The Reluctant Taoiseach

by David McCullagh

  However, it appears his colleagues kept a close eye on Costello’s public statements from then on. When MacBride found out that the Taoiseach was planning a press conference, he intervened to make sure there would be no questions. Rugby observed that here “on a smaller scale we see reproduced the Marshall-Truman pattern in the management of affairs of state”.142 And while most of his 3-hour speech on the second stage of the Republic of Ireland Bill was delivered off the cuff, the section relating to trade and citizenship rights was read from a text supplied by External Affairs.143

  It is clear from Rugby’s reports to London that he held Costello personally responsible for developments, saying the Taoiseach had “conducted this business in a slapdash and amateur fashion”. He later added that Fine Gael “had a sudden brainwave that they could steal the ‘Long Man’s’ clothes … They are all somewhat bewildered by their own sudden illogical iconoclasm and must now find high sounding phrases to justify it.”144

  This resentment was returned with interest by Costello, who by the end of October had developed “a curiously truculent bitterness towards the British”, according to Vinton Chapin of the American legation. Costello told Chapin that the External Relations Act was “a humbug arrangement”, adding that if the British wanted to treat them as aliens “that’s all right with us, we’ve been trying to establish that status for seven hundred years”. He appeared confident that the trade and nationality questions could be resolved—the British had already given commitments on both these matters, and trying to escape from them would risk their relationship with India. Chapin observed that Costello’s attitude “may result from emotional reaction as well as from stress of official responsibilities, plus advice received on grounds of political expediency”.145

  A similar assessment of Costello’s attitude was made by the British, after the Irish suggested a conference involving the main Commonwealth countries to discuss the implications of repeal146 (involving Canada, Australia and New Zealand was smart politics, as they acted as a restraining influence on the British). A memorandum for Attlee suggested that Costello should be “pressed to come himself. But should he be asked to bring Mr MacBride as well? My information is that Mr Costello is very emotional on this question and cannot easily be made to look at the facts. There is apparently some reason to believe that Mr MacBride would be more calm …”147

  The irony of the British looking to the former Chief of Staff of the IRA to restrain the former delegate to Commonwealth conferences is striking. But Costello did not take part in the discussion. MacBride and McGilligan met the British and Commonwealth representatives, first at Chequers and then in Paris. The Taoiseach’s absence is curious. While not on a par with that of de Valera from the Treaty negotiations in 1921, it does suggest that either he or his colleagues agreed with the American and British assessment of his emotional state.

  McGilligan and MacBride, with the strong and crucial support of the Australians, Canadians and New Zealanders, reached agreement with the British that neither side would say anything to make it more difficult to maintain that they were not foreign countries; Ireland and the Commonwealth countries would exchange reciprocal citizenship rights; and the Irish would co-operate with the British to fight claims based on Most Favoured Nation status.148

  While his political judgement when speaking in public may have been suspect, there was no doubt about Costello’s legal skills. MacBride’s draft of the bill to repeal the External Relations Act was titled “The Executive Powers of the State (International Relations) Bill”, and included the following as Section 1(2): “In any instrument relating to the executive power of the state in or in connection with its external relations, the state may be referred to as the Republic of Ireland (or the Irish Republic).”149 As well as being extraordinarily wordy, it was rather unclear and unduly permissive (“may be referred to …”). On his copy of the Bill, Costello redrafted the section to the far simpler and more direct “The description of the State shall be the Republic of Ireland.” He also changed the title to “The Republic of Ireland Bill”.150

  Ronan Fanning suggests that these changes “bear out the interpretation that it was Costello’s … impatience with the ambiguities of the External Relations Act and a determination that there be an end to ambiguity which gave the legislation its shape and substance”.151 MacBride’s version would have added ambiguity; Costello’s removed it. Costello also showed his determination to assert ownership of the legislation by deciding to bring it through the Oireachtas. His officials had assumed MacBride would do so.152

