Alexander the Great Failure

by John D Grainger

  loyalty to it against the man who aimed to restore its unity. Their demands were that Antigonos should distribute the cash he had acquired more equitably, and, since so many satrapies were vacant, he should agree to further redistribution.

  The implication was Antigonos’ followers or clients would not receive preferment, and that Seleukos would return to Babylon. Antigonos’ reply was the alternative suggestion that a negotiation should take place on the basis of who had what now.

  The offers of negotiation on both sides were actually declarations of war.32

  Antigonos’ eastern settlement was essentially to ignore it: most of the satraps who had joined Eumenes were left in place. In Babylonia Seleukos was replaced

  by Peithon, son of Agenor, who had been satrap of part of India until driven out.

  A new satrap for Media, Nikanor, replaced the executed Peithon, and was given

  a vague viceroyalty role to supervise the easterners. This was exactly what those eastern satraps had objected to before. Antigonos would fi nd little support east of Media, and if circumstances went wrong for him, the eastern satraps were likely to come out against him. It was one of the elements which led to his eventual

  defeat.

  The eastern satrapies were numerous – Areia, Parthia, Arachosia, Susiana,

  Persis, Baktria, Sogdiana, Paropamisadai – and individually did not count for

  much in terms of military or political power. Most of the men in offi ce did not play a great role in Alexander’s wars, but several of them had been in offi ce for up to ten years by the time Antigonos defeated Eumenes. They had been largely

  untroubled by central government authority and had developed strong local

  roots. They operated successful administrations, that is, they operated very

  much as Philip II had in Macedon, or as the Persian satraps had. An assertion of satrapal power by Peithon or Antigonos would be resisted. Even if these men had

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  few troops at their disposal, in combination their forces were substantial, and the Median and Baktrian cavalry was formidable.

  Antigonos returned to the west fairly slowly. The joint ultimatum was

  delivered in the winter of 316/315, and in the spring he reached Syria. Ptolemy had reoccupied southern Syria when Antigonos and Eumenes had moved off

  eastwards. 33 Antigonos selected this as his fi rst target, and moved in. Ptolemy made Tyre his main point of defence. Antigonos took a leisurely year to capture the city, while elsewhere in Phoenicia he built a new fl eet. His next target was likely to be either Egypt or Greece, probably both. 34

  Antigonos also issued a proclamation by which the Greek cities were to be

  freed of their occupying garrisons, and sent agents all through Greece to spread the message, and recruit mercenaries. He was copying Polyperchon’s gesture, but was a good deal more effective in implementing it. 35 This was a serious threat to Kassander’s position in Greece. Antigonos tried to undermine Kassander within

  Macedon itself by proposing to put him on trial for the treatment of Roxane

  and King Alexander, and complained that Kassander had been founding cities

  illegally.

  Antigonos’ basis for all this was a deal he had made with Polyperchon,

  who agreed to transfer the regency to Antigonos in return for being named

  as Antigonos’ commander in the Peloponnese. This may have been cynical,

  but it was consistent with Antigonos’ new position of power. The two sides in

  this confl ict were each using the concept of the unity of the empire to appeal for support, showing that there was powerful public support for that unity.

  Antigonos used his army as a Macedonian Assembly to ratify these proceedings. 36

  Legality of a sort was important, even to Antigonos.

  Seleukos, with a fl eet provided by Ptolemy, sailed along the Phoenician coast, fl aunting his defi ance in Antigonos’ face. He contacted possibly anti-Antigonid satraps in Antigonos’ home territory of Anatolia, based himself in Cyprus, and persuaded the satrap of Karia, Asandros, to join the coalition. Asandros must

  already have been apprehensive. A substantial Antigonid force under Antigonos’

  nephew Polemaios was in Lydia, presumably as a defensive move, but it obviously threatened any independently-minded satrap in the region, and Asandros was

  such a one. Kassander sent an army into Anatolia, by way of the Black Sea

  port of Amisos, under a general called Asklepiodoros, who moved south into

  Kappadokia. His mission was presumably as a distraction, but Kappadokia had

  been one of the satrapies claimed in the allies’ ultimatum. 37

  The timing of events in this war is diffi cult, but it would seem that much of this happened while Antigonos was involved in Phoenicia. 38 Once he had the ships the siege was easily fi nished, and in summer 314 his fl eet sailed to the Aegean. In strategic terms Antigonos occupied the centre ground and could choose to attack in any direction. The strongest of his enemies were Ptolemy and Kassandros, and

