The Plots Against Hitler
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38. Even the attempts of Allen Dulles: Dulles himself was initially hostile to the conspirators. Then, he became more sympathetic, but Gisevius’s doubts about the resolution of the generals did not encourage him. For the development of Dulles’s approach to the resistance, see Allen W. Dulles (COI New York) to Colonel William J. Donovan, 8.5.1942; Dulles (OSS Bern) to OSS Washington, 13.1.1943, 8.11.1943, 27.1.1944, 12.7.1944, in Heideking and Mauch, American Intelligence, pp. 24, 38–9, 152–53, 192–93, 244. As for Gisevius’s doubts (he is not mentioned, but his identity is clear from context), see Buxton to Cordell Hull, 16.5.1944, Heideking and Mauch, 219–22.
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39. Stauffenberg had been able to get in touch: Nuremberg Blue, 15:403; Gotthard von Falkenhausen to Eberhard Zeller, 29.11.1945, Zeller Papers, IfZ, ED 88/1, p. 34. Rommel’s true commitment to the coup has always been controversial. The tapped testimony of General Eberbach (in British captivity) suggests that Rommel at least thought about a coup d’état and an assassination at the time, giving more credence to the possibility of his involvement. See Sönke Neitzel, Abgehört: Deutsche Generäle in britischer Kriegsgefangenschaft 1942–1945 (Berlin: Propyläen, 2005), pp. 351, 353, 372.
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40. According to the operational procedure: Valkyrie 31.7.1943, BA-MA RH/12/21, 56.
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41. The general continued to play that game: Hoffmann, Stauffenberg, 201; Unterhaltung mit Frau Ursula von Witzleben, 10.2.1970, 3, Deutsch Papers, series 3, box 3, round 1 Material.
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42. he told Olbricht and Stauffenberg “not to forget”: Hoffmann, Stauffenberg, 201, and compare with Mühleisen, “Patrioten im Widerstand,” 460.
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43. Hoepner, denounced by Gisevius: Hans B. Gisevius, To the Bitter End, trans. Richard Winston and Clara Winston (New York: Da Capo Press, 1998), 519; Hans Mommsen, Alternative zu Hitler: Studien zur Geschichte des deutschen Widerstandes (Munich: Beck, 2000), 375–76.
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44. he was even mentioned as part of the unrealistic plan: Niederschrift Manfred Roeder, 3 and 4 December 1951, IfZ, ZS-0124, p. 24, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zs/zs-0124.pdf.
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45. Hoepner had been forbidden . . . to wear uniform: Kaiser,Mut zum Bekenntnis, 500.
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46. Bussche was notified by telephone: Bussche, “Eid und Schuld,” 141.
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47. “It was January 1944”: Ewald-Heinrich von Kleist, interviewed by Nicholas Netteau, 13.1.1998; given to the present author with the courtesy of Nicholas Netteau; compare with Kleist’s interview to Eberhard Zeller, 14.2.1946, Zeller Papers, IfZ ED 88/2, p. 223.
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48. According to the young man’s testimony: Bodo Scheurig, Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin: Ein Konservativer gegen Hitler (Oldenburg: Stalling, 1968), 184–85; Hoffmann, Stauffenberg, 230–31; Klaus J. Müller, “Prussian Elements in the German Resistance,” in The Moral Imperative: New Essays on the Ethics of Resistance in National Socialist Germany, 1933–1945, ed. Andrew Chandler (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998), 63.
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49. “Tresckow took me to my private room”: Breitenbuch to Scheurig, 28.3.1970, Scheurig Papers, IfZ ZS/A 0031-2, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0031_02.pdf, p. 55.
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50. Breitenbuch was ready to sacrifice his own life: Eberhard von Breitenbuch, Erinnerungen eines Reserveoffiziers, 1939–1945: Aufgeschrieben zur Kenntnis meiner Kinder (Norderstedt: Books on Demand, 2011), 121.
