From Gaza to Jerusalem

by Stuart Hadaway

  The tanks were also already on hand, having been sent out over the winter. It had been decided not to use them for the first battle, as this was expected to be a mobile battle leading to a general pursuit of the enemy, in which the tanks would not have the ability to keep up. None of the eight machines were in their prime. The plan had been to send twelve new tanks, but this was later reduced to eight, and in a mix-up those that were despatched (a mixture of Mk. Is and Mk. IIs) were old training vehicles. Their crews were drawn from E Company, Heavy Branch Machine Gun Corps. They were called forward from their depot (which were briefly known during the First World War as ‘tankodromes’ before ‘tank park’ regrettably became the standard term) near Kantara, on the Suez Canal, to Khan Yunis and then Deir el Belah.91 Little effort appears to have been made to integrate the tanks fully into the plan, or arrange coordinated actions with them. Actions in France had already shown how vulnerable tanks could be to enemy artillery fire, and the necessity of acting in close harmony with supporting infantry and artillery in order to be effective. Other costly lessons had included the need to use tanks in large concentrated groups, with the ideal sub-unit within that being four tanks, as well as the dangers of over-estimating the ability of tanks and assigning them too many objectives. All of these lessons would be completely ignored during the coming battle. Indeed, the ‘Special Instructions – Tanks’ issued by Eastern Force HQ declared that:

  Tanks must be regarded as entirely accessory to the ordinary methods of attack, i.e., to the advance of infantry in close cooperation with the artillery.

  Any modifications or alterations required in the plan of attack when tanks are employed must be such as will not jeopardise the success of the attack in the event of the failure of the tanks.92

  On the one hand this is perhaps understandable; tanks were new and unfamiliar weapons, of known mechanical frailty and untried in desert combat conditions. It would be terrible for the attack of a brigade or even a division to fall to pieces at a critical juncture simply because a tank had broken down. On the other hand, by not making any allowances for the tanks in the plan at all, they were being almost certainly doomed to failure.

  If the rushed preparations and lack of reinforcements did not cause any misgivings among the men of the EEF, an order issued a week before the start of the second battle probably would have. In line with the policy operating in France, each unit would leave a cadre of men behind. They would act as a pool of reinforcements or, ominously, as an experienced core around which to rebuild any units that had taken severe losses. Every infantry battalion was leave either their commanding officer, his second-in-command, or the ‘fittest’ of the four company commanders behind to lead this cadre. With him would be at least four other ‘company officers’ (i.e. fighting officers as opposed to supply, signals, etc. officers) including at least one company commander and one second-in-command, as well as two company sergeant majors, the most senior non-commissioned men in each company. Each company would then leave an additional sergeant, corporal and lance corporal, and three privates from each platoon. On top of these, 10 per cent of the specialist troops (i.e. signallers, scouts, machine-gunners) would also be left behind. Apart from surely casting a pessimistic impression on the men, this was also a hefty proportion of soldiers to take from what were already mostly under-strength units. Even more importantly, it eliminated some significant sections of the chain of command on the eve of a battle. Just when soldiers would need to see familiar faces, and have a clear idea of whom to report to, listen to and follow, the whole structure of their company and battalion would be changed.93

  With all of these considerations, it is hard to see the coming action as anything but predestined to fail. Everything was too rushed. There was not enough change where change was needed, and too much where consistency and familiarity would have been most advantageous.

  Kress von Kressenstein’s forces now manned a formidable line of defences, held by some 49,000 troops, of which about 18,000 were front-line riflemen, supported by machine guns, artillery, and about 1,500 cavalrymen.94 The 3rd (OT) Infantry Division had come forward from Jemmame to permanent positions at Gaza. The defences south and east of the city, especially around Ali Muntar, had been considerably built up, with new redoubts and trenches built from Es Sire Ridge to the sea, including along Samson Ridge. The confused areas around Ali Muntar, already made complicated and formidable by the cactus hedges, had been improved and fortified, and the codenames for the new trench systems – The Maze, The Warren and The Labyrinth, speak for themselves.

