Athens and Sparta, and Philip was tapping into a vein of Panhellenic sentiment which was repelled by the repeated Greek wars, as he must have known; no doubt he shared in it himself. But the fi rst action of the council after electing Philip’s hegemon was to appoint him commander-in-chief of the joint Macedonian-Hellenic League army of conquest against Persia. 19 This had presumably been his intention all along, but only after Chaironeia did he have the power and authority to invade the empire; his intention to do so is implicit in his treatment of Athens in the peace settlement.
The League could only be a short-term solution. It froze the situation of
Greece into the position of 338/337. The possibilities of political change in Greece were reduced to the minimum, but this would require repeated applications of
the council’s mandate to enforce the no-change rule. Philip had enforced his
supremacy repeatedly in Thessaly over a period of 15 years, and in Thrace he had only just begun to do so. There was no reason to believe that proud Greek cities with histories of independence and imperial victories like Thebes and Athens
would accept the situation for long, and Sparta refused to have anything to do with the League. For Philip there were years ahead in which he would need to
attend carefully to the continuing quarrels, disputes, arguments and rebellions in all the lands he had conquered.
This was not his intention and it is unlikely he was much concerned about
controlling the League. There is no indication in his career that he thought in such long-term ways. The League was no more than a temporary solution to
Greece’s political problems. Instead he was going off to fi ght Persia. This could be one way to siphon Greek restlessness, and if he won Greek settlements in the conquered territory would do the same, as Isokrates had suggested, but it was
a case of running hard to stand still; the issues of Greece and Thrace and the Balkans would need to be tackled properly eventually.
Persian disquiet at Greek developments will have been obvious; its likely
reaction would be equally clear – intrigue in Greece, subsidies to Greek cities, recruit ment of Greek soldiers, military preparations in its western provinces.
Persian interventions at Perinthos, and possibly at Byzantion, Athenian requests for Persian help, Persian subsidies to Diopeithes, showed that the Great King was alert to the problem. Preparations to contest the coming invasion, however, were disrupted. In 338, Artaxerxes III was murdered on the orders of his vizier, Bagoas, who had been one of the commanders of the invasion of Egypt. Bagoas killed off all Artaxerxes’ sons as well, except for Arses, who became the new Great King as Artaxerxes IV. Not surprisingly Arses and Bagoas could not work together, and
soon Arses and all his sons were also murdered. A distant member of the royal
family was placed on the throne as Dareios III. Well warned, Dareios murdered
Bagoas. 20
T H E C O N Q U E S T O F G R E E C E , 3 4 0 – 3 3 4 b c 65
This dynastic crisis occupied the two years in which Philip conquered Greece,
and its effects gave Philip a golden opportunity to mount an invasion, while Persia was in disarray. Philip’s return to Macedon in the summer of 337, therefore, was only the preliminary to another war. He celebrated his victory, as usual, by getting married. For the fi rst time he chose a Macedonian girl, Kleopatra, the daughter of one of his barons. This created a gaudy family row, which involved a drunken party, public insults, the exile of Philip’s heir Alexander and his queen Olympias, and later a very public reconciliation. The villain of the piece, Attalos, Kleopatra’s uncle, was eventually removed from the court: it all left an unpleasant legacy, which poisoned the atmosphere of the court. 21
Beneath this court froth, preparations for the Persian expedition continued.
At some point Philip conducted yet another invasion of Illyria, against a king called Pleurias, a swift reminder of his power, and a lesson not to do anything awkward during the Persian campaign. 22 This did not interfere with the Persian preparations; indeed, the forces he used could get some warlike practice, and a reminder that Macedon was capable of both expeditions simultaneously would
be even better, and Philip would leave a competent defence force behind when
he crossed to Asia.
An advance force went across into Asia in the spring of 336, 10,000 men
commanded by Parmenion, to whom Attalos, the awkward uncle, was attached.
Paced by a fl eet along the coast, this force, mainly Macedonian but including some mercenaries, marched south as far as Ephesos. The coastal cities fell to the fl eet, inland cities to the army; they were liberated from the Persian-imposed tyrants, and democracies established. At Ephesos the pro-Persian rulers were
overthrown as Parmenion approached; the same had happened on Lesbos and
possibly at Erythrai. Not far beyond Ephesos, at Magnesia, Parmenion’s army
encountered a force commanded by Memnon of Rhodes, which was too strong
to be fought; perhaps Parmenion’s instructions were not to get into a battle at all. This was, after all, essentially a strong reconnaissance, and Parmenion’s army was not strong enough to begin a serious conquest. To have got as far as Ephesos was a good start, and he had fl ushed out an enemy force.23
The liberated thanked Philip by setting up altars to him – Zeus Philippios
at Eresos in Lesbos, an altar in the temple of Artemis at Ephesos;24 this was not worship of a divinity, but it was not far distant from it. Philip had a celebratory circular building constructed at Olympia to display statues of himself and
his family; 25 it may be that another of Philip’s ambitions was to have himself worshipped. It has indeed been argued that this was the purpose of his invasion of Persia, where he would become the new Great King, an absolute ruler, whose
governmental system would then be applied in Macedon;26 and presumably also in Greece. This seems rather far-fetched; it may have been the result of
the conquest, but it was hardly the aim. To expect to impose absolutism on
A L E X A N D E R T H E G R E AT F A I L U R E
66
either Macedon or Greece would suggest an ignorance of the expected reaction
impossible to believe of Philip. The worshipping of living men was not unknown in Greek cities (Philip had a cult in Amphipolis, according to a late source), 27
but it was not taken seriously by the Greeks, and it was completely unknown
in Persia.
