Edward L. Posey
Page 9
[22 Mar 51] Special Orders received from 7th ID and 187th ARCT
Andrade, Anthony, Private First Class
Alston, Marion, Sergeant
Carroll, James, Corporal
Courts, Curtis, Corporal
Higginbotham, McBert, Sergeant
Lesure, David, Corporal
Murphy, Jack, Sergeant First Class
Plater, James, Corporal
Rhodes, William, Corporal
Woodard, Isaiah, Corporal
Modified Jump School
The 187th ARCT received unqualified replacements as airborne troops, including specialists such as Captain James Miller, a surgeon from 2d Battalion. He needed to become qualified for the pending combat jump. All members of the 2d, whether cook, surgeon, or BAR man, had to be qualified paratroopers, so everyone needed the right training and certification. The regiment set up a week-long course of conditioning and practiced landings from the back of a cargo truck. The candidates made three jumps at that height and were awarded their wings. Captain Miller returned to the 187th ARCT and served with distinction in combat. Two others, Floyd Holland and Stewart Strothers, also completed the program, as announced in the Morning Report of 24 June 1950.
SO 38, 23 Hqs 187th ARCT—UP AR 600-70, Change 4, dtd 24 Jun 50…are rated qualified and awarded the Parachute Badge, having completed the modified jump course, as per VOCG.
2d RANGER CO
Holland, Floyd ER13259651 Strothers, Stewart ER33724491
[17 Mar 51] RECORD OF EVENTS
A prcht jump was made by members of this orgn on 16 Mar 1951 Two (2) EM lightly injured.
Herculano Dias Sergeant and Kirk P. Adkins Sergeant
Queen remembers only one other black replacement in addition to Doc Miller in the 187th ARCT. Sergeant First Class Menny Mosby from the 503d/80th AAA was in the S-2 (Maps) Section. Mosby later became a First Sergeant and retired as a Warrant Officer–3, in charge of the Walter Reed Army Medical Center Commissary, Washington, D.C., in the early 1980s.
Liberating Needed Materiel
The Rangers of 2d Company knew the good times between combat were not going to last forever. With various materials in short supply, they indulged in some moonlight requisitioning. Sergeant John “Pop” Jones, the 2d Ranger Company’s Mess Sergeant who had volunteered for the Majori-ri attack and received the Silver Star for outstanding bravery, attested that one of the most important duties of mess personnel—beside being able to fire up the stoves and put out a hot meal within an hour—was to scrounge, beg, borrow, or steal rations. The company ordered rations, supplies, and ammo on a two- to three-day cycle through the Regimental S-4 of the unit to which it was attached; but by the time the requisitions came in, 2d Ranger Company had often moved on to another regimental attachment without its supplies. This brought on the frequent necessity for members of the company to moonlight requisition vehicles to transport their own supplies, lest they end up without any after a couple of days. The 4th Rangers had similar experiences, and had to be fed by other line units. Second Company never sent its kitchen/supply train with the attached unit’s train, but kept it up near the tactical CP, close to the 60mm mortar positions (except on the Munsan-ni jump).
Moonlight requisitioning was easy in Taegu. The area was loaded with dumb, friendly non-combat units that utilized vehicles to visit the PXs and the whores of the local “cathouses.” The occupants were careless and the Ranger units were in need of transportation—especially jeeps and larger ¾-ton trucks. The trucks were easy to steal but harder to hide, so the Rangers replaced them with more appropriate jeeps that could make it over the rough front-line trails.
Corporal William Tucker and Sergeant First Class Norman Collins couldn’t tell the difference between the American and British vehicles. A jeep is not just a jeep: the British jeep of this era had a more square shape and was slightly larger than its American counterpart. Also, the jeep that Tucker and Collins “requisitioned” had the British Union Jack insignia painted on the sides of the hood! A British MP challenged them because neither looked like Her Majesty’s soldiers. Lieutenant Freeman, who could pass for white, told the British officer to take the damn jeep and get moving. Needless to say, this avoided possible courts-martial for Tucker and Collins, who did not make that mistake again.
