The Diamond Sutra

by Red Pine

  Chapter Twenty-seven: “Subhuti, what do you think? Was it due to the possession of attributes that the Tathagata realized unexcelled, perfect enlightenment? Subhuti, you should hold no such view. And why not? Subhuti, it could not have been due to the possession of attributes that the Tathagata realized unexcelled, perfect enlightenment.

  “Furthermore, Subhuti, someone may claim, ‘Those who set forth on the bodhisattva path announce the destruction or the end of some dharma.’ Subhuti, you should hold no such view. And why not? Those who set forth on the bodhisattva path do not announce the destruction or the end of any dharma.”

  CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN

  ONCE AGAIN, the event that gave rise to this sutra was the Buddha’s performance of his daily round: going to town to beg for food, returning to his dwelling place outside Shravasti, sitting down and focusing on what was before him. But who was it that did these things? And what do these activities have to do with buddhahood? In Chapter Five, the Buddha asked Subhuti if he could see the Tathagata by means of the set of attributes he had acquired. Despite Subhuti’s denial to the contrary, the Buddha told him he could see the Tathagata, but only by means of the attributes the Tathagata had not acquired. Thus, the Tathagata cannot be seen by means of the possession of attributes, nor do such attributes have anything to do with buddhahood. They are merely the concomitants of practice. Hence, when the Buddha asks Subhuti if the possession of attributes has any bearing on the realization of enlightenment, he dismisses any causal connection before Subhuti has a chance to reply.

  Kumarajiva’s insertion of an additional negative in the question and answer of this first section has resulted in a very different view of the relationship between the Buddha’s attributes and his attainment of enlightenment. According to Kumarajiva’s version, it was not not because of such attributes that the Buddha realized enlightenment. Essentially, Kumarajiva and those who have followed his interpretation see this first section as a warning against the view that merit is empty and thus has no relationship to buddhahood. And they see the second section as a warning against the view that dharmas are not already empty and thus must be eliminated. Thus, according to Kumarajiva, this chapter is a plea for the Middle Way between emptiness and existence.

  The interpretation I have followed, and which accords with all other Chinese translations and Sanskrit editions, reads this chapter as a warning against attachment to dharmas of any kind, both those that are seen as leading to buddhahood and those that are seen as obstructing the path to buddhahood. Neither is there an end to the path, nor is there a beginning. The Buddha prepares us for the next chapter by denying that there is something we achieve or something we transcend.

  Vasubandhu says, “Someone may claim that since merit does not lead to enlightenment, merit and its fruit are of no use to a bodhisattva. In order to eliminate this doubt, the sutra continues.”

  Chao-ming titles this: “Nothing Ended, Nothing Destroyed.”

  Hui-neng says, “Attributes have no form. Emptiness isn’t empty. From ancient times until now, who says something is ended or destroyed? Thus follows a chapter on how nothing is ended and nothing is destroyed.”

  “Subhuti, what do you think? Was it due to the possession

  of attributes that the Tathagata realized unexcelled,

  perfect enlightenment? Subhuti, you should hold no such

  view. And why not? Subhuti, it could not have been due

  to the possession of attributes that the Tathagata realized

  unexcelled, perfect enlightenment.

  In the previous chapter, the Buddha told Subhuti that the Tathagata cannot be seen by means of the attributes that accompanied his realization of enlightenment. For no matter how perfect they might be, they are still only attributes and their possession does not result in buddhahood but merely accompanies it. Throughout this sutra, the Buddha uses “unexcelled, perfect enlightenment” as a synonym for his dharma body, which is not subject to creation or destruction but which is the only attribute a buddha can be said to possess because it is no attribute.

  Han Ch’ing-ching says, “Although such perfect attributes constitute the body one depends on, they are not the cause one depends on for realizing unexcelled, perfect enlightenment.”

  Commenting on Kumarajiva’s interpretation of these lines, Hui-neng says, “Having heard that the true body is beyond form, Subhuti wonders if one can attain enlightenment without cultivating the thirty-two pure practices. The Buddha tells him, ‘Don’t think that the Tathagata attained enlightenment without practicing the thirty-two pure practices. If you claim that you can attain unexcelled, perfect enlightenment without practicing the thirty-two pure practices, you cut yourself off from the lineage of buddhas and say something that isn’t so.’”

