Hard Choices

by Hillary Rodham Clinton

  Contacts in Iran urged us to stay as quiet as possible. They worried that if the United States spoke out in support of the demonstrators, or overtly tried to insert ourselves into the situation, it would allow the regime to dismiss the protests as a foreign plot. Many of our intelligence analysts and Iran experts agreed. Still there was a strong temptation to stand up and proclaim our support for the Iranian people and our disgust with the heavy-handed tactics of the regime. That felt like the appropriate role for America to play, in keeping with our democratic values.

  After listening to all the arguments, the President grudgingly decided that we would better serve the aspirations of the Iranian people by not putting the United States in the middle of the crisis. It was a difficult, clear-eyed tactical call. It was not, as some commentators speculated at the time, because the President cared more about engaging with the regime than standing up to it. This was about doing what we believed was the right thing for the protesters and for democracy, nothing more. Behind the scenes my team at the State Department stayed in constant contact with activists in Iran and made an emergency intervention to prevent Twitter from shutting down for maintenance, which would have deprived protesters of a key communications tool.

  In retrospect I’m not sure our restraint was the right choice. It did not stop the regime from ruthlessly crushing the Green Movement, which was exceedingly painful to watch. More strident messages from the United States would probably not have prevented the outcome and might even have hastened it, but there’s no way of knowing now if we could have made a difference. I came to regret that we did not speak out more forcefully and rally others to do the same. In the aftermath of the crackdown in Iran, I resolved to step up efforts to provide pro-democracy activists with tools and technology to evade government repression and censorship. Over the next few years we invested tens of millions of dollars and trained more than five thousand activists around the world.

  By September, with Khamenei and Ahmadinejad back firmly in control in Tehran, there was a new flash point. For more than a year, Western intelligence agencies had been monitoring what was believed to be a secret Iranian enrichment facility under construction beneath the mountains near the city of Qom, southwest of Tehran. After the debacle of faulty intelligence about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, there was understandable caution in jumping to conclusions regarding Iran, but this was a deeply troubling development. The facility was just months away from completion and, if finished, would enhance Iran’s ability to build a nuclear bomb because of its protected location. When the Iranians discovered that we were aware of their deception, they scrambled to cover it up. On September 21, 2009, they delivered a low-key letter to the IAEA admitting the existence of a small pilot project near Qom that had somehow never been mentioned before.

  We decided to expose the truth on our own terms. That week world leaders were gathered for the annual meeting of the UN General Assembly in New York. We knew that public disclosure of Iran’s secret enrichment facility near Qom would cause an uproar—one we hoped to use to our advantage. President Obama was set to chair a meeting of the Security Council on nuclear security, and P5+1 negotiators were about to open a new round of talks with the Iranians. We had to choreograph carefully the disclosure with our British and French allies to maximize our leverage with both the Iranians and those countries predisposed to give them the benefit of the doubt, especially Russia and China. If handled deftly, this explosive revelation could tip the diplomatic balance against Iran and help move us toward tougher international sanctions.

  In President Obama’s suite at the Waldorf Astoria hotel, we huddled to plot our strategy. One option was to have the President make a dramatic presentation of the intelligence about the Qom facility at the Security Council. That would have conjured up memories of both the famous confrontation between U.S. Ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson and his Russian counterpart during the Cuban Missile Crisis and the infamous presentation by Secretary of State Colin Powell about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Neither was a precedent we wanted to repeat. We also wanted to be sure we had fully coordinated with our allies and briefed the IAEA, the Russians, and the Chinese in advance. So we decided against the UN Security Council route.

  On the afternoon of September 23, President Obama, National Security Advisor Jim Jones, and I met in the Waldorf for an hour with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, his Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, and his National Security Advisor Sergei Prikhodko and presented the evidence about Qom. In the first meeting between the two Presidents that spring in London, Medvedev had admitted that Russia had underestimated Iran’s nuclear program, but this new information about Iranian deception still shocked the Russians. It was the only time in the four years I served as Secretary that I can remember seeing the steely Lavrov appear flustered and at a loss for words. Afterward Medvedev surprised the press by talking tougher on Iran than they’d ever heard before: “Sanctions rarely lead to productive results—but in some cases sanctions are inevitable.” Reporters peppered the White House staff with questions about what had caused the noticeable change in Russian rhetoric, but we weren’t ready to go public yet with the Qom news.

  Plans took shape for an announcement two days later at the G-20 summit in Pittsburgh, where many of the same world leaders would travel from New York. When the time came, President Obama stepped to the podium alongside British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and French President Nicolas Sarkozy. “The size and configuration of this facility is inconsistent with a peaceful program,” President Obama declared. “Iran is breaking rules that all nations must follow.”

  Events were moving quickly now. On the first day of October, representatives of the P5+1 met in Geneva with an Iranian delegation. I sent Under Secretary of State Bill Burns to represent the United States and meet privately with the Iranian negotiator. Under growing international pressure, Iran agreed to allow IAEA inspectors to visit the secret site near Qom, which they did later that month.

