Alexander

by Guy Maclean Rogers

  Alexander called his friends together into a council and put the alternatives before them. After a

  silence, Parmenio alone dared to speak up: “If I were Alexander,” he said, “I should accept what was

  offered and make a treaty.” To which Alexander replied, “So should I, if I were Parmenio.”

  Alexander then told the envoys that the earth could not maintain its plan and order if there were two

  suns, nor could the world remain calm and free from war as long as two kings ruled. If Darius desired

  supremacy, he should fight Alexander to see which of them would have sole rule. If Darius despised

  glory and preferred a life of ease, then he should obey Alexander, but remain king over all other

  rulers, since this privilege was given to him by Alexander’s generosity. Such was Alexander’s reply.

  Moreover, there was more bad news for Darius after he received Alexander’s insulting response.

  Darius’ wife Stateira, who had been taken prisoner by Alexander after the battle of Issos, died in

  childbirth. Alexander provided her with a sumptuous funeral. Plutarch says that the magnanimity and

  self-restraint Alexander had shown toward her in captivity lessened Darius’ agitation and misery at

  his wife’s misfortune.

  The difference of opinion between Parmenio and Alexander in 331 was real and revealing.

  Parmenio may have believed that Alexander and the Macedonians had punished the Persians

  sufficiently by now, in accordance with the propaganda of the campaign. Moreover, the older, more

  experienced man may have thought it better to quit while the Macedonians were ahead; all could yet

  be lost in one battle against the vast numbers that Darius at that very moment was gathering in

  Babylon.

  Alexander, however, clearly had a different personal and strategic conception. Ever since the

  battle at the Granicus, Alexander apparently was not interested in a simple, punitive campaign. His

  decision to disband his fleet and his strategy of defeating the Persian fleet on land had proved correct,

  given his resources and above all his personal objective: to conquer the entire Persian empire. Once

  the Persian fleet had been eliminated as an effective fighting force after the death of Memnon,

  Alexander had almost no reason to accept Darius’ offer of half the prize he desired.

  Just as in battle, in council Alexander pursued his objectives with a ruthless single-mindedness.

  Unlike Parmenio, he was a risk-taker, and the cards he now held were better than the ones he had

  played when he stood to gain less. So by midsummer of 331 Alexander prepared to set out from Tyre,

  to test the gods’ favor yet again.

  THE GATHERING STORM

  Meanwhile, in Babylon Darius was mustering his grand army. Although cut off from the manpower

  resources of some of his former provinces in the west, he still could call up huge levies from the

  eastern and northeastern parts of his empire. After Darius sent out the order for his governors and

  their troops to come to Babylon, vast numbers of warriors did make their way to Mesopotamia. They

  came from a long list of nations and tribes: tough, battle-tested Sogdians, Bactrians, and Indians from

  the Bactrian border, especially adept at guerrilla warfare; contingents of the Sacae, a branch of the

  Asiatic Scythians, who fought in suits of laminated armor; Arachotians and Indian hillmen; and

  mounted Parthians, Hyrcanians, and Tapurians. From closer to home, Medes had turned up to fight

  alongside their kinsmen; contingents from the Persian Gulf followed. Uxians and Susiani had come

  down from their redoubts. Lowland and Mesopotamian Syrians had joined the grand army. Even the

  Babylonians, known better for their peacetime talents, had taken up arms.

  The list of Persian levies was not quite as long as Homer’s catalogue of ships in book 2 of the

  Iliad. But the geographical origins of the contingents under Darius’ command do give some idea of

  the spread of Persian rule to the north and east, and of its rich diversity.

  Altogether Darius’ force consisted of no fewer than 40,000 cavalry and a million infantry,

  according to Arrian. These totals are perhaps somewhat exaggerated, but there is no doubt that Darius

  assembled a very large army, one clearly numerically superior to Alexander’s forces.

  Nor would Darius rely solely on his vast numerical advantage. After facing the sarissa-wielding

  Macedonian phalanx at the battle of Issos, Darius had fashioned for his army swords and lances much

  longer than those previously carried into battle. Darius also had constructed 200 scythe-bearing

  chariots to astonish and terrify his enemy. The scythes on these chariots projected out in front of the

  horses and also from the sides. Finally, Indian troops from the far side of the Indus had brought Darius

  about fifteen elephants, a terrifying superweapon, by which Darius hoped to stem the inevitable

  Macedonian cavalry charge.

  Darius understood that his infantry was relatively weak compared with the Macedonian phalanx,

  but that his cavalry was strong. The cavalry on the right side of his line at Issos, after all, might have

  achieved a local, tactical victory had it not been forced to retreat to help the shattered left wing (and

  hard-pressed center) of his line. Now he had given his infantry what he hoped would be more

  effective weapons. He intended to use the scythed chariots to wreak havoc among Alexander’s heavy

  infantry. But he meant to win the battle with his cavalry, which, given adequate space, might be able

  to envelop the Macedonian line on one or both of its flanks.

  Clearly, it was not in Darius’ interest to fight Alexander from behind the walls of Babylon.