Arrangements for governing Macedon while he was on campaign were also
needed. The pattern of his campaigns in the past would suggest that he intended to return to his kingdom regularly, probably each winter. The western border
was a further diffi culty. Olympias had fl ed to her brother Alexander, now king of the Molossi, during the domestic upheaval after Philip’s latest marriage. Their son Alexander had left also, but he was persuaded to return. Olympias was too
dangerous to be left to plot in Epirus, but Philip could not bring her back while he was married to his new bride (who gave birth to a daughter early in 336). Instead he neutralized Olympias by giving his own daughter Kleopatra (Alexander’s
sister) to Alexander of Epiros as his bride. Kleopatra was as strong-willed as anyone in that extraordinary family, and could be counted on to prevent her
mother dominating her husband.
The marriage was arranged for the summer at Aigai, the old royal capital.
Philip staged a great celebration for his daughter’s marriage, celebrating as
well his own achievements. In a procession of the Twelve Gods his statue was
portrayed as the thirteenth fi gure. It was also a prediction of what he would achieve in Asia. This collection of past, present and future events is typical of the politician in Philip, who was a master at dealing with several issues at once, but it was, as more than one historian, ancient and modern, noticed, al
so a display of hubris unusual in the man.
During the celebrations of the marriage Philip was murdered. His assassin was
Pausanias, a man who had a grievance against Attalos, the uncle of Philip’s new queen, a grievance which Philip had refused to deal with. This was another layer of events at Aigai that day; one Philip had not taken into account. He died of this neglect. Pausanias ran off, but was chased and killed by members of Philip’s bodyguard.28
Conspiracy immediately comes to mind, probably unnecessarily. Almost
everyone of any note in Philip’s family and court has come under suspicion, but the main accused are Alexander, Olympias, Antipater and perhaps Parmenion;
and superfi cially plausible cases can be constructed against all of them. There is even one theory which sees a plot by men of Upper Macedon against domination
from the original kingdom.29 None of the theories stands up very well, and the most that can be said is that no one shed tears at the king’s killing. Alexander and Antipater certainly reacted very quickly to proclaim the former as king, but Antipater at least understood the dangers of an interregnum, and Alexander soon showed that he understood the issue as well.
T H E C O N Q U E S T O F G R E E C E , 3 4 0 – 3 3 4 b c 67
The fact is that the murderer was Pausanias, a man who had nursed a grievance
for a year and had been unable to get redress. His abuser had been Attalos, who was away in Asia and was the uncle of Philip’s new wife; Attalos was also the
sworn enemy of Alexander. In Pausanias’ grievance-fi lled mind, the only available man on whom he could gain his revenge was Philip, who had refused to take
action. It cannot have been absent from Pausanias’ mind that killing Philip would benefi t Alexander; perhaps he expected to get away with it. The question of ‘ cui bono’ used to accuse Alexander, is, given Pausanias’ state of mind, irrelevant. 30
Philip’s private life – if that term may be used for so public a man – was
disputatious enough that his death in a private dispute is scarcely a surprise.
Alexander established a fi rm grip on the kingdom from the start. He was supported by his father’s most prominent commanders, Antipater and Parmenion, though
he clearly felt he might face opposition. Antipater in fact stood up before the crowd in the theatre at Aigai, which had just witnessed Philip’s murder, to praise Alexander, which speech in part resulted in Alexander’s being acclaimed king
there and then, the audience in the theatre acting as the Macedonian Assembly. 31
It was the fi rst uncontested succession in Macedon for over a century.
Alexander was brought up in the Macedonian court. He had observed and
learned from his father, commanded part of the army on the Thracian and
Chaironeian campaigns, and acted in his father’s place more than once in the
past few years. He was intended by Philip as his successor from childhood,
and the support of Antipater and Parmenion was clearly good enough for the
Macedonians. Alexander, however, did have to work hard to make sure that
nothing happened to displace him. His succession might be instant, but it was
not without problems.
As the news of the death of the victorious king spread, Philip’s painfully
constructed empire began to break apart. Its personal basis became all too
clear; the succession of a 20-year-old boy was assumed to be that of someone
inexperienced and incompetent, and the history of the Macedonian royal
family gave grounds for an assumption that there would be trouble. In fact the Macedonian kingdom was intact and still functioning. If Alexander lived – not
a matter necessarily to be assumed – he had inherited his father’s political base intact. It was the surrounding subjugated lands which became restless.
Alexander spent several months in Macedon ensuring that the kingdom
functioned properly, and making quite sure that his kingship was not challenged.
