Days of Valor

by Robert L. Tonsetic

  When a Light Fire Team from the 3/17th Cav arrived over the scene of the fight, Taylor’s platoon leader, Lieutenant Lenhardt, received instructions to pop smoke to mark his platoon’s positions. The smoke grenades hissed and popped, sending plumes of yellow smoke skyward. Unfortunately, the smoke identified the platoon’s position to the enemy as well. Taylor recalled that shortly after the smoke grenades were thrown, “The enemy mortars were dropped in the tubes and launched…. I was hearing the ‘thumps.’…I was making counts of 22 before each mortar round hit the ground…and the rounds were marching to our position—to the smoke.” He further recalled that, “The round landing closest tore apart a tree at my position, and the branches were landing on me. I was hugging closely to the ground at that moment.”

  Second Platoon’s point man, Larry Norris, was finally able to pull back with the rest of his platoon after vowing to himself to “re-up” for a new MOS that would take him out of the field. He forgot all about it by the next day. Frank Mascitelli was not as lucky as Norris. He was still pinned down, and more than a little pissed off that his platoon had left him, assuming he was dead. Eventually he was able to link up with members of the 1st Platoon. Norris’s squad leader, Sergeant Stan Clark, wanted to attempt a flanking movement on the enemy bunker line, but was overruled by his platoon leader.

  Lieutenant Robert Stanley’s 3rd Platoon was also under fire, but moving behind the lead platoons, Stanley’s men were not drawing the same volume of fire as the others. Bob Archibald and Al Lewis were positioned by their platoon leader to protect the platoon’s flanks and rear. Archibald wrote, “Neither myself nor Al ever fired a round or saw anything.” Armed with an M79 grenade launcher, Archibald was concerned with his position in the dense jungle. He knew that the 40mm round fired by his grenade launcher had to travel about 30 feet to arm. He figured if he had to use the M79, “it would be like throwing rocks.” Archibald’s platoon leader, Lieutenant Stanley, waited for orders from his CO, Captain Jones. He never received any orders so his platoon took cover and stayed put.

  LTC Schroeder flew over the scene, trying to determine the layout of the enemy’s fortifications. It was not an easy task. The jungle base camp was situated under a thick green canopy, and the enemy bunkers were well camouflaged to prevent detection from the air or the ground. He radioed the Charlie Company commander:

  “Bishop 41, this is Knight 52, over.”

  “This is Bishop 41, we’re taking fire, we’re pinned down, over!”

  “This is Knight 52, pop smoke; mark your position over.”

  “This is Bishop 41, popping smoke, over.”

  Moments later, little wisps of yellow smoke began to drift through openings in the canopy, but the origin of the smoke was difficult to determine. Schroeder radioed his TOC at FSB Nashua and directed the duty officer to put Alpha Company and a platoon of Delta Troop ACAVs on alert for possible commitment to the scene of Charlie Company’s contact. Then he radioed his Echo Company commander and instructed him to circle in behind the enemy base camp. His radio transmission was interrupted by a call from a very distraught Captain Jones.

  “Knight 52, Knight 52, this is Bishop 41, we’re taking heavy fire, mortar fire, I think we’re surrounded, heavy casualties, over!”

  “This is Knight 52, I want you to get your platoons in assault formation and assault that bunker line, over.”

  “This is Bishop 41, can’t move over, pinned down!”

  Charlie Company’s situation on the ground was one of utter chaos. Panic-stricken grunts, some dragging their wounded comrades, sifted back through the dense foliage seeking cover from the heavy fire. Most found their way to Charlie Company’s CP group’s location, about fifty meters from the bunker line. First Sergeant Holmes grabbed several of the panicked troopers and set up a small perimeter to protect the command group. Ignoring the hostile fire striking around him, he walked around trying to restore order. Specialist Kaylor, the Captain’s RTO, tried to look cool, but his hands trembled as he worked his radio. He noticed a medic working on a seriously wounded soldier. The medic tried to inject the man, who was writhing in pain, with morphine. The medic fumbled with the syrette, dropping it twice before jabbing the needle through the man’s skin and then moving on to the next man. There were more than a dozen wounded in the CP area.

