The Reluctant Taoiseach

by David McCullagh

  Investment would be funded by “prudent” repatriation of sterling assets through “deliberately planned and controlled deficits” in the balance of payments; by some foreign capital; and by savings at home. Costello stressed the importance of maintaining financial confidence, ruling out a break with sterling. It was also vital to restore public belief in the future of the country. Among his concrete proposals were the establishment of a domestic money market (following the example of the Reserve Bank of India) so that banks could secure at home the liquidity they sought in London; changes to the Control of Manufactures Acts to attract risk-bearing foreign capital; a central savings office; and a Capital Investment Board.57

  This was, as The Leader noted, an ambitious statement of policy; it contained many ideas which would later have a significant impact on the Irish economy. MacEntee evidently recognised the appeal of the speech, for he had officials in the Department of Finance and the Revenue Commissioners draw up memoranda on various points raised by Costello. The officials were predictably critical (Whitaker, for instance, suggested it was “obviously absurd to set up Indian credit arrangements as standards to be followed by this country”), especially of the proposed Capital Investment Board.58

  Inside government, Lemass was pushing a rather similar agenda to that set out by Costello, arguing in July 1953 that continuing unemployment and emigration were caused by the low level of capital investment by private enterprise. Therefore, he argued, “there appears to be no practical alternative to an enlarged programme of State investment”. He wanted £10 million per year invested in road development and other labour-intensive projects. MacEntee rejected this proposal, arguing that “work for work’s sake” would be created “at the cost of heavier taxation and great risk to the country’s financial stability”. However, MacEntee was overruled, with the Government agreeing to the establishment of a National Development Fund of £5 million per year. MacEntee attempted to reopen the question, arguing that this extra sum would make a Budget deficit a certainty, and that the decision would signal “that ‘the lid is off’ and that economy is no longer to be seriously thought of”. His appeal for further consideration appears to have gone unanswered.59

  Costello was predictably unimpressed, dismissing the Fund as “a new machine for distributing political benefits”, and claiming that the Government was attempting to repair the damage it had caused to the economy with “works of an impermanent, and probably of an uneconomic character, which are little better than temporary Relief Schemes”. Capital investment, he said, “does not consist in pulling weeds out of the river Dodder, nor in wiping out villages for the sake of impatient road hogs … This is not Capital Investment, but rather rehabilitation of the victims of disaster—the disaster of FF finances …”60

  MacEntee’s policies on borrowing, and on Ireland’s sterling assets, were also the subject of criticism from Costello. He pointed out that despite the austerity policy introduced by the 1952 Budget, the banks’ sterling holdings actually increased. “The Irish people have to suffer austerity, to eat less and live less well in order that the Irish banking system should increase its holding of sterling assets.” The money, he insisted, would have been better used at home, especially as the value of sterling was depreciating.61 To make matters worse, MacEntee had held off seeking a loan in the autumn of 1951, when Irish credit was good. When he finally launched a loan the following year, the air of crisis he had generated meant a much higher level of interest was needed to attract investors.62

  Apart from the economy, health was also a controversial issue during the lifetime of the Fianna Fáil government, inevitably given the Mother and Child crisis. Costello nailed his colours to the mast early on—everyone accepted the need for improved health services, and the challenge now was to agree a scheme “which will conflict neither with moral principles nor with the just social requirements of the community”.63 When Health Minister Jim Ryan published his White Paper at the end of July 1952, it “accepted the principle of the No Means Test, but its application is circumscribed. Dr Browne had envisaged care of the children up to 16, it is now cut down to 6 weeks … He has won a formal point of principle, but is it the shadow as opposed to reality?”64 Many would argue that that was exactly what Browne got—but it was enough to allow him to vote for the Fianna Fáil scheme and continue supporting the Government.65

