into the Storm (1997)

by Tom - Nf - Commanders Clancy

  Three things helped the 2nd ACR troopers: the boldness of their small-unit leaders, the training of their soldiers, and the weather. They attacked in a sandstorm. The Iraqis never saw what hit them until it was too late.

  The Iraqis were in what is called a reverse-slope defense, a tactic they had used successfully against Iran. Taking advantage of the normal 50- to 100-foot undulations in the rolling desert, they had positioned part of a unit on the leading edge of a rise in the desert floor, while the remainder of the unit was concealed on the other side of the rise, or on the reverse slope. Their intent was to lure unsuspecting attackers into believing that they had to contend with only the small unit on the forward slope, but when attackers came over the rise, they would be hit by volley fire from the rest of the Iraqi defenders on the other side. It had been a good tactic against the Iranians. It did not work against our troops.

  Though there were few bunkers, as this had been a hastily drawn-up defense, most of their tanks and BMPs were in horseshoe-shaped sand revetments--sand pushed up to about turret level on three sides of the vehicle, with the rear left open, so that the vehicle could back out. Some of the revetments had been dug out, some not. The revetments helped to hide vehicles, but they did nothing to stop the long-rod penetrator of the M1A1 120-mm cannon from destroying the Iraqi tanks. (After the engagement we found many "notches" in the berms indicating where the penetrators had gone through to find their mark.) In other places, when they had time, the Iraqis would erect screens in front of their tanks to deflect HEAT projectiles. But they did not have time for that here. Likewise, though their artillery was in position behind the defense, they also did not have time to get very well coordinated. Behind the defenses by about fifteen kilometers were logistics vehicles.

  In addition to the reverse-slope defense, the Iraqis had some other devices. In some places (though not much in this engagement), they placed fifty-five-gallon drums out in front that could be heated at night and used as target reference points for their infrared night-sight equipment. They sometimes also (but not in this engagement) put out burning rubber tires to decoy laser-guided bombs or heat-seeking target designators away from their real targets.

  In other words, the Iraqis were doing the best they could. They were not totally immobile, either. At 73 Easting and elsewhere they tried to reposition to meet the attack better, or even to counterattack. Thus, 73 Easting was a running three- to four-hour fight.

  On this day, the weather was particularly bad, with visibility in the hundreds of meters, if that. The Iraqis never thought anyone would attack them in that kind of weather.

  Captain H. R. McMaster, Troop E commander, offers this account: "I was issuing final instructions to the troop when my tank crested another, almost imperceptible rise. As we came over the top, my gunner, Staff Sergeant Koch, yelled, 'Tanks direct front.' I then saw more of the enemy position that Magee and Lawrence had spotted. In an instant, I counted eight tanks in dug-in positions . . . on the back slope of the ridge . . . so that they could surprise us as we came over the rise and equalize their weapons' capability with ours. We, however, had surprised them. . . . They were close. Koch hit the button on the laser range finder and the display showed 1,420 meters. I yelled, 'Fire, fire sabot.' The enemy tank's turret separated from its hull in a hail of sparks. . . . All the troop's tanks were now in the fight. Eight more T-72s erupted into flames. Enemy tanks and BMPs ... erupted in innumerable fireballs. The troop was cutting a five-kilometer-wide swath of destruction through the enemy's defense. . . . In twenty-three minutes, Eagle Troop had reduced the enemy position to a spectacular array of burning vehicles."

  After he looked at the battle area the next morning, H. R. wrote, "Our Bradleys and tanks destroyed over thirty enemy tanks, approximately twenty personnel carriers and other armored vehicles, and about thirty trucks. The artillery strike had destroyed another thirty-five enemy trucks, large stocks of fuel, ammunition, and other supplies, and several armored vehicles. We were faced with the gruesome sight of a battlefield covered with enemy dead. One of the enemy prisoners claimed to have commanded a Republican Guards mechanized infantry battalion of over nine hundred men, reinforced with thirty-six tanks. He said that forty of the prisoners were all who remained alive. Eagle Troop had taken no casualties."

