Transport from the Russian front to the homeland during the same period included 346,829 sick and wounded, and 92,600 prisoners of war.15 Tragically, Conrad could not replace the catastrophic 1.25 million losses incurred during the 1914 campaigns. By the end of December 1914, only 303,000 Habsburg troops remained between the Vistula River and the Romanian frontier to oppose the Russians.
The San River Fortress Przemyśl citadel served as a guiding, or more appropriately, misguiding light for Conrad’s Eastern front strategy between October 1914 and April 1915. “Rescue Przemyśl!” became the Habsburg call to arms—for the Russians, “March to Budapest!” The fortress had proven beneficial during the chaotic September Habsburg retreat, when it slowed the Russian pursuit at the fortress environs, preventing the Russians from invading Hungary and enabling the battered army to retreat unscathed from the San River line. Meanwhile, San River bridgeheads, hastily constructed to protect the northern flank of the fortress, surrendered, enabling the enemy to approach the fortress unimpeded. Conrad feared its loss, which he thought would represent the defeat of the army and the Dual Monarchy.
Because of the lack of funding to upgrade the fortress before the war, all supply and building activities to make the citadel defensible occurred during the alarm and mobilization periods. Not until August 1914 did 27,000 workers provide preliminary preparations for the fortress mission to secure it against a preemptive Russian attack. That process terminated forty-two days later. The fortress initially had to be protected against an anticipated mass czarist cavalry attack and then secured against a possible siege. Prewar planning had anticipated weeks, even months, to prepare the fortress for war, but by 1914, only a few weeks remained. Between 14 and 18 August 1914, the workers constructed new defensive lines, artillery positions, ammunition supply depots, and additional structures to plug the gaps between the various interval positions. By the time the Russians reached the fortress environs on 15 September, seven new zones and twenty-four defensive positions spanned a fifty-kilometer area.16
The fortress commander, General Kusmanek, received his assignment just months before the declaration of war. The decision to deploy Habsburg Supreme Command headquarters within the fortress compounded his myriad problems, which interfered with fortress preparations and greatly increased its security problems. A series of three defensive lines consisting of concentric rings formed by nineteen permanent and twenty-three smaller forts protected the fortress, which was forty-eight kilometers in circumference. The main citadel zones were completed, but secondary ones were only partially finished. The citadel’s main weakness remained that it could not withstand modern heavy artillery fire. Fortunately, the Russians’ heaviest artillery received priority for the German, not Austro-Hungarian, front. Once besieged in September 1914, the fortress bound nine czarist infantry and two cavalry divisions. After its second siege commencing on 4 November, the fortress became a secondary theater, tying down fewer enemy troops (six infantry and one cavalry division).
A German October offensive attempt to seize Warsaw at the lower Vistula River front initially relieved the pressure on the gravely threatened Austro-Hungarian lines. The German drive forced the Russians to retreat on the Southwest front to the San River and Chyróv area to protect their flank positions between the Northwest and Southwest fronts. Later in November, when the Germans had to retreat before superior czarist numbers, they resumed their westward advance against the Habsburg army and encircled Fortress Przemyśl for the second time on 8 November. The Russians utilized inclement weather conditions to sever all rail and road access to the fortress. The besieging Eleventh Army consisted of six infantry divisions and one cavalry division, representing half the troops deployed during the first siege.
The fortress mission remained to repel any enemy offensive efforts and disrupt its rearward communication lines by binding as many czarist troops as possible. The second loss of the fortress represented a major blow to Habsburg prestige. Fortress Cracow became the target of major Russian attacks as the enemy sought to press the Habsburgs from their normal retreat routes to Vienna and force the main Carpathian passes to protect their west Galician positions. The Russian Tenth Army launched a major offensive from the Vistula River valley into Germany, while the Southwest front attempted to maintain East Galicia and the left Vistula River front crossing points. This forced the Habsburg armies rearward from the San River line. The German retreat from Warsaw in late November exposed the Austro-Hungarian armies’ northern flank; First Army retreated from its San River positions at Ivangorod, suffering a major defeat; and Third Army moved to the Dukla Pass and Second Army through the Uzsok and Lupkov passes, creating an eighty-kilometer gap between the Third and Fourth armies.