  Alexander had shown at Tyre what he could do if his enemy opted to stay behind city walls, even the

  high, thick walls of a courageously defended island city. So Darius wisely chose to move north to the

  open plains of Assyria (modern northern Iraq). His plan was to deploy for battle in the area of

  Nineveh (modern Kuyunjik and Nebi Yunus), where the terrain was well suited to his purpose,

  affording ample maneuvering room for the huge forces at his disposal.

  To give himself time to reach his selected field of battle, Darius sent the satrap Mazaeus forward to

  discover Alexander’s progress and to stop or (more likely) forestall his crossing of the Euphrates.

  Darius meanwhile made his way with the bulk of his army through the Mesopotamian plain, over the

  Tigris to Arbela and finally to Gaugamela. There his soldiers literally dug themselves into the plain

  between the river Bumelus (Gomil) and the Jebel Maqlub, the highest of the hills that together

  intersect the terrain between the Tigris River and the foothills of the Zagros Mountains.

  On the plain the Persians set about smoothing out the ground so that no broken surface might

  obstruct the movement of cavalry. Military discipline was maintained by continued training and

  practice. After all of his preparations, Darius was most concerned, however, that confusion might

  arise in the battle, owing to the different languages spoken by his soldiers. Given the list of

  combatants he had called up from around the Persian empire, Darius’ concern was not unwarranted.

  Unfortunately, we do not know what measures he adopted to deal with this not insignificant problem.

  But his other actions show that Darius was a careful commander and would leave nothing to chance.

  FROM TYRE TO GAUGAMELA

  Alexander, meanwhile, had set out from Tyre and rea
ched Thapsacus (on the upper Euphrates) in

  August 331. The Macedonians nearly had completed construction of two bridges across the Euphrates

  River, but had not quite brought them to the farther bank because of the presence of Mazaeus, with his

  3,000 mounted troops, waiting there. At Alexander’s approach, however, Mazaeus made off, and the

  Macedonian engineers finished their job. Alexander thus was able to cross the river.

  From Thapsacus Alexander and the Macedonian army probably marched to Harran (the Assyrian

  city in northwestern Mesopotamia) and then eastward along the route from Rhesaena to Nisibis

  (modern Nusaybin) in northeastern Mesopotamia, and finally on to the Tigris River. Alexander

  crossed the Tigris without opposition except for the swift current.

  While the troops were resting afterward there was an almost total eclipse of the moon, dated to

  nine P.M. on September 20, 331. Alexander offered sacrifice to Moon, Sun, and Earth, the three deities

  said to have caused the phenomenon. Alexander’s trusted seer Aristander prophesied that the Moon’s

  eclipse was propitious for the Macedonians and Alexander: the impending battle would be fought

  before the end of the month, and the sacrifices portended victory.

  On the fourth day after the crossing, Macedonian advance scouts sighted an advance guard of

  enemy cavalry in open ground, but their numbers could not be accurately assessed. Alexander himself

  then led a flying force of the Royal Squadron, one squadron of Companions, and the Paeonian

  mounted scouts ( prodromoi) against a thousand (or so) Persian cavalry. Some of these were captured,

  and it was learned that Darius was not far off, with a powerful force.

  Alexander pitched camp and rested his troops for four days. He then moved his army to a base

  camp below the northern foothills of Jebel Maqlub. From there, leaving behind the baggage animals

  and soldiers unfit for duty, he took his army across the hills. As his army descended the hills,

  Alexander saw the enormous enemy host. The sight led him to call an immediate meeting of his

  general staff officers.

  PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE

  Alexander now consulted with his personal Companions, generals, squadron commanders, and the

  officers of the allied and mercenary contingents. To them he put a question: should they advance at

  once, or camp where they were and make a detailed survey of the field of battle? The majority urged

  Alexander to advance immediately with the main infantry. Parmenio, however, advised a careful

  reconnaissance. For once, Alexander agreed. Light infantry and Companion cavalry were sent out to

  inspect the terrain.

  After the reconnaissance was completed, a second meeting of commanders was held. At the staff

  meeting Alexander exhorted his officers to encourage their troops: the sovereignty of all Asia was

  there and then to be decided, he declared. They should urge each man, in the moment of danger, to

  keep his place in the line and to heed the requirements of order: to remain perfectly silent when

  necessary; to shout loudly when it was right to shout; and to howl to inspire fear, when the moment to

  howl came. Above all, each man should remember that neglect of his own duty would bring the whole

  cause into common danger, while energetic attention to it would contribute to the common success.

  If Arrian faithfully reports here at least the essence of what Alexander said at the time, it is

  interesting to note that Alexander’s speech, rather than focusing on Macedonian successes in the past,

  concentrated upon what individual soldiers had to do during the impending battle for the army as a

  whole to be successful. Alexander simply told his soldiers that if they did their jobs, then all would

  be well. No heroics were needed. As ever, heroics could be left to someone else—Alexander. By

  such “pep” talks effective military leaders traditionally have helped those under their command to

  face imminent combat.

