Alexander the Great Failure

by John D Grainger

  Turkey. The Seleukid kingdom of Seleukos I and Antiochos I was always liable

  to lose control of Asia Minor; eventually it became the separate Attalid kingdom.

  One of the continuing tasks of Seleukid kings was to hold or regain Asia Minor; in the end it was beyond their strength. They attempted equally vainly to hold on to the east. Baktria was fully part of the kingdom only briefl y, under Seleukos and Antiochos I; by about 260 it was effectively an independent state. Similarly the Ptolemaic kingdom was always liable to see either Cyprus or Cyrenaica, or

  both, become detached as separate independent kingdoms. Magas in Cyrenaica

  was an independent king all through Ptolemy II’s reign.

  These kingdoms were relatively extensive, but were never as powerful as they

  seemed. One basic reason for this was manpower. It was not until many decades

  had passed that either the Seleukid or the Ptolemaic states seriously involved the ‘native’ populations in their affairs, though both went out of their ways to conciliate the more powerful of their non-Greek, non-Macedonian subjects. In

  Babylonia a few Babylonians became city managers, or even local governors;5

  in Egypt the native priesthood was encouraged with concessions and grants

  and offi ces; 6 but these measures were not intended to involve the native elites in affairs, rather they were aimed at keeping them out of political and military matters. Seleukos I recruited Iranian cavalry – this is the only possible source

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  for the large cavalry force he brought to the Ipsos campaign – but they seem to have been sent home soon after, and the Seleukids never had such a large cavalry force again.

  For civil administration and military manpower all three kingdoms were

  reliant on Greeks and Macedonians, together with those of the native populations who could pass as Greek. (This required a knowledge of Greek and at least

  something of a Greek education.) For Macedon this was not diffi cult, but

  Macedon’s limited geographical area also limited its population, and hence

  its civil and military power. The Ptolemaic and Seleukid kingdoms relied on

  immigration, and the natural increase among those immigrants’ descendants.

  By 217 both kings could fi eld armies of 70,000 men, though to do so both had

  to reach into the native populations and recruit from them – just, it was hoped, for the emergency.7

  This complex of problems, centred on a restricted access to manpower, had

  been part of the new world even during Alexander’s lifetime. The Seleukid

  kingdom was the most seriously affected. Macedon and Ptolemaic Egypt

  were compact states, relatively easy to defend because of their situations and borders, and they therefore required a less extensive military establishment than the Seleukids, but that state sprawled from India to Ionia, and had problems

  everywhere. Already in the reign of Seleukos I fragments became independent

  or semi-independent. He recognized the problem when he made his son king

  in the east, but there were other, less important or less accessible areas whose separation he ignored.

  In northern Iran one of Alexander’s Persian satraps, Atropates, founded the

  kingdom of Media Atropatene; 8 next door another mountainous area, Armenia, became independent under a line of satrap/kings beginning with Orontes, a

  former Akhaimenid governor. 9 Seleukos I’s agreement with Chandragupta Maurya handed Arachosia to the Indian ruler, and this left Karmania and Gedrosia to themselves. By contrast Babylonia, the economic heart of the kingdom, was

  always loyal. As the news of the murder of Seleukos I spread, the kingdom virtually collapsed. Antiochos was kept busy in reclaiming his inheritance, notably in Asia Minor, and it was from Babylonia that he extracted much of the wealth he needed to fi nance his wars. An agonized Babylonian chronicle records the resulting

  poverty and hunger. 10 At about the same time, a fi re at Persepolis probably indicates a local uprising, and there are stories of military rebellions suppressed by satraps; the later Seleukid kings held Persis only precariously. 11 They kept hold of Susiana, the next province to the west, but with Persis at least partly independent there was little chance of gaining access to the provinces further east.

