Hard Choices

by Hillary Rodham Clinton

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  I left El Salvador and flew to Honduras for the annual meeting of the Organization of American States. Honduras, roughly the size of Mississippi, is home to about 8 million of the poorest people in Latin America. Its history has been marked by a seemingly endless parade of discord and disasters. The President of Honduras was Manuel Zelaya, a throwback to the caricature of a Central American strongman, with his white cowboy hat, dark black mustache, and fondness for Hugo Chavez and Fidel Castro.

  I woke up early on the morning of June 2 and prepared for a long day of multilateral diplomacy, which, thanks to all the set-piece speeches and procedural mumbo-jumbo, can often be deadly boring. This day at the OAS, however, promised drama. We expected a number of nations to put forward a resolution lifting the 1962 suspension on Cuba’s membership in the organization. By tradition the OAS operates by consensus, meaning that even a single country’s objection to a measure can hold it up. But, technically, a two-thirds majority was all it took to adopt a resolution, if it came to that. Every vote counter believed a big majority of nations would support lifting the Cuba ban because they generally viewed it as an outdated artifact of the Cold War and believed that engaging Cuba and bringing it inside the family of nations was the best way to encourage reforms on the island. A few countries, including Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Ecuador, would characterize the ban more harshly as an example of U.S. bullying, and they saw bringing Cuba back into the OAS as a way both to stick it to the United States and weaken democratic norms across the region. That worried me. The OAS had adopted a charter in 2001 codifying strong democratic principles, and it stood as a landmark of the region’s journey away from its dictatorial past. We couldn’t let Chavez and his cronies make a show of gutting that charter.

  For the new Obama Administration, this presented an early test. We could stick to our old policy and refuse to support lifting Cuba’s suspension because a dictatorship has no place in an association of democracies, but then we would likely alienate many of our neighbors and make the United States look isolated in our own backyard. Or we could cave and admit that Cuba’s suspension was a Cold War anachronism, but that could make a mockery of the region’s hard-won democratic norms and create a firestorm back home. Neither option was at all appealing.

  As I was getting ready in my hotel room, I turned on CNN and saw a story about a Cuban father living and working in the United States who hadn’t seen his baby boy in a year and a half because of the restrictions on traveling between the two countries. Thanks to the Obama Administration’s easing of those restrictions, father and son were finally able to reunite. Following up on those changes, we offered to begin talks with the Cuban government about restoring direct mail service and cooperation on immigration processes. In the run-up to this summit in Honduras, the Cubans accepted. In short, the United States was living up to the President’s promise of a new beginning. But welcoming Cuba back to the OAS without dramatic democratic reforms was simply a nonstarter.

  For fifty years Cuba had been ruled as a Communist dictatorship by Fidel Castro. He and his regime denied its people fundamental freedoms and human rights, repressed dissent, kept a tight hold of the state-controlled economy, and worked to spread “the revolution” to other countries across the region and beyond. Despite advancing age and declining health, Castro and his brother, Raul, continued to rule Cuba with absolute power.

  Since 1960, the United States had maintained an embargo against the island in hopes of squeezing Castro from power, but it only succeeded in giving him a foil to blame for Cuba’s economic woes. In late 1995 the Clinton Administration offered Castro quiet talks to explore the possibility of improving relations. Those discussions were under way when, in February 1996, a Cuban Air Force jet shot down two small unarmed planes, killing four crew members. The planes were owned by a group of Cuban exiles in Miami called Brothers to the Rescue, who flew periodic missions to drop anti-Castro leaflets over Cuba. My husband called the incident “a blatant violation of international law.” The UN Security Council condemned Cuba’s actions, and the U.S. Congress passed legislation, with large bipartisan majorities in both houses, strengthening the embargo against Cuba and requiring Congressional approval for any future changes. The experience taught me to keep my eyes wide open when it came to dealing with the Castros.

  Since the Castro brothers were implacably opposed to the democratic principles enshrined in the OAS charter and did not hide their disdain for the institution, it was hard to see how giving them a seat at that table would be good for democracy or for the OAS. In fact, given the tradition of making decisions by consensus, it could give Cuba an effective veto over important regional matters.

  The Castro brothers were not in Honduras to argue their case. In fact they expressed no interest in joining the OAS. The charge was led by the government of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela (although it had wide support from others). A self-aggrandizing dictator who was more of an aggravation than a real threat, except to his own citizens, Chavez had shouted and schemed against the United States for years and worked to subvert democracy in his own country and across the region. He represented so much of the negative history that the region was trying to transcend. Chavez had stifled political opposition and the press in Venezuela, nationalized companies and seized their assets, squandered the country’s oil wealth, and was busy turning the country into a dictatorship.

  In April, President Obama had crossed paths with Chavez at the Summit of the Americas. At the time Chavez seemed delighted to shake President Obama’s hand, and he made a big show of presenting the President with a gift as a gesture of his goodwill. It turned out to be a book about U.S. imperialism and exploitation in Latin America—so not much of a gesture.