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51. Breitenbuch swore that he would never go through: Ibid., 123–24. For a slightly different version of the events, see Fabian von Schlabrendorff, The Secret War Against Hitler, trans. Hilda Simon (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), 295; compare with Alexander Stahlberg, Bounden Duty: The Memoirs of a German Officer, 1932–1945, trans. Patricia Crampton (London: Macmillan, 1990), 298. Stahlberg is clearly mistaken about the date, as Breitenbuch’s attempt took place in March 1944. His (Stahlberg’s) testimony might have been adversely affected by the passage of time.
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52. Some . . . were moved by the Normandy invasion: These debates are echoed in the OSS memoranda; see OSS director William J. Donovan to President FDR, 22.7.1944, in Heideking and Mauch, American Intelligence, 244, and in Hardenberg’s testimony, Mühleisen, “Patrioten im Widerstand,” 253. See also Harold C. Deutsch’s interview with Botho von Wussow and Gräfin Schwerin von Schwanenfeld, 27.6.1970, 12–13, Deutsch Papers, series 3, box 3, round 1 Material; and the testimony of Albrecht Fischer on his conversations with Goerdeler in spring 1944: Albrecht Fischer, “Erlebnisse vom 20. Juli 1944 bis 8. April 1945,” 9.10.1961, IfZ, ZS-1758, p. 3.
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53. “The assassination of Hitler must take place”: Hoffmann, Stauffenberg, 238. The text is slightly different in each of the following accounts: Eberhard Zeller, Geist der Freiheit: Der Zwanzigste Juli (Munich: Rhinn, 1952), 358–59; Schlabrendorff, Secret War Against Hitler, 277; Gerd R. Ueberschär, Stauffenberg: Der 20 Juli 1944 (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2004), 39; Meding, Mit dem Mut des Herzens: Die Frauen des 20 Juli (Berlin: Siedler, 1992), 118; compare with the version of Margarethe von Hardenberg (Oven) in an interview with Bodo Scheurig, 2.5.1969, Scheurig Papers, IfZ ZS/A 0031-2, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0031_02.pdf, p. 166.
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54. “during and preceding this war”: For the Stauffenberg quote, see Schulthess, Nina Schenk Gräfin von Stauffenberg, 81. Beck is quoted by Theodore S. Hamerow, On the Road to Wolf’s Lair: German Resistance to Hitler (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1997), 350. See also Friedrich Meinecke, Die deutsche Katastrophe: Betrachtungen und Erinnerungen (Wiesbaden: Brockhaus, 1946), 149; Meding, Mit dem Mut des Herzens, 273. Goerdeler’s letter is reproduced in full as an appendix to Helena P. Page’s biography of Olbricht, General Friedrich Olbricht; see Goerdeler an Olbricht/Zeitzler, 15.05.1943. For similar evidence, see the Kaltenbrunner reports in Jacobsen, “Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung,” 1:201.
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55. “The most terrible thing . . . is knowing”: Hoffmann, Stauffenberg, 243; Mühleisen, “Patrioten im Widerstand,” 456.
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56. Stauffenberg decided to kill Hitler himself: Hoffmann, Stauffenberg, 152.
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57. Major General Stieff, the only other conspirator: Fahrner, “Geschehnisse,” 255; Hoffmann,Stauffenberg, 226.
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58. In his diary, Hermann Kaiser used clumsy code names: Kaiser,Mut zum Bekenntnis, 436; Jacobsen, “Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung,” 1:57, 352, 461; Peter Hoffmann, The History of the German Resistance, 1933–1945, trans. Richard Barry (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1985), 378. In his testimony at the Nuremberg Trials, Schlabrendorff disclosed that some conspirators shied away from Hassell, because he was known as a reckless speaker; see Nuremberg Green, 13:391. In July 1944, Goerdeler was also considered so “compromised” and exposed to Gestapo eyes that even Beck tried to avoid his company in the days before July 20 (Jacobsen, “Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung,” 1:362). For Tresckow’s words, see Kaiser,Mut zum Bekenntnis, 422.