  In Iran, therefore, even as early as 280, the Seleukid kingdom was effectively reduced to Susiana, Persis and central Media, the lands along the old Royal

  Road from Babylonia to Baktria. In concentrating on their holdings in the

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  west, the Seleukids lost control of much of the east; Baktria and the whole east became fully independent by 260, at fi rst under the satraps Diodotos I and his son Diodotos II, and then under a whole series of kings.12 A determined effort was made to fasten a grip on the remaining Iranian land by means of colonies,

  centred around Ekbatana, but this clearly came behind Baktria and Syria (and

  Asia Minor) as preferred destinations for the colonists.

  In Asia Minor Antiochos was confronted with the enmity of a string of small

  but determined states along his northern border, and by the Galatian horde,

  and he became enmeshed in a long war to beat back the invaders. Perforce he

  accepted the independence of Bithynia, and the Northern League of cities and

  kingdoms. To these can be added Kappadokia, whose history is a blank between

  the war between Antigonos and the mid-third century; the Galatians eventually

  settled in part of it, and the rest emerged as an independent kingdom later on.

  The kingship – in the hands of yet another family descended from an Akhaimenid aristocrat – seems to have developed as a response to the threatening presence of the Galatians; the local era, implying a decisive event in the land’s history, began in 255 bc.13

  The basic reasons for the failure of the Seleukid kingdom to hold many

  marginal territories were, fi rst, the lack of military manpower, and secondly, the constant pressure exerted by enemies, particularly the Ptolemies from Egypt. A constant watch had to be kept on the Ptolemaic frontier, liable to be the scene of war at almost any excuse. So on top of a scarcity of military manpower there was the need to concentrate much of it permanently in Syria, leaving less for use elsewhere.

  Ptolemy II found he had gained more than he bargained for when he gave

  refuge to his sister Arsinoe II, the widow of Lysimachos and Ptolemy Keraunos.

  In Alexandria, she is said to have set about becoming the near-ruler of Egypt in compensation for losing Asia and Macedon. Ptolemy was already married to her

  stepdaughter, Arsinoe (I), who was soon evicted from the palace, and Arsinoe II then married her brother. 14 The intriguing abilities of her mother had clearly descended to Arsinoe; the Ptolemaic dynasty was thereby well set on its route to repeated intermarriage.

  The strong will of Arsinoe is generally assumed to have required this mar-

  ri age. Greeks were scandalized, and caustic comments came from poets and

  anecdotists, 15 who were punished by Ptolemy when he could reach them. But it takes two to marry, and Ptolemy knew what he was doing. His sister was a

  valuable woman with a much wider knowledge of the contemporary world than

  he had, after her earlier marriages. She could bring a fresh view to affairs, a view untainted by the fl attery to which the Ptolemies were already subject, and which inevitably distorted their view of outside events. Above all Arsinoe could give advice on the situation in Macedon.

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  The marriage is also related to the problem of the royal succession. The marital and progenitive career of Ptolemy I had left a complex family situation, three wives and a variety
of children. Ptolemy II was the son of the third wife, and his half-brothers might consider they had a better claim to the throne. Keraunos was dead, but Magas was independent in Cyrenaica. Ptolemy II had to consolidate

  the royal family into a unit. He gave refuge to Arsinoe’s son Ptolemy, but kept him under control. He gave refuge to Arsinoe herself and controlled her by their marriage – which, on this interpretation, was his idea. Two of his half-brothers, or brothers, were executed in the 270s. He had children of his own by his fi rst marriage, and Arsinoe II adopted them once she was married to her brother.

  Ptolemy had another sister, Philotera, who apparently never married; she was

  fully integrated into the family system though, and gave her name to at least

  three towns in the kingdom. 16

  The marriage of brother and sister was seen as a scandal, but it was also widely publicized and commemorated. Arsinoe appeared on coins either by herself or

  with her brother-husband. The two took the same surname, Philadelphos, and

  temples to them were built in Alexandria and Athens and other places. Arsinoe

  was commemorated and honoured when she died, but Philotera received

  the same honours. The whole process was Ptolemy II’s deliberate exaltation

  of his immediate family above collateral members, so that challenges from

  other branches could not be convincingly made. It was another solution to

  the succession issue, one to put beside those of Seleukos I, Kassander, and the Argeads.