  The Fianna Fáil scheme also (after much negotiation) satisfied the hierarchy; but the doctors remained implacable. It is instructive that Fine Gael opposed the Bill, and was the only party to do so. This lends support to the view that medical, rather than episcopal, influence was the main motivating factor in Fine Gael opposition to the Mother and Child scheme. On Costello’s prompting, Sweetman wrote an indignant letter to the Guardian, after that paper’s Dublin correspondent suggested that Fine Gael had only objected to the Health Bill when they “got wind that the Hierarchy was intending to issue a statement attacking the Bill as contrary to Catholic social teaching”. Sweetman pointed out that the Fine Gael opposition was “based on principles consistently advocated by the Party since 1945, when it violently opposed the objectionable proposals then introduced by Mr de Valera’s Government”.66

  In a vociferous speech, accompanied by much thumping of the bench in front of him, Costello denounced Ryan’s scheme as “unjust to the middle classes”, a mere “extension of the dispensary services”, which offered no real benefit to anyone. The proposal to take a £1 “contribution” from those outside the scope of the Bill to allow them to participate was, he claimed, “a fraudulent subterfuge to get over a moral objection which was put forward to the free-for-all scheme”. The Bill, he said, was “incapable of amendment”, and he vowed to “oppose it as vigorously and with every possible means lawfully and constitutionally within my power and at my disposal”. He insisted that Fine Gael remained committed to a “proper” health scheme, and criticised Ryan’s decision to disband the expert committee Costello had established within the Department.67

  Noël Browne claimed what was really irritating Costello was that “his friends were kicked out of the Custom House”. The former Minister claimed that the former Taoiseach had given this expert group “carte blanche to bring in whatever scheme is acceptable to the Medical Association”. Ryan accused Fine Gael of political expediency, saying he had never heard “a more unreasonable … or a more vigorous speech against any measure introduced in this House”.68 With some justice, Costello could be accused of going over the top. As Captain Peadar Cowan said at a later stage in the debate on the Health Bill, “Deputy Costello always suffers here from the serious defect of grossly exaggerating his point.”69 In any event, the 1953 Health Act became law—but its actual implementation was to be left to a new Costello government.70

  The first electoral test since the general election, and the Budget, came in June 1952, with no fewer than three by-elections, in Mayo North, Limerick East and Waterford. The latter seat had been held by Fine Gael’s Bridget Redmond; the other two were Fianna Fáil’s. Opening the by-election campaign in Limerick, Costello urged Opposition co-operation to ensure the Government didn’t win the seat. The Opposition had called for a general election to seek the voters’ views on the Budget—now the people had their chance. He promised that if returned to power, his government would immediately restore the food subsidies removed by MacEntee.71 In Waterford, he said a vote against the Government “will be a clear signal to halt the present drift towards economic stagnation before it has gone too far … Finance must be made the servant and not the master of the nation.”72 In Mayo, he accused the Government of being solely concerned with balancing the budget. “With what happens to the rest of the economy they are not concerned … We are in favour of a progressive financial policy, but with the traditions of our party we can be relied upon to maintain the fundamental soundness of such a policy.”73

  Given the Dáil arithmetic, three Opposition victories could have led to a change of government. It was, Costello told Tom Bodkin, a t
ime of “great alarums and excursions—hopes and fears. Hopes on the part of my colleagues that they would win the three by-elections—fears of the consequences to me personally on my part.” However, while Fine Gael won Limerick East—a “first class miracle”, according to Costello—Fianna Fáil took the seats in Mayo North and Waterford, leaving the overall numbers in the Dáil unchanged. “They are a tough … crowd that will not be easy to beat but will be beaten … Business is stagnant here, unemployment increasing, taxes and prices rising. And still they hold grimly on …”74

  The first test of opinion in the capital came with the death of Independent TD Alfred Byrne of Dublin North-West. Fine Gael didn’t contest the election, agreeing to support Byrne’s brother Thomas, as did Labour.75 Clann na Poblachta ran The O’Rahilly, while the Fianna Fáil candidate was Lord Mayor Andrew Clarkin. MacEntee’s Budget was the main target of opposition attack, with Costello saying that a Fianna Fáil victory “would be taken as an endorsement of their actions in removing the food subsidies”.76 He again accused the Government of misinterpreting the situation, and therefore adopting the wrong policies. “The fruits of Fianna Fáil policy have been so bitter that I think it can reasonably be said that its policy has been disastrous.”77