  Captain Joe Sartiano, Troop G commander, gives this report: "The ensuing move due east was based upon north-south grid lines. Ghost and Eagle moved abreast of each other. Eagle had contact at about the 70 Easting, and Ghost continued to move forward. Ghost encountered enemy vehicles dug in at the 73 Easting. After destroying the mass to our front, more enemy vehicles came into our zone, and the troop engaged them with assets available. The scout platoons went 'black' [ran out of ammo] on TOWs at 1800 hrs; each tank fired an average of fourteen rounds (14 x 9 tanks in troop = 126 tank rounds, each deadly accurate), the mortar section (two SP 4.2-inch mortars) fired 256. Early in the evening, due to the ammunition expenditure, Hawk Company (squadron's tank company) was to relieve Ghost Troop. . . . Battle damage was unknown at the time due to the limited visibility during the day. The troop lost one soldier, Sergeant Nels A. Moller, when an enemy tank hit his Bradley with a main gun round. . . . The troop closed in on its TAA at 0100 and stayed there until 1500. During this time, the troop held a memorial service there for Sergeant Moller."

  And Captain Dan Miller, Troop I commander, gives this report: "Enemy tank turrets were hurled skyward as 120-mm sabot rounds ripped through T-55s and T-72s. The fireballs that followed hurled debris 100 feet into the air. Secondary explosions destroyed the vehicles beyond recognition. . . . The annihilation of this Iraqi armor battalion continued when the troop found itself surrounded by burning hulls and exploding ammo bunkers. . . . The report of advancing T-72s from the east told us the battle wasn't over. Seven T-72s had managed to crawl out of their reveted positions and attempt a counterattack. The enemy was advancing at about 2,500 meters to our front. The flash from their gun tubes confirmed they had a fix on us. The scouts were in no position to continue the advance on T-72s. The T-72s' 125-mm main guns splashed short and kicked up a wall of dirt. In seconds they would have us in range and a Bradley was not built for such a hit. Again, the tanks quickly bounced forward. At 2,100 meters, the inferior T-72 didn't stand a chance against the Abrams M1A1. The depleted uranium long-rod penetrators from the sabot round passed through the T-72s like a hot knife through butter. The TOW missiles also had no problem with the range on penetration, and the counterattack was squelched like a match in a cup of water. . . . We lost one vehicle in the armor battle [I-14] but thankfully the crew . . . all survived. Three of the crew members returned the following day, and the other two were medevaced for burns."

  I learned later the extent of the damage the 2nd ACR had inflicted on the Tawalkana. The Battle of 73 Easting, which went on the rest of the afternoon and on and off into the evening until about 2300, proved to be a watershed event for our VII Corps attack and, in the longer run, for the U.S. Army.

  For the Army, it was a vindication in microcosm of all our emphasis on tough performance-oriented training; of our investments in combat maneuver centers at NTC and Hohenfels; our quality soldiers, NCOs, and leaders; our leader development; and our great leading-edge equipment. It had taken the U.S. Army almost twenty years to get to the results of 73 Easting. When Troop G commander, Captain Joe Sartiano, was later asked how his troop had been able to do so well their first time in combat, he answered that this hadn't been their first time; he and others in his troop had been in combat before--at the National Training Center.

  Here was the ultimate battlefield payoff of performance-oriented training under realistic combat conditions against a world-class opposing force at the National Training Center and at other combat maneuver centers. Later, other actions by units in 1st INF, 1st AD, and 3rd AD would lead many to the same conclusions. "After the OPFOR," a soldier in 1st AD said, "the Medina ain't nothin'."

  For VII Corps, the battle was critical because the 2nd AC
R not only succeeded in collapsing the security zone of the developing Iraqi defense, but delivered a resounding defeat to the Tawalkana first echelon and kept the Iraqis off balance until we got the 1st INF into the fight. Moreover, as I noted earlier, the 2nd ACR had found a seam between the RGFC defense and its subordinate units. Though there was no physical break in the defense, the identification of a seam or boundary is important. Where two different units have to tie together is a vulnerable area in any defense, and one you always try to attack. This was especially the case where two units had been thrown together as quickly as the Iraqis had done.