Garland, who drove for Allen, managed to get at least one jeep, and Corporal Glen Owens liberated two ¾-ton vehicles, which were then used as weapons carriers. Second Company had the stencils and markings ready for Master Sergeant Robert Watkins, 3d Platoon, who was a sign painter in civilian life. By the time the 2d Ranger Company returned to the front, their motor pool had grown large enough to need a Motor Corporal/Mechanic to operate. The 2d Ranger Company left Taegu with three jeeps, two weapons carriers, and two deuce- and-a-halves—a good haul of much-needed equipment and a testament to the Rangers’ ability to infiltrate and evade. Later, Sergeant Watkins also made helmet stencils that looked like parachute wings, and the 2d Rangers began to stand out among the troops in their dress.
False Alarm
About the second week of March, word arrived that 2d Ranger Company would jump behind the lines to capture Hill 303, overlooking Chunchon, in the central jump. It was a joint mission with 4th Company. Our DZ was on the north side of the Imjin River, about 100 yards wide but “shallow.” Queen was a little worried because we had already lost one man (Oakley) in water in what was supposed to be a small stream. He also knew from experience that any type of water landing was extremely hazardous. Once Hill 303 was captured, the Rangers were to hold it until contact (link-up) was made with the 25th Infantry Division or 1st Cavalry, which were coming up from the south. The jump, however, was called off when the 1st Cavalry and 1st Marine Division reached Chunchon ahead of schedule, with less resistance than anticipated.
Around 20 March, Weathersbee was told to report to Captain Anderson, 4th Company. Weathersbee and another sergeant were given a map of Chunchon and asked to make a sand table (a miniature replica of the terrain using dirt or sand and symbols representing forces) of the planned Chunchon operation (“Operation Ripper”). But when they finished, they learned the mission was cancelled. Instead, they were handed a map of Munsan-ni and told to get to work.
Chapter 5
First Airborne Assault Near Munsan-Ni, 23 March 1951
“If a man has a tent roof of caulked linen twelve braccia broad and twelve braccia high, he will be able to let himself fall from any great height without danger to himself.”
—Leonardo da Vinci21
Tactical Comments
The model Ranger Infantry Company (Airborne) had been set up under TO&E No. 7-87, dated 17 October 1950, Department of the Army. But it is doubtful that any actual company followed the TO&E to the letter. One of the advantages a Ranger commander received was that he could organize and table the unit to fit the mission. Most of 2d Ranger Company’s missions were infantry in the attack, so this is what we sought to do.
If this was our primary mission, the disadvantage was the lack of sufficient manpower to sustain an attack for a prolonged period because of a lack of trained replacements. Second Company was forced to rely on the good graces of General Ferenbaugh, 7th Division commanding general, to draw some of the colored troops that the 2d’s commanders knew of from both the official and unofficial pipeline. The segregation policy gave 2d Ranger Company access to replacements that ordinarily would not have been available—meaning if the system actually had been open, in keeping with President Truman’s Executive Order 9981. The reality was that in those years—after the declaration of Executive Order 9981, but before the Army was in full compliance with the new ban on segregation—Army integration policy was often modified according to the interpretations of high-ranking officials who did not support desegregation.
General Edward M. Almond, commander of the X Corps, the unit to which the 2d Ranger Company was attached in Korea, was one such official. In a 1953 interview, Almond aired his views: “When you say you have to have
ten percent Negroes [in the Army], you are lowering the combat efficiency of the Army.” Almond defended these opinions, which were seen as racist by the black press and others: “People think that being from the South, we don’t like Negroes. Not at all. But we understand their capabilities. And we don’t want to sit at the table with them.” When a division commander in Korea noted that whites and blacks trained together at Fort Chaffee in Arkansas, and asked Almond why he refused to mix black troops into the all-white infantry battalions, Almond continued to claim that blacks were incompetent, cowardly in combat, and so unreliable that they posed a danger to white soldiers.22
Another tactical disadvantage was that frequent movement of the unit necessitated increasing the size of the unit’s administrative augmentation force. For every man placed in an administrative role, you have to rob the line of rifle strength. Some prime examples are cited below:
—Because SCR-300s were used in the platoons, instead of a PRC-6 used by the platoon leader, messengers became radio operators.
—With no mortar and/or artillery forward observers, another SCR-300 was required to contact higher headquarters, usually at the battalion or regimental level.
—Having no assigned vehicle drivers necessitated removing Rangers from combat positions to serve as drivers. Even in combat an informal motor stable is needed for preventative and routine vehicle maintenance.
—Without a company armorer to care for the myriad of weapons and ammunition, fulfill their need for repair or replenishment, and reserve weapons in standby for special missions, these roles fell to combat personnel.