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59. Stauffenberg . . . hesitated at first: Hoffmann, Stauffenberg, 196; Henk, Die Tragödie, 52–54.
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60. The Communists accepted, in principle: Hoffmann, Stauffenberg, 196.
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61. Schulenburg sent a short message to Leber’s wife: Dorothea Beck, Julius Leber: Sozialdemokrat zwischen Reform und Widerstand (Berlin: Siedler, 1983), 199.
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62. Oven was carrying the operational plan of the coup: Mühleisen, “Patrioten im Widerstand,” 457; Meding, Courageous Hearts, 53–54.
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63. He and Beck had agreed in advance: Gotthard von Falkenhausen, “Bericht über Vorgänge in Paris am 20 Juli” (undated), Zeller Papers, IfZ ED 88/1, pp. 54–55; Hoffmann, Widerst
and, Staatsstreich, Attentat, 469–70.
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64. General Olbricht had activated the Valkyrie orders: Page, General Friedrich Olbricht, 206–8.
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65. Next time, Olbricht said, he would activate the orders: Ueberschär, Stauffenberg, 41; Jacobsen, “Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung,” 1:91; Otto Hitzfeld to Gerd Buchheit, 5.7.66, IfZ ZS-1858, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zs/zs-1858.pdf, p. 1.
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66. Adam von Trott zu Solz . . . reported that he had some basis: Jacobsen, “Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung,” 1:101, 175.
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67. the conspirators lost the most powerful: On the influence of Rommel’s injury on the coup at the western front, see Gotthard von Falkenhausen to Eberhard Zeller, 29.11.1945, Zeller Papers, IfZ, ED 88/1, p. 34.
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68. Arthur Nebe . . . gave them a tip: Gisevius, Bis Zum bittern Ende, 497; Gerhard Ritter, Carl Goerdeler und die deutsche Widerstandsbewegung (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1954), 408. I was not able to find evidence that such an arrest warrant was in fact issued. Most of the relevant Gestapo documents were destroyed in 1945, but in the Kaltenbrunner Reports (Jacobsen, “Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung,” 1:524) only the warning given to Goerdeler by his friends is mentioned, not an actual warrant. It is highly improbable that such a document was unbeknownst to Kaltenbrunner and his officials, had it existed. Nebe’s information was based either on a decision to publish a warrant or on rumors about such a decision. In any case, the Gestapo probably did not have the time to issue any arrest order until after July 20. In his interrogation, Goerdeler did not elaborate on the real reasons behind his escape on July 18, most probably in order not to incriminate his first host, Baron Palombini. See Jacobsen, “Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung,” 1:217.
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69. After a “jolly party” with his family: Interview with Charlotte von der Schulenburg, in Hava Kohav Beller, The Restless Conscience: Resistance to Hitler Within Germany, 1933–1945 (1992; Los Angeles: New Video Group, 2009), DVD.
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70. A chance visitor in the Bendlerstrasse: Jacobsen, “Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung,” 1:92; Meding, Courageous Hearts, 58; Hoffmann, Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat, 485.
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18. The Final Showdown: July 20, 1944
1. “an impregnable lair of reinforced concrete”: Abakumov to Beria, 22.2.1945, GARF Fond R-9401, Opis 2, Del 93, p. 6.
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2. Stauffenberg probably knew: Eberhard Zeller,Geist der Freiheit: Der Zwanzigste Juli (Munich: Rhinn, 1952), 381.