  East of Gaza a tight series of trench systems covered the area over which the British cavalry had passed a few weeks before. Known as Beer Trenches, these stretched for several miles to Khan Sihan, where a short gap existed before the line reached Atawine Redount. These positions were garrisoned by the newly arrived 53rd (OT) Infantry Division. They did not form a continuous line but as they were sited along a stretch of high ground they effectively dominated the area before them, as well as the apparently empty gaps in between. At the eastern end, the 16th (OT) Infantry Division held the Hairpin and Hureira Redoubts, and then a small detachment at the far end held Beersheba. Behind the line, the 3rd (OT) Cavalry Division was in reserve at Jemmame, although it was brought up to Tel esh Sheria on the evening of 17 April.95

  The 2nd Battle of Gaza opened late on 16 April, with the various British divisions moving forward from south of the Wadi Ghazze towards their concentration points to the north. On the far left, 53rd (Welsh) Division (under Brigadier General Mott, after Dallas’ resignation) moved forward up the coastal sand dunes between the Gaza–Rafa road and the sea. They advanced until their right met with the ‘Eastern Attack’ force, formed from 52nd (Lowland) and 54th (East Anglian) Divisions, together under the command of Major General W.E.B. Smith (OC 52nd Division). This had advanced to a line running from Sheikh Abbas on the right, through Mansura and onto Kurd Hill on the Es Sire Ridge. This move had meet with some resistance. The 157th Brigade had to clear Ottoman piquets off El Burjabye Ridge. This had been done by patrols from the brigade every night since 9 April, and so initially the Ottomans read nothing special into the attack.96 However, once the full brigade became visible in the dawn on Mansura Ridge, artillery fire began to fall among them. To their right, 163rd Brigade of 54th Division faced a stiffer task in clearing the Sheik Abbas Ridge. Although supported by two tanks (one of which was knocked out) some 300 men were lost clearing this area.97

  On the eastern flank of ‘Eastern Attack’ was the Desert Column. The Imperial Camel Corps Brigade moved up from Abasan el Kebir to bridge the gap between the infantry and the Imperial Mounted Division, whose first objective was the height at Tel el Jemmi (Tel Gamma). This tel* not only sat on or near the banks of two wadis, but was also an excellent command post. It gave clear views for many miles around, while conversely, in a relatively flat landscape, being a first-class navigation point for messengers or stretcher parties to find quickly. Chetwode lost no time in establishing this as the headquarters of the Desert Column. Further east, the A&NZ Mounted Division gathered at the prolific springs at Shellal. These had been abandoned by the Ottomans in March, leaving behind a machine-gun post dug into the ruins of a Byzantine church overlooking the springs. Underneath the post was found the remarkable sixth-century mosaic that was later taken back to Australia and is now on display in the Hall of Valour in the Australian War Memorial.

  By dawn on 17 April most of the initial objectives had been seized. The infantry held a line from Sheikh Abbas to the sea, and the Desert Column had taken possession of the two vital water sources on the eastern flank. From Tel el Jemmi, the Imperial Mounted Division had pushed north into touch with the eastern end of the Ottoman defensive line: the Atawine and Hairpin Redoubts. The A&NZ Mounted Division had come into touch with the most easterly enemy position, the Hureira Redoubt, and then swung further south to protect the open desert flank from the Ottoman garrison at Beersheba. Two patrols of the QOWH, from 5th Mounted Brigade,
had even crossed between the Hairpin and Hureira Redoubts to cut the telephone and telegraph lines. Two lieutenants, R.M.F. Harvey and Jack Parsons,** each led a five-man patrol out at midnight on a 6-mile ride through enemy lines. Parsons had encountered an Ottoman patrol and made a fighting retreat, while Harvey managed to destroy a lengthy section of line before running into a patrol and making it back to British lines at the gallop.98 Apart from any annoyance value, this raid also forced the Ottomans to rely on wireless communications, which could be easily intercepted and read by Military Intelligence in Cairo.99

  The Ottomans also attacked the British lines of communications. Soon after dawn on 19 April, a Rumpler C.1 (serial 2631) flown by Oberleutnants Gerhard Felmy and Richard Falke landed by the railway and pipeline near Bir Selmana. They laid charges on both, and on the telegraph and telephone posts. On detonation, the communications lines came down, but the pipeline was only scratched while the charges on the railway failed to explode. The German pilots retrieved the latter, and, placing them on the pipeline, tried again. This time, a hole was blown in the pipe. The pilots then escaped back to Ottoman lines, taking a piece of the pipeline as a prize.100

  The rest of 17 April was spent digging in, and at dusk the cavalry withdrew (leaving piquets behind) to their respective bases, where the springs and wadis were being developed to supply adequate water for the horses. At dawn on 18 April they were again in position close to the enemy, while the infantry continued to dig in along their advanced line. At the same time, stores, ammunition and artillery were brought up. The British and Ottoman artillery kept up sporadic fire throughout the day. By bringing his forces across the Wadi Ghazze and spending the best part of two days setting them up largely within sight of the Ottoman defences, Dobell had of course lost any chance of surprise in his attack. However, it is debatable how much surprise could really be achieved, given the British inability to keep German reconnaissance aircraft from their airspace.

