From Gaza to Jerusalem
Page 18
Through 1917, reinforcements poured into Syria, and later Palestine, to form the Yildirim Ordular Grubunu, or ‘Thunderbolt Army Group’.* The exact origins of this force are a little obscure; the idea seems to have been around since late 1916, but the spring of 1917 brought the means, motive and opportunity for the plan to become reality. The core of the Yildirim was provided by the Germans (who knew it as Army Group F), under Field Marshall Erich von Falkenhayn. Prussian War Minister at the outbreak of war, von Falkenhayn had been appointed Chief of the General Staff of the German Army soon afterwards. In this role he had been the mastermind behind the bloody fiasco at Verdun, which had been intended to bleed the French armies dry, and had instead cost the Germans as many casualties themselves. After this, he had been appointed to command the German Ninth Army in Romania, where he had quickly taken Bucharest. Now he was being sent to conduct a similar role in the Middle East, where his initial objective was to be Baghdad.
With von Falkenhayn came a German staff, to which a handful of Ottoman officers were bolted on, and a central cadre of German and Austrian troops. This force would be known as ‘Pasha II’, coming after the small ‘Pasha Force’ that had arrived in May 1916. Pasha II consisted of three infantry battalions (No. 701 from Pasha I, and Nos 702 and 703 from Germany), and a mass of support units including machine-gun companies, a range of artillery units of different types and calibres, medical units, signals and wireless units, some very large transport units, and five new Flieger Abteilung, FA301 to FA305.248 These new squadrons, each with a strength of eight aircraft (about half that of their British and Australian opponents), were equipped mostly with AEG C.IV two-seat reconnaissance aircraft (which could also carry a small bomb-load) but each also had a pair of Albatros D.III fighters, which were cutting edge at the time of despatch.249
These forces were useful in that they formed the support and logistical framework of an army corps, made up of units that were frequently lacking in the Ottoman services, but equally it was very light on actual fighting troops. The Ottomans seem to have been expecting several divisions of front-line infantry, but when these did not appear, they had to provide the troops themselves. The force was also extremely inexperienced when it came to the conditions they would face in Syria and Mesopotamia, and in working with the Ottomans. General Liman von Sanders, head of the German Military Mission to Constantinople, would later complain bitterly that neither he nor any of his staff had been involved in the formation of Yildirim, nor had their advice been asked to what equipment would be needed, what conditions would be faced, or whether special allowances needed to be made due to the nature of the theatre. Even the attachment of a handful of Ottoman staff officers to the headquarters did little to ease the problems that the force met as it travelled across the Ottoman Empire, ranging from simple language problems to misunderstandings as to how the local supply or command systems worked, to failure to anticipate the logistical problems that would be faced moving such a force around. The Ottoman railway and road system was still far below the standards that the Germans had expected, leading to long delays, while problems in recruiting drivers, drovers and other staff locally to help with the transport meant that large numbers of Germans had to be taken from their combat units to oversee the lines of communications instead; von Sanders claims that more of the Germans and Austrians were eventually used in this role than were used in the fighting units.250
Even as Yildirim began to gather at Aleppo, debate raged as to how to deploy them. The original plan had been to send them to Mesopotamia, to push back the British Army and retake Baghdad. This was the plan on which Enver Pasha, the Minister of War, was still intent. However, as Yildirim began to gather in May 1917, dissent grew. The forces were supposed to gather in the upper Euphrates, but Djemal Pasha successfully lobbied for them to be concentrated around Aleppo instead. This gave them better communications and also placed them in a more central position within the empire. From there, they could be sent to reinforce the fronts in southern Palestine, Mesopotamia, the Caucasus or even Syria should the British or French make a landing on the coast. As divisions began to gather, a series of conferences were convened in Constantinople to work out which of these fronts the force should be deployed to. Enver was still intent on Baghdad, while Djemal wanted to retain them in Syria to counter the growing British forces opposite Gaza (although he was worried about the Yildirim supplanting himself as the leading power in the region), using them as an imperial reserve and also a pool to allow him to rotate the divisions on the front line, who he currently could not relieve in any way.251 Meanwhile, von Falkenhayn surprised many by switching from being pro-Mesopotamia to instead wanting to counter-attack across the Sinai.
