From Gaza to Jerusalem

by Stuart Hadaway

  The further actions of the Eastern Force (EF) were not just a tactical decision, but also a strategic one to be taken at the highest of levels. In December 1916 David Lloyd George had become Prime Minister. He was a convinced ‘Easterner’; one who believed that the war could not be won by the mass, bloody battles on the Western Front, but instead by attacking Germany’s allies further east. However, his senior military commander, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir William Robertson, was a firm ‘Westerner’; one who believed that the war could only be won by defeating the Germans head-on in France and Belgium. The future of the army in Egypt became the focus of a tug-of-war between the opposing views. While Lloyd George encouraged Murray to advance, Robertson encouraged caution. Murray had asked in mid December 1916 for a further two infantry divisions to be sent to him, to sustain active operations through the winter and spring months. Lloyd George, eager for any victory to buoy up flagging morale at home, was keen, but resources were limited and already offensives were being planned for the spring in Mesopotamia, Macedonia, and across the Western Front. Instead, Robertson reminded Murray that, while he was to maintain the offensive where possible, his core task was to defend Egypt and that, in his view, Murray had more than adequate strength for this already.19

  In mid January 1917, Murray’s request was formally declined. On 11 January Murray was not only informed that any major action in Palestine would have to be suspended until the following winter (although he should continue to make limited local attacks), he was now to relinquish one of his divisions to send to France. Murray chose the 42nd Division, which he considered to be his best, and which began leaving Egypt in February.20 In partial compensation, Robertson gave permission for a new infantry division to be raised in Egypt, based upon three yeomanry brigades that still not been remounted since their withdrawal from the Dardanelles a year earlier. The 2nd Dismounted Brigade became the 229th Infantry Brigade, the 3rd Dismounted became the 230th Infantry, and the 4th Dismounted the 231st Infantry Brigade. Together, they formed the 74th (Yeomanry) Division, although they remained lacking in artillery and other support troops for a considerable period.21

  At the same time, the cavalry of the EF was reorganised. The A&NZ Mounted Division, under Major General Harry Chauvel, now consisted of the 1st and 2nd ALH Brigades, the NZMR Brigade and the 22nd Mounted Brigade. The 3rd and 4th ALH Brigades and the 5th and 6th Mounted Brigades now formed a new unit, the Imperial Mounted Division, under the command of Major General Henry Hodgson. This move greatly simplified the command structure of the cavalry, which up to then had included several independent brigades, but it also caused a stir among some of the Australian units, who would have preferred to have been grouped together as a single division.22

  While these discussions and reorganisations took place, the EF continued to probe the Ottoman positions, and to prepare for further operations. Construction of the railway and pipeline continued, the former reaching Rafah, about 32km (20 miles) south of Gaza, by 21 March, and the latter following shortly behind.23 Meanwhile, the remaining Ottoman garrisons south of Gaza had been withdrawn. The village of Khan Yunis, which contained important wells, was found to have been abandoned on 28 February and was occupied by the Desert Column. Further east the Ottomans had been developing a significant strongpoint around the wells and springs at Shellal (Besor Park), on the Wadi Ghazze. However, the position was judged too exposed by the Ottomans, who were mindful of the ability of the British cavalry to strike at such isolated garrisons.24 On 5 March patrols from the Royal Flying Corps reported that the garrison was being withdrawn, and this too was occupied without resistance.25

  The Ottoman line now ran from Gaza south-east to Tel Esh Sharia, where the 16th (OT) Infantry Division was based, and then on further south-east to Beersheba. Despite the lack of practical support from London, Murray was determined to press ahead with localised attacks into Palestine, starting with seizing Gaza as a gateway into southern Palestine. Moving the army into position was a drawn-out process. Troops moved mostly at night and then took cover during the day to be hidden from German aeroplanes. Although the RFC enjoyed a numerical advantage, the far fewer aircraft available to the Germans were newer and of a considerably higher performance, and little could be done practically to stop them roaming over the British lines at will.