  Textual note: In both parts of this section, Kumarajiva has the Buddha advising Subhuti not to think that ju-lai pu yi chu-tsu-hsiang ku (it was not because of the possession of attributes) that the Tathagata realized unexcelled, perfect enlightenment. Such a reading, linking the possession of attributes and the realization of enlightenment, is at variance with all other translations and editions. After “you should hold no such view,” Paramartha has an additional “that it was due to the possession of attributes that the Tathagata realized unexcelled, perfect enlightenment.” Dharmagupta does not have na (no) in the phrase na evan drashtavyan (no such view), apparently a copyist error. Kumarajiva and Bodhiruci do not include tat kasya hetoh (and why not), nor do the Gilgit or Stein Sanskrit editions. As elsewhere, Hsuan-tsang alone adds the Tathagata’s other titles here. This section is absent in Yi-ching and the Khotanese.

  “Furthermore, Subhuti, someone may claim, ‘Those

  who set forth on the bodhisattva path announce the

  destruction or the end of some dharma.’ Subhuti,

  you should hold no such view. And why not?

  Those who set forth on the bodhisattva path do not

  announce the destruction or the end of any dharma.”

  If the creation of dharmas (even such dharmas as a buddha’s perfect attributes) is not related to enlightenment, what about their destruction? Do bodhisattvas not bring about an end to suffering and destroy the basis of future rebirths through their countless acts of merit? What about such dharmas as these? Here, too, the Buddha seeks to steer Subhuti away from any semblance of attachment. No dharma is championed as ensuring buddhahood, nor is any dharma seen as opposing it. Not only are the Buddha’s own hard-won attributes not of any use, even the most distracting, erroneous conception is not an obstacle. For those who embark on the bodhisattva path realize that no dharma has ever come into being, will come into being, or now comes into being, which is what the Buddha refers to in the next chapter as “the forbearance of birthlessness.” If no dharma has ever existed, will exist in the future, or now exists, then no dharma has been, ever will be, or is now destroyed or brought to an end. Still, as Asanga says, this does not deny the value of merit, as long as it is uncreated merit—the merit of the bodhisattva who vows to liberate all beings without liberating a single being.

  Asanga says, “Such merit does not disappear nor its peerless fruit, nor birthlessness cut it off, for the fruit is pure.” (65) Vasubandhu comments, “Although merit does not result in enlightenment, merit and its fruit do not disappear, because those capable of the twin adornments of merit and wisdom achieve the supreme forbearance of birthlessness, which leads to the supreme reward.”

  Tao-ch’uan says, “If the enlightenment realized by the Tathagata was not the result of merit, then does the merit cultivated by a bodhisattva not form the seed of enlightenment? To eliminate this doubt, the Buddha says the Tathagata does not realize enlightenment because of his perfect attributes. His perfect attributes are the attributes of merit. Thus, in cultivating the seed of merit or in realizing the fruit of merit, the Mahayana not only remains unattached to attributes, it also does not base itself on the Hinayana view of their annihilation and destruction. Thus, in regard to dharmas, the
Buddha says attributes are not destroyed or cut off.”

  Chi-fo says, “Those who are attached to worldly dharmas are not free of distorted views. Hence, in the face of destruction, they cling to permanence. And in the face of permanence, they cling to destruction. But being inexhaustible and unending, the dharma of prajna cannot be said to be destructible. And having the ability to adapt to conditions, the dharma of prajna cannot be said to be indestructible. Here, when the Buddha talks about no destruction, he means that the dharma of prajna is neither destructible nor indestructible and cannot be grasped by such views as destruction or permanence.”

  Thich Nhat Hanh says, “When we look at a table, a flower, or the highest, most fulfilled, awakened mind, if we see that they exist independently of other objects of mind, we are caught in the view of permanence. On the other hand, if we think that everything is non-existent, we are caught in the view of annihilation. The middle way taught by the Buddha is a way free of these two views. Liberation is not to cut ourselves off from life or to try to reach nonbeing.”