  I regularly criticized Chavez and defended those in Venezuela brave enough to stand up to him. But I also tried not to say anything that might give Chavez an excuse to puff himself up and ride his high horse all over the region complaining about U.S. bullying. On Venezuelan television he once entertained a huge crowd by singing “I’m not loved by Hillary Clinton . . . and I don’t love her either” to the tune of a popular local song. It was hard to argue with that.

  My day in Honduras began with an early breakfast with Foreign Ministers from across the Caribbean. We had a lot to talk about, especially plans to respond to growing drug violence and for greater cooperation on energy. Most Caribbean nations were both starved for energy and vulnerable to the effects of climate change, from rising sea levels to extreme weather. So they were eager to work with us to find solutions. But, of course, the conversation also came around to Cuba. “We do look forward to the day when Cuba can join the OAS,” I assured the Ministers. “But we believe that membership in the OAS must come with responsibility. And we owe it to each other to uphold our standards of democracy and governance that have brought so much progress to our hemisphere. It’s not about reliving the past; it’s about the future and being true to the founding principles of this organization.”

  After breakfast it was on to the main event, the OAS General Assembly.

  Secretary-General José Miguel Insulza, a Chilean diplomat, and President Zelaya, our Honduran host, welcomed us to the hall and invited all the Ministers to pose for a “family photo.” How many of these leaders would join us in defending the organization’s democratic principles?

  Brazil was key. Under the leadership of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Brazil had emerged as an important global player. Lula, as he’s known, a charismatic former trade union leader elected in 2002, was the face of the dynamic new Brazil, which boasted one of the fastest growing economies in the world and a rapidly expanding middle class. Perhaps more than any other country, Brazil’s rise symbolized Latin America’s transformation and its promise for the future.

  When I first traveled to Brazil, as First Lady in 1995, it was still a relatively poor nation with a fragile democracy and massive economic inequality. Years of military dictatorship and a lefti
st insurgency had given way to a succession of weak civilian governments, which had not produced many results for the people. Brazil started to modernize with the election of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who had been inaugurated a few months before my visit. He set the country’s economic awakening in motion, and his wife, Ruth, an accomplished sociologist, started a poverty-reduction agency and conditional cash transfers to improve the lives of women and poor families. Cardoso was succeeded by the wildly popular Lula, who continued his economic policies, expanded the social safety net to reduce poverty, and slowed annual destruction in the Amazon rain forest by 75 percent.

  As Brazil’s economy grew, so did Lula’s assertiveness in foreign policy. He envisioned Brazil becoming a major world power, and his actions led to both constructive cooperation and some frustrations. For example, in 2004 Lula sent troops to lead the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti, where they did an excellent job of providing order and security under difficult conditions. On the other hand, he insisted on working with Turkey to cut a side deal with Iran on its nuclear program that did not meet the international community’s requirements.

  Still, overall I welcomed Brazil’s growing influence and considerable capacities to help solve problems. Later I would enjoy working with Dilma Rousseff, Lula’s protégée, Chief of Staff, and eventual successor as President. On January 1, 2011, I attended her inauguration on a rainy but festive day in Brasília. Tens of thousands of people lined the streets as the country’s first woman President drove by in a 1952 Rolls-Royce. She took the oath of office and accepted the traditional green and gold Presidential sash from her mentor, Lula, pledging to continue his work on eradicating poverty and inequality. She also acknowledged the history she was making. “Today, all Brazilian women should feel proud and happy.” Dilma is a formidable leader whom I admire and like. In the early 1970s she was a member of a left-wing guerrilla group and was imprisoned and tortured by the military dictatorship. She may not have Lula’s colorful bravado or Cardoso’s technical expertise, as some observers argued, but she has a strong intellect and true grit, two characteristics necessary for leadership in these challenging times. She showed her mettle in 2013, when Brazilians, frustrated by slowing growth, rising prices, and the perception that the government was more focused on preparing for high-profile events like the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics than improving life for average citizens, took to the streets in protest. Instead of rebuffing or beating and jailing the protestors, as many other countries have done, including Venezuela, Dilma met with them, acknowledged their concerns, and asked them to work with the government to solve the problems.

  On Cuba, I knew convincing the Brazilians would be an uphill battle. Lula would be inclined to support lifting the OAS suspension. But I wondered if his desire to play the role of regional statesman might work in our favor and encourage him to help us broker a compromise. I would have to feel out his Foreign Minister Celso Amorim and see what was possible.

  Another important player would be Chile. Like Brazil, Chile was a Latin American success story, transitioning to democracy in the 1990s from the brutal military dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet. The role of the United States in the 1973 coup that brought Pinochet to power and our support for his right-wing regime is a dark chapter in our involvement in the region, but our more recent relationship was strong and productive. Michelle Bachelet, elected in 2006 as Chile’s first woman President, was trained as a pediatrician. Like Dilma Rousseff in Brazil, she faced persecution under her country’s military dictatorship and eventually went into political exile. She returned after the fall of Pinochet and began her ascent through Chile’s political ranks. As President she worked to unite the country and address the human rights abuses of its past, opening a Museum of Memory and establishing the National Institute for Human Rights. Bachelet’s efforts on behalf of women in her country earned widespread praise and, after the end of her term as President in 2010, led to her appointment as the executive director of the newly created United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, known as UN Women. She and I became allies and friends in the ongoing struggle for the rights of women and girls. She returned to Chile and ran successfully for a second term as President in late 2013.

