V Corps command requested a delay in launching the offensive because snow masses blocked mountain passages and such difficulties would negate the vital element of surprise. Also, the chances of an early military success would rapidly dissipate if the enemy gained time to initiate effective countermeasures, which is precisely what occurred during the three Carpathian offensives. Other corps commanders also requested a delay in the operation until conditions improved. Then temperatures suddenly rose, hovering around freezing. Thawing conditions descended on the northern Fourth Army front, but heavy snowfall continued in higher elevations. However, by 21 January, the mercury again plummeted, and an additional meter of fresh snow further hindered movement.
A Group Szurmay Honvéd Infantry Division arrived and immediately began establishing security positions.117 The 38th Honvéd Infantry Division reported only two functional field cannons and requested additional machine guns. Responding to the supply chaos, V Corps command ordered two cavalry squadrons to regulate and assist traffic flow between the major Takcsany and Cisna supply centers. Troops had to improvise sleds for an entire supply column and requested the necessary tools. X and XVIII Corps also began improvising sled columns, while the latter awaited the opening of a forest rail line. All the while, troops continued arriving.118
Confusion reigned as Attack Group Krautwald prepared for its offensive. X Corps’ 2nd Infantry Division received the order to protect the group’s left flank positions while keeping strong enemy forces at bay. Obviously, X Corps 34th Infantry Division’s 6,500 men could not effectively resist the opposing 14,000 Russian troops, and thus the reserve 29th Infantry Division was rushed to the front.119 VII Corps troops, deployed to assist X Corps’ efforts to halt Russian incursions, could not fulfill that mission. Preparations continued amid last-minute change of plans. Additional artillery units received orders to move to the front while reconnaissance missions continued despite the difficult conditions. Habsburg troops trained to march with full field packs after their long battle pause.120
Pflanzer-Baltin, whose talent for battlefield improvisation became Habsburg legend, planned to launch a two-pronged offensive buttressed by XIII Corps’ three regular army divisions. A left flank group would advance while right flank forces defended against a potential Russian attack. Pflanzer-Baltin’s basic concept, determined by the inhospitable winter mountain terrain, called for assault units to advance in separate columns, seize an objective, and then continue the advance. However, positions lay buried under two meters of snow, and travel remained a slow and hazardous undertaking. Ammunition columns could not reach some front sectors. Meanwhile, conserving artillery shells, particularly high explosives, remained an important priority. One column required seven hours to advance three kilometers. Intercepted Russian radio transmissions indicated that an enemy attack was imminent.
On 17 January General Falkenhayn reaffirmed to Conrad his intention to deploy the four new German reserve corps on the Eastern front, barring an unforeseen Western front emergency. It pleased Conrad to learn of Germany’s forthcoming second Masurian Lakes battle, and he replied that the campaign assured a “great success.”121 The German effort would coincide with Conrad’s Carpathian operation, a replay of his 1914 envelopment attack strategy.
Five days before the offensive, a blizzard enveloped the battlefield. Habsburg troops had little protection from the elements and received only an irregular supply of ice-cold rations. Once the attack commenced, V Corps troops must advance quickly to support Group Szurmay efforts to seize Uzsok Pass. The 7th Infantry Division, the last reserve division, was transferred to Group Szurmay. Despite Habsburg gains at Uzsok Pass, the December 1914 battles demonstrated that controlling the key Uzsok–Turka road became difficult once the enemy received reinforcements.122 Prevailing conditions did not bode well for a rapid Habsburg success. Cooperation between Third and South armies remained crucial. While a Third Army V Corps detachment assisted South Army’s seizure of Uzsok Pass, the enemy must also be expelled from Turka, the heights at Borynia, and the Stryj Valley, the latter the site of a December battle. The right flank of the South Army German XXIV Corps would attempt a double envelopment of enemy positions by seizing major pass roads and blocking the Russian retreat route.
South Army prepared to launch a surprise attack before the enemy received reinforcements. However, railroad transport difficulties delayed the arrival of the division intended to assist in recapturing Uzsok Pass. As troops prepared for the encirclement maneuver, the enemy extended its positions. Moreover, the Russians retreated at the last possible moment, forcing the attackers to undertake long, laborious countermaneuvers.
