The coalition which had been forming round Thebes and which collapsed
because of Alexander’s swift march and sudden arrival was in fact very like the League of Corinth without Macedonian participation. Aitolia, Boiotia, Athens,
Elis, Argos and Arkadia in alliance were the larger part of Greece south of
Thessaly. If such an alliance had proved durable, a true Common Peace might
have resulted, but durability could only come at the expense of a constant state of hostility towards Macedon. Such a grouping would be unlikely to endure for
more than a year or so – but that would have suited Persia.
This set of campaigns in the Balkans and Greece is generally seen as a dazzling
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70
precursor to Alexander’s later career of Asian conquest. Politically, the core Macedonian kingdom remained loyal, as had the old hill kingdoms. Beyond these
lands, Thrace, Greece, Illyria, Thessaly all wished to break free of Macedonian control. Only Alexander’s speed and determination, and his army, held them.
This general anti-Macedonian attitude is scarcely surprising. When Philip died, the political agreements he had made automatically ended. Alexander had to
make new ones. At the same time, it is probable that, had he lived, Philip would have had to campaign to enforce his domination.
Alexander’s victories meant that the attack on Persia would certainly take
place, and he showed himself his father’s son by determining to go off to war
in the east as soon as possible. Philip had already conducted a survey of the
military resources of the league, and now Alexander indicated who was to provide what. The mainland cities supplied hoplites and light-armed soldiers, totalling only 7,000 men, together with 600 cavalry. A total of 160 ships were called up, equipped and manned, which accounted for about another 32,000 men, mainly
from Athens and the Aegean islands. This was a large force, roughly equal in
total to the Macedonian contingent (which included contingents from the
surrounding subject states). 47
No Greek city was left without the means of self-defence, and the neighbours
of Sparta were not called on to contribute at all; Sparta remained a danger to all the states round about and was soon in contact with the Great King. Similarly
Macedon was left with enough forces to see off any serious attack, either from the Balkans or from Greece. It was left under the viceroyalty of Antipater, who had more trouble from Olympias than he had from his neighbours. Alexander took
a force of over 80,000 men, cavalry, infantry and sailors, to his Persian War.
In Macedon there was some discussion of the folly of the king in going off to
war without leaving an heir to succeed him if he were killed. 48 Parmenion, who had returned from Asia during the Theban emergency, is said to have advised
the king to marry and have a son before he set off (but Parmenion is cast by the ancient historians in this role so often as to invite suspicion). In fact Alexander had had time to do that and still set off in 334. He did not, and good reasons can be conjectured. His choice of wife would be contentious, as his father’s choice of Kleopatra had been; Macedonian men did not usually marry as young as he
was; above all, he probably did not want to. His father’s marital career, and the confusion it had surely caused in the royal household, would deter any man from marriage. But it is also probable that he did not greatly care what happened to Macedon if he died. He certainly never showed any wish to return to it, and was careless of the place even as he lay dying.
The invasion of Asia took place in spring 334, two years later than originally planned. The succession crisis at Persepolis had prevented the Great King from doing much to hinder Philip and Alexander but the Persian commanders in Asia
T H E C O N Q U E S T O F G R E E C E , 3 4 0 – 3 3 4 b c 71
Minor were able to make preparations. The invasion was in no sense a surprise: several contingents of Greek envoys were at the royal court, from Thebes, Athens and Sparta, and the recruitment of Greek mercenary soldiers had been intensive
– there were many more Greeks in Persian service than in Alexander’s. A revolt in Egypt in 337–336 had not helped, but it was suppressed quickly enough. Philip’s advance force was driven back to the Hellespont, holding on to only Abydos
and Rhoetion. Parmenion was in Macedon during 335, and he may have taken
some men away, but the Greek mercenary general Memnon had been more than
equal to Parmenion as a general, which means that Memnon was a very good
commander indeed. The Persian defence was to be commanded by the satraps of
the threatened provinces, and they had collected a considerable army of 20,000
cavalry, a compact force of 6,000 Greek mercenaries, and a large number of local infantry levies, who were of little use. 49
Alexander sent his army to land at Abydos, while he went across near Troy,
sacrifi cing before, during and after the crossing, and hurling a spear ashore as a symbolic conquest. 50 His fi rst objectives were the Greek cities of the Aegean coast which Parmenion had visited two years before, but fi rst he had to eliminate the threat posed by the army of the satraps which had gathered to the east of
the landing places. At least three satraps – Arsites of Hellespontine Phrygia, Spithridates of Lydia/Ionia and Arsames of Kilikia – brought up their forces.
Memnon of Rhodes commanded the Greek mercenaries. He is said to have
advocated withdrawing and destroying the local resources, which armchair
strategists afterwards pronounced the best strategy; it was rejected by the satraps, for it would only drive the local population into Alexander’s arms. Their job was to protect as well as rule their provinces, not destroy them.51
Had Alexander marched south, this force could have followed him and cut
him off from the Hellespont and his communications; he must have expected
to have to besiege one or more of the cities, and the Persian fl eet was on its way into the Aegean. He might fi nd himself attacked by two land armies and by the fl eet all at once.
