The Plots Against Hitler
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1. “This war is a war between worldviews”: Max Domarus, Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen, 1932–1945: Kommentiert von einem deutschen Zeitgenossen (Würzburg: Schmidt, Neustadt a.d. Aisch, 1962), 2:1682; compare to the testimonies of Erwin Lahousen, Nuremberg Blue, 2:454; and Franz Halder, “Protokoll der öffentlichen Sitzung der Spruchkammer München X, BY 11/47, am 15.9.1948,” BA-MA Msg 2/213, p. 73(49).
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2. Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel . . . issued a second order: Nuremberg Blue (USA-554, 050-C), 34:254.
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3. “Gersdorff, if we don’t succeed”: Rudolf-Christoph Freiherr von Gersdorff, Soldat im Untergang (Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 1977), 87.
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4. “Fedi, . . . I’ve had your plane made ready”: Ibid., 88.
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5. “What if he dismisses us?”: Ibid.
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6. “Have it be noted, gentlemen”: Ibid., 89.
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7. “When we arrived at the place”: Israel Gutman and Chaim Shatzker, Ha-Sho’ah ve-Mashma’utah (Jerusalem: Merkaz Zalman Shazar, 1987), 106–9. Compare with the testimony of Erwin Lahousen, Nuremberg Blue, 2:454–56.
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8. Gen. Franz Halder . . . bore the largest measure: Christopher Browning, Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939–March 1942 (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem Press, 2004), 15–25, 216–22.
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9. “the severe but justified acts of revenge”: Nuremberg Blue, 20:642–46; (USA-927, 4064-PS), 34:131; (USA-556, 411-D), 35:85; Gerd R. Ueberschär, ed., NS Verbrechen und der militärische Widerstand gegen Hitler (Darmstadt: Primus, 2000), 185. For a thorough discussion of Wehrmacht and Einsatzgruppen relations in the Barbarossa Operation, see Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm Helmut Krausnick, Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges: Die Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitpolizei und des SD, 1938–1942 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1981), 223–43.
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10. Wehrmacht units supplied logistical assistance: Anthony Beevor, Stalingrad (London: Viking, 1998), 58.
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11. Credible evidence shows that Tresckow, Gersdorff, and the others: Tresckow’s attitude toward war crimes in his sector is one of the most controversial questions in the history of the German resistance to Hitler. While all historians agree that Tresckow was well informed, some believe that he was indifferent until the Borisov Massacre, on October 20, whereas others think that he resisted the atrocious orders even beforehand. For the former opinion, see Johannes Hürter, “Auf dem Weg zur Militäropposition: Tresckow, Gersdorff, der Vernichtungskrieg, und der Judenmord; Neue Dokumente über das Verhältnis der Heeresgruppe Mitte zur Einsatzgruppe B im Jahr 1941,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 3 (2004): 527–62; Johannes Hürter and Felix Römer, “Alte und neue Geschichtsbilder von Widerstand und Ostkrieg: Zu Hermann Gramls Beitrag ‘Massenmord und Militäropposition,’” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 54, no. 2 (April 2006): 300–322. For the latter opinion, see Hermann Graml, “Massenmord und Militäropposition: Zur jüngsten Diskussion über den Widerstand im Stab der Heeresgruppe Mitte,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 54, no. 1 (2006): 1–26; Günther Gillessen, “Tresckow und der Entschluß zum Hochverrat: Eine Nachschau zur Kontroverse über die Motive,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 58, no. 3 (2010): 364–86. And for my own assessment and interpretation of the evidence, see Danny Orbach, “The Other Prussia: General von Tresckow, Resistance to Hitler, and the Question of Charisma,” Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte (October 2016).
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12. The SS men drove to Barysaw: Gersdorff, Soldat im Untergang, 98.
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13. “This must not happen again”: Bodo Scheurig, Henning von Tresckow: Ein Preuße gegen Hitler; Biographie (Berlin: Propyläen, 1987), 126; Berg to Scheurig, 16.3.1970, Schlabrendorff (interview, 28.9.1970), Scheurig Papers, IfZ ZS/A 0031-2, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0031_02.pdf, pp. 9–15, 0031–3, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0031_03.pdf, p. 85.
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14. “I shall not tolerate any attack”: Fabian von Schlabrendorff, The Secret War Against Hitler, trans. Hilda Simon (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), 136.
