Edward L. Posey

by Last;Only All-Black Rangers US Army's First

  About 0530 hours Hargrove reported that he heard movement in the vicinity of his position but could not see anyone. Wilburn checked with nearby Outpost 2, but they had nothing to report. About 0545, just as it was getting lighter, Hargrove spotted a group of enemy soldiers approaching from the direction of the tunnel. He opened fire with his machine gun and dispersed the enemy. The firing alerted the rest of the men in the company, who started moving into their positions. Meanwhile, Hargrove’s LMG, however, froze up after it had fired the first couple of rounds. He instructed Small and Victor to open up with their BARs. Victor fired approximately two magazines before he stopped, frozen solid. (It was during this engagement that the Rangers learned that a regular coat of oil caused a weapon to freeze in very cold weather and that, contrary to normal procedures, weapons should be only lightly wiped with oil under intensely cold conditions.) With their automatic weapons frozen, PFCs Paulding and Thomas exchanged fire with an enemy force of unknown strength using their individual weapons. At least one of the enemy soldiers slipped in close enough to pitch a fragmentation grenade into the outpost position, wounding Small and Paulding. Small was hit in three places and Paulding was temporarily blinded by the explosion. Realizing that the enemy knew his exact position and outnumbered his crippled force, Hargrove ordered his men to withdraw to the reverse slope of the hill, and then quickly administered first aid to Small and Paulding. While all this was transpiring, Thomas began throwing hand grenades over the hill at the unseen enemy.

  Meanwhile, Lieutenant Queen, Sergeant John “Rigger” Ford, Sergeant Marion “Mighty Mouth” Alston, Master Sergeant “Dude” Walker, and a litter team from the medics had worked their way from the rear of the aid station to the bottom of the knob. There they met Hargrove and his outpost group. The litter team carried Small, while Victor and Thomas walked to the aid station on their own. While under sniper fire from nearby higher ground, Hargrove returned with Queen’s group to re-occupy the knob. The entire action lasted about twenty to thirty minutes.

  About the same time, Outpost 5 and Road Block “Able” were also attacked. Road Block “Able,” under the command of Lieutenant Pryor, had been taking intermittent fire all morning, and at daybreak the Rangers manning that outpost were forced to take to the hills with only light combat gear. When they tried to re-enter the perimeter without first calling in, the personnel of Road Block “Able” drew small arms fire.

  By 0700 hours the company occupied the perimeter in force. The earlier enemy efforts were nothing more than light probing actions. The main attack arrived about this time from north of the village of Changnim-ni, adjacent to and north of the perimeter. At 0715 hours the 32d RCT around Tanyang Pass, in response to the 2d’s reports, also reported that it was under attack. Enemy strength appeared to be as high as one hundred soldiers.

  Road Block “Baker” had not been heard from since 0600 hours because its radio battery had succumbed to the cold temperatures and quit two hours earlier. (More lessons learned: during cold weather the radio battery’s life was shortened by about one-third, the battery had to be changed frequently, and the radio operator could not set the radio down in the snow. In the future, the Rangers mounted the SCR–300 on a pack board to keep it out of the snow. This also allowed the convenient carrying of other essential combat accouterments, and enabled easier carrying and handling.) When the Rangers stationed at Road Block Baker were fired upon, they returned fire at the guerrillas attempting to slip into the village.

  By daylight, about 0745 hours, the guerillas were driven off without any penetration. A patrol was sent into town. Heavy patrolling continued around the town and in the hills. Intelligence reports later indicated that the enemy had been of the 1st Guerrilla Division, 5th Guerrilla “Ghost Corps.”

  The Tanyang fight was 2d Ranger Company’s first direct confrontation with the enemy. A declassified report15 from the 32d Infantry Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division boiled down the Rangers’ combat at Tanyang this way: “The main event of 7 January 1951, was the attack of the North Korean guerrillas on Tanyang. At 2345, 6 Jan., 20 unidentified Koreans approached Road Block “A.” The Rangers fired on them and they dispersed. Then at 0530 small arms and automatic weapons fire started in the South part of Tanyang and shortly after fighting had broken out all over town.”

  For his part in the action, Sergeant Hargrove was recommended for the Bronze Star.