The satrapal army was therefore Alexander’s fi rst target. He marched east to
fi nd it, and defeated it decisively at the Granikos River. The Persian commanders placed the Greek phalanx behind the cavalry, so the fi ght was between the cavalry forces. The Macedonians and Thessalians proved to be better in battle than the Persians, above all because of their discipline. As the Persian cavalry survivors broke and fl ed, Alexander turned on the Greek mercenary infantry. They fought hard, outnumbered by at least two to one and surrounded. Only 2,000 survived;
these surrendered, and were sent in chains to labour in Macedonia. Alexander
may have felt they were traitors to his cause, but he also knew full well that Greek soldiers alone would provide the infantry backbone for any Persian army. They
had to be removed wherever they were encountered. 52
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The Persian survivors scattered. Most of the commanders had been killed,
and Arsites committed suicide. Alexander sent the booty to Greece to advertise his success. A detachment occupied Arsites’ government centre, the town of
Daskyleion, and a Macedonian from Elimaia, Kalas, was appointed satrap. 53 This might indicate that it was Alexander’s plan to take over the empire as a going concern; more likely it was a temporary measure to ensure the continuation of
settled government in his rear as he marched away. Whatever plans he had for
the empire, it was clearly premature to implement them when he had beaten
only a local detachment of the Persian forces at the very edge of the empire. He constituted Ilion as a Greek city and remitted its taxes, while also maintainin
g the Persian administration at Daskyleion, and so he was appealing to Greeks of Asia.
The problem of governing his conquests was thus encountered already.
The main army marched south along the coast. Parmenion had collected rapid
civic submissions two years before, and this happened again. Without hindrance, Alexander reached Sardis, the main Persian administrative centre in western
Asia Minor. The commander surrendered the citadel and the treasure, the satrap having died at Granikos. Alexander appointed another satrap, Asander, brother
of Parmenion, for Lydia, and left a contingent of Argives as a new garrison. The Greeks of the league forces were scarcely being used, except as auxiliaries. 54
Ephesos had surrendered to Parmenion two years before, but was retaken by
Memnon. The result was internal revolution. A spate of revenge killings escalated to such an extent that Alexander had to step in to enforce order. 55 Detachments accepted the surrenders of other cities.
Only Miletos was the scene of any resistance, partly because of the proximity
of the Persian fl eet. The Greek fl eet blocked the narrow harbour entrance, isolat-ing the city which was then taken by assault. 56 This was the only occasion when Alexander had been able to use his fl eet in warfare, and, having control of western Asia Minor coast, he was not in need of supplies from Greece. He did need money, however, for his land army was very expensive, so he disbanded the fl eet, thereby saving money. 57 This was rather premature, for he could have used it to advant age at the next hold-up. Marching south he met one more resisting city, Halikarnassos, which he besieged in a fairly leisurely fashion through the summer and autumn
of 334. When the city fi nally fell he had cleared the Aegean coast. 58
The route of conquest Alexander had followed is distinctly odd. Partly, of
course, it was intended, like his move against the satrapal army, to clear enemies from behind him, though the presence of the Persian fl eet at large in the Aegean rather negated that, and Halikarnassos could have been blockaded by land. The
conquest route was thus aimed to gather up and liberate the Greek cities. After the victory at the Granikos River, he sent a trophy to Athens with the inscription that it was the result of a victory by Alexander and the Greeks, and there was certainly a good deal of interest and enthusiasm in Greece in his progress.
T H E C O N Q U E S T O F G R E E C E , 3 4 0 – 3 3 4 b c 73
The Greek cities of Asia, in the propaganda of the anti-Persians, were groaning under Persian rule. If Alexander was thus leading a campaign to liberate them
and to gain revenge for past Persian attacks on Greece and the oppression of
Greek cities, he had to take the cities, including Halikarnassos, and establish democracies where the Persians had favoured tyrannies or oligarchies. Whether
the cities were then enrolled in the League of Corinth is not known. There is
no evidence that they were, but it would not be surprising if it happened. Some island states – Mitylene, Samos, Chios, and so on – were certainly brought into the league. 59 Either way, for the fi rst time all the ancient Greek cities, in Greece, Asia, and the islands (with the exception of Sparta and Crete) were united under one rule.
The murder of Philip had only delayed the conquest of all Greece for a year
or so. In the propaganda of the war, the main work was now accomplished, for
the Persian war had begun with a campaign of conquest along the Asian coast. It was, of course, impossible to stop now, if only because any Persian reply would leave Alexander’s cities vulnerable to attack from inland. But from now on the propaganda of ‘liberation’ rang hollow, and revenge was the motive. Insofar
as either motive was actually believed by the Macedonians (who had not been
harmed by the Persian invasions), they were both superseded by the desire for
conquest and riches. Isokrates had distinguished three possible conquests: the Greek cities, Asia Minor ‘from Cilicia to the Halys’, and the whole empire. The fi rst was accomplished, and the second at least was necessary. But from now on it was a different war.
