Crucible of Command

by William C. Davis

  Lee confessed his “regret & mortification” to Mary soon thereafter. “I had taken every precaution to ensure success & counted on it,” he said. Lee blamed the night rain during their march that wore out the men and ruined their provisions. “The Ruler of the Universe . . . sent a storm to disconcert a well laid plan & destroy my hopes,” he told her.124 Putting the best face on it, two days later he issued congratulations to the army on what he now called a mere “forced reconnaissance,” and claimed success for discovering all they needed to know of enemy defenses. Now they would be ready to achieve victory when opportunity afforded.125 Few were fooled. “I think it is perfectly ridiculous, his having published a long account of a brilliant campaign which he intended to make if it had not failed,” complained a staff officer at Manassas. “I think this shows vanity without greatness.”126 Lee could only say that “we must try again.”127

  Once Loring’s command returned to its original camps, Lee left to see Floyd and Wise, expecting to find them united in the face of the enemy near the Gauley River. “I was very much struck with his fine soldierly and martial appearance,” a visiting congressman wrote on Lee’s arrival, and some were inspired to hope that Lee might bring about unity and cooperation.128 Instead, Lee found that Wise had left Floyd and moved to confront the foe on his own. Controlled in spite of his frustration, Lee told Wise that this was “the height of imprudence,” and asked—but did not order—him to unite his command with Floyd’s.129 Wise complained that he felt unjustly rebuked, accusing Floyd of misleading Lee.130 A few days later Davis finally ordered Wise to relinquish his command, and even then Wise asked Lee to advise him on whether to obey the order. At last Lee responded firmly to the point, bluntly saying, “Obey the President’s order.”131 Soon afterward, under cover of night, the Yankees withdrew to the Gauley River and the danger in the western counties abated for the moment.132

  For some time Lee held Loring near at hand to Floyd and Wise’s old legion, now beyond question acting in overall command, and hoping to combine them for a stroke at Rosecrans. Then on October 20 he learned that Rosecrans might be advancing again, as were the Federals at Cheat Mountain. He sent Loring to meet that threat and encouraged Floyd to advance toward Rosecrans. Having done that, he decided to leave those turbulent officers to deal with the enemy as best they could. Lee could not wait to get away from western Virginia’s generals. Behind him he left Staunton secure, and the coming winter weather would help protect the passes against the enemy. He was returning to Richmond.133

  He took with him frustrating memories of western Virginia that must have shaken his confidence. A well-planned and executed campaign fell apart at the last moment on a critical element Lee overlooked: verification of the strength of the Federal right flank on Cheat Mountain. When the fight did start, Lee’s only influence on the scattered skirmishing was to pull back and reform, and dare the enemy to attack him. Yet he was cool through it all. On a broader front, that spring and summer he demonstrated managerial skill in helping to raise volunteers, distributing armaments and materiel, assigning officers, and working effectively with first Letcher, and then Davis, with whom he laid the foundation of a fine working relationship. He was as much an architect of the victory at Manassas as any, and made Harpers Ferry, Norfolk, and the Manassas all safe. Even in western Virginia he left the three vital passes into the Shenandoah secure. If he failed to make Loring, Wise, and Floyd play well together, still he subordinated his own ego to the greater good by exercising patience in the effort, though the delay made some in the Confederacy wonder if he was resolute enough to be a good general.