  During the next few days several Rangers were hospitalized due to cold weather injuries. Ranger Wheeler Small, who was wounded at the railroad tunnel outpost, recalled:

  I was more concerned about riding the ambulance back down the mountain road than I was about the injuries. The road was so narrow that only vehicles going in one direction were allowed on the road, at any one time. Sometimes the convoys or any single vehicle was ambushed. I would not let them put me in the ambulance without my weapon. I was the only American in it; the others were Koreans. We got stopped several times by sniper fire. When we reached the field hospital, I was the only one alive.

  But he was alive. Sergeant First Class Isaac E. Baker, however, was not. Baker was the company’s first man killed in action (KIA)—which, as it turned out, he had predicted.

  Baker’s Prediction

  In 1948, before going into combat in Korea, Sergeant First Class Baker taught drill and tactical field training for the dismounted soldier at Fort Bragg. He trained, among others, SGM William Bates of the 558th Medical Collecting Company. Judging that his best path to a promotion was with an airborne unit, Baker went to Jump School and found his way to 2d Ranger Company.

  When the 2d Ranger Company landed at Yokohama and received passes from Camp Zama, Baker headed for the Cross Roads NCO Club in Yokohama. The 558th had left Bragg as a unit for deployment with the mission of taking all wounded soldiers on the flight from Korea to Japan. Baker knew that the 558th medics had arrived in Japan and would have found a friendly bar. Baker went looking for, and found, Bates. Baker told Bates he had no money because he had bought his son a dry cleaning business in the States as a source of income. Bates tried to buy Baker a drink, but he refused. He didn’t drink anymore, he wasn’t hungry, and he was really just there for the companionship. “I don’t think I am going to make it back,” he told Bates. “My time is up! If I don’t go to

  Korea on Wednesday, I’ll see you back here on Saturday.” But he went to Korea. And it was the last time Bates saw Baker alive.16

  Majori-Ri

  The declassified command report of the 32d Infantry17 relates enemy activity on 10 January 1951. A division artillery aerial observer reported three companies of enemy infantry moving south through the mountains east of Tanyang. The 32d Infantry’s Intelligence and Reconnaissance (I&R) Platoon exchanged long-range fire with ten to fifteen enemy near Pyongdong-ni. The 3/32 was relieved by the 1/31 coming up from the south near Andong by 1200 hours. The 3/32 was reinforced with a platoon of tanks, a 4.2mm mortar platoon, and Battery C, 48th Field Artillery Battalion, which moved to blocking positions northeast of Tanyang, to meet the 10th North Korean Division.

  During the period of 11 to 13 January, heavy enemy contact continued around Tanyang, with estimated enemy strength at battalion-to-regimental sized units. On 13 January, the 1/32, minus Company C, moved east-northeast from the aid station near Changnim-ni toward Majori-ri. The battalion came in on the move, with only a brief attack order issued. The order of march down the trail toward Majori-ri was Company B first, followed by the command group and the Rangers. Queen separated from 2d Ranger Company to guide Company A along the north ridge line in an attempt to outflank the village where an estimated enemy battalion was located. Queen knew the terrain because he had led patrols over that same route the previous week. His assistance was needed because Company A lacked maps and was unfamiliar with the terrain. Queen noticed that the unit seemed to arrive late and the men were carrying full field packs with pup tents attached. They did not drop any individual equipment, in stark contrast to Queen, who knew the advantages of tr
aveling light and had only an M-1 with an extra bandoleer and a blanket cut like a Mexican serape for shelter. Queen did not see the battalion 81mm mortars go into position, and the trail was too narrow for 75mm Recoilless Rifle movement. The men of Company A had great difficulty climbing and moved in single file.

  As the rest of 2d Ranger Company prepared for combat on that cold January morning, nearly every man was double loaded with ammunition because it was so difficult to re-supply in such mountainous terrain. As one of the 1st Platoon BAR operators, “Tank” Clarke carried his weapon and helped carry ammo for the 60mm mortar. The Rangers moved for a few miles along a railroad track that made it difficult to walk, which made the miserable march that much harder.