  The other item on the agenda in Geneva was the Tehran Research Reactor, which was given to Iran by the United States in the 1960s to produce medical isotopes to be used in diagnosis and treatment of diseases. Over the summer of 2009, Iran reported that it was running out of the nuclear fuel rods needed to power the reactor and produce the isotopes. While Iran did have a supply of low-enriched uranium, it did not have the higher-enriched uranium required for the fuel rods, so it asked the IAEA for assistance in meeting their fuel needs on the open market. This request caught the eye of American nuclear experts, including the State Department’s Bob Einhorn, who began working on a creative plan to solve several problems at once. What if Iran sent all, or at least a significant percentage, of its uranium stockpile abroad, and in return got back fuel rods that could power the research reactor but could not be used for a bomb? That would answer their legitimate needs while setting back their weapons program many months, perhaps up to a year. If the Iranians accepted, we’d have time to work toward a more comprehensive deal that would answer all our concerns about the nuclear program. If they refused, then their true ambitions would be exposed. In August I had discussed the idea with Russia’s Lavrov and argued that transferring low-enriched uranium out of Iran would reduce tensions in the region. I hoped that if the United States and Russia worked together to show unity, it would force the Iranians to respond. He agreed, saying, “We should look at this request seriously. We are ready in principle to participate with you.”

  Now, in the Geneva talks, it was time to put the proposal on the table and see how the Iranians would react. During a lunch break Burns suggested to the chief Iranian negotiator, Saeed Jalili, that they have a direct discussion apart from the bigger group. When Jalili agreed, Burns outlined the terms we were offering. Jalili knew he was facing a united international community and an undeniably fair and reasonable offer. He had no choice but to agree. Einhorn and the Iranian deputy negotiator went over the details point by point. The Iranians accepted all of it, with one proviso: nothin
g could be said publicly until after they’d gone back to Tehran and shared the agreement with their superiors.

  When the negotiators reconvened later in the month at the IAEA in Vienna, the Iranians had changed their tune. Jalili’s discussions in Tehran had not gone well. Hard-liners in the government were dead set against the deal. Now the Iranians were saying they were willing to give up a smaller amount of low-enriched uranium, and they wanted to store it in a remote part of Iran rather than send it abroad, both of which were unacceptable. It would defeat the whole purpose of denying them enough enriched uranium to make a bomb. The IAEA urged them to return to the terms of the original agreement, but without success. The Vienna meetings ended in failure. The deal was dead.

  As President Obama had promised during his campaign, we had tried to engage Iran. Now, he decided, it was time to ramp up the pressure and sharpen the choice facing Iran’s leaders. To impose real consequences, however, we would need the rest of the world to join us.

  Susan Rice, our Ambassador to the UN, reported that finding the votes for a strong resolution in the Security Council would be a hard lift. I was hearing the same thing from my foreign counterparts. “We don’t think this is the time to discuss sanctions against Iran,” Chinese Foreign Minister Yang told me in January 2010. “Once sanctions become the order of the day, it might be difficult to resume talks for a considerable period of time.” Yes, China and Russia agreed in principle that Iran should not be allowed to develop or possess nuclear weapons; they just weren’t willing to do much to stop it.

  Nonetheless I believed that with the wind now at our backs, it was worth trying to overcome this opposition and push tough new sanctions through the Security Council. Throughout the spring of 2010 we worked aggressively to round up the votes. I threw myself into it, with a wide-ranging diplomatic effort that reminded me of backroom negotiations in the Senate, with all the horse trading, arm-twisting, vote counting, alternating appeals to principle and self-interest, and hard-ball politics that go into passing major legislation.

  While attention generally focuses on the five permanent members of the Security Council because we each have the power to veto any resolution, there are actually another ten seats on the Council that rotate among other nations selected for two-year terms by the General Assembly. To be adopted, a Security Council resolution must avoid a veto but also garner nine votes out of fifteen total members. That made small countries with rotating seats such as Uganda and Lebanon very important. And it was why I spent time over my four years courting nations that didn’t normally play a big role in international affairs, such as Togo, but whose votes I knew we would need at pivotal times.

  Assembling nine votes among fifteen skittish Council members proved to be tricky. In one of my many strategy sessions with Britain’s David Miliband during this period, he made the point that it was not enough to convince China to hold off on vetoing the resolution; we needed affirmative support in order to bring other undecided votes along. “On our number counting, it otherwise seems dicey,” he said. “There is danger if they abstain that we may lose Nigeria, Uganda, Brazil, Turkey.” I was doing my own counting and did not believe we would lose Uganda or Nigeria. Brazil and Turkey would be another story. “And it is still an open question if the Russians will vote for the resolution if the Chinese abstain,” David continued. “We believe they will,” I responded, “but the cost might be a weaker resolution.” On it went.