  The result was a triumph. Byrne was elected on the first count, with a massive 61 per cent of the first preferences. Fianna Fáil’s Clarkin got 31 per cent, while The O’Rahilly received just 8 per cent. The British Embassy reported to London that the result, while not affecting the position in the Dáil, was “generally regarded as a major setback to Fianna Fáil”, who had put up a strong candidate and campaigned hard in his support.78 Costello claimed that no government since the establishment of the State “received such a strong rebuff or such an unmistakable demonstration of public mistrust”. He pointed out that Fianna Fáil didn’t win a majority of the votes in any of the three previous by-elections either. “After such a crushing defeat any self-respecting democratically elected government would dissolve the parliament and submit themselves and their policy to the people … An alternative government is available to them with a forward progressive policy that is based upon confidence in the people and in their capacity to develop the resources of the country.”79

  The next opportunity for the Opposition came in June 1953, after the deaths of a Labour TD from Cork East and a Fianna Fáil deputy in Wicklow. The economy again proved the dominant theme, with Costello telling voters in Cork that the Government’s “policy of enforced austerity and … restrictionism which has caused decline in industry and business prospects must be abandoned”.80 In Wicklow, he complained of the “disgracefully false charge” by Fianna Fáil that the Inter-party Government “engaged in a wild spree of borrowing”. He claimed his government’s record was better than that of Fianna Fáil, further accusing de Valera of securing the support of Independents with a programme “which sounded more like a Deed of Purchase than a policy”.81

  In Wicklow, Fine Gael candidate Mark Deering was in third place on the first count, which was headed by Fianna Fáil’s Paudge Brennan, son of the deceased TD, followed by Labour’s Senator James McCrea. However, Deering pulled ahead on transfers and managed to take the seat. In Cork East, Richard Barry of Fine Gael topped the poll, and took the seat with the transfers of Labour’s Sean Keane Junior, whose father had held the seat before his death. Costello told a correspondent in England that the results “were very encouraging and we are in full swing in preparation for a General Election which cannot be long postponed”.82

  The Fine Gael gain from Fianna Fáil in Wicklow narrowed de Valera’s majority, but the Taoiseach opted to meet the challenge head on. On the Monday after the by-elections, the Government decided to put down a confidence motion for debate in the Dáil on Wednesday 30 June. The Taoiseach spoke for 55 minutes, the leader of the Opposition for 15 minutes longer.83 Costello claimed the motion was “a ragged cloak for the Government’s political shame”, saying that with a “meagre majority” it planned to continue in office “in defiance of the will of the people … in the hope that something may turn up at some time in the future to save them from the wrath of the electorate”. He claimed the six constituencies which had seen by-elections were a “perfect microcosm of the whole country”, and that the Fianna Fáil vote had fallen from 46 per cent in the general election to just 39 per cent. However, he forecast that the Independent deputies “whose political existence depends on their maintaining the present Government in power [would] continue to do so”.84 Of course, he was right—the Government won the vote by 73 to 71, and also regained the political initiative.

  Two weeks later, former Ceann Comhairle Frank Fahy died. De Valera quickly moved the writ for the Galway South by-election, which was held on 21 August. Fianna Fáil was always likely to do better in this constituency than in some of the urban areas, and the quick campaign allowed the party to build on the momentum generated by the confidence vote. The Fine Gael candidate, Brendan Glynn, described Fianna Fáil’s “terrifying organisation, as thorough and frightening to many in this constituency as its counterpart behind the Iron Curtain”. But he said they had been “quite shaken” in the few days before the vote, and that Costello’s “wonderful meeting in Ballinasloe on Wednesday night nearly finished them”.85 In fact, the Fianna Fáil candidate was elected on the first count with 54.5 per cent of the vote; however, Glynn increased the Fine Gael vote from 29 per cent in the 1951 general election to 33 per cent, a reasonable though not dramatic performance in a difficult constituency.