  On the evening prior to the attack, a patrol of several Rangers moved up into the mountains and fired on some Koreans to their left front. The enemy did not appear to take any casualties. The men ate cold C rations before bedding down in the snow. According to Clarke, they were too cold and tired to try to chop through the frozen ground. The next day they awoke, stiff and freezing cold, and headed out to meet the enemy.

  The Rangers followed Company B down into a valley, slipping and sliding all the way. Traversing the mountain single file, they came to a village. As they approached the small collection of huts, they passed some dead cattle and a few dead civilians. Either the civilians had gotten in the way of the conflict or they were dead guerrillas from the previous days’ air strikes or artillery fire—it was impossible to know which. Making their way up a ravine, the Rangers came upon some young civilian men. The word was out: young Korean men who were not in the army or in uniform were either guerrillas or deserters. Some of the men from Baker Company or Battalion were ordered to guard them closely and, if in doubt, shoot them. The Koreans were shot down while trying to escape, and the Rangers never gained any intelligence from them, which they would later regret. What Battalion headquarters did not know was that the enemy may have been watching as their men were killed.

  The squad that Clarke was with moved farther up the valley while Baker Company started to climb the slope toward the huts. They had just seen some North Koreans killed while hiding behind a haystack. Without warning, a sharp small arms fire broke out and hit Baker Company squarely in the front. Private Frank King, Jr., was sitting on top of a rock eating a can of beans when a bullet struck him. Tucker heard Koreans screaming “Banzai! Banzai!” as King keeled over. Private First Class Herman L. Rembert was a few yards behind Sergeant Jackson, who was leading 1st Platoon. Rembert was hit in the chest and killed. Sergeant Harold Johnson, assistant squad leader to Sergeant First Class Daniel Boatwright, 3d Platoon, was hit in the helmet and right leg. With one man killed and several wounded in a handful of seconds, Jackson, Clarke, and the others took cover behind a large boulder. They could not see the enemy, but they could hear his gunfire. With a large rock protecting them, Clarke and about six other men in his group took stock of their situation and returned fire.

  Sergeant First Class Freeman, 1st Platoon Sergeant, yelled “put some fire on the hills!” Clarke and Corporal Lawrence “Poochie” Williams did as ordered, blazing away with their BARs. Clarke removed the bi-pod from his weapon during the firefight because the enemy always went after the automatic weapons; his BAR was a less conspicuous target without the bi-pod. Members of the squad set up the mortar as best as they could without a base plate and dumped all the rounds toward the enemy on the surrounding hills. Despite the heavy return fire, bullets rained down around the boulder position, which did not give as much protection as the Rangers had hoped. As they also quickly discovered, some of the enemy fire was coming from behind the boulder.

  It was at this time that Williams was struck in the head. He was killed immediately. His corpse almost dropped on top of Clarke, who heard Jackson yell, “Sergeant Freeman, Poochie got hit in the head!” There was nothing they could do for him. The bullet that hit Williams entered the top of his head and came out in front of his eye. Williams hated wearing a steel helmet, and wasn’t wearing one when he was hit. Some of the men wondered later whether a helmet might have saved his life, but there was no time to think of such things in the heat of battle. Shortly after Willams was killed, Jackson had a bullet rip open the tip of his chin, and Glover, who was on Jackson’s left, was hit in the neck. Glover was soon hit a second time in the neck, this time fatally. Just then another man near Clarke, Private First Class Robert St. Thomas, was struck in the foot. His feet were so cold that he could hardly feel the wound. St. Thomas peeled back his shoe-pack and asked Clarke, “Is that a bullet hole?” Clarke assured him that it was indeed a bullet hole.

  With two men killed and several wounded, the squad spread out because its position behind the boulder was drawing too much enemy fire. By this time Clarke had used up all but one magazine of ammo and had lost contact with the ammo bearers, one of whom was Corporal Isaiah Woodard. Men were still being hit all around Clarke. He had saved the last magazine to use for covering fire in a retreat. That time arrived when some of Company B came down the valley yelling everybody out!