Two members of the Lynkestian royal family were executed at Philip’s funeral
for their involvement in his killing, as were two pages. Since another Lynkestian brother was not executed, there had clearly been an investigation, and those
involved with the murderer had been identifi ed. This, at least offi cially, was the limit of any conspiracy. 32
Olympias was allowed to return from Epirus, but soon procured the murder
A L E X A N D E R T H E G R E AT F A I L U R E
68
of her supplanter Kleopatra and her infant daughter.33 This made it necessary to eliminate Attalos, her vociferous uncle, and an agent was sent to the army in Asia to do so: Parmenion made no objection, even though Attalos was his own
son-in-law: it was Attalos’ boorishness which had disrupted the royal family, and had caused Pausanias’ grievance. 34 These killings are perhaps understandable, but Alexander revealed an unpleasant streak of paranoia, which was to grow, when
he also ordered the murder of Amyntas, the son of Perdikkas III. Amyntas had
lived at Philip’s court and had acted as his agent in some diplomatic dealings, and was married to Kynnane, one of Philip’s daughters. He may have been seen
as Philip’s successor when Alexander went off to Illyria. Alexander certainly saw him as a competitor for the kingship in the early uncertainty; his murder was a pre-emptive move by the king in the long tradition of such killings within the Macedonian royal family.35
This minor massacre cleared the air in Macedon, and Alexander felt secure
enough to look abroad, where movements of rebellion in the name of independ-
ence from Macedonian domination were stirring. Greece was potentially the
most powerful of the restless areas, and Thessaly had to be secured, for his father’s post as archon was now vacant. In the autumn Alexander set off southwards. A group of Thessalians occupied the pass leading from Macedon, explaining that
they were discussing whether to admit him, implying that the elevation of an
archon was the business of the Thessalians. Alexander showed that he had his father’s military ingenuity by evading the block and appearing in strength in
Thessaly. He contacted Larissa, his father’s old mainstay in Thessaly, fi rst of all, and then without diffi culty was elected archon. From the Thessalian point of view, it was a coup d’état. 36
From Thessaly he marched to Thermopylai, where his father’s presidency of
the Amphiktyonic Council was rapidly conferred on him, and then appeared
before Thebes even as the city was still wondering whether to rebel or not.
Philip’s garrison on the Kadmeia had thereby served its purpose. Any other
tentative movements to ‘rebel’ faded away and at Corinth Alexander was chosen
as hegemon of the league in his father’s place, and appointed commander in chief of the expeditionary force against Persia: another coup d’etat. 37 The Greeks had been overawed by his speed, but were not convinced of his staying power.
Alexander had to return north to attend to other threats, and his absence gave the Greeks time to think longer about their situation.
Macedon’s northern border needed attention. The Triballi were causing
trouble and others in Thrace were stirring. Alexander campaigned there in the
spring of 335, exhibiting the speed and ingenuity already seen in Greece. Once the Triballi had been beaten and had surrendered, others succumbed as well. 38
Once more the Macedonian writ ran through Thrace, but again it was scarcely
a defi nitive conquest. The news of the ‘revolt’ of the king of an Illyrian group
T H E C O N Q U E S T O F G R E E C E , 3 4 0 – 3 3 4 b c 69
took Alexander across to the Adriatic side of the mountains, and another stirring display of military technique was followed by another victory. 39 The
se early campaigns of Alexander showed both his own natural facility for command,
but also the sheer professionalism and fl exibility of the army he had inherited.
Passing defended passes, winning two battles, a river crossing by night, great speed, all showed that almost any military manoeuvre or display was within their joint capability. 40
Alexander spent most of 335 in the north, and some of the cities in Greece
became inspired to try to recover their freedom of action. The Great King, whose soldiers were successfully blocking further advances by Parmenion’s army in
Asia, sent money to persuade the Greeks to rebel. 41 Athens offi cially refused the money; Demosthenes took control of it, and disbursed it in part to the Thebans.
He campaigned to persuade Athens to ‘rebel’, even announcing as fact a rumour
that Alexander had died in the Triballian war. 42 The Thebans were the only people to take real measures, and the city rose against the Macedonian garrison, though other parts of Greece – Arkadia, the Aitolians and others – mobilized. 43
Alexander, learning of this after his defeat of Kleitos in Illyria, made one of his speedy marches and arrived in Boiotia before even rumours of his approach. 44
He arrived as hegemon of the league, and required Thebes to submit to him in that offi ce. He was joined by troops from other cities of Boiotia, who had unpleasant memories of Theban domination. He gave the Thebans the chance
to ask forgiveness, which he promised, but inside the city those who advocated independence and freedom won the argument. They then lost the fight;
Alexander’s troops broke into and captured the city. 45
The news of Alexander’s arrival had deterred others who had intended to join
the Thebans. Athens promised to do so, but did not; the Arkadians marched,
but turned back; others made preliminary moves, and now sent apologies or, in
the case of the Athenians, congratulations to Alexander. Alexander, as hegemon, convoked a meeting of the league to decide on the Thebes’ punishment. The
meeting was dominated by cities which had suffered at Theban hands over the
past 40 years, and they voted, not surprisingly, for the destruction of the city, just as Thebes had destroyed them. 46
Alexander the Great Failure Page 12
