The Reluctant Taoiseach

by David McCullagh

  Thus, Browne was exactly in the position Costello had said in January he wanted him; waiting for the hierarchy’s ruling on his scheme, and in no position to argue with that ruling. Or so it appeared—Browne was to prove less obedient to the hierarchy than he indicated at this stage. At around this time he also rejected a compromise proposal from Norton that would have required households with an annual income above £1,000 to pay for services. Browne remained wedded to the free scheme, while the Labour leader had come to the conclusion that some scheme was better than none.78

  Costello, meanwhile, told McQuaid that even if the hierarchy approved the scheme, he was determined not to implement it, as he “was convinced of its impossibility and of the impossibility of fighting the Doctors, who were intensely opposed to the Scheme”.79 This account ties in with Patrick Lynch’s recollection that on the same day the Taoiseach said he would not be a member of a government that implemented such a scheme.80 Again, this raises the question of Costello’s motivation: was he simply following the dictates of his church (the usual interpretation), or had he reverted to traditional Fine Gael policy on State control of medicine? Conor Cruise O’Brien seems to have advocated the second interpretation, saying that Costello, “in an effort to quash Browne’s scheme, called in the help of the Catholic Church”.81 The truth in all probability lies in a combination of the two factors. Joe Lee suggested that “the strength of Costello’s position was that while his piety was absolutely genuine, it also happened to coincide with the material advantage of the interests he represented”.82

  In any case, the Taoiseach’s resolve not to go ahead with a scheme even if the Church approved it was most unlikely to be put to the test. On 4 April, the hierarchy met and followed McQuaid’s advice to reject Browne’s scheme. The Archbishop told his colleagues that if they did so, they would have “saved the country from advancing a long way towards socialistic welfare. In particular, we shall have checked the efforts of Leftist Labour elements, which are approaching the point of publicly ordering the Church to stand out of social life and confine herself to what they think is the Church’s proper sphere.”83

  The following evening, McQuaid delivered this decision to Costello at Government Buildings. It was, the Archbishop was careful to put in writing, “the unanimous decision of the General Meeting of the Archbishops and Bishops”. While declining to enter into a detailed examination of the points raised by Browne, the reply stated, “The Hierarchy must regard the Scheme proposed by the Minister for Health as opposed to Catholic social teaching.”84

  The different responses of Costello and Browne are instructive. As McQuaid later recorded after discussing the hierarchy document with the Taoiseach for an hour and a half, he “at once accepted fully the decisions of the Hierarchy [and] expressed great relief at the decision which would terminate the enormous worry and waste of time occasioned by Dr Browne’s actions”.85 Browne, however, after reading the letter in the presence of Costello, Norton and Brendan Corish, said, “It’s all right. The Bishops have not condemned the Scheme on grounds of morals.” According to Costello, Corish was shocked at Browne’s attitude: “If I had not heard the remark, I could not have believed it to be possible.”86 After seeking theological advice, Browne put a great deal of store in the distinction between moral and social teaching (the first had to be obeyed by all Catholics; the latter could in conscience be rejected). Clearly, others in the Government were less impressed by this distinction.

  McQuaid took a similar view, asking Costello to tell his Cabinet colleagues that “the letter was a definite condemnation of the scheme on moral grounds. Catholic social teaching meant Catholic moral teaching in regard to things social.” This dubious theological gloss was welcomed by the Taoiseach, who said he was pleased to have this statement in advance of the Cabinet meeting to be held later that day, 7 April. McQuaid also pointed out the number of times the bishops had used the phrase “this particular scheme”—in other words, an alterative could be acceptable.87

  Browne has left a vivid, though obviously one-sided, account of the three-hour Cabinet meeting. He described Costello reading McQuaid’s letter. “Clearly, for him, it was holy writ … He then looked at me and said ‘This must mean the end of the mother and child scheme’.” The Taoiseach agreed “grudgingly” to allow Browne to ask each of his colleagues if they accepted the ruling. All did, although Labour’s Michael Keyes demurred slightly, saying, “They shouldn’t be allowed to do this,” before nodding his agreement with the others. Browne, completely isolated, left the meeting.88

  That evening, Costello and Norton agreed the terms of the formal Government decision, which was sent by despatch rider to Browne’s home.89 This said the Government had decided, after considering McQuaid’s letter (Moynihan advised against citing this letter in a formal government decision),90 that the scheme should not be pursued, but that a new scheme should be brought forward that would be “in conformity with Catholic social teaching”, and that would provide the best modern facilities for those who couldn’t afford to pay for them—in other words, it would include a means test.91

  Given Browne’s consistent refusal to consider a means test, this decision left him in an untenable position. Costello told McQuaid that Browne must leave the Cabinet.92 A letter was drafted in the Department of the Taoiseach seeking Browne’s resignation, in which the Minister was to be berated for lack of discretion in leaking to the press that he was considering his position. It also pointed out that if he continued in office, the Government “could feel no confidence that effect would be given to their desire for the early introduction of an acceptable Mother and Child Service”, given his fractious relationship with the IMA.93