  Enemy mortar rounds began to explode near the CP. After each CRRRRUMMP, the grunts tried to scrape out shallow shelters in the dirt. Kaylor’s radio suddenly cackled to life. The RTO recognized LTC Schroeder’s call sign.

  “Bishop 41, this is Knight 52, over!”

  Kaylor answered the call, “This is Bishop 41 Alpha standby, over.”

  “This is Knight 52, put 41 on, over,” Schroeder replied impatiently. He wanted to talk directly to Captain Jones, not the RTO.

  Kaylor started to crawl toward Captain Jones, who was sitting with his back against a nearby tree. When he got closer he saw tears in the Captain’s eyes. He refused to take the radio handset from Kaylor. The radio cackled again.

  “Bishop 41, this is Knight 52, get your company moving, over.”

  Moving in a low crouch and panting, Kaylor dragged his radio toward First Sergeant Holmes, who was moving around the tiny perimeter distributing ammunition.

  “You’ve got to take this call Top, it’s the battalion commander. The Captain is in bad shape.”

  The First Sergeant grabbed the radio’s handset from Kaylor and depressed the “push to talk” button.

  “Knight 52, this is Bishop 41 Charlie, over,” Holmes said in his resonant bass voice.

  “This is Knight 52, what’s your situation, over,” Schroeder replied.

  “This is Bishop 41 Charlie. Things are pretty fucked up. We’re under heavy small arms and mortar fire. We need some help down here. We need gunships and a medevac. Where the hell is Echo Company?” Holmes replied.

  “This is Knight 52, who’s in charge down there?” the battalion commander queried.

  Glancing at his CO, who sat nearby staring at the ground between his feet, Holmes replied, “This is Bishop 41 Charlie. I guess I am, over.” “

  This is Knight 52, Roger, gunships are on the way; mark your positions and direct them in.”

  “Roger, out,” First Sergeant Holmes replied, passing the handset back to Kaylor.

  Holmes knew that one of the company’s officers was KIA, but there were still three lieutenants leading platoons. His CO, however, was no longer capable of commanding the company. Each platoon was fighting on its own without any direction. Specialist Kaylor, the company’s senior RTO, summed up the situation, describing the company as “an amoeba without any supporting structure.” Kaylor prepared himself for the worst, and thought about being captured by the VC. He silently vowed to take his own life rather than be taken prisoner.

  Lacking any orders or direction from their CO, Charlie Company’s platoon leaders were attempting to get the situation under control as best they could. Unlike their CO, the platoon leaders knew that they weren’t surrounded, but they were receiving incoming fire from their flanks. The lead platoons were also taking sniper fire from VC hidden in trees forward of their bunker line. The battle continued as each platoon conducted its own fight.

  Fourth Platoon moved at the rear of Charlie Company’s three rifle platoons. The 4th Platoon, led by Lieutenant Paul Viola, had deployed with only fourteen men that day, the rest of its men left back at the fire base with the platoon’s 81mm mortars. When the lead platoons made contact with the enemy’s perimeter, Viola’s platoon was ordered by Lieutenant Colonel Schroeder to move forward to evacuate the casualties. Viola had just monitored a disturbing radio transmission between Schroeder and Captain Jones. According to Viola, Jones sounded shaken and had asked his battalion commander, “What am I going to do?” Schroeder told Jones to “turn the company over to the next senior man at his location.”

  Viola wrote, “We had to fight our way in. Because of our strength and lack of stretchers, the casualties had to be moved using ponc
hos and poncho liners using all the platoon’s men.” Under Lieutenant Viola’s and Platoon Sergeant Cliff Jaynes’ direction, 4th Platoon managed to evacuate most of the seriously wounded men down a trail that led to the rear. Viola recalled that his men were under small arms fire as they were carrying the casualties, but since they were moving down a slight hill, the fire was overhead. Lieutenant Colonel Schroeder, orbiting overhead in his C&C ship, directed Viola to move the casualties toward an LZ to the south. The medevac ship arrived overhead before Viola’s men reached the LZ. Viola made a quick decision. His men had reached a “fairly open spot on the trail,” and he instructed his platoon sergeant to make an LZ at that location, using C4 to blow down several trees to expand the open area.

