains, and swamps, as well as weather conditions, in his offensive plans. His shortsightedness and wishful thinking persisted into the latter years of the war, including his ill-fated spring 1916 Italian Straf campaign.
At this juncture, a retrospective look into the events leading up to the Carpathian Winter campaign is critical to understanding this tragic chapter in military history. When the Central Powers declared war in July and August 1914, Austria-Hungary represented the least militarily prepared European great power. In the decades following the 1867 Ausgleich (compromise), the Dual Monarchy’s two parliaments in Budapest and Vienna consistently proved parsimonious in allocating funds for the military, particularly Budapest. Until 1913, army recruiting remained low and below the other great powers, although the empire’s population had increased 40 percent.
The Habsburg Common Army drew its recruits from all regions of the multiethnic empire. Professional officers, versed in several languages, provided a cohesive force among the various nationalities. The ability to communicate with their troops gained the soldiers’ trust and respect. When enemy efforts devastated the professional officer corps and reserve officers replaced them, communication faltered as did confidence in the new replacements. Often, sergeants had to “translate” a commander’s orders to the troops.
The Habsburg army lacked the strength to launch two offensives in 1914; thus, no concentration of forces could oppose either Serbia or Russia. When Conrad decided to change the original deployment ordered on 1 July, in Galicia against Russia, back to the San–Dniester River line (the so-called Rückverlegung), the troops had to march from their railroad unloading areas to the originally designated deployment line in the August heat. Conrad’s sudden change of mobilization and deployment plans resulted from his decision to launch a major offensive to crush Serbia before the reputedly slower-deploying Russians presented a major military danger to Habsburg troops. This proved to be a major mistake, which later led to devastating battlefield defeats.
As a result, 40 percent (or twenty divisions) of the Austro-Hungarian army originally deployed against Serbia. Thus, the two designated offensive armies on the czarist front, the First and Fourth, originally consisted of nine divisions rather than the twelve designated for a War Case “Russia.” First Army advanced north, the Fourth to the northeast commencing concentric advances. Third Army, designated to protect the attacking armies’ right flank positions, launched a disastrous late August seven-division offensive against twenty-one Russian divisions that attacked almost simultaneously. Meanwhile, Second Army had deployed most of its forces to defeat Serbia in War Case “Balkan,” when in a War Case “Russia” it had been designated to protect the Habsburg extreme right flank positions. Thus, in 1914, only one corps (XII) deployed in that important area.
Numerically superior Russian forces rapidly penetrated into the gaps between the Habsburg armies. The Habsburg Second and Third armies’ offensive proved indecisive, and Fourth Army’s rear echelon became seriously threatened when the Russians smashed into the gap between First and Fourth armies. Lacking reserve formations to halt the strong enemy advances, Habsburg forces retreated on 2 September after the overwhelming first Battle of Lemberg defeat. The three Austro-Hungarian armies then launched a second offensive once their fronts had finally been consolidated, but they suffered a further devastating defeat. To save the Habsburg armies from annihilation, they retreated on 11 September after the second Battle of Lemberg. The Third Army’s retreat during 13 and 14 September produced chaos, partly because the fall rainy season washed away the rain-soaked roads, and the destruction of bridges and railroads seriously retarded all movement.
The lack of a retreat plan led to panic within the Habsburg ranks, though less experienced soldiers also reacted out of fear and mistrust of their “foreign” brothers in arms. The hasty retreat resulted in the costly loss of matériel. The fact that the army was untrained in defensive warfare methods compounded the chaotic situation. Initially, the San River line appeared to present a suitably strong defensive position against the pursuing Russians. However, the army proved too exhausted to establish a viable defensive along the river. Thus, it continued to retreat further west on the treacherous, waterlogged Galician roads. Second Army deployed into the Carpathian Mountains between the Uzsok and Dukla passes.