Habsburg infantry units could expect little artillery support because only a few batteries had reached the war zone, partly because only draft animal columns transporting light loads could traverse the inhospitable terrain. XVIII Corps’ 44th Infantry Division reported that it required three days to place one cannon squad into position.123 As Russian reinforcements reportedly approached the Uzsok Pass area, Third Army received orders to launch its offensive on 23 January and the preliminary strike against the pass the day before.
Troops began assembling for the operation on 19 January despite prevailing blizzard conditions. Critical supplies had not reached the VII Corps front although urgent requests for additional labor units had been dispatched to keep supply routes functioning. Three XVIII Corps munitions columns remained bivouacked behind the mountain ridges because of lack of shelter for troops and pack animals. Reconnaissance reports confirmed enemy troop concentrations, particularly in the San River region between the main offensive objectives, Lisko and Sanok.124
Fortress Przemyśl’s time was running out, explaining why South Army must launch a deadly frontal assault. Conrad again allowed the fortress to dictate his strategy. Upon arrival, XIX Corps vanguard units must seize Baligrod and then bind the opposing troops. If V Corps seized key road sections, XIX Corps could achieve its mission. However, because they lacked warm food or shelter, V and XVIII Corp soldiers could not adequately prepare for their missions.125 The seriously unprepared and ill-equipped Habsburg armies found themselves forced to improvise while assisting labor units in keeping supply lines operational.
Serious battle did not erupt until 20 January, but enemy presence stymied all reconnaissance efforts on 21 and 22 January. For most troops, the ascent into the Carpathian Mountains provided a new and unnerving experience; for others, it was a deadly one.126 Regretfully, many of the Habsburg’s finest mountain troops had spilled their blood on the Galician plains during the August–September opening campaign. The increased railroad traffic continued to overburden the few Habsburg railroads.127 Thus, the shortage of South Army troop units forced a one-day delay in launching its offensive. Third Army Attack Groups Puhallo (V and XVIII Corps) and Krautwald (X Corps) missions remained unchanged. After seizing Uzsok Pass, Attack Group Puhallo must advance to Lutoviska. Inner flank cooperation between Third and Fourth Army remained critical, particularly once the Fourth Army launched its frontal attack because dominating mountain heights separated it from Third Army’s III Corps.128
Despite deteriorating conditions on 21 January, twelve Third Army divisions, deployed on a 100-kilometer front extending from the Dukla Pass depression to east of Uzsok Pass, poised to attack. Troops positioned on the forested ridges south of the Upper San River area remained only sixty kilometers from Fortress Przemyśl. The stage had been set for the first example of massive protracted mountain warfare in the age of total war.
Meanwhile, on 20 January, General Ivanov continued planning for his invasion of Hungary. Similar to Conrad, he envisioned a frontal attack to seize the remaining Carpathian Mountain ridges before an advance onto the Hungarian plains, knocking that country out of the war. Ivanov persisted with his plan, despite Stavka’s determination that Germany be the early 1915 military priority. He initially sought to neutralize regional Habsburg offensive pressure. Again like Conrad, Ivanov remained obstinate in pursuing his gran
d scheme, disregarding the human cost and danger it posed of drawing major Russian forces deep into the frigid Carpathian hellhole. He failed to consider, or chose to ignore, the grave threat that would emerge on his northern flank if his massed troops suddenly had to be extricated from the mountain theater, as occurred during May (Gorlice–Tarnov offensive).
Map 5. January 1915 Carpathian Offensive
Map 6. Concept for January Offensive
It is important to note that the larger Russian troop numbers were insignificant at the outset of the Habsburg offensive. The Habsburgs possessed more divisions, but Romanov units contained more troops. An equal number of troops deployed on both sides of the front north of the Carpathian Mountain region.
