Red Sky in the Morning

by Michael Pearson

  3. If, prior to the German invasion, the Russians had consulted us, arrangements could have been made as regards munitions etc.

  4. Instead until Hitler attacked, Britain did not know if the Russians would fight or whose side they would be on.

  5. Britain was left alone for a year while every Communist in the country tried to hamper our war effort, on orders from Moscow.

  6. If Britain had been invaded… or starved in the Battle of the Atlantic, the Soviet government would have remained utterly indifferent.

  7. Despite warnings, Russia left Hitler to choose his moment and his enemies.

  8. Russia was not short of manpower, what she needed was equipment, which Britain would endeavour to supply.[9]

  Churchill was evidently ‘letting off steam’, and did not propose that Cripps should pass his comments on to the Russians verbatim, but he fully intended that the British ambassador should bear them in mind in his dealings with the Soviets.

  Aware that the Royal Navy was already considerably stretched by escort duties in the Atlantic (despite invaluable assistance from the Royal Canadian Navy), plus substantial operations in the Mediterranean and the requirements of the Home Fleet, Churchill nevertheless insisted that the Admiralty make ships available to escort convoys to the Russian Arctic ports in the Barents Sea.

  Concurrent with Operation Barbarossa, German troops entered the territory of their reluctant allies the Finns, and Russian foresight following the war with Finland with regard to their dispositions for protecting the ports of Murmansk and Archangel and the crucial rail link to the Russian interior, now became apparent.

  A small exploratory convoy carrying mainly aircraft departed from Iceland on 21 August, and arrived in Russia without incident. A system of convoys was thereafter set in motion, commencing with PQ1 which departed from Iceland on 28 September 1941, arriving at Archangel on 11 October – returning convoys (in ballast) were given the prefix QP. By the end of 1941, seven convoys had sailed through to Russia carrying vital supplies – 750 tanks, 800 fighters, 1400 vehicles, and over 100,000 tons (101,600 tonnes) of stores.

  —♦—

  President Theodore Roosevelt believed that the United States should and would join the fight against Facism in Europe. However, in 1940 he faced re-election, making it necessary to court a vocal and not insubstantial ‘isolationist’ grouping in Congress and among the public at large. Nevertheless, the President ensured that supplies were sent to Britain and, in exchange for US rights to use bases in certain British possessions, arranged for the transfer to the Royal Navy of fifty old but still welcome US Navy destroyers. For Britain the first hope of the war came when Germany invaded Russia. The second came on Sunday, 8 December 1941, when Japanese forces attacked the US fleet at Pearl Harbor without warning – followed by Hitler’s declaration of war on the United States in support of his Japanese allies. The German declaration neatly solved any problems which President Roosevelt might have had persuading the public that America’s war lay across the Atlantic as well as the Pacific.

  With the entrance of the United States into the war, plans were put in hand to increase transatlantic shipments so that supplies could be sent specifically for Russia and not taken from those sent for Britain’s war effort, as had previously been the case.

  It took the German high command some time to appreciate the importance of stopping the resupply of the Red Army through the Arctic ports. Possibly they did not believe that the campaign would last long enough for the convoys to matter; however, this would be only one of a number of reasons for the lack of German activity for several months of convoy traffic. From the opening of Barbarossa reconnaissance flights had been restricted as a result of aircraft being withdrawn from Luftflotte V (the German air fleet responsible for Norway) to assist with the campaign in Russia. Additionally, a principal cause must have been the German high command’s lack of an effective inter-service general staff to co-ordinate the needs and responsibilities of the Wehrmacht, Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe. On the contrary there was more often than not undisguised hostility between the heads of the different services, encouraged by Hitler on the principle of ‘divide and rule’. This antipathy was particularly true of Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering, commander-in-chief (C-in-C) of the Luftwaffe, and Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, C-in-C Kriegsmarine, who had a long-running and furious argument over the control of naval aviation. This argument was never resolved, despite the conclusion of a pact in 1939, which Goering immediately proceeded to undermine by starving squadrons earmarked for the navy of aircraft. A similar dispute between the RAF and the Royal Navy lasted for over a decade between the wars, but was finally settled when naval air power (the Fleet Air Arm) was transferred to the control of the navy between 1937 and 1939. Goering, the former First World War fighter ace, proved to be a highly incompetent service chief, and to make matters worse appeared ready to do almost anything to flatter Hitler in an attempt to improve his own position to the detriment of the other service chiefs, whom he considered rivals to be fought as hard as the enemy. Such damaging rivalry did nothing to assist combined operations to hunt down Allied shipping.