  In mid-April I made my pitch to Yoweri Museveni, President of Uganda. Ahmadinejad was due in Uganda the next day, as part of Iran’s diplomatic counterattack designed to block new sanctions, so it was crucial that I got to Museveni first to secure his agreement. It helped that I had known him since 1997, when I first visited his country, and that my husband and I had kept in touch with him since. I reminded him that the Obama Administration had tried to engage with Iran and that the international community had made good-faith offers. Iran had rejected every entreaty, defied the international community, and continued to enrich uranium at high levels. I also warned that if diplomacy failed, the result might be military action, which no one wanted to see. This would prove to be a compelling argument for many wavering countries. “We want to work with you to send the most powerful message to Iran and demonstrate that there still is time for Iran to change its behavior,” I said.

  Museveni was circumspect. “I will tell [Ahmadinejad] two things,” he said. “First, we uphold the right of all countries to access nuclear energy for electricity and other uses, and second, we are totally against proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is the message I will put in my written speech for the banquet. I will encourage him to open his country to inspection if he has nothing to hide.” I pressed the point: “If you have your experts look at the IAEA report where they lay out the issues, it is hard not to have suspicions.” “I agree with you,” he replied. “For Iran to have nuclear weapons, that means Saudi Arabia and Egypt will have to do the same. That affects us directly and we can’t support that. I will have a frank discussion with the President.” In the end Uganda voted for the sanctions.

  As Miliband rightly observed, China represented the key vote. If we could convince Beijing to come around, the rest of the Security Council would likely fall into place. In New York, Susan Rice and her team were working with other delegations on language for the sanctions resolution. The Chinese and Russians kept trying to weaken the terms. We made some concessions, but we saw no point in passing another toothless resolution. In April, President Obama invited leaders from around the world to Washington for a summit on nuclear security. He took the opportunity to sit down with Chinese President Hu Jintao to talk about Iran. I listened as the two Presidents went back and forth in a side room off the main Convention Center floor. China had extensive commercial ties with Tehran and depended on Iranian oil to fuel its rapid industrial growth. President Hu agreed that Iran should not acquire nuclear weapons, but he was leery of any steps that felt too aggressive. Finally the two Presidents agreed to back “substantial” measures, without clarifying exactly what that would mean.

  Not long afterward I followed up with Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo. China was still blocking important elements of the draft sanctions resolution, especially meaningful measures on finance and banking activity directly tied to Iran’s illicit nuclear activities. “I must say, China’s response, while having evolved helpfully, still falls short of the reciprocal effort we expected from President Hu’s conversation with President Obama,” I told Dai. “We need to act in a quick and unified manner through a meaningful resolution if we are to reduce the growing risk of conflict in the region and give space for a political solution.” I said that lack of international unity and resolve would undermine the interests China was seeking to protect, including maintaining stability in the Middle East, keeping oil prices stable, and protecting the recovery of the global economy. “We want to avoid events that will escape our control,” I added.

  Dai admitted that he too was dissatisfied, but he remained optimistic. For the moment, so was I. We kept talking to the Chinese and the Russians. The gaps were narrowing, and it felt as though we were getting close to an agreement that would impose the strictest sanctions in history.

  But then, just when our goal was in sight, events took another unexpected turn. On May 17, 2010, in a triumphant press conference in Tehran, the Presidents of Brazil, Turkey, and Iran announced they had reached an agreement for Iran to swap low-enriched uranium for reactor fuel rods. Superficially their deal resembled the offer Iran had spurned the previous October. But in fact it was deeply flawed. The deal did not account for the fact that Iran had continued to enrich uranium for several months since the earlier proposal and the transfer of the same amount of uranium would now leave it with a significant stockpile. Unlike in the October agreement, Iranians would retain ownership of the uranium they sent abroad and reserved the right to pull it back at any time. Most troubling, though, was the fact that Iran continued to proclaim its right to enrich u
ranium to higher levels, and there was nothing in this new agreement to stop it or even to indicate that it would discuss the matter with the IAEA or P5+1. In short, this agreement would address Iran’s need to find fuel rods for its research reactor, but it would do precious little to answer the world’s concerns about its illegal weapons program. Given the timing, I was sure it was an Iranian attempt to derail our push for sanctions at the UN—and there was a good chance it would succeed.

  Ever since the October 2009 agreement collapsed, Turkey and Brazil had been making noises about revisiting it. Both countries held rotating seats on the UN Security Council and were eager to exercise increased influence on the world stage. They were prime examples of the “emerging powers” whose rapid economic growth was fueling big ambitions for regional and global clout. They also happened to have two confident leaders in Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey, both of whom considered themselves to be men of action able to bend history to their will. Once they had set their sights on brokering a solution on Iran, there was little that could dissuade them from trying, even if only lackluster—or even counterproductive—results emerged.

  The United States and the other permanent members of the Security Council reacted cautiously to Brazil and Turkey’s early efforts. After so much duplicity, we worried that Iran might exploit the good intentions of Brazil and Turkey in order to protect its nuclear program and fracture the growing international consensus against it. Our concerns grew as it became clear that the Iranians had no intention of stopping their enrichment activities and were suggesting they would give up their uranium in small batches rather than in one big shipment, as originally envisioned. Over time that would mean they would never be without enough nuclear material to build a bomb.