  In return, the British took advantage of the small numbers of enemy aeroplanes to raid into Ottoman territory. On 20 March 1917 a flight from No. 1 Squadron, Australian Flying Corps, was detailed to bomb the railway over the Wadi Hesi. Two bomb-carrying BE2cs, flown by Captain D.W. Rutherford and Lieutenant Drummond, were escorted by two Martynside G.100s, flown by Lieutenant L. Ellis and Lieutenant Frank McNamara. Although officially escorts, the Martynsides each had a few bombs on board. On arriving over the target, the two BE2cs dropped their bombs first, with Lieutenant Ellis following suit. McNamara dropped his last, flying low over a train to do so. Too low, in fact, as shrapnel from the explosions tore into his own aircraft, and his right buttock. As he turned for home, he spotted a BE2c on the ground, and, despite his wound, made the swift decision to land and pick up the pilot, Captain Rutherford. He landed successfully, but on take-off his wound began to tell. As his right leg weakened, the aircraft swung to one side, hit rough ground and the undercarriage tore off. Rutherford and McNamara clambered out of the wreckage, and, pausing only to set fire to the Martynside, ran and hobbled back to the BE2c. By now, Ottoman cavalrymen were closing in rapidly on the pair, but McNamara scrambled into the cockpit while Rutherford started the engine. With McNamara at the controls, they somehow coaxed the damaged aircraft into the air, even as the Ottoman horsemen raced along beside them. During the 70-mile flight to the nearest British airfield, McNamara could only keep himself conscious by sticking his head out the cockpit into the slipstream, and on landing he collapsed from loss of blood. For his actions, he received the first Victoria Cross of the Palestine campaign.26

  Meanwhile, the army closed on Gaza. Units had to move by stages dictated by the available water sources, and in numbers that would not over-tax that supply. Under these circumstances, it took six days to move the army into place. By midnight on 25 March 1917 the troops were concentrated at the closest points they could without being discovered by the enemy.

  At Deir el Belah, about 13km (8 miles) south-west of Gaza, stood the Desert Column under Chetwode. His two mounted divisions were both reduced to three brigades for the operation – the A&NZ Mounted Division lost the 1st ALH Brigade and the Imperial Mounted Division lost the 4th ALH Brigade. Having also lost the 42nd Division to France, for this battle the 53rd (Welsh) Division, under Major General A.G. Dallas, were attached to his command. The rest of the Eastern Force was spread out around them. The 52nd (Lowland) Division was at Khan Yunis 8km (5 miles) further south-west, as a general reserve. The 54th (East Anglian) Division stood 3.2 km (2 miles) east of the Desert Column at In Seirate, and the Imperial Camel Corps at Abasan el Kebir, 8km (5 miles) south-east of Khan Yunis.27 Both of these formations would move east for the battle, protecting the army’s inland flank.

  The Desert Column was to bear the brunt of the fighting. The A&NZ Mounted Division and the Imperial Mounted Division were to cross the Wadi Ghazze to the east, and head north to cast a protective cordon around the city. Their task was two-fold. Firstly, they were to prevent the garrison of Gaza, judged to be about 2,000 men, from escaping. Throughout the planning for the battle, the overriding assumption by most of the senior officers, based on Ottoman actions over the past eight months in the Sinai and just across the border, was that the garrison would not stand and fight, but would rather withdraw after a token resistance.28 Murray wanted the garrison of Gaza eliminated from the Ottoman order of battle, and so to prevent any such running, the A&NZ Mounted Division was to cut them off to the north and north-east, and the Imperial Mounted Division to the north-east and east. Their second task would be to prevent Ottoman reinforcements from entering the city from those directions. The Imperial Came
l Corps (ICC), acting under the direct command of Dobell instead of under Chetwode, would operate to the south of the Imperial Mounted Division, cutting off the routes to or from Beersheba, and completing the encirclement. The two divisions and the ICC together would amount to some 11,000 men, although only around 6,000 of them would be capable of fighting in the firing line.29 This was a lower proportion than usual; the mounted troops would have to operate for several days away from their camps and so took large numbers of pack animals along to carry rations, ammunition and small supplies of water. The extra handlers needed to lead these animals would not be able to fight. Crucially, it was not expected that the two divisions of horsemen would be able to find sufficient water to meet their needs during the day, and this assumption placed a clear deadline on the action.30