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3. Fellgiebel became involved in the conspiracy: Helmuth Arnz, “Abschrift einer Niederschrift über den General der Nachrichtentruppen Erich Fellgiebel,” Zeller Papers, IfZ ED 88/1, pp. 2–3; Beria to Stalin, 19.9.1944, GARF Fond R-9401, Opis 2, Del 66, p. 317; Peter Hoffmann, Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat: Der Kampf der Opposition gegen Hitler (Munich: Piper, 1985), 415; Joachim Kuhn, “Eigenhändige Aussagen,” in Peter Hoffman, Stauffenbergs Freund: Die tragische Geschichte des Widerstandskämpfers Joachim Kuhn(Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 2007), 199; Hermann Kaiser,Mut zum Bekenntnis: Die geheimen Tagebücher des Hauptmanns Hermann Kaiser, 1941, 1943, ed. Peter M. Kaiser (Berlin: Lukas Verlag, 2010), 436, 478. There are some indications that Fellgiebel became involved, at least indirectly, in winter 1942. See Stahlberg to Scheurig (interview, 15.9.1965), Scheurig Papers, IfZ ZS/A 0031-3, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0031_03.pdf, p. 111.
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4. After briefing Fellgiebel one last time: Arnz, “Abschrift,” Zeller Papers, IfZ ED 88/1, pp. 3–4.
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5. Stauffenberg believed that the meeting: Hoffmann, Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat, 487.
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6. Stauffenberg suddenly asked for permission: Hans A. Jacobsen, ed., “Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung”: Die Opposition gegen Hitler und der Staatsstreich vom 20. Juli 1944 in der SD-Berichterstattung: Geheime Dokumente aus dem ehemaligen Reichssicherheitshauptamt(Stuttgart: Seewald, 1984), 1:85.
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7. Peeping through the half-opened door: Peter Hoffmann, Stauffenberg: A Family History, 1905–1944 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 265.
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8. Hitler nodded in response: Jacobsen, “Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung,” 1:85.
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9. “The Russian . . . is strongly advancing”: Zeller, Geist der Freiheit, 381.
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10. Stauffenberg ordered the driver: Jacobsen, “Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung,” 1:86; Karl Fischer, Ich Fuhr Stauffenberg: Erinnerungen an die Kriegsjahre, 1939–1945 (Angermünde: Spiegelberg Verlag, 2008), 97.
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11. “Thank you very much, and wish us luck”: Fischer, Ich Fuhr Stauffenberg, 97; Jacobsen, “Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung,” 1:86.
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12. Inside the Third Ring, in Hitler’s briefing hut: Hoffmann, Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat, 495. For an additional firsthand testimony, see Walter Warlimont, Im Hauptquartier der deutschen Wehrmacht, 1939–1945 (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Graefe, 1962), 471.
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13. “I always knew . . . that I am surrounded”: Hoffmann, Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat, 496.
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14. “Something terrible happened”: Arnz, “Abschrift,” Zeller Papers, IfZ ED 88/1, p. 4.
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15. In Hitler’s headquarters, there was still great confusion: Hoffmann, Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat, 504; “Ernennung Himmlers zum Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres, 20.7.1944” (Doc. 340), in Führer-Erlasse, 1939–1940, ed. Martin Holl (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1997), 433; firsthand testimony: “Der 20. Juli 1944 im Führerhauptquartier,” 4, Deutsch Papers, series 4, box 9, Halder Franz. Another indication can be found in Goebbels’s radio broadcast from 26.7.1944; see FBIS, NARA, Rg.263, SA 190, R 23, C 34, S7, box 93, H4.
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16. “Mussolini was absolutely horrified”: Paul Schmidt, Hitler’s Interpreter, ed. and trans. R. H. C. Steed (New York: Macmillan, 1951), 275–76.
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17. During dinner, the Nazi leaders were still busy: Max Domarus, Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen, 1932–1945: Kommentiert von einem deutschen Zeitgenossen (Würzburg: Schmidt, Neustadt a.d. Aisch, 1962), 2127; Zeller, Geist der Freiheit, 422–23.
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18. “It begins! . . . I have heard from Olbricht”: Hans B. Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende (Zurich: Fretz & Wasmuth, 1946), 510. On Hase, see Roland Kopp, Paul von Hase von der Alexander-Kaserne nach Plötzensee: Eine deutsche Soldatenbiographie, 1885–1944 (Münster: Lit, 2001), 268–69.