  At the end of November, Costello appealed for the co-operation of supporters of all Opposition parties “to bring about the final break up of the Government which has wrought such havoc”.86 But most observers felt that the Government had actually consolidated its position, especially since three of its Independent supporters—Noël Browne, Michael ffrench-O’Carroll and Patrick Cogan—joined Fianna Fáil in October.87 While Galway wasn’t in itself particularly important, the by-election “acquired almost national significance by the fuss with which it was surrounded”.88 As 1954 dawned, the Government looked relatively stable—but within a few months, Jack Costello would be back in office as Taoiseach.

  Before looking at how that came about, we should consider Costello’s other preoccupation in these years, the law. As was pointed out at the start of the chapter, this was arguably his most successful period as a barrister. He was at the height of his powers, had the status of being a former Taoiseach, and was one of the most sought-after senior counsels. When Arthur Cox was asked to act for Winston Churchill in a libel action being taken against him by Brigadier Eric Dorman-O’Gowan,89 he asked Costello to lead the legal team. Churchill’s British lawyer, Hartley Shawcross, told his client that “Costello is said to occupy easily the leading position at the Irish bar and he impressed me as being undoubtedly a fighter.”90 However, the former Taoiseach did not get an opportunity to defend the Prime Minister, as the matter was settled out of court.91

  A libel action which did go to trial involved two Irish institutions—The Leader magazine, and poet Patrick Kavanagh. Kavanagh took exception to a profile of him published in The Leader in October 1952, and sued for libel. Among other things, the profile referred to Kavanagh holding court in McDaid’s pub, surrounded by younger artists: “The great voice, reminiscent of a load of gravel sliding down the side of a quarry, booms out … With a malevolent insult, which, naturally, is well received, the Master orders a further measure … ‘Yous have no merit, no merit at all’—he insults them individually and collectively … His observations on contemporary city life are shot through with a superficiality and lack of perception.” However, the profile also acknowledged that Kavanagh was “our finest living poet”, that he had been “harshly” treated by the State, and that his poem The Great Hunger was “probably the best poem written in Ireland since Goldsmith gave us The Deserted Village”.92

  According to his biographer, Kavanagh didn’t expect the action to come to trial, anticipating that The Lea
der would agree an out of court settlement.93 Curiously, Costello indicated at the time that it was Kavanagh who wouldn’t settle. He told Tom Bodkin that he had “a certain amount of sympathy with the Plaintiff though I think he was very wrong in bringing the action in all the circumstances and particularly in not giving us an opportunity of doing something before the Proceedings were instituted. However, I suppose he knows his own business best.”94

  The trial was a public sensation—future Chief Justice Ronan Keane, who attended as a law student, recalls members of the public queuing out the Round Hall of the Four Courts and down the quays trying to get in. The level of public interest was only matched by the Arms Trial almost 20 years later.95 The Kavanagh action opened on Wednesday 3 February 1954, before a newly appointed judge, Mr Justice Tommy Teevan. Kavanagh’s legal team was led by former Fine Gael TD Sir John Esmonde; Costello led for the defence.

  The offending profile was read in full, and Kavanagh’s counsel claimed that he had been “gravely injured in his character, credit and reputation and in his profession as a writer and journalist, and had been brought into public hatred, scandal and contempt”. Kavanagh told the jury that “a wild life is total anathema to me”.96 In his cross-examination, Costello demonstrated a detailed knowledge of Kavanagh’s writings, and compared the relatively complimentary tenor of the profile in The Leader with Kavanagh’s own published criticism of other people’s work, which according to his biographer was “far more vicious and personal”.97 Observers were struck by Costello’s effective way of appealing to the jury, contrasting his “plain man of the people persona with Kavanagh’s profession of himself as an artist”.98

  The profile had referred to “the ceiling of his Pembroke Road flat on which his friend Brendan Behan has woven such delicate traceries of intermingling colour to suggest a London sky at evening”.99 During the second full day of cross-examination, Kavanagh vehemently denied being a friend of Behan, becoming quite heated on the subject. One of Behan’s brothers, Seamus, wrote directly to Costello after reading newspaper reports of this evidence. He said that Kavanagh had perjured himself. “I have frequently seen Mr Kavanagh in my brother’s company, and I have been myself introduced to Mr Kavanagh by my brother in McDaid’s of Grafton Street (Harry Street). You may make what use you wish of this letter.”100