  —♦—

  To begin with Russia-bound convoys would consist of fifteen or so merchant ships, concentrated in north-west Scotland at Loch Ewe and/or Icelandic ports; however as the situation became more pressing, the number of ships increased to thirty or more. The escort would usually consist of a distant force of heavy ships from the Home Fleet comprising (dependent upon availability) a battleship or battlecruiser, one or more heavy cruisers and a destroyer screen. An aircraft carrier should ideally have accompanied the heavy ships or the convoy itself to give air cover, but this was rarely possible due to the lack of carriers available to the fleet until the specifically designed escort carriers began to come on stream in 1943. The capital ships from the Home Fleet would operate some 300–400 miles[10] (552–742 km) from the convoy, but remain within high-speed striking distance in the hope of catching German surface raiders operating from northern Norway. The British heavy ships would not, however, proceed east of Bear Island (see map A p. 144), as this would bring them within range of U-boats and the Luftwaffe. Secondly, there would be a detached covering force, usually two light cruisers, which would shadow the convoy through the Barents Sea, remaining at some 30–40 miles (55–75 km) distance, also to avoid U-boats. Close escort and anti-submarine protection would be provided by destroyers supported by an assorted force of corvettes, trawlers, minesweepers and occasionally, during summer months when the Luftwaffe was active, an anti-aircraft cruiser.

  By 1942 Hitler was becoming convinced that the Allies planned an invasion of Norway, and to counter this threat and bolster attacks on the Arctic convoys he ordered a concentration of German capital ships in Norwegian waters. The battleship Tirpitz was subsequently located by British reconnaissance in Aas Fjord, 15 miles (27 km) from Trondheim, on 23 January 1942; while on 11 February the battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, accompanied by the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen and escorts, began their epic dash from Brest northward through the English Channel. British forces were slow to react and the ships got through undamaged by air and sea attacks; however Gneisenau hit a mine and Scharnhorst hit two. Both ships were able to proceed to German ports, where Gneisenau was further damaged by air attack while in dry dock at Kiel. Prinz Eugen continued on to Norway in company with the pocket battleship Admiral Scheer, and although the heavy cruiser was torpedo-damaged en route, a powerful German naval force was now building up.

  In the meantime a further four convoys, PQ8, 9, 10 and 11, had by the last week of February delivered cargo from fifty-six merchantmen into Murmansk (Archangel being frozen during the Arctic winter), for the loss of one ship sunk, and one damaged but towed to the Kola Inlet (the entrance to Murmansk).

  —♦—

  German actions against the convoys inevitably grew in intensity, and losses of both merchant and naval vessels in the Arctic began to mount, to the extent that the Admiralty prop
osed that sailings be suspended for the summer months, the period of perpetual Arctic daylight. Churchill, pressed by both Stalin and Roosevelt to increase not decrease shipments, vetoed the proposal. His memo of 17 May 1942 to General Sir Hastings Ismay, Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence and liaison with the Chiefs of Staff Committee, explains the predicament:

  1. Not only Premier Stalin but President Roosevelt will object very much to our desisting from running the convoys now. The Russians are in heavy action, and will expect us to run the risks and pay the price entailed by our contribution. The United States ships are queuing up. My own feeling, mingled with much anxiety, is that the convoy ought to sail on the 18th [of May]. The operation is justified if a half get through. The failure on our part to make the attempt would weaken our influence with both our major allies. I share your misgivings but I feel it is a matter of duty.