  As soon as the LZ was large enough, the dust-off pilot eased his UH-1 into the small clearing, clipping the branches off several trees still standing around the perimeter. Platoon Sergeant Jaynes directed the loading of the wounded men on the chopper as Lieutenant Viola received more instructions from Schroeder. Viola wanted to return to the fight, but Schroeder had other plans. He instructed Viola to continue moving south to secure a larger LZ. Schroeder had already made up his mind to pull Charlie Company out of the fight.

  While the Charlie Company platoons continued the fight, Echo Company maneuvered around Charlie Company to the eastern side of the enemy base camp and launched an assault, surprising the defenders. PFC Lou Alexander was point man for Echo Company’s lead platoon. Alexander skillfully guided his platoon into an assault position, and then armed only with a pistol and several hand grenades, he stood up and charged an enemy bunker. After tossing a grenade into the bunker’s firing port, he waited until the grenade exploded and then crawled into the bunker and recovered the weapons from the dead VC. Following Alexander’s lead, Specialist Don Slagle led his squad forward, using fire and movement, and was able to gain a foothold in part of the enemy trench system. Slagle consolidated his position and, after treating his wounded, proceeded to attack the enemy fighting bunkers along the trench, destroying them one by one.

  Lieutenant Bill Danforth led his platoon on Echo’s left flank, skillfully maneuvering his platoon to assault the enemy trench system. Once his men gained the trench line, they turned their attention to the enemy bunkers. After several of their bunkers were destroyed with hand grenades, the VC defending the eastern perimeter withdrew toward secondary positions within the camp. They left behind 15 dead. Echo Company lost two KIAs in the assault, PFC Gordon Dalton and Specialist Thomas Malloy, and 15 men were WIA.

  The enemy resistance began to crumble when two platoons of Alpha Company supported by 3rd Platoon, Delta Troop, 17th Cav arrived in the vicinity of the northern edge of the enemy base camp, and directed a heavy volume of fire against the defenders. As darkness began to fall, the VC started to withdraw from their fortifications. Orbiting overhead in his C&C ship, LTC Schroeder spotted several small groups of enemy soldiers fleeing the area.

  At 1755 hours, Charlie Company reported that the enemy had broken contact on the western side of the perimeter. Schroeder decided to extract Charlie Company. He knew Jones had lost control of his company, and he wanted to find out what had happened. He ordered the company to move to a PZ for a night extraction. Echo Company and two platoons from Alpha Company dug in around the perimeter of the enemy base camp under a black night sky.

  It was not until Charlie Company returned to Nashua that anyone noticed that the body of one of their KIAs had not been recovered. When he found out about the missing KIA, LTC Schroeder informed the company that they’d be going in at first light to recover their dead. He decided that Captain Jones would have to be removed as soon as he could find a replacement.

  Bob Archibald was stunned when he learned his friend Guy Kistner had been killed that day, and he told his foxhole buddy, Al Lewis, about his premonition. Lewis then asked Archibald if he thought he’d make it out of Vietnam alive. Archibald stared at Lewis, and then said that he had no premonitions about him. In his own words, Bob Archibald later said, “I lied.”

  The 27 December fight was the last contact between the Warrior battalion and units of the Dong Nai Regiment that month. On 5 January 1968, the 4/12th Infantry moved to an area south of the Dong Nai River to the east of Bien Hoa. This redeployment was part of a plan by the II Field Force Commander, Lieutenant General Weyand, to pull a number of US battalions out of the remote jungle and border areas, and reposition them around the Saigon-Bien Hoa-Long Binh areas. Weyand was concerned about the possibility of an enemy offensive directed against South Vietnam’s population centers, and his analysis of the situation was right on target.

  The 199th Light Infantry Brigade’s foray into War Zone D inflicted considerable damage on the Viet Cong’s Dong Nai Regiment. The regiment did launch attacks on the District Capital of Tan Uyen during the Tet Offensive, but was not able to hold the town for any length of time. A document found on the body of the Regimental XO indicated that the Regiment started the Tet Offensive with only 1,100 men. Normal strength of the Dong Nai Regiment was around 2,200 men. If the captured document was accurate, the enemy regiment had only 50 percent of its strength during the Tet Offensive, and was not combat effective. The 199th LIB’s operations in War Zone D during December 1967 also disrupted the Communists’ lines of supply and communication. In some cases, major VC units such as the 5th VC Division had to alter their planned invasion routes to reach the Long Binh and Bien Hoa areas. That Division’s attacking regiments were forced to take long circuitous routes to reach their objectives.