  Something else changed in Lee. Gone was remorse over disunion. Indeed, he had shed much of it by the time of the Manassas victory. “I have no regrets, far as I am concerned, for the past, and have no apprehensions for the future,” he had written a friend on July 27. “I bear no malice, have no animosities to indulge, no selfish purpose to gratify. My only object is to repel the invaders of our peace and the spoilers of our homes.” He left no room for doubt now that his resolve was fixed:

  I do not pretend to see the results of this conflict in which we have been forced, but leave its direction to a Merciful God, who I know will not afflict us unnecessarily. As far as my advice and my counsel goes, it will be continued on our side as long as there is one horse that can carry his rider and one arm to wield a sword. I prefer annihilation to submission. They may destroy, but I trust will never conquer us.134

  Now the Federals were routinely “the enemy,” especially after the death at Cheat Mountain of his adjutant Lieutenant Colonel John A. Washington. It was his first really close loss, and Lee took it very personally. “Our enemy’s have stamped their attack upon our rights, with additional infamy,” he fumed, “& by killing the lineal descendant and representative of him who under the guidance of Almighty God established them & by his virtues rendered our Republic immortal.” Ironically, in the same sentence he spoke of Northerners as enemies, yet referred to the Union as “our Republic,” though one hardly immortal at the moment. In his sorrow and anger he seemed to feel that the Yankees singled out Washington for death especially.135 If his reference to “our Republic” was a slip, his emotional separation from the North was maturing rapidly, especially when he thought of Arlington under the invader’s heel. Asked if the Yankees had vandalized his home, he acknowledged that he heard they had, and tears came to his eyes, his voice quavering as he confessed he never expected to see it again.136

  He inspired few that season. “Lee has done nothing in the West,” one officer complained. “I did not think him a man for the field.137 Indeed, he had not yet commanded soldiers in a conventional combat, especially on the scale toward which this conflict rapidly escalated. As a senior ranking field general of the Confederate Army, he was sure to get the opportunity if the president ever cut him loose. Until then many could wonder “What has Become of Gen. Lee?”

  Scarcely had Grant occupied Paducah before he told Frémont that with a modest reinforcement he could take Columbus, then reiterated the request five days later.138 Paralyzed by timidity, Frémont stopped communicating with Grant after September 28, then left St. Louis to confront Confederates in southwest Missouri, leaving his adjutant to act for him. Essentially, Grant was on his own.139 Seeing firsthand the evidence of sloth in high positions, he now told Julia that the war was likely to last even longer than his last forecast.140 For six weeks he went without guidance or approval, compelled to scatter his forces as garrisons when he believed he should be concentrating against Columbus. “What I want is to advance,” he told Julia on October 20.141 In their first communications, Brigadier General William T. Sherman, commanding the Department of the Cumberland at Louisville, asked Grant on October 16 to move against Columbus to divert Confederates at Bowling Green from his own front. Grant wanted to move immediately if St. Louis allowed, but again no authorization came.142

  He believed that his commands at Cairo and Cape Girardeau, totaling about 11,000, could move in combination with the 6,800 at Paducah under Brigadier General Charles F. Smith and capture Columbus, isolating Confederates in southeast Missouri and forcing them back into Arkansas.143 It would also take the Mobile & Ohio Railroad, a vital artery for the enemy army being assembled at Bowling Green, give Grant a supply line for a move farther south, and put him in place to strike at the rebels holding New Madrid and Island Number 10 in the middle of the river. How far he could go beyond that was the stuff of dreams, but his fixation on “going south” made it clear that a strategy was germinating. At the same time he heard that President Lincoln had taken notice of his operations to date, and Washburne was pressing for a second star for him. “I am not a place seeker but will try and sustain myself wherever the authorities that be may place me,” he told Julia.144 Hearing of others pressing for his advancement, he found it gratifying but, perhaps with the ineffective Frémont in mind, he felt no more such promotions ought to be made until brigadiers actually proved themselves deserving.145