  This decision was interpreted by Noël Browne as a slight to MacBride—in fact, it was urged on Costello by his son-in-law, Alexis FitzGerald, as a way of explaining to Fine Gael supporters how and why he decided on repeal. FitzGerald admitted that “my own reaction to the announcement … was one of unhappiness, until I grasped what had been done and what the possibilities of the situation were”. However, he pointed out, “there are serious Unionists who seriously support Fine Gael on the grounds that the party could be relied on more than the others to support the British connection … I think these people deserve the attention of a well thought out argument.”153

  Well thought out arguments were not going to restore Costello’s relationship with the Irish Times, though—the paper claimed, “the standard of political honesty in Ireland has been lowered grievously by the action of Mr Costello and his Fine Gael colleagues”.154 During the 1951 election campaign, the paper badly misquoted the Taoiseach in a headline, which read, “Fine Gael Glories in break with Commonwealth—Mr Costello”. In fact, as the body of the story made clear, Costello said Fine Gael “gloried in the fact that the severance of the link with the British Commonwealth brought peace to the country and took the gunplay out of Irish politics”. His son-in-law wrote to the paper the following day to point out the distortion, adding that “fair accounts” were given in both the Irish Independent and—more surprisingly—the Irish Press.155

  Despite the attitude of the Irish Times, Costello always denied that the declaration of the Republic lost the Protestant vote for Fine Gael. He insisted to John Kelly (later a Fine Gael Attorney General) that that vote had been lost in 1932—Protestants had all expected to be murdered in their beds when de Valera got into power, and had been voting for him since out of gratitude that they weren’t!156 And of course, while the pro-Commonwealth vote may have been alienated, Costello’s move had widened his party’s appeal, as his son-in-law observed: “By one stroke of genius politically, you have placed Fine Gael back in the centre of the national tradition right where Mick Collins had it. No longer will young Fine Gael politicians have to engage in the hopeless task of defending the Commonwealth association.”157

  Fianna Fáil—particularly Frank Aiken—made a point of highlighting Costello’s unlikely credentials as a Republican, particularly as he had for years described himself as a King’s Counsel. As the Taoiseach admitted to Aiken in the Dáil, those called to the Inner Bar since 1924 were called Senior Counsel. Aiken pointed out Costello was described in the telephone book and in various directories as a K.C. and said that “some people have grave doubts as to whether he is a Republican masquerading as a King’s man or a King’s man masquerading as a Republican”.158 In Aiken’s papers is a copy of a ballad lampooning “Jay Cee the S.C. from Dublin Town [who] described himself as K.C. to win favour for the Crown”.159 Aiken raised the issue a number of times in the Dáil—Costello eventually suggested in exasperation that he should see a psychiatrist.160

  Costello’s speech introducing the second stage of the Republic of Ireland Bill was a marathon, lasting three hours. He said the Bill would “end forever, in a simple, clear and unequivocal way this country’s long and tragic association with the institution of the British Crown and will make it manifest beyond equivocation or subtlety that the national and international status of this country is that of an independent republic”. He claimed the measure would be “an instrument of domestic peace, of national unity and
of international concord and goodwill”. The Taoiseach added, with more than a hint of self-deprecation, that over the previous quarter century, we “have had rather too much … of constitutional law and constitutional lawyers”.

  But how could he explain the apparent change in Fine Gael’s approach to the Commonwealth? Ingeniously, he blamed the British. His party had attempted to honour the Treaty; but once the British tamely accepted de Valera’s undermining of the settlement of 1921, “those who were under an obligation to maintain that Treaty were released”.

  He admitted that when answering questions from Peadar Cowan in July and August he had “walked very warily” and hadn’t expressed his personal opinion; but now he did—Ireland had not been a member of the Commonwealth since 1936. But while clearing up ambiguities was important, it was not the Government’s main reason for introducing the measure. The most important factor in the decision was, he insisted, to “put an end to the bitterness and conflict between sections of our people”.