  It is also doubtful how much of an advantage mere surprise would have been against the Ottoman defences. As it was, if nothing else Dobell had ensured that his men would not face the long march that had preceded the first battle, and would therefore hopefully go into action on time and relatively fresh. This they did at dawn on 19 April. At 5.30 a.m. the British artillery opened a barrage, supported by the naval guns off-shore. It was a fairly ineffectual affair; with fewer than 150 guns to cover a frontage of 13,700m (15,000yds) and only limited ammunition, the shelling was too light to make any difference.101 For the first ninety minutes the 4.5in howitzers kept up a steady fire of gas shells – around 2,000 in all, spread across twelve of what were deemed to be the tougher defensive posts or largest artillery positions. As with the main bombardment, the concentration was too low; the gas evaporated or dissipated long before the necessary density could be built up to have any effect, and it seems likely that the Ottomans did not even know that gas had been used.102

  At 7.15 a.m. the 53rd (Welsh) Division advanced, followed by the Eastern Attack at 7.30 a.m. In both cases, most units had to advance for an average of 1,800m (2,000yds) across ground that was ‘perfectly open grass-land, quite smooth and as flat as a lawn’;103 this as the best part of a thirty-minute march at the standard infantry rate of 3mph. Sergeant Thomas Minshall of the 10th King’s Shropshire Light Infantry was stirred by the sight of the long lines advancing:

  The air and earth fairly shook, shells of all calibres up to 11 inches, tore slits into the elaborate Turkish defences, the battleships pouring a deadly fire into the forts on the hills around the city, and our comrades commenced to advance about 8.30 a.m. [sic]. I saw the men walking across the plain before Gaza, every man a hero, they moved forward with splendid steadiness through a shower of shrapnel and high explosives and owing to the open ground many brave fellows dropped never to rise again as I watched them advance.104

  Perhaps of crucial importance to his account, Minshall’s battalion was part of 74th (Yeomanry) Division, which was kept as a reserve and did not take any part in the advance themselves. Those who did found a less romantic reality: the plain was swept by artillery and machine-gun fire, and the Ottoman defences were virtually untouched by the bombardment. On Eastern Attack’s flank, the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade had been attached to 54th Division, while the two mounted divisions were given orders merely to ‘demonstrate’ in front of the Ottoman lines. This entailed creating enough of a threat that the Ottomans would be compelled to keep their line fully manned, and thus not able to send troops west as reinforcements. The cavalry were also to guard the open flank against any counter-attacks from Beersheba.105

  The 53rd (Welsh) Division had the most successful day of any of the attacking formations. Despite stiff resistance, and with the aid of two tanks (although one broke a track very early on and was of little use) the division took the small Sheikh Ajiln hill on the coast, and the much larger Samson Ridge at around 1 p.m. This ridge ran parallel along the south-western side of Gaza, but separate from the main defences. Once on the ridge, the division did not have the strength to cross the valley and assault the El Arish Redoubt opposite, although the single remaining tank made an attempt. The female* Mk.1, named ‘Tiger’, ran amok for several hours, at times with Ottoman infantry literally banging on the side trying to get in. Every crew member was wounded, and at one point Lieutenant Dunkerley of the Royal West Kents, on board as a guide, had to take the controls and drive the tank, despite having a wound himself. Eventually, having fired 27,000 rounds of ammunition, the tank withdrew. The division, however, made the sensible decision to dig in with the gains already made and, by early afternoon, their artillery had been diverted to supporting the 52nd Division to their right.106