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6
The great campaign, 334–325 bc
For nine years after his capture of Halikarnassos, Alexander marched about the Persian Empire and its neighbours, fully occupied with military matters. The
administration of his conquests was left to the satraps he appointed; some were incompetent or venal; others were killed in quarrels and rebellions. It was clearly no more than a stopgap.
Alexander appointed satraps in Hellespontine Phrygia and Lydia, but in Karia
he reappointed the former Persian satrap, the local Queen Ada.1 He was faced with the problem that the empire he was invading required a large number
of administrators. He had also appointed garrison commanders and fi nancial
offi cers at Sardis, 2 and so far had only dealt with the fringe of the empire. He did not have enough skilled and trustworthy manpower to leave men behind in
administrative roles on such a scale throughout the empire.
He could not ignore the fact that this was enemy territory while the Great
King lived and ruled. Garrisons were needed to control the conquests, and
detachments had to deal with outlying areas. Few commanders could be allowed
to be detached to such tasks. Alexander had used Parmenion in that role at
Daskyleion and in Ionia. These conquests were in territory largely friendly, where the Greek cities could be expected to remain cooperative, but even there he had to leave occasional garrisons.
He surely realized from the start that he was dealing with an extent of territory with which no Greek or Macedonian had ever yet had to cope; none seems to
have had any idea of its size. 3 Its size began to become clear to his army during the winter of 334/333. Alexander sent a detachment, under Parmenion, inland by way of Sardis into Phrygia with the heavy equipment. He took another section
through Lykia and Pamphylia himself, in one of his less glorious campaigns. In Pamphylia he was defi ed at three separate cities, and only at one of these did he prevail. He left some troops in a garrison (at Side), and appointed one of his closest friends, Nearchos of Crete, as satrap of both Lykia and Pamphylia. 4
In this case he combined two areas under one man, and again on a larger
scale in the Anatolian interior. After dropping off a force to besiege Kelainai, the Phrygian satrapal centre, he camped at Gordion, where Parmenion rejoined. He
left one of his father’s contemporaries, Antigonus the One-Eyed, as satrap of
Phrygia, a huge area with indefi nite boundaries. He had very few troops, and his
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76
fi rst task was to gain the surrender of the Persian force holding Kelainai, which became his administrative centre; the surrendered troops, Carians and Greek
mercenaries, were recruited into his force, and others were recruited locally.5
Alexander received the formal surrender of the Paphlagonians on the north
coast, and of the Kappadokians further east in the interior; Kalas, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, was assigned to Paphlagonia; 6 a man called Sabiktas is said to have been made satrap of Kappadokia – he is never heard of again, and
may not even have existed. 7
The Great King appointed Memnon as overall commander in the west after
the Granikos defeat. Now he was using the Persian fl eet to begin the process of undoing Alexander’s conquest of the Asian coast. He gained control at Kos, Chios and Samos, perhaps of Miletos, and laid siege to Mitylene on Lesbos. His agents were active in Greece, meeting with a favourable but cautious response. Memnon died at Mitylene and was eventually succeeded by his nephew Pharnabazos, but
he was ordered to send his mercenaries to the king. Alexander had called
Dareios’
Aegean bluff, and moved on eastwards rather than turning west to deal with
Memnon: Dareios was outbluffed.8
Alexander marched swiftly from Gordion to Kilikia and turned south
towards Syria, only to be surprised by the full Persian royal army under the
Dareios’ personal command. He had marched up from Babylon and got across
Alexander’s rearward communications by crossing the Amanus Mountains.
Strategically the Persians had trapped Alexander, who had to reverse his march, deploy his army in a narrow plain, and devise a way of using his battle-winning combination of hoplite infantry and disciplined cavalry on a battlefi eld which stretched up a mountainside. He set his phalanx to attack the Greek mercenaries, but concentrated much of his cavalry on the hillside. Close to the sea the
Thessalian cavalry alone faced the main force of the Persian horse. Alexander
commanded the spearhead of the attack directed at Dareios. The Thessalians
were driven back; the phalanx nearly lost cohesion crossing the stream between the armies; Alexander’s charge broke the Persian left; Dareios fl ed to avoid
capture. Alexander kept control of his men and turned them seaward to help his phalanx. This, rather than Dareios’ fl ight, was the decisive move, for the Persian mercenary phalanx, taken in fl ank, now collapsed. A general fl ight followed, with much killing. 9
Dareios withdrew towards his main base in Babylonia. Most surviving Persians
withdrew east with him, but others moved north, and still others went south.
Amyntas, son of Antiochos, a Macedonian enemy of Alexander’s, took 4,000
mercenaries to Tripolis, then to Cyprus, where he collected more troops and
went on to Egypt. He claimed to have Dareios’ commission as satrap, but soon
outstayed his welcome; he and most of his men were killed by Mazakes, the
Persian governor. 10
T H E G R E AT C A M PA I G N , 3 3 4 – 3 2 5 b c
77
Alexander moved south from the battlefi eld, received the submissions of the
Phoenician cities of Arados and Sidon, but was held up by determined resistance at Tyre. Meanwhile a substantial detachment of the Persian survivors moved
Alexander the Great Failure Page 13