  “It has been my lot to assist at the birth of two Constitutions of this State. It has been my misfortune, if I may put it that way, during the six years when I was Attorney-General, to devise and put into operation here measures which were and which were admitted to be oppressive in order to try to combat acts of violence of one kind or another … I took no pleasure in carrying out the functions thrust upon me at that time. But the experience that I had then left its mark upon me … I was determined that never again would I take any part in a Government that had to enforce order by extra-judicial processes. I never will … I ask for a verdict on this measure which will put an end to violence, bring into being domestic peace and concord amongst Irishmen so that never again will an Irish Government have to execute an Irishman because he wants a republic … We are going to put an end to that here once and for all.”161

  Many thought the speech a tour de force; not surprisingly, Lord Rugby was not one of them. He felt that Costello’s “painfully prolonged exposition did not ring at all true … Not being altogether happy in his own soul, Mr Costello abandoned the quiet tone which suits him best, and frequently broke into the traditional style of the flamboyant Irish orator. Since the substance was not convincing these efforts did not produce a ringing echo … there was too much humbug about it all for supporters as well as opponents.”162

  As the new year dawned, Jack Costello had cause for satisfaction—preparations for the declaration of the Republic were well under way, and none of the dire consequences threatened by the British were going to transpire. It appeared he and his government would be none the worse for his adventure in diplomacy. His daughter Eavan, in a post-Christmas letter, noted that “Daddy is not quite so busy now that we are all safely Republicans!”163 But the repeal of the External Relations Act was to have unwelcome effects north of the Border.

  In November, Northern Ireland’s Prime Minister, Sir Basil Brooke, met Attlee at Chequers to seek ways to compensate for the change in Dublin’s status.164 Officials from London and Belfast got to work, but the British were intent on introducing “minimal” legislative changes. Brooke’s priority was to strengthen Northern Ireland’s constitutional position to head off pressure from Dublin on partition, as well as “to eliminate the possibility of interference by any government in Whitehall now or in the future”.165 The latter desire, which reflected Unionist distrust of Labour, was achieved all too well—the absence of “interference” from London was a contributory factor in the outbreak of the Troubles in 1969.

  Feeling themselves under threat, Unionists rallied round Brooke. A meeting of the standing committee of the Ulster Unionist Council in December passed a vote of confidence in the Prime Minister (and concluded by singing “For he’s a jolly good fellow”). “The proceedings throughout were most enthusiastic, reminiscent of the old days when the Ulster Volunteer Force was formed.”166 Sensing the mood, Brooke told the following month’s meeting that he was “perfectly satisfied” with the negotiations in London on the constitutional position, and believed the time was right for a general election “so that it may be made clear beyond doubt that the decision of Northern Ireland is to remain part of the United Kingdom”.167

  In response, Costello invited the leaders of all parties in the Dáil to a meeting in the Mansion House to consider how to help anti-partition candidates in the election.168 MacBride may have been the original source of the idea—he had proposed an all-party committee on partition in April 1948, to avoid the issue being used “for party purposes, which is manifestly undesirable”.169 The committee agreed to take up a collection to raise funds for anti-partition candidates the following Sunday—in line with tradition, the collection was taken up outside Catholic churches as people left Mass.

  Demonstrating his lack of understanding of the North, Costello told an American diplomat that the parish had been selected as a matter of convenience, and that the Church “would remain strictly on sidelines avoiding possible … secular controversy”.170 In fact, a more efficient way of raising Unionist indignation could scarcely have been found; and what became known as the “Chapel Gate Election” proved a triumph for Brooke. The collection was of no use to sitting nationalists, as none of them were in marginal constituencies. But it was a disaster for the Northern Ireland Labour Party, which was wiped out by the Unionists as Protestant voters concentrated on constitutional questions rather than social policy.