  Clarke was certain that St. Thomas had gotten out safely, but he was mistaken. As he would later learn, St. Thomas was killed in action. The last time Clarke remembered seeing him alive was when he commented on the bullet hole in his foot. Moving back, Jackson ran across a rice paddy as enemy bullets sprayed the ground around his feet. When he spotted a large ditch he jumped into it for safety and crawled up the bank. Standing no more than ten yards from him was a Korean shooting to his left. The enemy soldier did not see Jackson, who leveled down on him and squeezed off two rounds before his carbine jammed. Jackson later recalled that St. Thomas was positioned in the direction the enemy was firing; he was sure the Korean was shooting at St. Thomas.

  The shower of enemy gunfire continued. During the withdrawal Clarke passed Corporal J. T. Holley, who had been hit in the back and could not move. Holley was asking Clarke to help him to cover (he refused to leave the fight) when Sergeant Boatwright was hit twice. Clarke helped Boatwright gain shelter beneath a ledge but, thinking they would regroup and counterattack, left Holley where he was. Unfortunately, they did not regroup as Clarke expected. Instead, the North Koreans moved in and executed the seriously wounded—the same way they perceived their own men had been executed at the start of the skirmish. Although Rangers are not supposed to leave their wounded behind, the CO had ordered their immediate withdrawal. On the way out, Dude Walker was providing covering fire with an M-1 rifle, yelling, “Come on out. I got you covered!” Clarke realized his error regarding Holley too late to rectify it. It was a mistake that haunted him for a long time. Had he understood the situation, they could have tried to drag Holley out against his wishes.

  Up on the ridge, the Rangers regrouped and gathered some of their walking wounded. Lieutenant Bernard Pryor, 1st Platoon Leader, staggered up. He had been hit at the top of the head and blood was streaming down his face. The bullet had gone through the top of his helmet and skimmed his scalp. The Rangers tried to get him on a litter but he refused. After a few moments, he collapsed and several South Korean porters carried him to the aid station.

  After they broke contact with the enemy, the Rangers began to dig in for defense. They knew the Koreans would counterattack. Clarke, who was still out of ammo for the BAR, began to empty M-1 clips to fill BAR magazines. They dug in and the fighting went on into the night as the enemy counterattacked, but Company B held the enemy off with machine gun and small arms fire.

  At the Aid Station

  Weathersbee, who had badly sprained an ankle during an earlier patrol, was due to be evacuated but received permission from Lieutenant Allen to stay on light duty at the aid station. When the aid station was attacked, he and others repelled the enemy. Before the attack, Robert St. Thomas, one of the Company’s cooks, had come in, loaded himself down with ammo, and yelled, “I’m going up into the mountains.” He volunteered for the mission and did not return. Once the wounded started coming in, Sergeant Tee
die P. Andres moved from man to man, performing his duties as a medic. Weathersbee heard him say, “They are all dead.” One of the dead was St. Thomas.

  Much later, William “the Ghost” Washington arrived at the aid station with an injury to his hand. He told Weathersbee that he had had to play dead while North Korean guerrillas stripped him of his boots and tried to cut his wedding band from his finger. As artillery shells started falling, the Ghost—true to his nickname—got up, returned to friendly lines, and made it to the aid station.

  When Lieutenant Queen heard of the firefight over the radio and learned that Captain Allen was wounded, he rushed back from Company A, which never got into the fighting. Queen went to the aid station to pick up those Rangers who had been left behind or who, like Washington, had been treated and were ready to go back into combat. He also picked up all of the ammo at the aid station and took command of the company, placing the 1st Platoon on the ridge line perimeter facing east, where he had left Company A.

  Wounded men such as Pryor were evacuated by helicopter, which set down about five miles from the aid station where the altitude was low enough for it to land. The less-seriously wounded were sent by ambulance to the closest MASH.

  The next day, the Rangers learned that sixteen men from Company B had been killed at Majori-ri, and one wounded soldier from Company B was carried from the fighting with his guts protruding from a wound and tied to a pole, but miraculously survived his injuries. Eight Rangers were declared KIA: Corporals Richard Glover, J. T. Holley, Milton Johnson, and Lawrence Williams; PFCs Frank King, Jr., Charles Scott, and Robert St. Thomas; and Private Herman L. Rembert. Both Pryor, who was shot in the head, and Estell, whose right arm was seriously injured when a bullet shattered the bone, were removed from the area and evacuated by helicopter.