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  he opted to tackle Kassander fi rst. If he won he would control King Alexander IV

  (if he survived), plus Macedon and Greece. These were still the main sources of military manpower, and it was consistent with his assumption of the regency, and his clear enmity towards Kassander. The decision required that the situation in Anatolia be cleared up fi rst. This decision may well have been a strategic error; if he had eliminated Ptolemy fi rst, there would be no distractions in his rear; a defeat of Ptolemy would have driven Seleukos out of Egypt, and it was Seleukos who was, despite his lack of obvious power, his main enemy. Antigonos was

  fully conscious of the problem, and met Ptolemy at an Egyptian place called

  Ekregma for negotiations. They failed. Antigonos was not prepared to agree to

  Ptolemy’s terms.39

  Antigonos marched from Syria into his old satrapy of Phrygia and his old

  capital at Kelainai in the spring of 313. His nephew Polemaios had pushed

  Askepiodoros out of Anatolia, and was sent against Asandros in Karia, where

  Kassander had sent other troops to assist his ally. Kassander’s forces were defeated, and Antigonos came in with his main army and polished off the conquest of the

  whole area. This took some time, for it involved intrigues, captures, escapes and betrayals, but by the end of 313 Antigonos was in control. Ptolemy sent troops to help Asandros, making it all the more important for Antigonos to control

  the area. 40

  Antigonos’ fl eet gained control of the islands in the centre of the Aegean.

  These were formed into the League of the Islanders, with Antigonos as patron. 41

  This was the fi rst real test of Antigonos’ proclaimed ‘freedom’ of the Greeks. Its implementation was a good omen for the Greek cities; Antigonos placed no

  garrisons in the islands, unless requested to. In Karia, also, one of the reasons for Asandros’ failure was the preference of the Greek cities of the coast for Antigonos over him.

  Antigonos sent another nephew, Telesphoros, into the Peloponnese, where

  Kassander’s position crumbled, 42 though Athens held fi rm to Kassander’s cause under the philosopher tyrant, Demetrios of Phaleron. Polemaios was sent with

  another force into Euboia and Boiotia. 43 Kassander had recently restored the city of Thebes, which was not a move calculated to win him support from the

  rest of the Boiotian cities; Antigonos had made this one of his main complaints about Kassander.

  By the end of 313 Antigonos had made progress in recovering control of

  Anatolia, and in gaining power in Greece. Kassander held only the Mounychia

  fortress in Athens south of Thessaly. But Antigonos’ policy of not garrisoning the cities he took from K
assander left his position in Greece precarious, and

  he made no impression on Kassander’s base in Macedon or on Lysimachos in

  Thrace. Meanwhile, Ptolemy, who had shifted his Egyptian capital from Memphis

  to Alexandria during 313, used his fl eet to suppress a revolt in Kyrene, conquer

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  Cyprus, and launch attacks in Kilikia, where Antigonos stored a large part of his treasure. 44

  Antigonos wintered his army at the Hellespont, where he could menace

  Lysimachos across the Straits, though Byzantion refused to join his alliance. 45

  Threatened from that direction and by Polemaios from the south and with

  the Aegean dominated by Antigonos’ fl eet, Kassander offered to negotiate,

  but Antigonos spurned this, not yet strong enough to dictate terms.46 He was encouraged by this evidence of chinks in the alliance’s armour. Polemaios pushed northwards into Phokis during the winter, but neither there nor at the Straits could the allies’ defences be penetrated.

