Battalion and brigade commanders wasted no time expressing their serious concerns about the operation. Numerical inferiority disrupted the attack momentum and forfeited the essential element of surprise. In addition, Habsburg field commanders warned that the mountain terrain frustrated cooperation between neighboring units, aggravated further by unreliable wire communication as a result of snow and ice on telephone lines. Moreover, heavy snowfall impeded troop movement and caused soldiers to abandon artillery batteries behind the high mountain ridges rather than transport them to the front. With little and often no artillery support, advancing Habsburg infantry bore the full force of Russian firepower. Third Army sacrificed over two-thirds of its soldiers in its failed initial Carpathian offensive, many of whom succumbed to illness or froze to death.
Separated attack groups often lost their bearing in the blinding snow storms. The soldiers suffered from frostbite; their weapons jammed from the bitter cold. Nevertheless, Conrad’s soldiers continued their attacks.4 Troops were expected to undertake exhausting marches through meter-deep snow to reach the battlefield, only to find no shelter awaiting them. In a cruel twist of fate, frigid conditions interspersed with sudden periods of rising temperatures and thaw. Steady rain and melting snow turned the valley terrain into a pit of mud as troops, artillery, ammunition, animals, and supply wagons sank into the mire. Rising floodwaters swept away bridges, and soldiers were forced to lie in their waterlogged positions.
A Habsburg artillery officer’s diary offers a vivid portrayal of the disorder and dismay that characterized the opening campaign. His entries describe repeated, swift, unproductive, and exhausting marches and detail the deplorable conditions along the mountain roadways and in gun positions, dubbed Strafstellungen (penalty positions) by the men. Supply wagons sank to their axles as heavy traffic flow on the poorly constructed roads produced quagmires. Adding to their misery, soldiers often had to help move heavy equipment. Even horse-drawn wagons with ten to fourteen harnesses could not navigate the muddy passageways.5 Troops gathered fallen branches and tossed them into the mud in an effort to stabilize road surfaces. Countless horse carcasses blocked the roadways and were likewise heaved into the muck.
South Army German troops were unfamiliar with mountain environs. Their inexperience and general unsuitability for mountain warfare became a major disadvantage. Because they lacked the most basic winter attire and equipment, hundreds of troops suffered frostbite every day, and many succumbed to the White Death (der weisse Tod). Weather and terrain conditions took a heavy toll on horses and other draft animals. Though map keys designated the Carpathian Mountain region as maneuverable terrain, many mountain slopes proved too steep for the animals to traverse. German artillery units, arriving late at the front, likewise had no experience in mountain warfare. The few artillery pieces that actually arrived were limited to offroad passages and ineffective firing positions.
Returning to the offensive undertaking, the attacking troops advanced slowly through man-high drifted snow, which exacerbated the terrain conditions. Forward movement of artillery and supplies proved time-consuming and tedious. The troops’ physical condition had already deteriorated because of their prolonged stay in the trenches commencing in December.6 As twenty Habsburg divisions advanced toward the Dukla, Lupkov, and Uzsok passes, they became exposed to the difficult Carpathian conditions. The attackers advanced in line formation with no reserve formations to continue if the attack proved successful. As losses mounted, the front lines became too extended for even the surviving troop units to defend.
Major Attack Group Puhallo advanced northward to seize the terrain north of the Russian major railroad and supply center at Ustrzyki Dolne, encompassing the conquest of important czarist railroad and road connections. Its right middle flank advanced along both sides of Lutoviska and its valuable railroad connection, while its 43rd Infantry Division advanced toward Baligrod to connect with Attack Group Krautwald. General Puhallo’s paltry three-division force would advance into a critical forty-kilometer gap in the Russian lines south of Fortress Przemyśl toward the Lisko–Sanok railroad lines. A weak defensive force of two Russian cavalry divisions defended this portion of the front, which offered the most rapid egress to Fortress Przemyśl.