  Antigonos Gonatas gained control of Macedon and Thessaly, the whole of his

  father’s kingdom, but he did so by the use of Greek and Galatian mercenaries. His claim to rule was based on heredity and, more convincingly, on bringing peace to the ravaged land. Any acclamation by the Macedonian army was impossible and

  probably never occurred, and the Macedonians withheld their formal support

  for some time. Antigonos needed to keep on earning his kingship, but the longer he remained as king, the fi rmer his seat would be.

  The danger in the short term was seen in 274. Pyrrhos had returned from

  his western expedition anxious to recover his old position in Epiros and Greece.

  He revived his claim to the Macedonian throne, dating from the aftermath of

  Demetrios’ debacle, and invaded Macedon. There was the one battle between the

  kings, at a place called ‘the Narrows’, whose location is uncertain: Pyrrhos’ forces defeated Antigonos’ Galatians, and then the Macedonian phalanx crumbled and

  ran. Pyrrhos got as far as Aigai, the old capital. 17 The kings waited to see how the Macedonians would react; the Macedonians, meanwhile, waited to see who

  would win. Antigonos held the coastal towns, including the main cities, and his fl eet. The stalemate broke when Pyrrhos allowed his Galatian mercenaries to loot the royal tombs at Aigai, thereby forfeiting the good opinion of the Macedonians.

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  He had no wish to besiege cities which could be easily supplied from the sea, and so retreated, leaving his son Ptolemy in charge; Antigonos, having done as little fi ghting as possible, quietly recovered all that he had lost. For the second time the cities had saved the kingdom, not the rural barons; Macedonian society had clearly been changed drastically by the events of the 270s.

  Pyrrhos went off to the Peloponnese to attack Sparta on behalf of his friend

  Kleonymos, a claimant to the Spartan throne; King Areus and the Spartan army

  were away on a campaign in Crete, and no doubt Pyrrhos was aware of this. And

  yet Pyrrhos’ attack on Sparta city was defeated by the resolution of the Spartans who were there, old men, women and boys, in a pitched battle. Gonatas moved

  in reinforcements by sea, to block his retreat. Driven away from Sparta by a

  Macedonian force and by the arrival of Areus and his army, he attempted to

  take Argos. One of his elephants got stuck in a narrow gateway and trumpeted

  the alarm, and during street fi ghting next day Pyrrhos was knocked out by a tile fl ung by an old woman sitting on a roof; one of Antigonos’ soldiers fi nished him off. 18 He was Antigonos’ opposite, dashing about from one fi ght to another where Antigonos deliberately avoided battles; he conjured up enemies on all sides,

  where Antigonos had doggedly aimed only at Macedon, and, having reached his

  goal, held on to it.

  This was the last serious challenge Antigonos faced for Macedon. He employed

  mercenaries to drive out the Galatians, and avoided fi ghting Pyrrhos where

  possible, and so spared Macedon still further strains. His alliance with the

  Seleukid kingdom protected him internationally, and his fl eet gave him partial control of the Aegean. His political interests were confi ned to Macedon and its immediate neighbours, and he acted as a traditional Macedonian king; he was

  not, as some must have feared, another Demetrios. He was the political heir of Kassander rather than his father or grandfather – he was a grandson of Antipater through his mother.

  Antigonos was able to recover his dominant position in Greece, based on the

  control of Corinth, Peiraios, Chalkis and Demetrias, but he reduced his garrisons, and preferred to support friendly regimes in the cities rather than the unpopular garrisons. He left Boiotia alone and refrained from antagonizing the Aitolians.

  This was suffi cient to satisfy him for the time being.