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15. “because it is not clear whether it is possible”: This line of interpretation is supported by the Gestapo reports; see Hans A. Jacobsen, ed.,“Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung”: Die Opposition gegen Hitler und der Staatsstreich vom 20. Juli 1944 in der SD-Berichterstattung: Geheime Dokumente aus dem ehemaligen Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1984), 1:425. A report from 29.9.1944, based on the interrogation of Admiral Canaris, reads as follows: “In Army Group Center it was believed that the SS impeded the pacification of the hinterland . . . and in consideration of the general state of affairs in the east, this political momentum played a significant role in the wider clique of 20.7 conspirators.” See also Horst Mühleisen, “Patrioten im Widerstand: Carl-Hans Graf von Hardenbergs Erlebnisbericht,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 14, no. 3 (January 1993): 450. Tresckow’s attempts to reduce as far as possible the number of Einsatzgruppen units in Army Group Center’s rear are documented in a report by SS officer Kurt Knoblauch to one of his commanders, although the latter did not suspect Tresckow’s motives and was oblivious to his resistance activities. See Kommandostab RF-SS, Der Chef des Stabes an Jüttner 19.6.41, BA-MA SF-02/37542. Christian Gerlach, a historian who has implicated Tresckow in war crimes, presented this document misleadingly and incorrectly in one of his articles, arguing that “Tresckow and Knoblauch agreed to the deployment of Einsatzgruppen units.” In fact, the decision to allow the units to deploy was taken at much higher levels, as required by the second Wagner-Heydrich agreement. Tresckow and Knoblauch met only to coordinate the deployment’s technical side. Tresckow nevertheless managed to reduce the number of Einsatzgruppen in his area. Gerlach does not mention this. See Christian Gerlach, “Männer des 20 Juli und der Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion,” in Vernichtungskrieg: Verbrechen der Wehrmacht, 1941 bis 1944, ed. Hannes Heer and Klaus Naumann (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1995), 439–40.
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16. “During all the long talks I conducted”: Maj. I. G. Freiherr von Gersdorff, “Abschrift, 9.12.1941,” Scheurig Papers, IfZ 0031-4, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0031_04.pdf, p. 186. It is interesting that Gersdorff forgot this report after the war and had to be reminded by a historian who found it by chance. See Krausnick to Gersdorff, 29.10.1956, and Gersdorff’s reply, 30.10.1956, IfZ ZS-0047-2, pp. 105–8. On Heinz’s order of the day against the massacre of the Jews of Lvov, see Susanne Meiml, Nationalsozialisten gegen Hitler: Die nationalrevolutionäre Opposition um Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz (Berlin: Siedler, 2000), 318–19.
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17. “Should we wonder that there are partisans?”: Bogislaw von Bonin to Bodo Scheurig (interview), 25.9.1970, Scheurig Papers, IfZ ZS/A 0031-2, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0031_02.pdf, p. 50.
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13. “Flash” and Liqueur Bottles: Assassination Attempts in the East
1. “If we do not make a resolute advance to Moscow”: Bodo Scheurig, Henning von Tresckow: Ein Preuße gegen Hitler; Biographie (Berlin: Propyläen, 1987), 130; Alexander Stahlberg, Die verdammte Pflicht (Berlin: Ullstein, 1988), 222.
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2. “The German soldier of the winter war”: Rudolf-Christoph Freiherr von Gersdorff, Soldat im Untergang (Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 1977), 114.
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3. “This war that you still believe has a chance”: Scheurig, Henning von Tresckow, 152–53; Stahlberg, Die verdammte Pflicht, 224.
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4. when confronted with the notion of absolute obedience: Hermann Kaiser,Mut zum Bekenntnis: Die geheimen Tagebücher des Hauptmanns Hermann Kaiser, 1941, 1943, ed. Peter M. Kaiser (Berlin: Lukas Verlag, 2010), 487.
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5. he was still not considered a full-fled
ged member: Helena Schrader, Codename Valkyrie: General Friedrich Olbricht and the Plot Against Hitler (Sparkford, U.K.: Haynes, 2009), 171–211.
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6. Olbricht was “very careful”: Kaiser,Mut zum Bekenntnis, 306; compare with Hans A. Jacobsen, ed., “Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung”: Die Opposition gegen Hitler und der Staatsstreich vom 20. Juli 1944 in der SD-Berichterstattung: Geheime Dokumente aus dem ehemaligen Reichssicherheitshauptamt(Stuttgart: Seewald, 1984), 1:369.
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7. Olbricht finally joined the conspiracy: Kaiser,Mut zum Bekenntnis, 287–88.
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8. the “strong man of the home front”: Bernhard R. Kroener, Generaloberst Friedrich Fromm: Der starke Mann im Heimatkriegsgebiet; Eine Biographie (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2005), 412–13. For one example, see the testimony of Maj. Hans-Ludwig Bartram, 1954, “20. Juli 1944,” BA-MA Msg 2/214, p. 1. Among other praises, Bartram wrote that “Fromm as a personality will always be my role model.” He described Fromm as a commander who “excelled spiritually, and was superior to anyone in knowledge and competence. And still, he always cared and shared in the personal issues of his subordinates.”