Meanwhile, Habsburg Fourth Army right flank units had deployed between the Fortress Cracow perimeter and northern Vistula River bank. Third Army front extended from the Carpathian forelands to the upper Dunajec River because Second Army had been transferred to the German Northwest front to defend Silesia, a major industrial area threatened by the czarist Vistula River front activity. The Russians discovered the serious weakness on the Habsburg front southeast of Cracow, where the Habsburg Second Army troops had been deployed. The czarist Third and Eighth armies launched an assault against the entire Habsburg front, but particularly Fortress Cracow. During November, defense of the Carpathian Mountain front, spanning hundreds of kilometers, rested on the exhausted eleven-division Third Army and Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin’s irregular territorial forces. Conrad now encountered two problems: he must defeat the Russians pressing Fortress Cracow and restore the Carpathian Mountain situation. He ordered Fourth Army units deployed north of Fortress Cracow to intercept and halt the advancing czarist army. When Fourth Army failed, the army rapidly rail-transferred south of the fortress environs to counter the menacing flank threat emanating from that area.
During the first half of November, while major battles extended to Fortress Cracow, the Russian Third Army advanced through the Dukla Pass area. Then on 19 November, heavy snow and frigid conditions settled into the mountains. At the end of the month, the Russian Eighth Army advanced along the shortest route at the upper San River, then pressed further westward. The Russians seized the Lupkov Pass, then the Dukla, to provide easy access to the Hungarian Plains. Meanwhile, the situation south of Fortress Cracow worsened as the Russian Third Army repulsed the weak Habsburg covering troops forcing them back into the mountain regions. Then on 26 November, the czarist army shifted north toward Cracow to attempt to turn the Austro-Hungarian right flank positions and sever the Habsburg retreat route. This also isolated Fortress Przemyśl, where the besieging czarist 12th and 19th Infantry Divisions had transferred to the Carpathian battlefield, signifying that the siege army now consisted almost entirely of reserve formations.
The Austro-Hungarian army found itself in a critical situation during early December. It had to launch an offensive to prevent neutral Italy and Romania entering the war, as well as halt the steady Russian military advance westward. Repeated battlefield defeats on the Russian front had created an unfavorable military situation, and the embarrassing Serbian debacle early in the month caused a major loss of Habsburg prestige, specifically in the Balkans. Germany pressed the Habsburgs to retrieve their military honor by launching an offensive against Serbia, and to prevent Italy and Romania from seeking irredentist aims in the Dual Monarchy. The early December battle, with a Limanova-Lapanov victory, proved welcome after so many defeats. The Russians retreated fifty kilometers, their Eighth Army losing 70 percent of its manpower. The success temporarily prevented the Russians from invading Hungary, ended the threat to Fortress Cracow—and, because of their threatened flank positions, it forced them to abandon a major campaign into Germany.
At the height of battle in mid-December, the Third Army attacked the open Russian flank in the Carpathian Mountains. The assault forced czarist formations to retreat from the area and from the Fortress Cracow front, resulting in the Limanova-Lapanov victory, th
e first in the war for Austria-Hungary. At the same time, General Ivanov determined to transfer the mass of his armies into the Carpathian Mountain area as a prelude to an invasion of Hungary, because “the road to Berlin lies through Austria-Hungary.” During the ensuing late December campaign, the Russians secured their extreme left flank positions. After Limanova-Lapanov, Conrad ordered his depleted troops to pursue the retreating Russians, but that ended quickly on 17 December, mainly because of high casualties and an enemy counteroffensive that hurled Habsburg forces rearward into the Carpathian Mountains toward the main ridges.
General Falkenhayn’s goal remained to push the Russians behind the San–Vistula River line to reduce the enemy’s offensive capabilities. The early December Habsburg Third Army December mission entailed binding the Russian Eighth Army and severing the last major czarist supply and transportation artery, as well as blocking the Russian retreat route.17 In late December, when the Russians seized the critical Dukla Pass and created a defensive line extending from the Uzsok Pass, they placed the Habsburg army at a great disadvantage. After Limanova-Lapanov, battle reports emphasized the enormous casualties and the extraordinarily strenuous physical efforts required to survive the inclement weather and harsh terrain conditions. In addition, Habsburg troops lacked cover as well as regular food and supplies. Many active duty officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers fell in combat, which resulted in slackened discipline and battle effectiveness, while combat battle fatigue produced troop apathy.