  2. I presume all the ships are armed with AA guns and that not more than 25 would be sent.

  3. I will bring the question before the Cabinet tomorrow (Monday) in your presence, but meanwhile all preparations should proceed.[11]

  The convoy in question, PQ16, consisting of thirty-five merchant ships, subsequently sailed on 21 May and on 27 May was subjected to attacks by 108 torpedo bombers. These attacks continued for five days, but losses were kept down to six ships. Churchill had in some measure trusted to luck and that luck had held; however it was about to run out.

  On Finnish and Norwegian airfields around the North Cape, the northernmost tip of Norway, the Luftwaffe assembled a formidable force of torpedo bombers, dive bombers, level bombers and fighter support. In addition Admiral Doenitz, C-in-C of the U-boat arm of the Kriegsmarine, received orders to increase the number of operational units in the Arctic to ten.

  As all available Allied escorts were required for Operation Harpoon, a convoy for the relief of hard-pressed Malta, the next Russia convoy, PQ17, was scheduled for the end of June.

  —♦—

  The Admiralty in general, and C-in-C Home Fleet Admiral Tovey in particular, were very well aware that running convoys through to Arctic Russia in the summer months of perpetual daylight would incur substantial risk of heavy loss in merchant and escort vessels and their crews. The chances of discovery by U-boats or round-the-clock Luftwaffe reconnaissance would be virtually certain.

  Up to this point the German high command had used only U-boats and air attack against convoys, but Admiral Tovey and Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound were convinced that surface raiders would also be brought into action, including the battleship Tirpitz. The upper echelons of Naval High Command had a wary respect for this powerful adversary, fearing disaster should she ever get loose. In conversations between the two men Sir Dudley Pound advised Admiral Tovey that if Tirpitz were to break out of her Norwegian base to intercept a convoy, he might well order it to scatter. Tovey was not in agreement with this approach, believing that nothing would be gained as the merchantmen would then be isolated and picked off at will by U-boat and aircraft attack. Keeping the convoy together, he maintained, would at least give the close escort some chance of harassing and delaying the attackers until British capital ships could be brought into action in support.

  Convoy PQ17 comprised thirty-five merchantmen, and sailed on 27 June 1942 from the Icelandic port of Hvalfjord. Covering the passage to Russia, a powerful escort included with the Home Fleet distant-covering force the aircraft carrier HMS Victorious, and for the first time ships of the US Navy accompanying both the Home Fleet units and the detached cruiser force in the Barents Sea.

  —♦—

  Also very aware of the improved prospects for attacking Russia-bound convoys which summer provided, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder fully intended to combine operations by Tirpitz and the German battle group in Norway with attacks by U-boats and the Luftwaffe. However, he also had his problems, not least of which was Hitler’s extreme reluctance to put his heavy ships at risk. Hitler insisted that before convoys were attacked by major German surface units, any British aircraft carriers with the supporting forces were to be attacked and destroyed by the Luftwaffe. This placed an impossible handicap on the German naval high command, and was compounded by the Führer’s orders that no attacks were to be made by any German heavy ships unless he personally gave the order for them to sail.[12] In an attempt to comply with these crippling restrictions, Raeder devised Operation Rosselsprung (‘Knight’s Move’), which was to be carried out in two phases. Upon detection of a convoy the German heavy ships were to sail from their bases along the Norwegian coast to concentrate at sortie ports in northern Norway, there to await Hitler’s final sanction for an offensive operation. This movement in advance of final attack orders would have a completely unforeseen outcome.

  PQ17 first made contact with enemy forces on 1 July, when escorting destroyers attacked two German U-boats which were discovered on the surface. The U-boats dived unharmed but later that day a reconnaissance aircraft circled the convoy, followed by the first of a number of aircraft attacks, which continued for several days. Losses were suffered but for the most part these attacks were successfully beaten off.

  Putting Rosselsprung into action, Raeder ordered Tirpitz and Admiral Hipper north from Trondheim, and Admiral Scheer and Lützow north from Narvik, all bound for Altenfjord. Lützow grounded, but Tirpitz, Hipper, and Scheer arrived at their destination on 3 July; on that afternoon British aircraft reconnaissance reported Tirpitz and Hipper missing from Trondheim.