  At his headquarters in a Cairo bank, Grant perched at a cashier’s window writing orders, making requisitions, and keeping orderlies busy running his messages. He started before dawn and often worked well into the night, leaving his hand painfully cramped, yet he thrived on the activity and felt healthier than ever. Occasionally he escaped for a brief ride, but that was all, and scarcely had time to mourn when his brother Simpson died on September 13. He was budgeting his time and delegating efficiently now, and by late September found that “I have reduced the duties of my office very much from what they were by being a little more exclusive than I was at first.”146 Still, Rawlins’s arrival on September 8 to assume his duties as adjutant was most welcome, thereby relieving the general of much of the paperwork.147 It also gave Grant time to attend to personal business. With a salary now of nearly $4,000, he was virtually out of debt and sending money home to Julia, with an injunction to save as much as possible to get them launched comfortably in peacetime.148 He also learned to dismiss place seekers quickly, especially those his father often sent to him seeking appointments. Grant took the position that “I have none to give and want to be placed under no obligation to anyone.” In his view, if he found a place for someone on the staff of one of his subordinates, he became responsible should that man fail in his duty and he might have to take away what he had given, offending both the appointee and whomever recommended him. “I want always to be in a condition to do my duty,” he told his sister Mary, “without partiality, favor or affection.”149

  On November 2 Frémont notified Grant that 3,000 Confederates had moved into southeast Missouri and he wanted them forced back into Arkansas.150 By now Grant had five brigades led by McClernand, Richard Oglesby, W. H. L. Wallace, John Cook, and Charles F. Smith. He sent two columns to converge on the rebels, and in his instructions revealed a difference between himself and his superior. The latter spoke of “driving” the foe; Grant told his subordinates “to destroy this force.” Frémont was content to defer threats; Grant wanted them eliminated. As was now his habit, he left details to his subordinates’ discretion.151 “I do not want to cripple you by instructions,” he said, “but simply give you the objects of the expedition and leave you to execute them.”152 And then Grant did something more. Ignored when he applied for permission to take Columbus, Grant assembled the permission he wanted on his own.153 Two months earlier Frémont had told him to take Belmont, but soon cancelled that instruction.154 Earlier Frémont had wanted Paducah, and Grant took it without orders, and with no reprimand afterward. Frémont had said nothing to imply he no longer wanted Belmont, so Grant decided to apply the Paducah precedent. By November 5, if not earlier, he resolved to “go south” immediately and make at least a demonstration, which could be a prelude to attacking Columbus next. Furthermore, persistent rumor said Lincoln was tired of Frémont and would relieve him any day now.155 In fact, on November 2 he did. Grant did not know that as of November 5 but he knew his commander was an unpopular lame duck. It might be weeks before a successor took over. That left a command vacuum that gave Grant an opportunity.

  Citing a November 1 order from Frémont to demonstrate toward Belmont without bringing on an engagement, Grant ordered McClernand to prepare for a reconnaissance in force, and told Smith that he intended “to menace Belmont,” asking him to distract Polk at Columbus.156 Grant was ready to go by midnight November 6 with 3,100 men, still evolving his plans, and sharing his full intent with no one. First he suggested that he might countervail Frémont’s orders and recall the columns in southeast Missouri to join him at Belmont, which would swell his force to 9,000.157 A risk like that suggested that he contemplated something more than a mere demonstration. A few hours later he actually did it, ordering both columns to “communicate with me at Belmont.”158 Though Grant later claimed this was only to make his demonstration more effective, he clearly intended to occupy Belmont or establish a foothold nearby.159 Soon Smith cryptically asked “do you propose to carry out the idea & when,” without saying what the “idea” might be. It is implicit that Grant proposed something contingent on a success at Belmont, most likely a move on New Madrid. Then across the Mississippi and north against Columbus itself, while Smith’s approach from Paducah would squeeze Polk between them and cut off retreat.160 Ultimately, Grant would have six distinct columns in motion across southeast Missouri and western Kentucky, the most complex attempt at convergence of forces yet in this war, evidence that he had this plan awaiting an opportunity, and now it had come. Each column would support the other, positioning him to take quick advantage of any opportunity. There were risks, of course, the greatest to Grant himself if something went wrong.