In early December, the Russians had penetrated key Carpathian passes leading to Budapest, but Habsburg troop numbers proved insufficient to halt them. Galician roads remained in terrible shape, with only one route suitable for logistical support and troop reinforcements, seriously hindering operations. The troops had been engaged in combat for months, during which division numbers had sunk sharply. In addition, serious deficiencies, particularly of artillery shells, prevailed, further lessening battle effectiveness. The 1914 casualties had been so enormous that replacement troops could not fill the ensuing gaps in the front lines.
General Ivanov was confident his troops could now garner a decisive victory over the Habsburg armies. However, reinforcements were needed between the Uzsok Pass and Romanian frontier, his most threatened strategic area, where only four czarist divisions stood. Ivanov insisted that Fortress Przemyśl was encircled by only weak forces—quite an exaggeration—and that a mere two cavalry divisions defended the key terrain between the Uzsok Pass and Baligrod. Czarist reinforcements would have to transfer from the German Northwest front where the major Russian offensive had been scheduled. Ivanov planned for his troops to traverse the Carpathian Mountains to invade Hungary, now that his flank positions had been secured. Intending to strike at the point of least resistance, he concentrated troops near Mezölaborcz to occupy the main Carpathian Mountain crossings.
At the end of December, the Austro-Hungarian military situation appeared bleak, especially when considering the loss of professional soldiers. The army desperately needed time to recover from its ordeal and replace its enormous casualties. It also had to defend the major Carpathian Mountain crossings against Russian advances, in particular because the Third Army had retreated far into the region and the Russians threatened to invade Hungary in early 1915. Thus, Conrad determined to launch a Carpathian Mountain offensive early in the New Year, although he lacked reserve formations, and his rapidly diminishing troop numbers would face superior Russian numbers. Both Conrad and Ivanov looked to the Carpathian theater as the weather caused a weeks-long pause in the fighting.
Chapter 1 traces Habsburg army preparations to launch the first Carpathian offensive from early January 1915. Serious questions arise relative to the army’s preparedness for a major military operation in such adverse winter mountain weather and terrain conditions. Further problems included the lack of artillery shells and difficulties deploying artillery on the rugged terrain, compounded by the difficult and unresolved logistical problems.
Map 2. Austro-Hungarian–Russian Front, December 1914
Chapter 2 highlights the first Carpathian offensive, launched on 23 January 1915, and its catastrophic outcome. Chapter 3 describes the second Carpathian effort, launched on 27 February 1915. For the first time during the war, Habsburg forces initially outnumbered czarist troops. The chapter details their struggles to overcome two fierce adversaries: the overwhelming Russian forces and the terrible mountain conditions.
Chapter 4 discusses the third and final Carpathian offensive in late March, scheduled to coincide with a breakout attempt from Fortress Przemyśl, an objective of all three offensives, and the bloody April Easter Battle. With Russian troops on the verge of breaking through the battered Habsburg Carpathian Mountain defensive positions, an invasion of Hungary appeared imminent. The chapter concludes with the Gorlice–Tarnov offensive, the Central Powers’ greatest victory of World War I, which spared the Habsburg army from final defeat and possible annihilation in the Carpathian war theater.
1
Background to the Battles
Those who do not know the conditions of mountains and forests, hazardous defiles, marshes and swamps, cannot conduct the march of an army.
Sun Tzu, The Art of War
BY JANUARY 1915 their Carpathian Mountain exertions had left Russian and Austro-Hungarian troops exhausted.1 Weather conditions forced a pause in major operations, allowing both sides to rehabilitate. Localized isolated battles erupted when each sought to improve front-line positions, particularly those between Gorlice and the Uzsok Pass.