The main reason for this debate was that Yildirim would be the Ottoman Empire’s last reserve. The collapse of the Russian Army, the successes in Romania, and a general thinning of the Ottoman coastal defences in Anatolia and the Dardanelles allowed a massive concentration of forces to take place. Eventually, nearly eighteen divisions would be involved, out of an overall strength of some forty-five combat divisions fielded by the Ottomans. Not all of these divisions remained with the Yildirim, and many would not arrive until the end of 1917 or even the spring of 1918, but it was still clear that, once gathered, the empire would have very little more to spare. So far the empire had lost over half a million men killed, captured or missing, and around 750,000 wounded. On the other side of the ledger, around 100,000 young men per year reached the age of conscription, although this was reduced to only 90,000 by 1917 as parts of the empire in the Caucasus and Arabia were lost to the enemy. The forces that would eventually form the Yildirim would report shortages of some 70,000 men from their authorised strength, and yet receive just 27,000 reinforcements by the end of the year.252
Other reinforcements flowed in, in the form of complete divisions from all across the empire, albeit invariably as under-strength as those already in Palestine. It was a slow process, the 7th (OT) Infantry Division for example left Constantinople on 14 January 1917, but did not start to reach the railhead at Beersheba until 7 May, with the last units arriving only on 14 June. Other units had much further to travel; over the summer the 14th (OT) Infantry Division arrived from the Dardanelles, the 20th (OT) from Galicia (where Poland, Russia and Hungary meet), 26th (OT) from Romania, and the 48th (OT) and 53rd (OT) Infantry Divisions from the Caucasus. Two of the arrivals did not stay very long. In early October the 50th (OT) Infantry Division, which had arrived from Macedonia, was despatched on to the 6th (OT) Army in Mesopotamia, and the 59th (OT) Infantry Division, which had come from Aydin, on the Aegean coast of Anatolia, was broken up to be used to reinforce other divisions in the area. More arrived in the autumn, some only days or weeks before the expected British attack broke; the 19th (OT) Infantry Division arrived in late October from Galicia. Others still were even later; the 1st (OT) Infantry Division arrived from the Caucasus in December 1917, while the 42nd (OT) Infantry Division from the Dardanelles and the 2nd (Caucasus) Cavalry Division did not arrive until early 1918. Even some of the German units, such as the Flieger Abteilung, whose presence was supposed to form the core of the Yildirim, did not arrive until October or November.
The transport situation was a significant hindrance to the gathering of the forces for Yildirim. It took time to bring men and equipment across the patchwork of poor roads and incomplete railways that bound the empire together. The logistical situation was further damaged on 6 September, when a massive explosion ripped through the Haider Pasha (Haydarpaşa) railway station in Constantinople. The harbour, railway yards and warehouses at the station suffered considerable damage, while not only was valuable rolling stock lost, but also a considerable amount of supplies, mostly brought all the way from Germany and destined for Yildirim. It would be a severe blow in an empire with a small industrial base and limited resources.253 The German air units were still moving through the station at the time. Several crated aircraft were destroyed and more damaged, and some of the ground cre
w injured. In addition to those caught in the explosion, more aircraft were damaged or lost in other transport accidents, or simply on one of the five occasions when the crates had to be transferred from rail cars to lorries or back again, or even between railways of different gauges. In all, eight of the fifty-six new aircraft were completely wrecked in the move.254
In September the Baghdad plan was abandoned, and, with it looking as if he had prevailed and that the Yildirim would become a central imperial reserve, Djemal took up an invitation to visit Germany and the Western Front. While there he received news that, in fact, Yildirim would be used on the southern Palestine front, initially as reinforcements, and later as a force to counter-attack across the Sinai. To this end, the forces in southern Palestine were to be reorganised, and his own command reduced. The HQ of the 4th (OT) Army was de-activated on 26 September 1917, and Djemal’s staff moved from Jerusalem north to Damascus. Djemal now went from being military commander and virtual ruler of Syria and Palestine, to being the Commander of the Armies of Syria and Western Arabia. These consisted of the Hedjaz Expeditionary Force, and of XII (OT) Corps, covering the coastal areas of Syria from Jaffa north, the area east of the Jordan, and the lines of communications for Yildirim.255 This latter task gave him responsibility for the logistical support of Yildirim, and control of their supply and communication lines back to Aleppo; north of Aleppo they became the responsibility of the German Military Mission in Constantinople.
A few days after the dissolution of the 4th (OT) Army, the 8th (OT) Army was stood up in southern Palestine, commanding all of the units along the Gaza–Beersheba line. Command was given to Friedrich Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein, the German officer who had been fighting in the Sinai since 1915. At the same time, the 7th (OT) Army was established at Aleppo, with the intention of moving south as soon as possible to take over the Beersheba end of the line. Command was given to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the hero of Gallipoli who later would be instrumental in the formation of (and President of) the Turkish Republic. Kemal (who would not be granted his more familiar name – Atatürk, ‘Father of the Turks’ – until 1934) had grave reservations about his new posting, and expressed doubts over the offensive plan to attack Egypt, the ability to supply the force, and the increasing influence of the Germans throughout the Ottoman military. He expressed these directly to Enver Pasha and within weeks resigned from his command, being replaced by Fevzi Pasha.256 Both of the new armies, and the 6th (OT) Army in Mesopotamia, came under the direct control of Yildirim, whose headquarters moved from Aleppo to Jerusalem. The commander, von Falkenhayn, remained for the moment in Aleppo, fearing to be caught on the road and removed from his staff and communications when the expected British offensive began.257
While these big movements and changes were taking place, smaller-scale reforms were also being made. Over the summer training was carried out with the latest weapons and techniques at all levels, with companies, battalions and regiments drilling together to improve efficiency and coordination. In particular, machine-gun companies were formed and trained for each infantry battalion, significantly enhancing their firepower in an area where Ottoman forces had traditionally been lacking. In September, an army-wide reform also saw assault units, based on the German ‘stormtrooper’ model, being formed within each division. Made up from the fittest and most aggressive young men, they were trained to take the spearhead in attacks, and received better equipment and rations. The Yildirim and the 4th (OT) Army both formed complete battalions of these troops.258
By late October, ten Ottoman divisions were in place along the Gaza–Beersheba line, although some of them just barely. The 7th (OT) Army had moved into the eastern end of the line through the month, and on 28 October 1917 officially took over that portion of the line. The III (OT) Corps transferred to the 7th (OT) Army and remained at Beersheba with the 3rd (OT) Cavalry Division and the 27th (OT) Infantry Division. This latter division consisted of nearly 80 per cent Arabs, making it unreliable in the eyes of the senior Ottoman and German commanders. Kress von Kressenstein classed it as ‘badly trained, badly organised, and composed of Arabs who had to be watched’.259 To the west was the 16th (OT) Infantry Division, holding the redoubts along the line as far as opposite Shellal, while the 24th (OT) Division was in reserve behind the lines.