  While I was at the 2nd ACR TAC, I talked mainly to Lieutenant Colonel Steve Robinette. What I wanted most was to get a picture of the battles, of what they had learned about the Iraqis, of the passage forward of the 1st INF, and how to exploit that seam. My first instincts were to use the 2nd ACR by sending them toward Objective Denver. The 1st CAV was another possibility, since by that time they would be ready in Lee.

  My most important thought just then, however, was that the 2nd ACR had found the security zone and collapsed it, and then had severely punished the first-echelon defense of the now formerly elite RGFC.

  Some quick considerations led to a decision to pass the 1st INF somewhere between 65 and 75 Easting. I now left the specific location of that to the commanders of the 2nd ACR and the 1st INF to work out. I still wanted the passage to occur in daylight, but at this point that no longer looked possible. (It actually started at around 2200 that night, soon after the Battle of 73 Easting was winding down.)

  At 1600, I left the 2nd ACR and flew over to the 3rd AD TAC CP, by now forward in their new zone.

  1630 3RD AD TAC CP

  At the 3rd AD TAC, I met briefly with both Butch Funk and Ron Griffith. Ron was there to personally coordinate boundaries and flank contact between the divisions. The normal rule of thumb in units is that contact responsibility is from left to right. Since Ron was on the left, he had come to 3rd AD.

  Both commanders were concerned about boundary coordination and had gone to great lengths to see to it they were tied in on the flanks. Because they were about to enter a night attack posture, we all were increasingly concerned about fratricide.

  Meanwhile, both divisions had done a superb job of making the sharp ninety-degree turn in the trackless desert with no landmarks and only GPS and LORAN to guide them. Complicating navigation was the fact that 1st AD used mainly LORAN while 3rd AD used mainly GPS.

  At that point, Butch Funk was right at the beginning of what they would call the Battle of Phase Line Bullet.

  Butch told me he had two brigades on line, Colonel Bob Higgins's 2nd in the north and the 1st of Colonel Bill Nash (of recent Bosnia command) in the south. Both brigades had units in contact. At around 69 Easting, their 2nd Brigade reported sixty to seventy T-72s in revetments and began a fight. At 1610, farther south, their CAV squadron (4/7 CAV) and 4-18 INF (1st Brigade) were in a battle from 69 to 73 Easting with T-62s and infantry in bunkers. At 1645, both brigades passed through Phase Line Tangerine. From there and on into the night, they had a series of running tank fights with Iraqi defending units in reverse-slope defenses with T-72s. It confirmed what I already knew. Along 70 to 80 Easting, we had hit a hastily defending RGFC division plus reinforcements. They were fighting back--just as they had fought back against 2nd ACR.

  So Butch had a lot to tell me.

  Ron Griffith also had a lot to report.

  By now, after his ninety-degree turn, he had three brigades on line, with his aviation out front. He was anxious, though, to get his Apache battalion back from the 2nd ACR for his coming fights.

  He'd get them back, I told him, after the passage of the 1st INF through the 2nd ACR.

  There were several other things on his mind: First, he had left an infantry battalion in al-Busayyah to finish the action there (6/6 INF under command of Lieutenant Colonel Mike McGee). Second, because XVIII Corps units were a good sixty kilometers or so behind him, he now had the open flank. And finally, he told me about a possible fratricide between one of his engineer units and an element of the 3rd ACR that had crossed the boundary into our sector.

  All combat elements of 1st AD were by then forty to sixty kilometers east of al-Busayyah. On a number of occasions, the 3rd ACR had been told over the radio by both Griffith and Brigadier General Jay Hendrix, his assistant division commander, that only friendly logistical/support elements were on or near the airfield near al-Busayyah. (At that time, they were highly concerned about seizing this airfield, because it was planned as the center of a log base to be established if combat actions were extended.) The blue-on-blue event resulted in the deaths of two soldiers, while two others were wounded.

  That shook me up.