  However, the letter was not sent. Costello still harboured a hope, unrealistic as it now appears, that something could be salvaged from the wreckage. Nearly two decades later, he claimed that if things had been handled differently by MacBride, “the whole situation might have been very well resolved”.94 This would, obviously, have required compromise from Browne, and also from the doctors. Neither was very likely. In any event, MacBride had by now had enough. Despite the Taoiseach’s suggestion that “possibly we should hold off”, he wrote demanding Browne’s resignation.95

  Browne complied, in a terse letter, on 11 April. Costello, characteristically, was more generous in his reply, saying he and his colleagues appreciated Browne’s work in the Department of Health, “and regret that circumstances should have arisen that have made your resignation unavoidable”.96 Costello invited Browne to accompany him to Áras an Uachtaráin when he went to advise President O’Kelly to accept the resignation; the outgoing Minister declined, going to the Park on his own an hour and a half later.97 Presumably the conversation would have been a little stilted had the two men travelled together. But Browne was about to give everyone in the country plenty to talk about.

  First, he gave the correspondence to the morning newspapers, ensuring the widest possible publicity for his viewpoint. Then he made a scathing attack on his former Government colleagues in the Dáil, forcing Costello in turn to make a lengthy contribution setting out his own position and that of his government.

  Browne said he “had been led to believe” that his insistence on the exclusion of a means test had the full support of his colleagues, but now knew that it had not. “While … I as a Catholic accept unequivocally and unreservedly the views of the Hierarchy on this matter, I have not been able to accept the manner in which this matter has been dealt with by my former colleagues in the Government.” He repeated the claim that Costello had led him to believe that the hierarchy had been satisfied by his October meeting with McQuaid and his colleagues, and complained again that the Taoiseach hadn’t forwarded his letter to the bishops. “This conduct … is open, it seems to me, to only two possible explanations—either that he would not oppose the scheme if agreement were reached with the Medical Association on the means test or that, in the light of his knowledge of the objections still being made by the Hierarch
y and withheld from me, he intended that the scheme without a means test must never in fact be implemented.”98

  Costello said that he had “seldom listened to a statement in which there were so many—let me say it as charitably as possible—inaccuracies, misstatements and misrepresentations”. He had attempted to act as peacemaker, and had given Browne every help, even after the crucial Cabinet meeting. “I wanted him to know that we still were willing to help him and did not want to turn the corkscrew on him. My attitude during all those frightful months received the thanks embodied in the document read here today by Deputy Dr Browne.”

  He pointed out that it was Browne who had sought to amend the legislation to allow for the charging of fees, but the Cabinet rejected the proposal because “we were young as a Government at that time, and we thought we could not put the provision he suggested through the House”. Costello criticised the former Minister for making public matters that were “to be adjusted behind closed doors and … never intended to be the subject of public controversy”. But, with the permission of Archbishop McQuaid, he read further documents into the Dáil record which, he claimed, showed that Browne was wrong to suggest that he had “deluded him and tricked him”. Costello claimed it had been clear all along that he hadn’t replied to the hierarchy’s letter because he was attempting to reach a solution.

  Browne’s criticisms of his former colleagues were repaid in full by the Taoiseach, who said he had reached the conclusion that Browne “was not competent or capable to fulfil the duties of the Department of Health. He was incapable of negotiation; he was obstinate at times and vacillating at other times … I regret my view is that temperamentally he is unfitted for the post of Cabinet Minister.” On the vital question of Church–State relations, Costello said that a government which was “given advice or warnings by the authoritative people in the Catholic Church, on matters strictly confined to faith and morals … will give to their directions … complete obedience and allegiance … I, as a Catholic, obey my Church authorities and will continue to do so, in spite of the Irish Times or anything else, in spite of the fact that they may take votes from me or my party, or anything else of that kind.”99

  Costello’s speech was a carefully constructed defence of his position, and was effective in the context of the Dáil. But his problem was reaching the wider public. As Browne’s biographer John Horgan has noted, “few people would have read all the densely packed columns [of the Dáil debates] … More, on the other hand, would have read at least a large part of the voluminous correspondence which Browne released to the newspapers … reading other people’s letters, after all, is far more fun than reading Dáil debates.”100

  While he was speaking in the Dáil, there was yet another twist. McQuaid had rung up demanding to speak to the Taoiseach. Patrick Lynch, who was in the “bull-pen”, the section of the Dáil where officials sit, was summoned to take the call. The Irish News Agency, one of MacBride’s pet projects, had asked the Archbishop to write a 1,000-word article explaining the bishops’ point of view on the controversy. McQuaid was outraged at this request, and vented his anger on the unfortunate Lynch. When Costello returned to his office, Lynch passed on the message. The Taoiseach put his head in his hands, exclaiming, “Dear God! This is the end.”101

  It was far from the end; Costello would be pursued by questions about the Mother and Child crisis for the rest of his life. The Irish Times was particularly critical, both at the time and later. Costello professed not to care, telling a meeting of UCD’s Literary and Historical Society that he was “around long enough not to be particularly upset by what John Masefield would call the flung spray and the blown spume of the Pearl Bar”.102 As Noël Browne’s iconic status was burnished in later years, Costello’s image was tarnished (although not as much as MacBride’s). But what was the effect, apart from ending Browne’s ministerial career and giving Unionists ample evidence to claim that the Republic was a theocratic state?