On 21 January XVIII Corps reported that its shortage of artillery prevented it from either achieving artillery superiority or effectively supporting its infantry. On 22 January a Group Szurmay brigade received orders to advance from the Uzsok Pass area to liaison with V Corps 33rd Infantry Division to attack toward the Uzsok–Turka line. Inhospitable terrain and meter-deep snow created many problems for the endeavor. Considering the czarist ability to transport reinforcements rapidly, swift control of the Uzsok–Turka line would be an extremely important, yet immensely difficult, mission. Thus, the Third Army right flank attack group (V Corps and Group Szurmay) must seize Turka.
Pressured to relieve Fortress Przemyśl, Conrad ordered a Third Army frontal attack along the shortest route to the fortress along the Lupkov Pass saddle to force the Russians to mass strong defensive forces in that region. South Army eastern flank positions must deflect any enemy threat to Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin. South Army mission remained to traverse the remaining mountain ridges to reach the Galician plains, where it would initiate maneuver warfare.
The lack of railroad unloading ramps impeded attack preparations and slowed the movement of supplies. Losses from illness continued to rise as a result of the extreme climatic conditions. The enormous preoffensive difficulties ultimately proved insurmountable.129
The Russian and Habsburg armies each prepared to launch their own offensive over the Carpathian mountain walls. Eventually, two-thirds of the Habsburg army and four Russian armies became embroiled in the battle. In only three and a half months, more than two million casualties were sustained. Was it possible for the Habsburg winter mountain campaign to succeed despite Conrad’s hastily prepared plan?
2
The First Carpathian Offensive
January–February 1915
Religious souls visualize hell as a blazing inferno with burning embers and intense heat. The soldiers fighting in the Carpathian Mountains during that first winter of the war know otherwise. Colonel Georg Veith
COLONEL GEORG VEITH recorded:
On 23 January we rushed forward into the icy hell of the Carpathian battlefield. We stormed the Uzsok, Verecke and Wyszkov Passes, but on the northern slope of the mountains, the troops encountered a blizzard. The reports from these days are shocking. Everyday hundreds froze to death. The wounded that were unable to drag themselves forward were left behind to die. Entire ranks were reduced to tears in the face of the terrible agony.
Each night, the 21. Infantry Regiment dug in until the last man was found frozen to death at daybreak. Pack animals could not advance through the deep snow. The men had to carry their own supplies on foot. The soldiers went without food for days. At −25°C, food rations froze solid. For seven days straight, the 43. Infantry Division battled over powering Russian troops with no warm food to sustain them. For a full thirty days, not one single man had any shelter. Hardly a battalion on the Habsburg front consisted of 200 men as lines grew thinner and thinner. Battle-weary front line troops were continuously being wrenched from one position to another to plug a newly-formed gap. Medics and those not seriously ill or injured were called into service. A constant state of mass confusion reigned; a tremendous detriment to any military command. Apathy and indifference were gaining a foothold and could not be contained.1
Conrad’s armies faced an unfavorable tactical situation from the outset.2 The Germans grew increasingly alarmed over the rapid deterioration of Habsburg combat strength. A decline in morale, discipline, and physical stamina followed. Adamant that no time be lost, Conrad refused to postpone the attack, gambling that the current break in the weather would last. It was a gamble he would lose, for just as the operation got underway, a blizzard struck along the front. Now Conrad’s armies became engaged in a life-and-death struggle against the czarist military foe and the forces of nature. In order to advance, Habsburg troops had to first clear a path through the deep snow or hack their way step by step along the icy mountain passes.
Table 2. k.u.k. Troops Transferred into the Carpathians
Units Number
of Trains Russian Front Railroad Line
XVIII Corps 43rd + 44th IDs 271 December 20–28, 1914 Mezölaborcz & Ungvar,
X Corps 2nd + 24th IDs January 11–12, 1915 Sianka
V Corps 33rd + 37th IDs 149 January 3–12, 1915 Mezölaborcz
Landsturm Brigade 14 January 10–14, 191 Borgo
XIX Corps 7th, 29th, 40th IDs 230 January 13–21, 1915 Mezölaborcz + Ungvar,
XIII Corps 36th + 42nd IDs 92,104 January 22–February 3, 1915 Sianka
VIII Corps 9th + 21st IDs 189 January 25–February 5, 1915 Körösmezö
February 6–16 Mezölaborcz + Ungvar, Sianka
3 k.u.k. IDs 615 December 20, 1915–February 16, 1916
Source: Ratzenhofer, “Aufmarsch hinter den Karpathen.”