  The actual assault on Gaza was to be carried out by 12,000 infantry, mostly of the 53rd (Welsh) Division – the 158th, 159th and 160th Brigades, plus the 161st Brigade attached from 54th Division. Their attack would come at Gaza from the south-east, running along two ridge lines to converge just outside the city.

  Along the coast runs a strip of sand dunes, at times several miles wide. In the area directly south-west of Gaza they run to about 3.2km (2 miles) inland, until reaching a low ridge along which the main Rafah–Gaza road runs. This ridge was low enough to have little tactical or strategic significance for the coming battle, although on the seaward side a mixed detachment under Lieutenant Colonel N. Money DSO was placed to cut off any attempts of the Ottomans to escape or counter-attack along the beach.* Just to the east of the main road a higher ridge runs from Khirbet el Sire north to the eastern edge of Gaza. Here, it terminates in a hill topped by a mosque. Known as Ali Muntar, this hill rises about 91m (300ft) over Gaza, and was about 800m (half a mile) from the edge of the city in 1917. Just south of it on the ridge, known as Es Sire Ridge, stands Green Hill. Just to the north of Ali Muntar, but separate from it, stood Clay Hill. Together, the two hills covered the approaches to Ali Muntar, while Ali Muntar dominated Gaza. Although the exact strengths and locations of any defences were not know, it was expected that these would be the crux of the Ottoman positions.

  To the east of Es Sire Ridge runs a broad valley, on the other side of which (and parallel to Es Sire Ridge) ran Burjabye Ridge. About 4.8km (3 miles) south-east of Gaza this ridge terminates in a plateau at Khirbet Mansura. This provided a good platform for any artillery supporting an attack on Ali Muntar. To the east of these at the head of another ridge is another plateau, Sheikh Abbas. From this latter position a good view over the surrounding area can be obtained, and it was here that 54th (East Anglian) Division was to stand ready to support either the attacking infantry or the defending cavalry.

  For most of their length, the areas along and between the ridges of Es Sire and Burjabye was almost devoid of cover, apart from the frequent, steep-sided and deep but generally narrow nullahs (dried stream beds) that ran down their sides. There was some crop growth, but this was quickly trampled. Closer to the city, a serious obstacle arose in the shape of cactus hedges. These grew all around the edges of the city, but were particularly dense in the south, just beyond Green Hill in an area known as ‘The Labyrinth’. They were used, as they still are today, to mark the boundaries of fields and orchards. They grew to a considerable height, and could be 1.2 to 1.5m (4 or 5ft) thick. They were flexible enough for shell fire to have little serious effect, and the only way for the attackers to get through them would be by hacking at them with bayonets; even then, the soldier was likely to only be faced with another hedge a few metres further on. While slowing down the attackers, these hedges also provided excellent cover and protection for the defenders. The slopes running up to the three key hills, though, were clear of cacti. Indeed, they were almost devoid of any cover at all.

  The attack started in the early hours of 26 March. Different units began at different times, depending on how far they had to travel. The 53rd (Welsh) Division began at 1 a.m., despite having already marched 11km (7 miles) earlier in the evening. They now faced another 6.5km (4 miles) to reach the Wadi Ghazze, which they were to cross by 4 a.m. From there, it would be 4.8 more kilometres (3 miles) to Esh Sheluf on Es Sire Ridge and Mansura on Burjabye Ridge, which were to be the start points for the actual assault.31 The cavalry moved out slightly later.