  In response to Alexander’s speech, the assembled commanders assured him that they could be

  relied upon. Having brought the meeting to a close, Alexander then ordered the army to eat and rest.

  Parmenio afterward went to Alexander’s tent and advised him to attack the Persians at night; the

  enemy would be surprised, confused, and more prone to panic during a night attack, he suggested.

  Since others were listening, Alexander replied grandiloquently that it would be dishonorable

  ( aischron) to steal a victory (at night). Alexander had to win his victory openly and without

  stratagem.

  While the presentation of Alexander’s response to Parmenio probably belongs to the hostile

  literary tradition that was created by Alexander’s publicists after the king and the old general had

  their falling out, behind the rhetorical flourish lay sound tactical and strategic judgment. Alexander, a

  student of warfare from the Trojan War to his own day, knew that combat at night was notoriously

  unpredictable. Stronger attacking forces often had been defeated by weaker ones, contrary to

  expectation. Once the element of surprise had been adjusted for, anything could happen.

  Alexander also recognized that to become king of all Asia he must capture or kill Darius himself.

  Nothing less would suffice. If Darius escaped, a distinct possibility given the confusion of warfare at

  night, Alexander would not have his decisive and final victory. And if the Macedonians came out the

  worse, they would be alone in a hostile country. Above all, however, if Alexander believed, as he

  apparently did, that the Macedonians could and would defeat the Persians during the day, there was

  no reason to risk the uncertainties of a night battle.

  Alexander rejected Parmenio’s advice because he trusted in Aristander’s interpretation of the

  sacrifices: the Macedonians would win, and they would win before the end of the month. Alexander

  relied upon the divine inspiration of his seer rather than the seasoned advice of his best and most

  experienced general. At the defining moment of his life, Alexander placed his ultimate trust in the

  gods.

  Indeed, Alexander spent the night before the battle in front of his tent in the company not of his

  generals but of his seer, Aristander, with whom he performed sacred ceremonies and sacrificed to the

  god Fear ( Phobos), for the first and only time. Some commentators have interpreted this sacrifice as

  an indication of fear or doubt on Alexander’s part. This interpretation represents a fundamental

  misunderstanding of how Greek religion itself worked. Alexander’s sacrifice to the god Fear was a

  way of giving that god his due lest he visit the Macedonians during the battle and extract his price.

  Alexander believed that the only thing the Macedonians had to fear was Fear himself. If the

  Macedonians fearlessly did their jobs, and left the heroics to the hero, they would win, as Aristander

  promised.

  The Persians meanwhile were standing to arms throughout the night, and Darius held a review of

  them by torchlight. They had no camp surrounding them and they feared a night attack—just as

  Parmenio suggested. There was no meal or rest for them. This enervating stand to arms and the

  anxiety that arose during it subsequently told against the Persians more than anything else.

  When dawn finally broke, the Persians were still under arms, while Alexander overslept. In fact, it

  was only with difficulty that Parmenio was able to rouse Alexander after e
ntering his tent, standing by

  his couch, and calling out his name two or three times.

  Finally having awakened Alexander, the astonished general asked the king how he could possibly

  sleep as if already victorious. Smiling, Alexander replied that the Macedonians already had won the

  battle, now that they had been delivered from wandering about in a vast and desolate country in

  pursuit of Darius, who heretofore had fled the fight.

  BATTLE FORMATIONS

  As it happens, we know exactly how the Persians stood to fight, because the Persian order of battle

  fell into Macedonian hands afterward. On the left of the Persian line was stationed the Bactrian

  cavalry, supported by the Dahae and the Arachotians. Next to these (from the outside to the center)

  were the mixed Persian cavalry and infantry, followed by the Susian and the Cadusian contingents.

  This was the disposition of units up to the center of the entire phalanx.

  To the right were the contingents from “Hollow” (lowland) Syria and Mesopotamia, and farther to

  the right, the Medes. In touch with these were the Parthians and the Sacae, then the Topeirians, and

  next the Hycanians. Last, closest to the center, were the Albanians and Sacesinians.

  In the center of the line was Darius himself with a thousand of his kinsmen, the royal Persian

  bodyguard with the golden apples on their spear-butts, the Indians, the “transplanted” Carians (who

  had been carried off from their homeland), and the Mardian archers. Uxians, Babylonians, troops

  from the Persian Gulf, and Sittacenians were drawn up in deep formation behind them.

  In addition, in front of the Persian left wing (facing Alexander’s right wing) were the Scythian

  cavalry, about a thousand Bactrians, and one hundred scythed chariots. The elephants and another fifty

  chariots were posted in close support of the royal squadron of the king’s cavalry.

  Another fifty chariots were posted in front of the Persian right wing, as were the Armenian and

  Cappadocian cavalry. The Greek mercenary infantry was drawn up facing the Macedonian infantry

  phalanx in two sections, one on each side of Darius and his Persian guard. These Greek mercenaries

  were considered the only infantry on the Persian side capable of standing up to the Macedonian