  Apparently, Hendrix, with corps approval, had denied the 3rd ACR permission to cross the VII Corps/1st AD boundary. This refusal had been needless, since the battle for al-Busayyah had long been over, and 1st AD was well forward. But it had happened. Ron and I both exploded . . . and then we had to go on the move again.

  1700 VII CORPS MAIN TAC

  I flew the short distance to the TAC, which was now set up at our new location.

  I still had to make the decision on the Big Red One. Should I pass them forward at night or wait until morning? Clearly, the 2nd ACR had not only collapsed the RGFC security zone, they were now attacking main RGFC defenses and had found a seam between the RGFC and another unit. If we were going to sustain the attack momentum the regiment had started, I needed the 1st INF's 348 M1A1s fresh into the fight to replace the 2nd ACR's 123 tanks, which had been fighting most of the day.

  But a hastily coordinated night forward passage of lines leading right off the march into a night attack was a tough and highly risky operation. Though we had trained some forward passage in simulations during our BCTP scenarios with the 1st INF in March 1990, I knew that wasn't going to help us a great deal. I also had a certain amount of experience with passages of lines and reliefs in place as a squadron commander in the 3rd ACR, then as commander of the 11th ACR and of the 1st AD. Yet all that had been a rearward passage in the defense.

  I weighed the pluses and minuses once again. The risk to our troops was that units could get misoriented in the dark and there could be fratricide. But waiting until morning also was a risk. The RGFC was right in front of us, and it was moving units into the defense. At the same time, continuing the attack with the 2nd ACR posed no less a fratricide risk as making the passage at night--and they had only one-third the combat power of the Big Red One. That meant that the 2nd ACR might run out of combat power in the middle of the RGFC defense. Worse, the Iraqis might be able to set a stronger defense with mines and better-coordinated artillery fires.

  I weighed these considerations quickly, then made my decision. I needed the 1st INF combat power attacking the now-stunned defense before they could recover. The Big Red One had the combat power I needed to keep attacking and maybe break through to Highway 8. It was a risk, not a gamble. But it was a risk.

  At 1700 hours, I called Tom Rhame and ordered him to pass through the 2nd ACR and attack to seize Norfolk. It was a heavy decision for me: I knew what I was asking the soldiers and leaders to do. Though I did not second-guess myself, I thought about it all night long as I listened to reports of our battles on the radio in the TAC close by.

  G + 2 . . . THE REST OF THE THEATER

  For the first twenty-four hours after their launch on G-Day, XVIII Corps's powerful 24th MECH had relatively easy going, with virtually no enemy opposition, over hard desert highlands as they thrust north toward Highway 8 and the Euphrates. They had a very long way to go, however. It was roughly 300 kilometers from their line of departure to Highway 8. But then, about sixty kilometers south of the highway, as the terrain sloped down toward the river, the going got considerably rougher. After rains, much of the area turns into nearly impenetrable quagmires. There were rains aplenty.

  And so it took the division the better part of the night of 25 Februar
y until midday of the twenty-sixth to negotiate "the great dismal bog," as they called it, and begin the final attacks to put an armored cork on the Euphrates River valley.

  The division had a number of objectives on or near Highway 8. South and east of the town of an-Nasiriyah were two airfields: Tallil, near the town, and Jalibah, not quite halfway (about seventy-five kilometers) between an-Nasiriyah and Basra. After they got through the bog, the 24th MECH took aim at the two airfields and at the highway itself. Soon the Iraqis were checked and the highway was secure. (Iraqi command to the east seemed unaware of this fact, for later that evening, a convoy of several dozen trucks and tanks on HETs were motoring up the highway--a brigade of the Hammurabi Division, it later turned out, trying to escape to Baghdad. First Brigade soon let the convoy know that the XVIII Corps had slammed the most direct route from Basra to Baghdad in their face.)

  By early evening of the twenty-sixth, 2nd Brigade was in position to attack Jalibah, and by early morning of the following day, 197th Brigade had fought another 300 Republican Guard commandos in the vicinity of Tallil Airfield and secured a position southeast of the field. The 24th Division spent the morning of the twenty-seventh attacking the airfield.