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19. The rumors about the blast in Wolf’s Lair: Wilhelm R. von Schramm, Aufstand der Generale: Der 20 Juli in Paris (Munich: Kindler, 1964), 82–83.
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20. At 3:45 p.m., Stauffenberg disembarked: Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende, 517–18; see also the interview with Ludwig von Hammerstein in Hava Kohav Beller, The Restless Conscience: Resistance to Hitler Within Germany, 1933–1945(1992; Los Angeles: New Video Group, 2009), DVD, 1:20.
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21. “There was an assassination attempt”: Hoffmann, Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat, 513–14; Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende, 518–19; H. L. Bartram, “20. Juli 1944,” BA-MA Msg 2/214, p. 2. For a more sympathetic view of Fromm, see Bernhard Kroener, Generaloberst Friedrich Fromm: Der starke Mann im Heimatkriegsgebiet; Eine Biographie (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2005), 682–701.
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22. Lieutenant General Hase ordered the guard battalion: “Befehl für den Berliner Wehrmachtkommandanten, 20.7.1944,” reproduced in Kopp, Paul von Hase, plate 35.
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23. Olbricht was hardly out of Fromm’s office: Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende, 519; “Stenogram der ersten Volksgerichtshofverhandlung vom 7/8 August 1944,” in Die Angeklagten des 20 Juli vor dem Volksgerichtshof, ed. Bengt von zur Mühlen (Berl
in: Chronos, 2001), appendix, 76.
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24. Here, the conspirators entered a dangerous mental loop: Eugen Gerstenmaier, “Der 20. Juli 1944,” BA-MA Msg 2/213, p. 5(26).
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25. Beck, however, was doubtful: Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende, 514; Nicholas Reynolds, Treason Was No Crime: Ludwig Beck, Chief of the German General Staff (London: Kimber, 1976), 264; Jacobsen, “Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung,” 1:191; “Stenogram,” 122.
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26. Stauffenberg’s next move: Walter Bargatzky, “Persönliche Erinnerungen an die Aufstandsbewegung des 20. Juli 1944 in Frankreich,” 20.10.1945, IfZ, ZS-203, p. 10.
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27. “General, . . . the Gestapo is trying to stage a coup”: Schramm, Aufstand der Generale, 84, 86–87; Andreas von Klewitz, “General d. Inf. Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel und der 20 Juli 1944 in Paris,” in Mühlen, Angeklagten, 107.
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28. “It should be welcomed”: Schramm, Aufstand der Generale, 84, 86–87.
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29. “I sat in my office in Majestic”: Walter Bargatzky, “Letzte Runde in Paris,” in 20 Juli 1944, ed. Hans A. Jacobsen and Erich Zimmermann (Bonn: Berto Vaerlag, 1960), 154.
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30. Soon afterward, Hofacker rushed: Schramm, Aufstand der Generale, 103; Hans Freiherr von Boineburg-Langsfeld, “Als Kommandant von Groß-Paris am 20.Juli 1944,” in Der 20. Juli 1944 in Paris: Verlauf, Hauptbeteiligte, Augenzeugen, ed. Bengt von zur Mühlen and Frank Bauer (Berlin: Chronos, 1995), 198.
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31. “I think that the Führer is alive”: Hoffmann, Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat, 514, 519–20; H. L. Bartram, “20. Juli 1944,” BA-MA Msg 2/214, p. 2; Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende, 519; “Stenogram,” 77; Kleist (interview with Zeller,14.2.1946), “Augenzeugenbericht,” Zeller Papers, IfZ ED 88/2, p. 225; compare with Hardenberg’s testimony in “Patrioten im Widerstand: Carl-Hans Graf von Hardenbergs Erlebnisbericht,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 14, no. 3 (January 1993): 461. For a slightly different version, see Kroener, Generaloberst Friedrich Fromm, 682–86.
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32. Two hours earlier, Mertz had sent them: Jacobsen, “Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung,” 1:63.