  On receiving this report, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound became concerned that Tirpitz was out and heading for PQ17; his apprehension mounted during the ensuing hours as no confirmation of Tirpitz’s whereabouts was received. As the hours passed Ultra[13] decrypts of German radio traffic pointed towards a concentration of heavy ships, probably including Tirpitz, at Altenfjord, but gave no indication that a battle group was at sea bound for the convoy; nor did the standard warnings to U-boats in the area materialise, advising them to be on the lookout for approaching friendly surface units. Despite the lack of supporting evidence, Admiral Pound’s conviction grew that Tirpitz was on her way to intercept PQ17 and, by-passing Admiral Tovey (who was at sea with the Home Fleet distant covering force), despatched three signals direct to the convoy escort which would have disastrous results. The first of these reached Rear-Admiral Hamilton, in command of the accompanying cruiser squadron, at approximately 21.20 on 4 July and read: ‘Most Immediate. Cruiser force to withdraw westward at high speed. (2111B/4).’

  This first message, despatched as a result of reported U-boat activity in the area, was followed in quick succession by two further urgent transmissions, the first arriving with Rear-Admiral Hamilton at approximately 22.00: ‘Immediate. Owing to threat from surface ships, convoy is to disperse and proceed to Russian ports. (2123B/4).’ And finally: ‘Most immediate. My 2123/4, convoy is to scatter. (2136/4).[14]

  Rear-Admiral Hamilton’s understanding (and that of the other senior officers of the escort) was that a ‘convoy is to scatter’ signal would only be sent if the Admiralty had definite information that an attack by powerful surface ships was imminent. As a consequence he expected to see Tirpitz and a battle group steaming over the horizon at any moment. The ‘scatter’ signal was passed to the convoy at 22.15, followed by much disbelief, repeats and confirmations. Finally the port columns of merchant ships peeled slowly off to the left, starboard columns to the right, while the centre columns carried straight on.

  Rear-Admiral Hamilton ordered the destroyer escort to close on his cruisers and at 22.30 the combined force turned westward, steering to pass south of the dispersing merchant ships (i.e. between the merchantmen and the supposed German surface units). As ordered, the remainder of the close escort also ‘scattered’, leaving the merchantmen to their fate. Only one of the escorts continued to offer any protection, the trawler Ayreshire succeeding in shepherding three freighters as far as Novaya Zemlya by 10 July.

  His orders being unequivocal, Hamilton kept on westward at
25 knots, keeping the destroyers with him, reasoning that when the convoy scattered the enemy would attack it with U-boats and aircraft, and send their surface units after him. This being the case, he might be able to draw them onto Victorious’s aircraft and possibly the Home Fleet battle group itself.[15]

  In the Barents Sea the situation in which the defenceless merchant ships found themselves quickly descended into tragedy. On 5 July six vessels were sunk by air attack and six torpedoed by U-boats. One ship was bombed on the 6th, and between the evening of the 6th and the early morning of the 8th four more were torpedoed. Two more were sunk on the night of the 9th/10th.[16]

  As for Tirpitz, Hitler’s permission to launch an attack by the battle group was finally obtained on the forenoon of 5 July, and the executive order to proceed to sea given at 11.37, by which time Hamilton’s cruiser force was known to be heading westward, and Admiral Tovey’s covering force to be some 450 miles (832 km) from the convoy and the North Cape alike. During the day German intelligence intercepted messages from Allied ships from which it was calculated that Admiral Tovey’s battle group would be able to close sufficiently to launch an air attack by 01.00 on the 6th. As reports of the many sinkings by U-boat and air attack came through, it became apparent that sending the battle group after the stragglers was simply not worth the risk. Consequently at 21.32 on the 5th Tirpitz and her consorts were ordered to abandon the operation and twenty minutes later altered course for Altenfjord.[17] The German battleship had delivered a major victory without having fired a shot.

  The final tally was thirteen ships destroyed by air attack, and ten sunk by submarines, for the loss of six German aircraft. Quite apart from the priceless loss of life (153 merchant seamen lost their lives), the Red Army was deprived of 430 tanks, 210 aircraft and 3350 vehicles,[18] equivalent to the destruction which might be expected from a major land battle.