  McQuaid rated the crisis as the most important event in Irish history since Catholic Emancipation in 1829. “That the clash should have come in this particular form and under this Government, with Mr Costello at its head, is a very happy success for the Church. The decision of the Government has thrown back Socialism and Communism for a very long time. No Government, for years to come, unless it is frankly Communist, can afford to disregard the moral teaching of the Bishops.”103

  But it wasn’t quite as straightforward as that. Conor Cruise O’Brien pointed out that the government which obeyed the hierarchy was defeated, the party that chose bishops over Browne was shattered, Browne himself was comfortably returned to the next Dáil, and the following Fianna Fáil government introduced a Mother and Child Scheme.104 This is true, although Browne, while he voted for his successor’s scheme, later disowned it. And there were clearly limits to anti-clericalism in Fianna Fáil. In 1953, when the new health scheme was being criticised by the hierarchy, Dan Breen told a parliamentary party meeting, “It’s a terrible pity that 30 years ago, when we had the chance, we didn’t shoot a few Bishops.” His novel approach to Church–State relations was greeted with silence, “although Eamon de Valera looked glum”.105 In the long run, the controversy damaged the Church’s image, and certainly couldn’t be seen as a success, happy or not.

  To return to the immediate aftermath of Browne’s resignation, Costello took over as Minister for Health himself. The move was supposed to be temporary,106 but he remained in the post until the change of government—one reason may have been that a new appointment would have required a Dáil vote, which the Government had no guarantee of winning.

  James Deeny, the Department’s Chief Medical Officer, was then on secondment to the National Tuberculosis Survey, but was told that the Taoiseach “worked only with the medical staff, whom he saw all day every day. When he had decided what he wanted to do, he sent for the Secretary of the Department and in the presence of the medical people gave him his orders. As he was Taoiseach as well as Minister for Health and had a positive determined manner, no one dared to say anything, but the administration did not like it.”107

  The dislike was returned with interest. Costello held senior civil servants in the Department partly responsible for the crisis that had been allowed to develop. Dr J.D. McCormack, a senior medical adviser in the Department, was also a fellow member of Portmarnock. He claimed to the Taoiseach that there was “a prejudice against the medical profession among the lay administrators”.108 This confirmed Costello’s suspicions about attempted State control of medicine. He later told the Dáil that he took away from his short time in the Department “one paramount impression … there was, in the course of the day-to-day administration of this Department, being done … something which was … steadily and surely leading to socialised medicine”.109

  The Taoiseach proceeded to sideline the civil servants and put the Department’s medical staff in charge of negotiations with the IMA. Nothing came of this approach before the general election.110 The joint committee he had set up was dissolved by the new Minister, Dr Jim Ryan—Costello blamed the decision on the need to placate some of the Independents supporting the new government111 (principally Browne). Given time, Costello’s approach might have led to a compromise, although one that would have suited the medical profession.

  But time was something the Inter-party Government no longer had. Discussions of the Mother and Child issue, for the sake of clarity, usually ignore the other pressing matters facing the Government, almost as if it was the only problem facing Costello and his colleagues. But of course this was very far from the case, and while the difficulty with Noël Browne may have been the most important factor in triggering the 1951 general election, it certainly wasn’t the only one. As early as January, the Canadian High Commissioner in London was reporting a prediction by Boland, now the Ambassador to London, that there would be an election in May. “Rising costs and increasing shortages were making life difficult for the people and government. The recent country-wide strikes of r
ailway and bank employees had pointed up the strains under which the Irish economy was suffering. I got the impression that the wear and tear of the last couple of years had taken something out of Costello’s coalition which is not likely to go to the country in quite the solid phalanx he foresaw when he was in Ottawa three years ago.”112 Current affairs journal The Leader noted at around the same time that “the situation in industry has taken a serious turn for the worse over Christmas” with strikes threatening national paralysis, while the Government had “given the impression of weakness all along the line in its handling of the Baltinglass issue”. It added that the absurdity of the latter situation “often brings governments down except in a country which enjoys comedy in politics”.113

  Costello was, occasionally at least, able to enjoy the comedy himself. He told a meeting of the Literary and Historical Society in UCD that being in government “brought neither power nor enjoyment”, although some people seemed to believe he was omnipotent. This he denied, exclaiming, “Power! Why, we could not even cook up a job in a village post office!”114 A sense of the pressure the Taoiseach was under is given by a letter to his friend Tom Bodkin in February (before the healthcare situation reached crisis point). Costello apologised for delays in dealing with the Arts Bill. “The spirit was willing but the insanity that swept through the country before and after Christmas and the illness of practically all my colleagues threw such a burden on me that a 24 hour day wasn’t long enough to provide time to deal with everything … Again strikes—milk, bread, railways, banks—Estimates, Prices Orders and a succession of problems delayed me …”115