  Textual note: Among Chinese translators, only Dharmagupta and Hsuan-tsang preface this section with khalu punas (furthermore). In the first sentence, Kumarajiva, Bodhiruci, and Paramartha have ju juo / juo ju tso shih nien (if you think that) in place of kaschid vadet (someone may claim). Paramartha follows this with ju-lai yu shih-shuo (the Tathagata says). Kumarajiva and Bodhiruci have fa a-nuo-to-lo san-mao san-p’u-t’i (bring forth the thought of unexcelled, perfect enlightenment) for both occurrences of bodhisattva-yana sanprasthita (set forth on the bodhisattva path). The only Chinese editions that reflect the presence of two verbs here (vinasha [destroy] and uccheda [end]) are those of Paramartha, Dharmagupta, and Hsuan-tsang. The others combine both into tuanmieh (annihilate). The Gilgit and Stein editions also omit tat kasya hetoh (and why not), as does Conze in his translation, although his Sanskrit text includes it. Among Chinese editions, only Hsuan-tsang does not include it. Müller not only does not include tat kasya hetoh (and why not), he does not include the remainder of the section either. Paramartha prefaces the last sentence with ju-lai pu shuo (the Tathagata does not say). This section is missing in the Khotanese.

  Chapter Twenty-eight: “Furthermore, Subhuti, if a noble son or daughter took as many worlds as there are grains of sand in the Ganges and covered them with the seven jewels and gave them as a gift to the tathagatas, the arhans, the fully-enlightened ones, and a bodhisattva gained an acceptance of the selfless, birthless nature of dharmas, the body of merit produced as a result would be immeasurably, infinitely greater. And yet, Subhuti, this fearless bodhisattva would not obtain a body of merit.”

  The venerable Subhuti said, “But surely, Bhagavan, this bodhisattva would obtain a body of merit!”

  The Buddha replied, “They would, Subhuti, but without grasping it. Thus is it called ‘obtaining.’”

  CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT

  THE BUDDHA HAS REPEATEDLY considered the merit produced by offerings of unimaginable value, even the sacrifice of one’s own existence, and has compared such offerings to the merit produced by understanding and sharing this teaching with others. But his previous examples concerned the practice of learning and explaining as little as a single gatha of this sutra. The Buddha now approaches the heart of this teaching, as he goes beyond the sutra, itself, and beyond the mountain/no-mountain/mountain dialectic he has used thus far in trying to show the perfection of wisdom in action. He puts aside his prajna and dharma eyes and turns to his buddha eye (cf. Chapter Eighteen), as he brings us to the mother of buddhas, which cannot be approached as a perception but as an experience, the experience and acceptance of the selfless, birthless nature of all dharmas. Those bodhisattvas who have just embarked on the bodhisattva path are not capable of enduring such a trauma, only those at the end of it, which is why the Buddha has waited until now to reveal the essential teaching of the perfection of wisdom. Thus, the body of merit of which the Buddha now speaks is not the reward body, but the dharma body, the real body, which bodhisattvas obtain but obtain without grasping. For once bodhisattvas are able to bear the birthlessness of all dharmas, how can they be said to obtain anything other than the body they were never without, the body that does not begin to exist, cease to exist, or now exist.

  Chao-ming titles this: “No Possession, No Attachment.”

  Hui-neng says, “Great minds achieve the acceptance of things because they are free of attachments. Their worldly merit is so great, why would they want to possess anything? Thus follows a chapter on no possession and no attachment.”

  “Furthermore, Subhuti, if a noble son or daughter

  took as many worlds as there are grains of sand in

  the Ganges and covered them with the seven jewels

  and gave them as a gift to the tathagatas, the arhans,

  the fully-enlightened ones, and a bodhisattva gained

  an acceptance of the selfless, birthless nature of

  dharmas, the body of merit produced as a result

  would be immeasurably, infinitely greater. And yet,

  Subhuti, this fearless bodhisattva would not obtain

  a body of merit.”