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9. it was Fromm’s reluctance to commit himself: Kaiser,Mut zum Bekenntnis, 307; Johannes Rohowsky, “Stellungnahme zur Kennes-Kritik bezügl. Müller-Broschüre,” 18.5.48, BA-MA N/124/10.
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10. “Maybe he has some higher calling”: Kaiser,Mut zum Bekenntnis, 134.
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11. he kept playing his double game: Ibid., 424–25.
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12. “Germany has never been in better shape”: Ibid., 306–7.
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13. “the threads of the entire plot”: Fabian von Schlabrendorff, The Secret War Against Hitler, trans. Hilda Simon (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), 225. On Olbricht’s critical role in the conspiracy’s management, see also the testimony of Franz Maria Liedig, Hauptquartier, Streitkräfte der Vereinigten Staaten, Europäische Abteilung, Zentrum des militärischen Geheimdienstes APO 757, Sonderbericht einer Vernehmung (CSIR) No. 6, Ereignisse des Monats Juli 1944, Franz Maria Liedig, 19, Deutsch Papers, series 4, box 9, General Opposition.
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14. Witzleben was extremely pessimistic: Schlabrendorff, Secret War Against Hitler, 144; Ulrich von Hassell,Die Hassell-Tagebücher, 1938–1944: Aufzeichnungen vom anderen Deutschland, ed. Friedrich Freiherr Hiller von Gärtringen (Munich: Goldmann, 1994), 297; GARF Fond R-9401, Opis 2, Del 66, pp. 318–19; Unterhaltung mit Frau Ursula von Witzleben, 10.2.1970, 11, Deutsch Papers, series 3, box 3, round 1 Material.
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15. “One has to resort to active revolutionary means”: Horst Mühleisen, “Patrioten im Widerstand: Carl-Hans Graf von Hardenbergs Erlebnisbericht,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 14, no. 3 (January 1993): 449–50.
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16. “is it really so negative”: Stahlberg to Scheurig (interview, 15.9.1965), Scheurig Papers, IfZ ZS/A 0031-3, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0031_03.pdf, pp. 111–14. For a slightly different version, see the interview with Philipp von Boeselager in Hava Kohav Beller’s documentary film The Restless Conscience: Resistance to Hitler Within Germany, 1933–1945 (1992; Los Angeles: New Video Group, 2009), DVD; Mühleisen, “Patrioten im Widerstand,” 451. For Manstein’s version, see Nuremberg Blue 20:624–25; Joachim Kuhn, “Eigenhändige Aussagen des Majors der deutschen Wehrmacht Ioachim Kuhn, 2.9.1944,” in Peter Hoffmann, Stauffenbergs Freund: Die tragische Geschichte des Widerstandskämpfers Joachim Kuhn (Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 2007), 202–3. See also Gersdorff to Krausnick, 19.10.1956, IfZ ZS-0047-2, pp. 10–11. For a discussion of Manstein’s heavy responsibility for Nazi war crimes, see Michael Schröder, “Erich von Manstein—Ein unpolitischer Soldat?,” Forum “Barbarossa,” no. 3 (2004), http://www.historisches-centrum.de/forum/schroeders04-2.html.
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17. Tresckow did better with his immediate superior: Fabian von Schlabrendorff, Offiziere gegen Hitler (Zurich: Europa Verlag, 1946), 57; Berg an Scheurig, 16.3.1970, Scheurig Papers, IfZ ZS/A 0031-2, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0031_02.pdf, pp. 9–15. When Breitenbuch urged Kluge to protest, at least, against the murder of the Jews, the field marshal flatly refused. He noted that either Goebbels would throw his protest letter in the dustbin or Hitler would force him to resign. In any case, he, Kluge, commanded more divisions and troops than any one person in history, and he would never forsake his troops and responsibility for the sake of empty protests. When Breitenbuch tried to offer counterarguments, he was promptly ordered to leave the room. See Eberhard von Breitenbuch, Erinnerungen eines Reserveoffiziers, 1939–1945: Aufgeschrieben zur Kenntnis meiner Kinder (Norderstedt: Books on Demand, 2011), 87.
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18. “O [Olbricht] is on vacation”: Kaiser,Mut zum Bekenntnis, 347.
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19. Oster was reluctant to rely on the communication network: Ibid., 436; compare with Jacobsen, “Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung,” 1:370.
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20. Witzleben . . . agreed to lead the Wehrmacht: Hans Crome testified on the preparations for a coup in 1942 but did not know of the assassination attempt. See GARF Fond R-9401, Opis 2, Del 66, p. 318. On Witzleben, see Kaiser,Mut zum Bekenntnis, 438. Witzleben was depressed, unhealthy, and isolated at the time, and was updated on developments in the outside world by Count Schwerin, his contact in the conspiracy (“Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung,” 1:366).