—Air-to-ground radio and the AN/GRC-9 radio (use of which was a three-man operation) were operated without specialized personnel.
—There were no Assistant Platoon Sergeants or Section Leaders.
Weaponry provided another tactical disadvantage. The most prevalent Ranger weapon was the BAR, which was used to counteract the Burp Gun (a Chinese sub-machine gun or AK-47). Second Company did not get Thompson submachine guns, which were comparable to the Burp Gun—with the exception of Lieutenants Pryor and Anthony, who had captured ones. The weight of a BAR and its ammo was more than the M-1, the standard-issue U.S. Army rifle in Korea. Contrary to the Geneva Convention, Ranger medics carried carbines. Queen frequently had to order Sergeant William E. “Rabbit” Thomas, company medic, to fall back behind the second squad so he would not get involved in the firefight before he could care for the wounded.
Ranks were not always matched to positions. A squad leader might be a Staff Sergeant or Sergeant First Class, while a good BAR man might be a Sergeant and was almost always a Corporal. A rifleman, an assistant BAR man, could be a Corporal. Constant casualties created frequent vacancies, and requests for promotion orders were rarely turned down by headquarters. The authorization of relatively high ranks in a Ranger company did cause a few problems later when the units were inactivated and the men were sent to the 187th ARCT, because of a lack of vacancies and doubt in the minds of some about their abilities. But the Rangers did not have to take a reduction to private, as the “Triple Nickelers” did after the initial cadre was trained.
An Open Secret
The news of an impending airborne operation was an open secret because the 187th and the Rangers remained in the marshalling area adjacent to the Taegu Airfield (K-2) for almost three weeks, from 27 February to 23 March 1950. The Rangers who were hospitalized in Japan and Korea also guessed as much because many of the doctors discharged them early. Rumors spread by a slip of the tongue through the troops and the local civilians involved in the preparations. Lieutenant Cliette reported back to duty on 3 March, three days after the unit arrived in Taegu, after he had been hospitalized on 20 February and promoted to 1st Lieutenant on 23 February. Returning from the hospital via troop train to 2d Ranger Company, Cliette reported that the military police riding on the trains received word to have all 187th Paratroopers and Rangers unload and get on the first available transportation to Taegu.
In addition to the replacements Lieutenant Anthony brought from CONUS, the 2d had returnees from several other hospitals, including Rangers George Rankins, Clinton Cleveland, Jude P. St. Martin, Herman C. Jackson, Anthony Andrade, Charles O. Lewis, Edward L. Posey, Edward D. Adams, Harold Johnson, Roland Hodge, Smead H. Robertson, and Robert S. Gray, as well as Craig Paulding and Wheeler S. Small, Jr., who had been wounded at Majori-ri but talked their way into an early release from the hospital after hearing the rumor of an upcoming combat jump. This would be the first combat jump ever made by U.S. Rangers and by all-black troops.
The tents in the marshalling area were lined up to form a company street, among the remnants of the apple orchard. Except for keeping the units within the orchard, there was no attempt at camouflage because the North Korean “Bed Check Charlie” aircraft had not gone any farther south than Seoul. The U.S. Air Force had established air superiority, and there were elements of the 80th AAA Battalion from 82d A/B Division around the airfield, as well as Eighth Army (Rear) in Taegu.
Weathersbee recalled that one day when the unit went out for a practice jump, he saw Ted Williams, the famous baseball player for the Boston Red Sox. Williams, a reserve aviator, had been recalled to active duty as a major in the Marine Corps, and his unit was flying a mission out of K-2 airfield. Weathersbee went over to say hello and shake his hand. While there he also saw Captain Forrest Walker, formerly 3d Battalion, 505th, who was being rotated to the States from the 2d ID. Captain Walker had served with distinction and been awarded the Silver Star by General Ridgway, although the award had been ordered stopped by General Almond, and Walker was reassigned to the 3d Battalion, 9th Infantry.23 Men like Weathersbee admired Walker for leading Company E, 9th Infantry Regiment, in the mid-January recapture of Wonju, on the central front. The fact that prejudice had kept Walker’s well-earned Silver Star from him only made him more of a hero.