  The 52nd (Lowland) Division needed that help very badly. The 155th Brigade managed to gain a foothold on Outpost Hill by about 10 a.m. Their supporting tank tipped over, but a reserve was brought up in its place. An Ottoman counter-attack pushed the Scots back at about 11 a.m., but they managed to rally and take the hill. Unfortunately, Outpost Hill was just that, an outpost in front of the main line. As with the Welsh by the coast, crossing the gap into the main defences proved impossible. By dusk around seventy men under the command of Lieutenant Robert Anderson were all that remained, mostly from the 4th Battalion King’s Own Scottish Borderers (KOSB), with a few others from the 5th Battalion KOSB and the 5th Royal Scots Fusiliers. Anderson made the decision to withdraw, ensuring that the wounded were successfully evacuated but paying with his own life. The 4th Battalion suffered six officers and 155 men killed, and only nine officers and fifteen men wounded. The highly unusual ratio (usually more men would be wounded than killed) speaks of the weight of Ottoman fire, making it impossible to recover wounded men or drag them into cover. The 5th KOSB lost even more heavily: twenty-one officers and 322 men killed or wounded. That night, the battalion mustered at less than company strength. The two other battalions in the brigade – 4th and 5th RSF – suffered a combined casualty total of around 500 men.107

  Further along the line, the 54th (East Anglian) Division paid much the same cost for even less gain. Two companies of 1/10th London Regiment, from 162nd Brigade, broke through just to the east of Ali Muntar at 8.30 a.m., and advanced north until they actually crossed the Gaza–Beersheba road. However, two battalions of Ottoman infantry counter-attacked and pushed them back. Further east two companies of the 1/5th Norfolk Regiment followed a tank into a redoubt a mile north-west of Khan Sihan. The tank was quickly knocked out by artillery fire, and the supporting battalions –1/4th Norfolks and 1/8th Hampshire Regiment – were pinned down too far back to give any support. Eventually the last battalion in the brigade, 1/5th Suffolk Regiment, was sent forward. Their commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel F.H.A. Wollaston, found there was nothing that could be done:

  Our Brigade’s objectives was [sic] trenches and a couple of redoubts about 2,000 yards to our front. The 4th and 5th Norfolks commenced the attack with some of the Machine Gun Company following a Tank, this Tank got into one
redoubt and did very good work but it was knocked out a few minutes later and the crew came out of it burning. Some men also got into the redoubt and took a few prisoners but could not hold it. The 8th Hants soon went up in support and after that little is known of what happened; the Brigade was spread about in small parties and as far as could be ascertained most of them were either killed or wounded. The Turks seem to have reserved their machine-gun fire for certain places and the troops were caught by this fire from every direction and on coming to these selected spots they were simply mown down. In the afternoon men were seen retiring and we … were sent forward. Machine-gun fire from the left enfiladed us practically the whole way and was as hot as anyone could wish for, but by some marvel hardly anyone was hit. We arrived at the line where the remains of the Hampshires were and finding that it would simply be a case of the Battalion being wiped out like the remainder, we decided to dig ourselves in where we were (at this place the bullets just cleared our heads).108

  By the time the 1/5th Norfolks could be extracted, the three battalions had suffered 1,500 casualties, including two of their commanding officers and all twelve company commanders.109 The Imperial Camel Corps, supported by the 4th ALH Brigade, managed to push through east of Khan Sihan and seize a section of the Ottoman line, but only briefly. As elsewhere, the Ottomans merely withdrew further into their defensive positions while their artillery plastered the breach, and then mounted an overwhelming counter-attack. By mid-morning the British artillery were running short on shells, and were unable to provide the kind of barrier-barrage that was needed to protect captured positions, or break up Ottoman attacks.110

  To the east much of the cavalry became bogged down assaulting Sausage Ridge, which ran south from Hairpin Redoubt and protruded between the two divisions. The southern end was taken by the New Zealand Mounted Rifles, but the attack was held up at the redoubt itself. This was never meant to be a serious assault; the cavalry divisions were weaker in numbers and more spread out than the infantry. They lacked the firepower in either artillery or riflemen to put enough pressure on well-entrenched positions and were only supposed to keep the Ottomans on that flank from helping their comrades further west. However, Brigadier General Hodgson, commanding the Imperial Mounted Division, attacked in earnest, and in so far as it kept the defenders of Hairpin and Atawine Redoubts in place, his attacks worked. Indeed, more than worked, as a considerable Ottoman force gathered and counter-attacked at 2 p.m., forcing the cavalry to retreat.111 At about the same time, the 3rd (OT) Cavalry Division under Colonel Essad Bey launched its own counter-attack, looping around the A&NZ Mounted Division’s open right flank.