  Antigonos’ army in Syria was nominally commanded by his teenage son

  Demetrios, with several experienced Macedonian commanders assisting him.

  Ptolemy, with Seleukos as one of his commanders, threatened a full-scale invasion of Syria. This was intended to achieve several goals, for Ptolemy to recover

  southern Syria and draw Demetrios’ army southwards out of northern Syria, his

  main base; and secondly, to allow Seleukos to get to Babylon. Ptolemy also hoped that a battle would seriously damage the Antigonid forces. It seems unlikely that they expected to do more than infl ict a severe defeat on Demetrios, but even that would reduce the pressure on Kassander.

  The subsequent battle of Gaza proved to be the decisive encounter in the

  war, with disproportionate effects. Demetrios commanded only a fraction of

  his father’s army, about 18,000 men; Ptolemy’s army had been built up to about 20,000 men. He had been recruiting steadily for years, mostly Macedonians and

  Greek mercenaries, but he also mustered a few units of Egyptians – the only time in a century his family did this. Demetrius and his advisers faced two old soldiers of Alexander, of somewhat more cunning aspect than they were. Demetrios had

  a force of 43 elephants, intended as the decisive weapon. This threat stimulated the defensive inventiveness in their opponents.

  The two phalanxes faced each other, and both sides massed most of their

  cavalry on the eastern wing; Demetrios’ elephants faced a solid phalanx of

  infantry and archers, protected by a carpet of spikes and chains. The battle

  therefore became one between cavalry. Demetrios’ cavalry charged and mixed it

  with Ptolemy and Seleukos’ horsemen. The elephants charged, but were stopped

  by the spikes and chains, which they would not walk on. The archers then shot

  down the mahouts and aimed at the elephants’ eyes, maddening the beasts and

  driving them away into the Antigonid army, which broke and fl ed, as much from their own rampaging elephants as from the Ptolemaic pursuit.47

  Demetrios acknowledged defeat after his army disintegrated and Ptolemy

  captured Gaza city. He retired as far as northern Syria before recovering control of a serious number of soldiers. 48 Ptolemy, conscious that he had beaten only a part of Antigonos’ forces, moved his army carefully northwards. Tyre was held

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  against Ptolemy, but only briefl y; the garrison was unwilling to stand a siege and forced surrender. 49

  Ptolemy gained more than just territory. He took over most of Demetrios’

  hoplites, Greek mercenaries who were not in the business of fi ghting to the

  death. They were sent into Egypt as colonists, a very useful reinforcement of the Greco-Macedonian element among Ptolemy’s subjects. 50 Ptolemy did not need to recruit Egyptians again.

  The next result was that the allies opened up a new front. From the battle-

  fi eld – this was clearly prearranged and would probably have happened even

  if Demetrios had won – Seleukos took a small force on a ride past Demetrios’

  disintegrating army, through Syria and Mesopotamia (where he collected more

  troops from Antigonos’ garrison at Karrhai) and into Babylonia to reclaim his lost satrapy. Antigonos’ satrap, Peithon son of Agenor, had been killed at Gaza, which will have loosened the command structure. He reached Babylon with about 3,000

  soldiers, three times the number he started with. This expedition was undoubtedly Seleukos’ own idea; Ptolemy was never so audacious, and he did not even risk any troops – all of them were Seleukos’ (or originally Antigonos’) men.51

  Seleukos was central to the opposition of the allies to Antigonos. He had

  apparently been content to be satrap in Babylonia until his expulsion, and

  undoubtedly saw this as unjust and sought revenge. His fi rst aim was to recover his satrapy, but that would now never be enough. He remained the most

  determined of Antigonos’ enemies, but he was, in Babylon, the most vulnerable

  of the coalition partners.