While Weathersbee worked on a sand table for the Munsan-ni drop (part of Operation Courageous) with a Sergeant First Class from 4th Company, the Rangers established a separate sand table because it was well known that the RCT table would be very busy with briefings. Besides, everyone was utilizing the talents found in their own units. The jump, part of Operation Tomahawk (23 March), would be at Munsan-ni, about twenty-four miles northwest of Seoul. Operation Tomahawk was the Eighth Army’s new plan that, it was hoped, would cause a panicked withdrawal by the enemy. Operation Killer (21 February to 7 March) had failed to accomplish a rapid enemy movement, but after Seoul fell to UN forces during Operation Ripper (7 March to 31 March), the Chinese were pulling back. The 187th was to drop twenty-five miles northwest of Seoul and an armored column was to link up with it there. The ground unit would be Task Force Growden, led by the 6th Tank Battalion, 24th ID, with artillery and infantry. The 2d and 4th Company Rangers were attached to the 187th and both would participate in the jump. Second Company would be distinguished by yellow chutes with yellow strips, and 4th Company by yellow chutes with red strips.
Operations Order 1 from the 187th RCT detailed the jump for 23 March 1951 at 0900 hours. The drop altitude was approximately 900 feet. The plan assumed that the paratrooper drop, followed by a linkup with U.N. forces from the south and east, would cut off enemy units defending the approaches to Munsan-ni. There was only one main road leading northwest from Seoul, and that road passed through Munsan-ni. Escape or withdrawal routes from Munsan-ni required ferry and ford crossings of the Imjin River. Taking control of Munsan-ni would destroy the enemy’s supply and communications routes from Kaesong to Munsan-ni and then southeast to Seoul. Second Company’s mission was to seize and hold Hill 151 until control of the hill could be passed to the 187th’s 2d Battalion.
The evening before the jump, the men of 2d Ranger Company went down to the airfield and fitted their chutes. The chutes were loaded onto the planes so they would stay dry, protected from any early morning dew. Each Ranger packed a duffle bag and a light combat pack with two days of C-rations, poncho, a 60-mm mortar roun
d, and extra socks. No one carried a sleeping bag, but all had field jackets and a sweater or long-john top for chilly nights. Nearly everyone carried two hand grenades, one or two bandoleers of ammo, jump knives, and pistols. The leaders had flashlights and binoculars. Queen had the company telephone, an EE-8, and the air/color panel, along with a blanket fashioned and sewn like a Mexican serape that enabled him to sleep with his weapons-hands covered, but free to operate his M-1 without delay. Everyone carried toilet paper in more than one location.
That evening, the company had a regular dinner, but it was a quiet night in which no one went over to the airbase to visit any of the clubs. Many stayed up late to write a last-minute letter home and check weapons. The bundles for the mortars and the light machine guns were packed and the chutes fitted and marked. Some Rangers attended a church service.
Good Friday—23 March
The men of 2d Ranger Company got up early the next morning—which also happened to be Good Friday. Sergeant Parks, Mess Sergeant, had some scrambled eggs, pancakes, and fresh (reconstituted) milk ready for the Rangers: a hearty breakfast, but definitely not a condemned man’s meal of steak, potatoes, and wine. Second Company’s men repeated the chant “Buffalo—Rangers!” as they marched to the airfield and located the C-46s that would fly them to the drop zone (DZ). They packed their bundles and marked them with blue ribbon, because the yellow strips the 2d had been ordered to use were not available. The colored strips made it easier for the Rangers to know which bundles to look for when they hit the ground, and perhaps to recognize and locate them quickly.
After a shout of “Buffalo” the Rangers boarded their respective aircraft and started chuting up. The C-46 was a good plane to jump from because it had two doors and a slow speed for jumping. The flight crew was a National Guard unit that had been called to active duty. Before boarding, Allen called the unit together for a moment of silent prayer. Dias didn’t have an appropriate jump-type chin strap for his helmet, so he tore up a bandoleer to make a chin strap. Even so, he lost his helmet in the “opening shock” and hit the ground without it. Over in the 1st Platoon aircraft, Allen was the jumpmaster. Lieutenant Freeman, platoon leader, was in one door of the C-46 and Corporal “Pretty Willie” Coleman, his radio operator, was in the other. Corporal Joe Wells and Corporal Cleaven McBride jumped with some of the 187th Headquarters and Headquarters Company men assigned to jump in one of the 2d Ranger aircraft. According to Dias, 4th Company Rangers A. B. Smith from Vidor, Texas, and Al Koop of Enid, Okalahoma, jumped with the 2d Ranger Company’s 1st Platoon because their aircraft was out of space.