Third Army right flank Group Szurmay’s preoffensive attack on 22 January failed to achieve its main objective despite having captured some important positions. Terrain conditions wreaked havoc on Szurmay’s operational timetables, critical for the mission’s success. Some units came to a complete standstill; pack animals were useless on the slippery ground. At an alarming rate, frostbite and exposure claimed the lives of more Habsburg soldiers than enemy action.
The Third Army, expanded to fifteen infantry and four cavalry divisions and supported at its right flank by the South Army, struggled to execute Conrad’s orders. The 175,000-man attack force was too weak to launch a frontal assault along the 160-kilometer-wide front intended to envelop the enemy’s extreme left flank positions and roll up its front. Insufficient troop strength combined with the expansive front resulted in units attacking in single file. Not surprisingly, the daring endeavor produced catastrophic losses. In all, twenty and a half divisions participated in the Carpathian offensive commencing on 23 January 1915. On the Galician front, forty-one infantry and eight cavalry divisions opposed thirty-eight czarist infantry and fifteen cavalry divisions.3 The Third Army’s front extended from Uzsok Pass to Gladyszóv, South Army’s from Uzsok Pass to Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin’s front. The operation extended from the Dukla depression to east of Uzsok Pass.
Group Szurmay eventually seized Uzsok Pass, and the South Army, Verecke Pass. Szurmay then focused on his next objective, advancing to Turka and Sambor. At the extreme right flank, Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin’s ragtag forces advanced through deep snow into the Bukovina province, aiming to strike the enemy communication centers. Once Habsburg troops regained the Bukovina, Pflanzer-Baltin’s troops would assist the South Army in its efforts to debouch onto the Galician maneuver zone.
Four low-capacity railroad lines extended from Budapest into the mountains. Moving large military formations, reinforcements, and supplies into the Carpathian Mountain theater presented a logistical nightmare. Excessive, unavoidable delays in launching the offensive gave the Russians ample time to initiate countermeasures. The attack on czarist positions on the northern slopes of the Carpathian Mountains under blizzard conditions became an exercise in futility and made excessive demands on the ill-prepared soldiers. Conrad’s highly anticipated swift victory soon vanished when his armies were forced to halt at the mountain ridgelines. Habsburg Supreme Command expressed its extreme displeasure o
ver the lack of progress, which did not bode well for future endeavors.
The atmosphere on the home front and on the battlefield grew tense when the ill-fated first offensive commenced. Attention focused on the Carpathian Mountains, where the vast battlefront made it difficult to maintain control. The operation occurred in stages, commencing with first the Third Army’s eastern, then western, flank. The terrain and inclement weather conditions precipitated isolated and uncoordinated battles. Mountain slopes and ridgelines separated units from other columns, frustrating unified action. Third Army could not advance if the neighboring Fourth and South armies failed to make progress, leading to major difficulties.
Such circumstances raised serious concerns among field commanders, who held little confidence in the operation’s success. As Conrad continued to order repeated attacks, field officers attempted to pass their orders to neighboring units, convinced the effort was futile and would only result in additional unnecessary bloodshed. In January 1915, for example, General Boroević tried to shift responsibility for the main offensive effort to nearby General Pflanzer-Baltin. General Böhm-Ermolli, commander of the second offensive in February, also made attempts to pass his mission onto Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin. Both generals recognized that the plan lacked several critical prerequisites required for success. In view of troop shortages, the time factor, and severe weather and terrain conditions, the plan was unrealistic. Because of his obsession with liberating Fortress Przemyśl, Conrad violated a fundamental rule of military leadership: a commander must know the capabilities of his fighting instrument. Such ineptitude helps explain the German High Command’s refusal to allow its troops to be subordinated to Austria-Hungary. Increasing unrealistic demands on field commanders and their troops led to the growing lack of confidence in the Habsburg Supreme Command itself.
Blood on the Snow Page 9