There were many problems with the Third Army offensive action. The first day’s mission was to reach enemy artillery positions, which proved elusive. The operation also lacked thorough planning and preparation. In an obvious blunder, artillery did not advance with the attacking forces because the snow-enveloped terrain hindered movement, making guns difficult to place into new positions. Conrad, having seized the initiative, envisioned a swift victory, and with the element of surprise, he attempted to preempt a long winter mountain campaign. He intended to neutralize any Russian offensive plans on this weakly held portion of the front. This caused the near annihilation of the attacking troops in the three disastrous Carpathian efforts.
It proved impossible for troop units to cooperate in battle because they failed to achieve a significant advantage against the enemy or overcome the adverse conditions. Thus, attempts to outflank individual enemy positions failed as the enemy simply extended their flank positions when attacked. The resultant Habsburg frontal attacks produced enormous casualties because the mountain terrain was unsuitable for maneuvering major troop formations. This resulted in partial attacks, with the advancing units often forced to separate, which exacerbated the pressure to relieve Fortress Przemyśl. One problem was the lack of sufficient manpower to accomplish the missions. Group Puhallo transferred an entire brigade to neighboring Group Szurmay for an assault against Uzsok Pass after the operation commenced. Group Puhallo now consisted of two and a half divisions to cover its forty-kilometer-wide front along the upper San River. The area contained important roads and railroads providing egress to the lower mountains north of Uzsok Pass. The group advanced twenty kilometers north of the pass in a short time, but faltered as it sustained heavy losses. It possessed no reserves to maintain the attack momentum. An excessive number of troops deployed for flank protection left too few for the attack formations. In addition, the inadequate reinforcements entered battle piecemeal.
Moreover, when the VII Corps defended key positions near Dukla Pass, it affected the mission to encircle czarist positions elsewhere. Thus, the 20th Honvéd Infantry Division could not support X Corps’ 2nd Infantry Division efforts against the opposing mountain heights. Both divisions became outflanked, creating a major predicament. In hindsight, if two additional divisions had deployed at Group Puhallo’s front, the mission might have succeeded, particularly by capturing the railroad junction at Ustrzyki Dolne, from which the Russians transferred troops and reinforcements to any threatened front sector. If General Puhallo had been able to maintain his attack momentum, the ensuing enemy counterattacks on 26 January might have been prevented. Soon, however, the enemy severed the important Chyróv–Sambor railroad line at Dukla Pass.
In effect, Group Puhallo’s efforts created an isolated battle zone, in which progress became increasingly limited as the casualties escalated. This, combined with admirable czarist defensive efforts, destroyed any chance for additional success. Again in hindsight, the operation would have been better served by launching a rapid thrust with additional manpower and firepower, which would have greatly increased the chances for success.
Nevertheless, the group advanced the twenty kilometers and with Group Szurmay crossed the San River on 26 January. The mentioned transfer of one of Group Puhallo’s brigades to Group Szurmay, however, introduced the practice of transferring military units for other purposes than the major offensive. In doing so, Habsburg leaders lost sight of the military axiom of massing forces at the main portion of the attack front. The surrender of an entire brigade seriously weakened General Puhallo’s middle and left flank positions, removing forces required to successfully complete the mission.
As Attack Groups Puhallo and Krautwald advanced a dangerous twenty kilometer gap soon separated them. Al
though reserve formations could have neutralized the problem, none was available, with Puhallo’s flanks suddenly badly exposed. This weakness did not go unnoticed by czarist military leadership, and the result became obvious on 26 January 1915, when they launched a major counterattack.
Meanwhile, Group Krautwald’s mission was to strike the Russian Eighth Army’s eastern flank positions. X Corps (2nd, 24th, and 34th Infantry Divisions) must advance through Baligrod. The group’s heavyweight left flank would then advance toward Lisko–Sanok, but instead, it encountered strong enemy resistance. The X Corps’ 2nd Infantry Division mission became to protect the group’s left flank, then advance to the northeast, where the Russians had assembled troops. The VII Corps’ 20th Honvéd Infantry Division, ordered first to envelop the czarist positions in cooperation with the 2nd Infantry Division, failed. Yet the entire Carpathian offensive effort relied on 2nd Infantry Division’s success.