  At 4 a.m., as dawn began to break, a fog started to roll in off the sea. By 5 a.m. it had thickened to a point where visibility was in places just 20m (21yds); difficult conditions for navigating unfamiliar territory that is lacking in landmarks at the best of times. And it was unfamiliar territory. So as to maintain the element of surprise, little reconnaissance had been done of this area, and even less of the defences themselves. The officer commanding 53rd (Welsh) Division had only personally visited the area just north of the wadi, and had not ventured to where the battle itself would be fought.32 On the eve of the battle he approached the area again with his senior commanders, although only as far as the wadi. While doing so, they made careful notes and recorded compass bearings to enable them to find their way to their crossing points in the dark, but on returning to the divisional camp were told that they would instead follow routes marked by the Royal Engineers. It was now too late for them to familiarise themselves with these in daylight.33

  Opinion is divided on how much of a problem the fog was. It certainly slowed the progress of some of the units and formations involved, although comparing unit records shows that the fog was patchy and lifted at different times in different places. In particular, the infantry suffered more than the cavalry, and it was the latter’s greater experience in riding across unfamiliar country that probably helped here. The level of impediment to the movements of the infantry also varied. Some of the first units to cross the Wadi Ghazze were fine; the 160th Brigade of the 53rd (Welsh) Division were across the Wadi and in position by 5 a.m., before the fog closed in. Behind them, the 158th Brigade found that the tapes the Royal Engineers had laid to mark the path had been removed (by the Australians, they assumed, although this is probably a case of a ‘give a dog a bad name’, or rather ‘a digger an undisciplined reputation’), and were over an hour late in reaching their starting point.34 Even today, with Gaza and the surrounding area heavily settled, and roads and power-lines criss-crossing the whole area, it is easy to become lost or disorientated without clear sight of landmarks or buildings. While a compass is useful, it does not take too many diversions to avoid nullahs to throw out any hopes of keeping to a straight line.

  But it was not so much the delay in getting troops into position, but the delays that the fog caused in allowing the higher command to establish themselves that really caused the problems. Brigades and divisions had problems keeping contact with each other, but perhaps most importantly it blocked the Ottoman positions from sight. The plans for the attack had been left deliberately vague, waiting for close observation of the enemy positions to be carried out at dawn before detailed orders could be drawn up. And, once they had been drawn up, the next problem would be issuing them and establishing proper communications around the battlefield despite the fog.

  Communications were the glue that held the army together, carrying information and orders up and down the chain of command, but also allowing effective coordination between units that were fighting side by side, and between the infantry making the attack and the artillery who were supporting them. In 1917, the communications technology available on battlefields was lagging behind the advances in weaponry and tactics. Battlefields now stretched over many kilometres, making it beyond the ability of a single commanding general to monitor the field and issue orders in person. To have any real chance of controlling his forces, a divisional or corps commander had to stand well back from the battlefield (something for which First World War commanders are often unfairly criticised) and rely on a communications network to bring reports in and send orders out. These commanders and their HQs had to be static, too; the commander had to stay where his subordinates, and indeed superiors, coul
d find him, without them wasting time and effort searching the battlefield for their errant general. When General Dallas went forward to reconnoitre soon after dawn, Chetwode found himself unable to contact one of his senior commanders for a considerable period, much to his frustration.35

  Wireless and telephone sets were available, but they were cumbersome, unreliable and fragile. In the case of the 1st Battle of Gaza, it was additionally found that the Ottoman wireless equipment in Gaza put out a signal strong enough to swamp the British transmissions, making their wireless sets useless.36 Telephones were more reliable, as long as the wires were not cut by a shell or a wheel passing over them. They were used not only between units and headquarters, but also between artillery batteries and their forward observers. However, shortages of cable made themselves felt, especially as batteries changed position and had to lay extra lines to the new site, or as the infantry advanced. Many of the observers found themselves having increasing difficulties in staying in touch with the guns they were supposed to be directing, with the result that the infantry did not get the support they needed.37