The debilitating situation forced Conrad to seek the assistance of their powerful German ally—a bitter pill considering their early and increasingly persistent efforts to influence Habsburg military operations. A period of interallied squabbles commenced, preventing the establishment of a unified command structure and undermining chances for a Central Powers vic
tory. The inability to establish a cohesive allied strategy partially resulted from a personality conflict between Conrad and his German counterpart, Erich von Falkenhayn. Their opposing viewpoints polarized portions of the military establishment into the “Westerners” camp, led by Falkenhayn, and the “Easterners,” represented by Conrad and Falkenhayn’s nemeses, the German Eastern front commanders, Hindenburg and Ludendorff. The Westerners believed that ultimate victory could only occur on the Western front, but during December 1914, that front settled into trench warfare, with massive troop concentrations opposing each other along the lengthy battlefront, which stretched hundreds of kilometers. Citing the Western front stalemate, Conrad argued that the Eastern front presented the greatest promise for a decisive victory and that, with German support, allied forces could prevail over the Russian colossus and then the Germans could return to the Western front to end the war.
By the end of September 1914, the Russians had conquered the greater part of Galicia and planned to defeat Germany by unleashing a “steamroller” offensive across the Vistula River, with four armies advancing into Silesia and toward Berlin. As early as October, czarist general Ivanov made plans to launch an offensive through the Carpathian Mountains to invade Hungary to force Austria-Hungary out of the war. Such a campaign faced difficulties, particularly because Stavka, the czarist supreme headquarters, had selected Germany as the next major military objective. In addition, Russian strategists had to protect their flanks between the Northwest and Southwest fronts before attempting to attack the Carpathian Mountains or invade Germany.
Map 1. Carpathian Front, August–September 1914
The Carpathian Mountain region initially became the focus of attention when the Habsburg army retreated in mid-September 1914. Both General Conrad and General Ivanov soon discovered that the Carpathian Mountain region had correctly been designated as ill-suited for prolonged large troop maneuvers. Though both ultimately lacked the necessary troop strengths to achieve a decisive victory, each feared the other intended to envelop their respective extreme flank positions in the far reaches of the Carpathian Mountains. Insufficiently prepared for a winter mountain campaign but unwilling to yield to their opponent, both armies sustained enormous casualties in the world’s first total war mountain campaign. Both also rushed to launch an offensive in the inhospitable mountains because Conrad and Ivanov believed that the first who seized the opportunity to launch an offensive would gain a critical advantage. But there was a major determinant of the Carpathian campaign: the remaining area of the Southwest front had equivalent opposing troop numbers, so an offensive north of the mountain range offered little chance of success.
The Russian fall Vistula River campaign failed to capture Berlin, but the invasion routes to Vienna and Budapest remained exposed and nearly defenseless at various Carpathian Mountain crossings. The September Habsburg retreat caught the attention of Cossack troops roaming the Carpathian Mountain range and introduced small unit warfare to the vast mountain theater, but did not yet threaten Hungary. The Carpathian Mountains developed into the main Eastern front battleground for the 1914–1915 winter campaign because both the extreme czarist left flank and Habsburg right flank positions invited opposing envelopment movements. With the exception of the German Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes in early February 1915, the crucial Eastern front battles developed primarily in the Carpathian Mountain campaign.
The Habsburg Third Army retreated mid-September 1914, and Fortress Przemyśl fell to the Russians. The October Habsburg offensive later liberated the fortress. Mountain weather conditions were a major concern: a great amount of snow fell at Uzsok Pass as early as 28 September 1914. The three October-through-December monthly Habsburg campaigns offered the first glimpse into the difficulties inherent in waging war on winter mountainous terrain and produced some of the highest casualties of the entire war.
The early October Habsburg offensive objective, in conjunction with German support, was to free Fortress Przemyśl and regain the San River line. Conrad launched a hasty offensive because he feared that the fortress could not repulse a massed enemy attack. The allied campaigns forced the Germans to shift considerable troop numbers to that front to save the Habsburg army from catastrophe. During the October campaign, the fortress withstood multiple czarist mass attacks between 3 and 8 October in a Russian attempt to storm the citadel before a Habsburg counteroffensive could relieve it. The Third and Fourth armies, after advancing eighty kilometers, could not cross the San River because of strong czarist defensive positions.
As the Third Army approached Fortress Przemyśl, the flooded roadways along the seventy-eight miles rearward to the railroad supply head could not maintain the logistical support for the army. Thus, the Third Army plundered the fortress’ food supplies upon reaching it. In the interim, six days of resupply efforts replaced some of the food and ammunition the field armies had confiscated. Destroyed bridges had to be rebuilt after the recent czarist retreat, so the available time for resupply proved short, but it did not restore the fortress food provisions ransacked by the Third and Second armies.