On 23 January, General Krautwald’s forces encountered heavy resistance, which forced its left flank units to retreat to their original positions. By 25 January, the group received orders to hold those positions and, if possible, expand its right flank success. The army’s left flank groups Joseph and Colerus must prevent enemy egress over the main ridges on their front or prevent czarist troops from intervening against the army right flank offensive efforts. The VII Corps (Group Joseph) must block the invasion route through the Czeremcha saddle area, most important for the defense of Dukla Pass.7 Group Colerus (III Corps) retained the important mission to protect the neighboring Fourth Army’s southern flank (inner flank of the two armies).
Third Army’s overall mission remained to envelop the enemy’s extreme left flank positions from the Habsburg right flank, then advance northward into the Sanok–Rymanov–Krosno–Jaslo basin area. Groups Puhallo and Szurmay would perform the flanking maneuver because General Szurmay’s mission remained to seize Uzsok Pass and then advance to Turka and Sambor, the site of an important enemy road and railroad line. Group Szurmay’s forces proved inadequate to seize the pass or prevent the enemy from transferring reinforcements from the pass area.
On 22 January, three infantry and one and a half cavalry divisions advanced toward the pass. A neighboring South Army left-flank column was to advance and bind the anticipated opposing enemy forces to minimize the danger to Group Szurmay’s right flank as it advanced. The area’s importance emanated from the threat of a Russian breakthrough at the Third and Fourth armies’ inner flanks.
South Army transport delays retarded its launch date to 24 January, except for Corps Hofmann, which advanced on 23 January. Hofmann’s troops encountered stiff enemy resistance as a column advanced toward Uzsok Pass, while its remaining troops pressed south to southeasterly through the wooded Carpathian Mountains toward Fortress Przemyśl. However, they achieved little progress because of the terrible conditions.8 The same fate neutralized Third Army’s Group Szurmay’s efforts to advance from Uzsok Pass to Turka and Sambor.
In the East Carpathian range, General Pflanzer-Baltin deployed his troops in echelon formation to advance toward his multiple objectives. Some forces must recapture the Bukovina province, while others helped South Army to escape its mountain prison, but the army group lacked sufficient numbers to accomplish all its missions. Yet Pflanzer-Baltin’s ragtag forces garnered the only major victory of the entire Carpathian campaign. Only insufficient railroad capacity prevented their achieving further significant gains by receiving reinforcements.
Conditions along the few roadways leading to the various army fronts had not improved. The night of 22 January was quiet, clear, and cold, and icy road conditions delayed the arrival of an XVIII Corps supply column.9 Critical routes remained in such poor condition that additional labor crews became necessary to keep them open. Numerous Landsturm units performed such road maintenance duty.
When Third Army advanced, Fourth Army southern-flank units would join it, depending on the conditions.10 Its right flank IX Corps would cooperate with the Third Army III Corps to launch an encircling maneuver toward Banica, near the critical Gorlice intersections.11 Close cooperation between the two army flanks would neutralize the Russian threat from the area of Uzsok Pass, but deep snow and the distance to traverse made this difficult to accomplish.
Blizzard conditions, including deep snow and man-high drifts, exacer bated the advance, left Habsburg troops cold and exhausted, and made futile the attempts to move artillery pieces and supplies into the mountains.12 Units reported increasing illness and frostbite cases. Attempts to open snow bound railroad stretches failed because of labor unit unavailability; thus, inadequate supplies and ammunition stores reached the front lines.13
Group Szurmay troops advanced twenty-five kilometers before the main Attack Group Puhallo. Third Army right flank’s small numerical advantage was eleven infantry and two and a half cavalry divisions against nine infantry and four cavalry divisions. In the area west of the Czeremcha roads, Group Joseph’s (VII Corps) four infantry and two cavalry divisions opposed five Russian infantry and one cavalry division. The enormous logistical problems of moving large troop formations by rail into the mountains became a serious deterrent to Habsburg success. Railroad delays allowed the enemy time to initiate effective countermeasures.