  The interference from Dublin also gave Brooke greater leverage with London. Attlee told him that a formal protest against the propaganda campaign would be counterproductive. But he reminded him that forthcoming British legislation, the Ireland Bill, would affirm Northern Ireland’s constitutional position and territorial integrity. “I feel that the most effective action that we can take is to make a clear and firm statement on the subject of partition in the proceedings on this Bill.” But this statement would have to wait until after Easter, as the British “consider that it would be inexpedient to introduce the Ireland Bill until the Republic of Ireland Act has been brought into force by the Éire government.”171 Dublin had to be seen to be responsible.

  Costello was anxious that the coming into force of the Republic of Ireland Act on Easter Monday “should be marked by fitting national celebrations”. But de Valera was dismissive, writing to the Taoiseach that “public demonstrations and rejoicings are out of place” while partition lasted.172 Fianna Fáil boycotted the celebrations, which centred on the General Post Office. In a radio broadcast, Costello said they had “put ourselves apart but not cut ourselves adrift from our former associations with the great nations of the Commonwealth … We hope for a closer and more harmonious association based on community of interests and common ideals than could ever have existed from formal ties.”173 Two weeks later, the British published the Ireland Bill.

  While the Bill recognised the Republic, and stated that it and its citizens were not to be treated as “foreign” under the terms of British legislation, it also gave a guarantee to the North: “In no event will Northern Ireland or any part thereof cease to be part of His Majesty’s dominions and of the United Kingdom without the consent of the Parliament of Northern Ireland.” Brooke was delighted, writing in his diary, “We have got what we wanted … Ulster is safe.”174 This—entirely predictable—gesture to Unionism was seen in London as an equitable balance to what the British thought was generous treatment of the new Republic. Irish nationalists regarded it as a base betrayal.

  De Valera pushed Costello for an immediate statement against “the British Bill intended to confirm Partition”; Costello replied that he wanted to wait until MacBride reported back on his discussions with Attlee.175 The Taoiseach suggested another reason for delay to US Minister George Garrett—“he wanted to cool off before issuing statement”.176 On Saturday 7 May, the Cabinet met to agree the terms of an aide-memoire to be sent to the British. It recorded the Government’s “emphatic and solemn protest against the re-enactment by the British Parliament of legislation purporting to confirm the unj
ust partition of Ireland … the Government of Ireland can only regard the enactment … as an unnecessary, provocative and gratuitous reassertion of the claim of the British Parliament to intervene in Irish affairs”.177 This was, MacBride told the British Representative, Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, “much milder and more restrained in tone than had at one time seemed likely”. Laithwaite said he was “astonished that there should be so much disturbance over the reaffirmation in a statute of a declaration which has stood on record since last October”178—a reference to Attlee’s statement in the House of Commons, in similar terms to the proposed legislation.

  Costello now led the political response, opening a Dáil debate on a motion criticising the British with a “vigorous and bitter” speech which lasted for an hour and a half. There was an “air of crisis” about the meeting of the Dáil, with packed public galleries and a full attendance of TDS. The Canadian diplomat David Johnson thought the Taoiseach “probably feels that he has to speak in this way to maintain the leadership of the nation”.179

  Costello stressed the united response of the Dáil, as the motion was to be seconded by de Valera. He accused the Labour Government of “purporting to annex permanently portion of our country, to fasten and to clamp down upon our people the wrong of Partition which was initiated 29 years ago …” He said it was important that members of the Dáil should speak “calmly and coolly”. This sentiment was rather undermined when he went on to say that while he didn’t believe Attlee and his colleagues were being vindictive, he did think they were “guilty of stupidity”. Ironically, in view of his own Canadian pronouncement, he complained bitterly of the lack of advance warning given by the British, which he claimed was due to their desire “to get it into the House of Commons so that it would be too late for the protest and too late for examination …” Finally, to applause, he said that while Ireland had no great strength as a nation, “we can hit the British Government in their prestige and in their pride and in their pocket”.180