  The 199th LIB’s infantry battalions, particularly Schroeder’s 4/12th, inflicted heavy losses on the enemy during December of 1967, but their victories came at a high price. Forty-two men were killed during that month, and the wounded numbered in the hundreds. No one anticipated that the heaviest fighting was yet to come. At the end of January, the 199th LIB was destined to face an enemy onslaught that was to go down as the most famous battle of the Vietnam War: the Tet Offensive of 1968.

  CHAPTER 6

  THE GATHERING STORM

  While the 199th LIB’s December incursion into War Zone D partially disrupted the Communist buildup, it was far too limited to disrupt the enemy’s timetable for the Tet Offensive. As the new year began, the VC and NVA preparations for the general offensive went into high gear. Enemy tactical commanders reconnoitered their assigned objectives, while their quartermasters continued to push forward massive amounts of weapons, ammunition, and other war fighting supplies. Special emphasis was placed on equipping VC assault battalions with AK-47 and AK-50 assault rifles, and RPG-2 and RPG-7 anti-tank rockets. At the same time, NVA replacements from the north began to arrive in increasing numbers to bring the main force VC units up to their authorized strength levels. By mid-January, attack regiments and battalions were on the move toward their assembly areas. Weapons, ammunition, and other equipment were pre-positioned in forward areas. US intelligence units detected some of the preparations, but analysts were slow in putting the pieces of the puzzle together. Most senior analysts discounted the likelihood of major ground attacks on Saigon, Bien Hoa, and Long Binh.

  Despite the movement of men and supplies toward the built-up areas around Saigon, there were few contacts between US forces and Communist units in those areas during most of January 1968. The Communists went to great lengths to insure that operational security was maintained. Enemy infiltrators and reconnaissance teams traveled unarmed in civilian clothing as they moved about their target areas. Contact with US and ARVN forces was avoided, and every possible effort was made to blend in with the civilian population. Some of the insurgents were recognized and even welcomed by family members and former acquaintances, but no alarms were raised. The South Vietnamese, including their armed forces, continued preparations for the upcoming holiday, ignoring the warning signs.

  There was, however, one senior US commander who closely monitored the intelligence and had the foresight to take action. Lieutenant General Weyand, the II Field Force Com
mander, suspected that the Communists’ objectives in III Corps were the population centers and the nearby US installations. At a meeting held on 10 January 1968, Weyand convinced his boss, General Westmoreland, that a “strategic reversal” or shift in gravity of US forces was needed to prepare for a major enemy offensive in the III Corps area. With General Westmoreland’s approval, Weyand ordered the movement of a number of US maneuver battalions from the remote jungle and border areas to locations closer to Saigon, Bien Hoa, and Long Binh. By 29 January 1968, 27 battalions were deployed around the periphery of the Saigon metropolitan area, up from the 14 battalions that had been in the area during early January.

  As part of this redeployment of forces, the 199th Light Infantry Brigade was released from its mission in War Zone D. Three new areas of operation were assigned to the brigade: AO UNIONTOWN, AO COLUMBUS, and AO HAVERFORD.

  AO Uniontown encompassed some 130 square kilometers, and included the main avenues of approach leading from War Zone D into the Long Binh and Bien Hoa areas. For control purposes, the AO was broken down into three sectors. AO NORTH UNIONTOWN was the area north of the Dong Nai River in the southernmost portion of War Zone D, and was commonly referred to as the “rocket belt.” The 199th LIB was charged with disrupting enemy rocket attacks directed on Long Binh and Bien Hoa from this area. CENTRAL UNIONTOWN included the area south of the Dong Nai River, stretching south to Highway 1 that ran from Bien Hoa to Xuan Loc. SOUTH UNIONTOWN extended eight kilometers south of Highway 1, and was bordered on the west by Highway 13. The 199th LIB’s main base camp, II Field Force Headquarters, USARV Headquarters, the Long Binh ammunition dump, and a number of aviation units and medical support facilities were located in South Uniontown. The 199th LIB’s mission was to protect these installations from rocket, mortar, and ground attack. The 4/12th Infantry was assigned responsibility for AO Uniontown.