Despite the relative quiet, neither side could rest, keenly aware of the considerable preparations necessary for upcoming battle. Habsburg troops prepared new defensive positions as they awaited the arrival of reinforcements. Air and cavalry reconnaissance monitored the location and concentration of Russian units while simultaneously identifying potential sites for positioning additional troops and artillery. Convinced of Russian intent to invade the region, Conrad planned a preemptive strike, and accurate intelligence was critical to the operation’s success.
Amid alarming diplomatic reports emanating out of Italy and Romania, Conrad staunchly advocated launching a Carpathian Mountain offensive. The region held the greatest promise for victory over the Russians; a win that would persuade Italy, Romania, and Bulgaria to remain neutral. Conrad’s plan resurrected two of his earlier 1914 objectives—one defensive (preventing the invasion of Hungary), the other offensive (liberating Fortress Przemyśl). The Dukla hollow area thus became a key battleground for the operation. Habsburg Third Army eastern flank units, the major attack force, would strike in echelon formation toward the Lisko–Sanok railroads to sever the Russians from their major transportation centers.
Initially, General Boroević left flank forces and neighboring Fourth Army southern flank units were to assume a defensive stance. The success of the Third Army’s operations hinged on regained control of Uzsok Pass and capturing the major railroads supporting the Russian troops along the San River. Deployed between the Romanian frontier and Wyszkov ridges, Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin’s mission was to protect the Third Army’s extreme right flank. South army troops, primarily Habsburg units, deployed into the Waldkarpathen region east of Uzsok Pass between Third Army and Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin. From there, they had to traverse the Verecke Pass and Wyszkov ridges and advance to the Stryj River. If successful, South Army troops would either join the Third Army offensive or continue advancing eastward. Conrad’s plan depended entirely on timing, surprise, and total cooperation among all participating armies. Under no circumstances should the operation falter and afford the Russians time to transfer in reinforcements. If everything went as planned, the battle would be short, and Habsburg troops would then be free to cross the Carpathian Mountains into Galicia. However, several aspects of Conrad’s plan were flawed. The shortage of railroads in the Carpathian Mountain region slowed the mobilization and deployment of troop masses. Habsburg military strategists underestimated or
simply ignored the significant demands placed on the troops. The severe weather conditions and rugged terrain left Habsburg troops exhausted and demoralized, making them ideal targets for insidious national propaganda. Reports of mass desertions among certain ethnic groups, most notably the Czechs, unnerved Habsburg Supreme Command.
Conrad committed grave, though perhaps unintentional, errors in planning his Carpathian campaign. The first late January 1915 offensive failed to adequately address the formidable logistical challenges inherent in winter mountain warfare. When the intended swift victory gave way to a prolonged winter confrontation, Habsburg troops had to battle superior Russian numbers without the benefit of a reliable support system. Positioned on higher ground, czarist sharpshooters gunned down Conrad’s troops one by one as they slowly navigated through the deep snow, jokingly comparing it to a rabbit hunt.2 Many Habsburg soldiers took their own lives to escape the nightmare.
Habsburg Third Army daily logbooks provide disturbing eyewitness accounts of the dreadful battle conditions, many of which diverge significantly from official postwar publications. Field commanders’ pleas for additional rest and rehabilitation from the 1914 campaigns before the offensive’s launch date went unanswered by Habsburg Supreme Command. Urgent requests for ammunition and additional troops can be found throughout the various Tagebücher.
Habsburg military strategy focused on preventing a Russian offensive in the Carpathians for some time, with the notion that victory in that theater would release some Habsburg forces for deployment elsewhere. The plan proposed that the Third and South armies encircle czarist extreme left flank positions and then push them behind the San–Vistula River line, liberating Fortress Przemyśl in the process. A Russian offensive could potentially neutralize Habsburg efforts and return the initiative to the enemy. In what would become the Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes, in February 1915, the German Ninth Army attacked enemy forces over the Narev River, pressing the Russians behind the Vistula River. The resulting gigantic pincer maneuver, launched from widely separated allied flanks, reincarnated Conrad’s 1914 grandiose plan. This did little to endear Conrad to the Germans, who increasingly began to question his leadership abilities and the viability of the Austro-Hungarian armies. Mounting casualties, declining morale, desertion, and waning resistance power seemed to justify the Germans’ concerns.
Blood on the Snow Page 4