  The Aitolian League, instrumental in saving the sanctuary at Delphi from

  the Galatians, came to control the Amphiktyonic League. This had been the

  means by which others, including Philip II, had attempted to dominate central

  Greece. By gathering many of the small local voting communities into their own league, the Aitolians succeeded rather better than Philip. This is the beginning of the Aitolians’ great period. Their expansion was careful, relatively slow, and accomplished in the main by persuasion and consent, but it produced a compact

  state by the 250s. It succeeded in this because of the exhaustion of Macedon, and

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  eventually the two states were bound to clash. Until Macedon recovered, both

  remained wary. 19

  The more distant enemy Antigonos faced was Ptolemy II, who may have

  fi nanced Pyrrhos’ attack on him in 274. 20 Ptolemy’s enmity was based on naval competition in the Aegean, and on Antigonos’ alliance with Antiochos.

  Antigonos’ marriage with Phila, and the preceding agreement by which a fi rm

  boundary was set to the two kings’ territories and areas of infl uence, solved all their mutual problems, which was the essential foundation for the alliance’s

  continuation, since neither had designs on the other’s lands. 21 In addition both kings were kept busy in the 270s with other problems, Antigonos in Macedon,

  with Pyrrhos, and in Greece, Antiochos with Asia Minor.

  Antiochos had to fi ght bands of Galatians where he could fi nd them. It took

  time to locate and catch them, and defeating them was never easy. Eventually

  he brought a large force of them into battle, in which his elephants provided a major winning weapon. This may have been as early as 275 or as late as 270. 22 The acceptance of responsibility for combating these raiders by the Seleukid king is interesting: he had inherited Asia Minor from his father, who had held it only a few months before his death. Antiochos was determined to hold on to this part

  of his inheritance, but it was not an easy task and cost rather more in terms of imperial control than perhaps was warranted.

  The campaigns were confused and confusing, exactly the sort of situation

  Ptolemy II was adept at exploiting, but he seems on this occasion to have been pre-empted. His half-brother Magas, king in Cyrenaica, marri
ed the daughter

  of Antiochos and Stratonike, Apama, a signal that the kings were allied. This

  took place by 274; even during the Galatian war, Antiochos was active in anti-

  Ptolemaic diplomacy; he was now allied with Antigonos and Magas; Ptolemy’s

  riposte may well have been to encourage Pyrrhos to attack Antigonos in 274.

  Magas made a grasp for the Egyptian kingship in 275, beginning a march on

  Alexandria from Kyrene, but a rising of the native Libyans forced him to turn

  back. 23 Ptolemy blamed Antiochos for the war, but was prevented from marching against either Magas or Antiochos by a mutiny among his Galatian mercenaries.

  When he put it down, he claimed a victory over the barbarians equivalent to that of Antigonos and Antiochos. 24

  The situation developed into a war in Syria between Ptolemy and Antiochos,

  beginning probably in 274, as a result of which Magas in Cyrenaica and the

  Galatians in Asia Minor had to be left largely alone. Antiochos made some

  conquests in Syria and Ptolemy had to fi ght hard to recover his losses. The kings made peace in 271 without any serious territorial changes taking place; Antiochos turned back north to give the Galatians another drubbing – the elephant victory was in the late 270s.

  The Galatian invasion of Asia Minor protected the new kingdoms along the

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  north coast of Anatolia from being subdued by Antiochos and indirectly assisted Magas maintaining his independence as king in Cyrenaica. Within Asia Minor

  new emphasis was laid on other local powers, including the Macedonian lords:

  Philetairos of Pergamon assisted in the fi ght against the invaders and this hoisted him to a position of near-independence; 25 Antiochos’ brother Akhaios settled in Asia Minor and gained a position of local authority from which his descendents later aspired to local kingship.26 Meanwhile the Galatians settled in part of Kappadokia, centred on such ancient towns as Ankyra and Gordion. The process

  had thus continued of the slow disintegration of the great kingdoms, which was to end in the fi rst century bc by them being swallowed up by Rome or Parthia. In place of two kingdoms, Macedon and Persia, in 335, there were at least nine states in 270: Macedon, the Seleukid and Ptolemaic kingdoms, Bithynia, the Northern