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21. “Boeselager, . . . you heard what the Führer said”: Philipp Freiherr von Boeselager, “Mein Weg zum 20. Juli 1944 (Vortrag gehalten am 20. Juli 2002 bei den Johannitern in Wasserburg/Bayern)” (unpublished manuscript, 2002), 20–23.
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22. Kluge’s avarice overcame him: Peter Hoffmann, Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat: Der Kampf der Opposition gegen Hitler (Munich: Piper, 1985), 338.
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23. A single bullet . . . was likely to miss: Philipp von Boeselager to Peter Hoffmann, 19.11.1964, IfZ ZS-2118, p. 2, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zs/zs-2118.pdf; Gersdorff to Scheurig, 28.3.1972, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0031_02.pdf, p. 131.
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24. Boeselager put together an elite cavalry force: Boeselager to Hoffmann, IfZ, p. 3; Kuhn, “Eigenhändige Aussagen,” 202; Schlabrendorff, Secret War Against Hitler, 269; Gersdorff, Soldat im Untergang, 126; Nuremberg Green, 13:397.
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25. “they died so that Germany could continue to live”: Anthony Beevor, Stalingrad (London: Viking, 1998), 333.
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26. “I wondered . . . whether I was signing my own death warrant”: Gersdorff, Soldat im Untergang, 119–20.
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27. “Tresckow spoke with me with utter frankness”: Ibid., 121–22. See also Rudolf-Christoph Freiherr von Gersdorff, “History of the Attempt on Hitler’s Life (20 Jul. 1944),” Historical Division Headquarters, United States Army Europe, Foreign Military Studies Branch, USAMHI, pp. 11–12.
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28. “One is ready to act only when commanded”: Kaiser,Mut zum Bekenntnis, 420–22, 439, 445.
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29. “to do everything possible to reinforce his resolution”: Ibid., 434.
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30. “Not to lose even one day”: Ibid., 419, 433.
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31. “Is it not horrifying”: Gersdorff, Soldat im Untergang, 129; Scheurig, Henning von Tresckow, 202.
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32. “there is no point, as Himmler will not be there”: Boeselager to Hoffmann, 19.11.1964, IfZ ZS-2118, p. 3.
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33. On March 3, he sent a message to Olbricht: Hoffmann, Widerstand, Staats-streich, Attentat, 347; Klaus-Jürgen Müller, Generaloberst Ludwig Beck: Eine Biographie (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 2008), 465; Kaiser,Mut zum Bekenntnis, 459; Gersdorff, Soldat im Untergang, 126; Gersdorff, History, USAMHI, pp. 10–11. On the decision to assassinate Hitler, s
ee also “Verrätter vor dem Volksgericht, Teil II, Rolle 4, Ton/ 294m/ 10,45 min,” in Bengt von zur Mühlen, ed., Die Angeklagten des 20 Juli vor dem Volksgerichtshof (Berlin: Chronos, 2001), 257–58. Hans Crome dates Beck’s decision to sanction the assassination to the end of 1942; see GARF Fond R-9401, Opis 2, Del 66, p. 313.
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34. “Hitler was served a special meal”: Schlabrendorff, Secret War Against Hitler, 76–77.
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35. “I waited until Hitler had dismissed the officers”: Ibid., 235.
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36. “In order to free Germany and the world”: Scheurig, Henning von Tresckow, 144–45; Gersdorff, History, USAMHI, p. 14; and see a similar position in Hardenberg’s testimony, Mühleisen, “Patrioten in Widerstand,” 457–58.
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37. “After waiting more than two hours”: Schlabrendorff, Secret War Against Hitler, 236.
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38. Schlabrendorff . . . seriously feared a belated explosion: Ibid.
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39. “I could see that the condition of the explosive”: Ibid., 237–38.
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40. Apparently, he would need to blow himself up: Gersdorff, Soldat im Untergang, 128–29.
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41. “I spent March 20 at the Armory”: Ibid., 130.
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42. “I arrived at the Armory on the late morning”: Ibid., 131.
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43. Fifty seconds later, the radio announced: FBIS, NARA, Rg.263, SA 190, R 23, C 34, S7, box 58, pp. 1–7. American intelligence analysts counted fifty seconds between the announcement that Hitler had entered the museum and the announcement of his exit (p. 7). Gersdorff’s account of the speech is inaccurate, which is unsurprising, given the circumstances and the great mental pressure he was under. Hitler made no explicit mention of Götterdämmerung, the “twilight of the gods,” although he did speak of the utter obliteration of the Western Allies and the eradication of their culture in a Communist revolution.
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44. “So the window of opportunity for the assassination closed”: Rudolf Pechel, Deutscher Widerstand (Zurich: Rentsch, 1947), 164; compare with Gersdorff’s testimony to the U.S. Army’s Center of Military History, Gersdorff, History, USAMHI, pp. 17–18.