  Even at the time, it must have been clear that, as a result of Gaza and Seleukos’

  return to Babylon, Antigonos’ grasp at Alexander’s empire had failed. He recovered Syria during 311, 52 but he could not get into Egypt. He could threaten Kassander and Lysimachos, but not penetrate their strongholds; now he had lost Babylonia. Then from Greece news arrived that his nephew Telesphoros, who had

  been made a subordinate of Polemaios’, had rebelled, 53 fi nancing his rising by looting treasures from the sanctuary at Olympia. This rebellion did not last long, but it prevented any operations by Polemaios in Greece for a time. Antigonos

  was on the defensive.

  From Media, Antigonos’ viceroy Nikanor came down though the mountains

  with an army of 10,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry to evict Seleukos. He was

  ambushed in the marshes of the Tigris valley by Seleukos’ much smaller army,

  and Seleukos captured and then enlisted most of his army. 54 Suddenly Seleukos was a formidable force, with an army of 20,000 men, and solid local support in Babylonia, where Antigonos’ regime had not been liked. Antigonos’ governing

  methods were not conducive to his popularity, and it is noticeable that his

  soldiers were very willing to join his enemies: he had now lost well over 20,000

  men to Ptolemy and Seleukos.

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  Antigonos was fi ghting on four fronts – Syria, Babylon, Greece and the Straits.

  Demetrios was sent on a fl ying raid against Babylon city, part of which he

  seized, but he encountered a stubborn defence commanded by Seleukos’ general

  Patrokles. Antigonos had given him a strict time limit; he had to withdraw when he did not succeed at once. 55 Antigonos could hit out in all directions but score in none. Fought to a standstill, he made a peace with his western opponents.

  Kassander and Lysimachos seized the opportunity created by Telesphoros’ brief

  rebellion to negotiate. Agreement was quickly reached and then Ptolemy hastily joined in. The terms were that all should hold what they had, and that Antigonos’

  Tyre proclamation of Greek freedom should be accepted as common policy. 56

  It was a peace of sorts, but not one anyone expected to last. Antigonos had not modifi ed his ambitions. Above all, Seleukos was not included, either because he refused to be involved or because Antigonos refused to include him.

  None of the participants was satisfi ed, but the fact of the truce indicated

  a mutual exhaustion. Antigonos was thwarted, Kassander and Ptolemy had

  lost territory, Lysimachos was very v
ulnerable. Some of the Greek cities had

  recovered a degree of autonomy, but were coming to realize that this involved

  accept ing a relationship with a great man akin to subordination. Several of the more important cities were a good deal less than autonomous: Athens still had a Macedonian garrison backing up the dictatorial rule of Demetrios of Phaleron,

  Corinth had a Macedonian garrison on its acropolis under Polyperchon’s control.

  There were still potent limits on the freedom of the Greek cities.

  The cities of the eastern Aegean coast adapted well to this regime, for it was a distinct improvement in political terms on the methods the Persian Empire had

  used on them. Some of the grander cities – Ephesos, Miletos, Rhodes among

  them – began to enjoy a period of great economic prosperity at this time. Much of this was a result of Antigonos’ even and consistent approach, based on his

  proclamation of Greek civic freedom, which he conscientiously applied, so

  setting the pattern for everyone else. 57 The preoccupation of the great men with combating each other, therefore, permitted Greek cities to work themselves

  into political situations of less onerous supervision, and largely prevented them from fi ghting each other. In some cases states went further. The Aitolian League emerged as a local power in Greece fi t to stand beside, or rather against, Macedon.

  Attacked without result by the joint forces of Antipater and Krateros in 322, and again by Kassander later, the League had emerged more solid than before, and

  was looking to expand.

  The main power in the Greek peninsula was still, however, Macedon. Partially

  drained of its men of military age by Alexander for his great campaign, 58 it was still capable of fi elding tough armies under Antipater and his son. Kassander was able to extend his power into Greece and across the western mountains into Epiros, and seems to have had little trouble with his northern boundary. Thrace,

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  now a separate satrapy, was both a protection and less of a potential problem than before, and Thessaly was now almost indissolubly united to Macedon.