Meanwhile, between 20 to 26 January, Group Szurmay’s right flank units had the additional task of maintaining its supply artery despite enormous obstacles. To avoid a bloody frontal attack against strong enemy-blocking positions, Szurmay dispatched strong side columns through the crucial Ung Valley, also a protective area for Laborcz Valley. This, however, increased the threat to his now-exposed flanks. Szurmay achieved partial success by sacrificing the element of surprise. The group required five hours to seize key Ung Valley positions (four kilometers’ distance) through the inclement conditions. Troops had to shovel their way through an icy storm, many ultimately suffering from frostbite.14 The inhospitable terrain and blizzard conditions wreaked havoc with operational timetables, and Third Army advanced just three to four kilometers per day. Its slow progress caused Fourth Army to launch an attack from the southern flank to assist Third Army efforts.15
Meanwhile, Conrad planned to commence a new attack impulse.16 VII Corps must continue to block the potential major enemy invasion route through Dukla Pass, protect X Corps’ flank positions, and attack any enemy troop concentrations. The 17th Infantry Division commander General LeBeau reported that artillery units were not in their ordered positions; his troops were endangered by their own artillery fire, and he faced an unfavorable tactical situation. The failure of the 20th Honvéd Infantry Division to seize high terrain positions left both flank positions exposed.17 VII Corps’ inability to achieve notable progress against well-defended and entrenched czarist defensive lines between 23 and 29 January continued to threaten the 17th Infantry Division’s flank position. Further success became unlikely, given the multiple adverse circumstances. XIX Corps’ 34th Infantry Division, for example, lost 5,000 men in one day, while frostbite continued to plague the weary troops.18
On 24 January Third Army again attempted to advance and recapture Carpathian passes, but in the early morning hours, fog and heavy snow prevented significant progress.19 Group Puhallo’s XVIII Corps’ 44th Infantry Division advanced in column formation, its progress interrupted by weak enemy forces on 23 and 24 January, but the Russians retreated after a short battle.20 Although supply conditions remained unfavorable, the corps regrouped to renew its attack on 25 January through a gap between the Russian Eighth Army and its Group Uzsok.
X Corps reported that the increasing necessity to provide Third Army left flank security drained the main attack force. Numerous artillery units had just begun to arrive at the front while corps ammunition train columns stretched far back into the rear echelons. Forward movement remained a tedious job on the snow-draped terrain. The corps advanced twenty-two kilometers to attack the well-defended enemy but found itself in danger of getting lost in the thick fog and deep snow. Even with all availabl
e reserves inserted into the thinning lines, it failed to seize the opposing enemy positions. If X Corps retreated, it would endanger the entire offensive operation. Moreover, the shortage of officers, insufficient artillery support, the inclement weather, and disrupted communications hindered their effectiveness.21
On 24 January X Corps’ 2nd Infantry Division fought pitched battles to seize high terrain, with both sides suffering severe casualties. The division received no artillery support because of the snowstorm and dense fog, while having to shovel its way into attack position. Without reinforcements to replace the mounting casualties, X Corps witnessed ever-extended lines until available reserves moved into the forward battle area to assure their maintenance.22
When the adjacent VII Corps 20th Honvéd Infantry Division retreated to its 22 January positions, it freed enemy troops for deployment elsewhere. A powerful czarist surprise attack launched in dense fog pummeled X Corps’ 2nd Infantry Division. A delay in X Corps action compromised the crucial element of surprise.23 Meanwhile, 2nd Infantry Division’s multiple missions far exceeded its capabilities (while it occupied a vital position on the front).
V and XVIII Corps and Group Szurmay deployed along the upper San River line with the objective to drive the Russians from the San River valley area to neutralize any threat to its rear and flank areas. On 23 January, the V Corps’ 37th Honvéd Infantry Division, its troops exhausted from a difficult advance, failed to attain its objective.24 Front-line unit reports detailed the debilitating effects of the blizzard conditions on offensive efforts. XVIII Corps’ 43rd Infantry Division indicated that one to two meters of snow delayed its marches. In valleys, washed-out roads had turned into a sea of mud. Enemy troops barricaded the slopes along the valley leading to Baligrod, the division attack column’s goal and a major objective throughout the Carpathian offensives.25
Blood on the Snow Page 10