  Chile favored reducing Cuba’s isolation and had urged the United States to lift our embargo. In early 2009, Bachelet became the first Chilean President in decades to visit Havana and meet with the Castro brothers. Afterward Fidel published a column taking Bolivia’s side in a territorial dispute with Chile dating from the 1870s and criticizing the “Chilean oligarchy” for exploiting the Bolivians. It was a reminder of how capricious and nasty he could be. I hoped Chile would decide to uphold its own democratic principles and help us defuse this crisis.

  My top advisor on Latin America was Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs Tom Shannon, a highly respected senior Foreign Service officer who had served in five administrations. Tom had held the top Latin America job under Secretary Rice, and I asked him to stay on until he could be confirmed to serve as our Ambassador to Brazil. Ever since Tom laid out the pros and cons of Cuba’s rejoining the OAS and explained what a difficult diplomatic position we were in, he and I had been brainstorming ways out of the crisis. Eventually the outlines of a plan came into focus.

  Given what President Obama had said about moving past the stale debates of the Cold War, it would be hypocritical of us to continue insisting that Cuba be kept out of the OAS for the reasons it was first suspended in 1962, ostensibly its adherence to “Marxism-Leninism” and alignment “with the communist bloc.” It would be more credible and accurate to focus on Cuba’s present-day human rights violations, which were incompatible with the OAS charter. What if we agreed to lift the suspension, but with the condition that Cuba be reseated as a member only if it made enough democratic reforms to bring it in line with the charter? And, to expose the Castro brothers’ contempt for the OAS itself, why not require Cuba to formally request readmittance? Perhaps that was a compromise that Brazil, Chile, and others would accept. We didn’t necessarily need to win over the hard-liners like Venezuela because maintaining the status quo would be a win in itself. But if they saw the region moving toward a compromise, even they might want to get on board.

  After the pomp and circumstance of the opening session was over, I went into a side meeting of several Foreign Ministers and presented our compromise resolution as an alternative to the version that lifted the suspension with no conditions. The proposal was met with considerable surprise in the room because it was quite different from the line the United States had previously taken, although in my view it achieved the same goals. Tom and I began making the rounds, buttonholing Foreign Ministers and making the case for our plan. At midday I addressed the General Assembly and argued that the organization’s democratic principles and Latin America’s democratic progress were too important to surrender. I also reminded my colleagues that the Obama Administration was already taking steps to engage Cuba.

  Cuba’s backers were making their case as well. Zelaya called the original 1962 vote to suspend Cuba “that other day that will live in infamy” and urged the assembly to “correct that mistake.” Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega said the suspension was “imposed by tyrants” and, showing his true colors, declared that “the OAS continues to be an instrument of domination of the United States.” Along with the Venezuelans, the Nicaraguans were threatening either to call a vote, which would put everyone on the spot, or to walk out and quit the organization.

  As the day wore on I was keenly aware of the clock. I was supposed to leave Honduras in the early evening to fly to Cairo, where I was meeting President Obama for his major address to the Muslim world. Before I left we needed to make sure that there wasn’t a two-thirds majority ready to admit Cuba without conditions. We argued to everyone who would listen that this would not be in the best interests of the OAS. At one point President Obama called Lula directly, encouraging him to help push through our
compromise. I pulled Zelaya aside into a small room and played up his role and responsibilities as host of the conference. If he backed our compromise, he could help save not just this summit but the OAS itself. If not, he would be remembered as the leader who presided over the organization’s collapse. These appeals seemed to make a difference. By late afternoon, though we were far from consensus, I felt confident that things were moving in the right direction. Even if our resolution didn’t pass, neither would the other one, and I thought it was unlikely that the OAS would disintegrate over the issue. I headed for the airport and asked Tom to keep me closely updated. “Bring it home,” I told him as I got into the car.

  A few hours later Tom called to tell me that it looked like a deal might be at hand. Our team was negotiating on final language for the conditions, but it seemed our compromise was gaining support. By the end of the evening only Venezuela, Nicaragua, Honduras, and a few allies were holding out for their clean resolution. Instead of the United States being isolated, as we had originally feared, now it was Chavez and his crew facing a unified region. According to some reports, Zelaya called Chavez and suggested they bow to the will of the majority and accept the compromise. Whatever the reason, in the morning they reversed course, and we were able to achieve consensus on our resolution. The Ministers broke into applause when it was adopted.

  In Havana, the Castro regime reacted angrily and refused to petition for entry into the OAS or to accept any conditions or democratic reforms. So in effect, the suspension remained in place. But we succeeded in replacing an outdated rationale with a modern process that would further strengthen the OAS commitment to democracy.