  In this sutra, the Buddha focuses on three of the six perfections: the first perfection of charity, the third perfection of acceptance or forbearance, and the sixth perfection of wisdom. Here, the Buddha merges all three. For when we give something, we must be able to bear its loss and accept its absence. Thus, charity and acceptance are two aspects of the same practice. It is the perfection of wisdom, however, that transforms this twofold practice. For it is by means of wisdom that we realize that the elements of practice are empty, that there is no gift, no giver, no recipient, and thus no practice. Not only is there not now any practice, there never has been any practice, nor will there ever be any practice. And yet, instead of resulting in no merit, such realization results in obtaining a body of merit beyond the limits of conception, but a body of merit that is not obtained because such a body does not exist. For the hand cannot grasp itself. By realizing and accepting that all dharmas have no self, that they are not real, a bodhisattva gives up attachment to all created things. And only by giving up such pervasive, all-consuming attachment can a bodhisattva liberate all beings, beings who do not now exist, have never existed, and never will exist. In later, more developed descriptions of a bodhisattva’s progress, such as that in the Dashabhumika Sutra, the term anutpattika-dharma-kshanti (acceptance of birthlessness) is said to characterize the eighth of the ten stages that culminate with buddhahood, and which is the subject of the next chapter.

  Hui-neng says, “To penetrate all dharmas without thoughts of a subject or object is what is meant by acceptance. The merit obtained by such persons exceeds the merit from the seven jewels because the merit produced by bodhisattvas is not for themselves. But because their thoughts are focused on helping all beings, it is said that they do not possess merit.”

  Li Wen-hui says, “Once one knows that all dharmas have no self and that all the myriad things do not really come into being and do not really have any individuality, the merit obtained from an offering of the seven jewels cannot compare.”

  Sheng-yi says, “If there are bodhisattvas who make offerings but who realize that all dharmas are selfless—that all dharmas arise from causes, that the nature of causes is empty, that being empty they are without a self, and that causes are thus false, and that being false they are without a self, and that among causes nothing arises or passes away because they are completely without a self—and they accept the truth of selflessness, and accept the birthlessness of dharmas, and realize the prajna of true appearances, and practice formless charity, these are bodhisattvas who penetrate this teaching.”

  Tao-ch’uan says, “His ears hear as if he were deaf. His mouth speaks as if he were mute. My song goes: ‘A man with no horse follows a lord on a horse / high and low, near and far, all follow too / then the horse dies, and the man goes home / his relatives are like roadside strangers / it’s just t
hat old friends / have changed their old paths.”

  Chi-fo says, “All dharmas must be selfless. But people are incapable of selflessness because they are incapable of acceptance. If they can’t be accepting, how can they be selfless? But only through selflessness can they become accepting. All the other five thousand words in this sutra merely explain these few, which comprise the Buddha’s essential teaching.”

  Textual note: Among Chinese translators, only Dharmagupta and Hsuan-tsang include khalu punar (furthermore). Kumarajiva has p’u-sa (bodhisattva) in place of kula-putra kula-duhita (noble son or daughter). He also has jen (person) in place of the first occurrence of bodhisattva. The recipient of this offering is not mentioned by any Chinese translator, except Hsuan-tsang. Kumarajiva also omits anutpattika (birthless), as does the Gilgit edition. The term, however, is present in the Stein edition as well as in the Sanskrit editions of Conze and Müller and present as wusheng (birthless) in all other Chinese translations. For punya-skandha (body of merit), Kumarajiva, Bodhiruci, and Paramartha have fu-te (blessing), while Dharmagupta, Hsuan-tsang, and Yi-ching have fu-chu (pile of blessings). For prasavet (produced), Kumarajiva, Bodhiruci, and Paramartha have te (obtained). Among Chinese editions, only Yi-ching includes aprameyan asankhyeyan (immeasurably, infinitely), which is also missing in the Stein and Gilgit editions. Before the last sentence, Kumarajiva ho-yi-ku (and why). And for the last sentence, Kumarajiva and Bodhiruci have yi chu-p’u-sa pu-shou fu-te ku (this is because such bodhisattvas do not receive any merit), while Paramartha has hsing ta-sheng jen, pu-ying chih-chu fu-te-chih-chu (those who practice the Mahayana should not be attached to a collection of blessings). This entire chapter is missing in the Khotanese.