  His main column aboard six steamboats set off about six at night with the gunboats Lexington and Tyler in advance. Grant tied up for the night several miles south of Cairo, expecting to make Polk think Columbus was the objective.161 Then he went to bed aboard the Belle Memphis. Either before leaving or during the night, Grant received information suggesting that Polk had reinforcements ready to cross the Mississippi, or were already over the river, to threaten Frémont or one of Grant’s own columns. In either case, an attack on Belmont could distract those Confederates and draw them back, further reason to make more than a reconnaissance.162 By eight the next morning they went ashore on the Missouri side just above a river bend that kept them out of sight from Columbus. A spatter of musketry from woods lining the bank meant that Belmont would soon know they were coming, so Grant put the infantry on its way immediately under McClernand and remained behind to get the artillery off-loaded. In just minutes, skirmishing began and then he heard the cannon of the Lexington and Tyler as they passed the bend to distract Columbus’s batteries. Grant mounted his horse and posted a few companies down the riverbank as a reserve to protect the transports, then caught up with the infantry just as it went into the line of battle about two miles from Belmont’s camps. Grant ordered an advance, then left McClernand to it and rode to survey his line. He and his staff stayed mounted behind the line as it advanced through the enemy camps, cheering the men and rallying the wavering until the rebels evacuated northward along the bank. Grant triumphantly ordered his men in pursuit.

  Then it fell apart as men began leaving the firing line to plunder the rebel camps. To remove temptation, Grant ordered all the tents burned, only to hear sounds indicating that Polk had landed reinforcements upstream to launch a counterattack while cannon at Columbus opened fire on the Union position. As Grant and his officers struggled to get the men back in their ranks and into the cover of a heavy wood, he learned that at least two more steamboats had been spotted coming with yet more rebel reinforcements.

  Grant never intended to stay at Belmont, but he had expected to stake a foothold nearby. Confederate reinforcements put an end to that. He had routed the enemy garrison, if temporarily, captured its artillery, burned its camps, and given Polk notice that Belmont was at hazard. His men had a taste of battle and he and his officers their first experience at command. With nothing more to gain, and much to lose if he remained too long, he ordered a retreat to the landing. Some men panicked and ran away, while others forgot their discipline and just wandered. Then the original Belmont garrison regrouped and erupted from the woods on their right as they retreated. The hazard of Grant’s optimism became evident; having driven them off, he gave them no more thought. Taken by surprise, he saw his column at hazard of disintegrating. Then the obverse of that vulnerability emerged as he coolly rode ahead to collect the reserve he had posted earlier that day. Unfortunately, they panicked when they heard the counterattack, and were already at the transports. Virtually all who were ambulatory made it back to the landing, though they had to abandon the captured artillery. Supporting fire from Lexington and Tyler stalled the Confederates long enough for Grant to get his men on their boats and steaming north. Amid a last enemy lunge toward the landing, Grant himself rode his horse half sliding, half walking down a steep bank, and then coolly trotted across a plank, the last man aboard the la
st boat. He walked up to a cabin on the Texas deck and lay on a sofa to take a nap, probably exhausted by stress, but soon joined his officers in the main cabin. While they excitedly exchanged accounts of experience under fire, Grant sat silently by himself. Better than any, he knew what they had achieved, and how close they had come to disaster, his silence now perhaps reflecting uncertainty as to how his superior would react when they returned to Cairo.163

  He found the town illuminated in celebration, and wired to St. Louis a brief statement of the attack and retreat.164 The next day he put his total losses at about 250, adding that he believed his action prevented any Confederates from reinforcing those facing Frémont, and declared that “the victory was complete.”165 Destroying enemy camps counted only as an irritant, and of the six cannon captured he abandoned four in the retreat, along with about a thousand rifles dropped by his own soldiers when they ran for their transports. His actual loss came to 95 killed, 306 wounded, and 195 missing and presumably captured, double his first estimate, and 75 fewer than the enemy’s. Between 2,500 rebels in the camps and an unknown number of those sent by Polk, the Confederates considerably outnumbered the Federals.166