The Second Army cooperated with the Third Army relief effort at Fortress Przemyśl by attempting to roll up the Russian extreme left flank positions. On 6 October, Second Army’s VII Corps advanced along the major Mezölaborcz-Lisko-Rostocki-Baligrod road to seize the Uzsok Pass and then the enemy-held major railroad junctions at Turka, Stary Sambor, and Lutoviska, which remained important offensive objectives during the further fall and 1915 Carpathian Mountain campaigns. On 7 October, the first serious mountain snowstorm introduced initial severe weather and terrain conditions to the advancing Habsburg troops. By 13 October, Habsburg armies had advanced the eighty kilometers to the San River. This area between the Dukla and Uzsok passes developed into the fulcrum for the 1915 Carpathian Winter War campaigns.
The Habsburg October offensive, which recaptured Fortress Przemyśl between 10 October and the first week in November, eventually failed for many reasons, including frontal attacks launched against extremely well-prepared Russian mountain positions, which reoccurred as a major factor during the 1915 Carpathian campaigns. Vital mountain artillery batteries had been deployed on the Balkan front; they were thus unavailable for the major Russian theater. Weather remained a major factor throughout fall and winter 1915. Heavy fall rains intermittently produced a muddy morass, retarding logistical and troop movement, including heavy ammunition wagons, artillery, and general supplies. Icy, snow-covered high-elevation roads proved difficult, if not futile, for transport. Supply efforts had to halt overnight until the roadways’ icy cover had melted by midday the next day.
Russia dealt the Habsburg army a stunning blow in its three fall 1914 campaigns, as well as in the subsequent 1915 Carpathian offensives. A successful offensive depended on speed and coordinated regular transport of troops, supplies, ammunition, artillery pieces, and shells, but only four narrow-gauge Habsburg railroad lines provided access to the 400-kilometer-wide Carpathian Mountain front. One major two-track line extended from Budapest to Mezölaborcz in the Laborcz Valley, making the latter a primary objective for Russian action during the first Carpathian campaign. Its early February 1915 surrender precluded use of this important railroad hub for offensive purposes to recapture Fortress Przemyśl and interrupted the Third Army’s right flank supply efforts for the offensive forces.
Austria-Hungary’s sparse railroad network posed a tremendous military and logistical disadvantage throughout the war. Extending like a spiderweb from Budapest, the Hungarian railroad system provided limited access to the main Habsburg operational area. Furthermore, it could not satisfy the various requirements of such large military forces. The huge number of troop transports overtaxed the low capacity rail lines, delaying the arrival of troop units, reinforcements, and war matériel, as well as transporting the wounded homeward. Internal political bickering between Austria and Hungary had for decades led to political impasse. Consequently, few railroads, stations, or ramps had been cons
tructed from Budapest to the Carpathian Mountain region—a severe military handicap during the Carpathian campaign.
Nor could the poorly constructed and dilapidated Galician roads meet the sudden enormous increase in demand. Other passageways through the sparsely populated forested mountains were too few and primitive for military use. For each increase in rail troop transport intensity, there came a corresponding disturbance of Ersatz, supply, and war matériel traffic. These factors disrupted the maximum technically feasible Habsburg rail traffic intensity, delaying all transport movement.
Four Habsburg armies and forty-two divisions were ultimately transported into the wintry abyss. In early 1915, many units transferred from the Balkan and Galician fronts, the Hinterland and the German Eastern and Western fronts for the offensive undertakings. A total of 4,952 trains transported 168,080 sick and 26,240 wounded POWs from the Russian front to the Hinterland. The train traffic between January and the end of March 1915 totaled 2,752 trains, which transported 14,404 officers, 643,081 troops, and 13,783 wagons and artillery pieces to the front. This encompassed one army commander, ten corps commanders, and forty-two divisions through 116 days and 2,547 trains. On average, twenty-three trains traveled per day, and sometimes up to fifty-four.
The majority of units transferred to the Carpathian theater arrived from the Russian front north of the mountains. These included five corps commanders (X, XVIII, V, IV, XI) and twenty-one divisions on 1,288 trains. Three corps commanders (XIX, XIII, VIII) and seven infantry divisions were transported from the Balkan front in 615 trains. In addition, the German ally sent two corps commanders (XXIV and II) and six infantry divisions on 471 trains and two infantry and four Habsburg cavalry divisions from the homeland to the front in 173 transport trainloads.
Blood on the Snow Page 3