The western half of the line was still held by Kress von Kressenstein’s 8th (OT) Army. He believed that the coming British attack would fall on Gaza, based on his understanding of the logistics and capabilities of the British forces, and the information being fed to him by British intelligence (see below). Therefore, XXII (OT) Corps, consisting of the 3rd and 53rd (OT) Infantry Divisions, were heavily emplaced in the trenches around Gaza. The latter unit was fresh and new to the line, replacing the 7th (OT) Infantry Division that had been on the line all summer, but was now withdrawn (as part of the 4th (OT) Army) to the coastal area north of Gaza, where the British were expected to make an amphibious landing. To the east of XXII (OT) Corps was XX (OT) Corps, with the 26th and 54th (OT) Infantry Divisions. The 19th (OT) Infantry Division was just arriving in the army area, and was being placed in reserve. These dispositions meant that the western end of the line was held in much greater strength than the eastern end.260 Between them, the two armies fielded a force of around 33,000 infantry (British intelligence estimated 40,000), plus 1,400 cavalry and 260 field guns.261
For the British, this was fortunate, as the plan now being put together by Allenby and his staffs envisaged only diversionary attacks against Gaza, while the main breakthrough was made at Beersheba, before turning west and north-west to roll up the Ottoman line. This plan had been formulated by Lieutenant General Sir Philip Chetwode when he was commander of Eastern Force, aided by his Chief of Staff, Sir Guy Dawnay. In a paper put before General Murray on 21 June 1917, they proposed that the defences around Gaza were too strong for any attack with the resources currently available (or reasonably expected to be available) to have any success. An attack to the east of Gaza would also run into strong enemy positions, and leave the attacker open to counter-attack from the eastern half of the defences. An attack on the eastern end of the line, particularly at Hareira and Tel el Sharia, however, would not only pierce the line, probably forcing the Beersheba garrison to retreat rather than be cut off, and allow the British to threaten the supply lines to Gaza and so possibly inducing them to retire as well, but would also secure the attacking force good sources of water. This still left the problem of having the resources to follow up this success properly. Chetwode and Dawnay were of the opinion that some divisions would need to be stripped of their transport in order to allow others the freedom of movement that would be needed to chase the Ottoman Army and keep it retreating, rather than allowing it to simply take up position in the defensive line that was even now being prepared along the Wadi Hesi. It was also recommended that any advance be made before October, when the rainy season would begin and the roads turn to mud.262
This plan was based on the opposing sides having roughly equal numbers, although reinforcements on both sides made Chetwode’s calculations obsolete. The Ottoman strengths are stated above, while the EEF had grown to around 80,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry, although garrison and lines of communications commitments cut these figures back to about 60,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry usable for the coming offensive.263 This was a far lower ratio than the three-to-one attacker-to-defender ratio usually taken as standard in military operations to give a reasonable chance of success. Certainly, it meant that any direct attack on Gaza was out of the question, and on his arrival Allenby took the Chetwode plan and used it as the foundations of his own, although it was far from a simple copy.
For one thing, it soon became obvious that the September deadline that Allenby had talked about on first arrival was impractical, and the date was pushed back into October. This did of course put it into the rainy season, with all of the problems of mud and floods that that entailed. As the rain fell on the Judean Mountains, which ran down the western bank
of the Jordan Valley and the Dead Sea, and flowed out to the sea, the usually dry wadis were likely to become difficult or even impossible to pass, with flash-floods causing additional dangers. Large parts of the coastal plains would become marshland as they became inundated with water. This created many problems, large and small, from the transport and movement of the army, to the welfare of the soldiers. Plans had to be made to issue the men with extra blankets, cardigans and greatcoats before the offensive, and to arrange for the supply of khaki serge uniforms to replace their thin khaki drill tunics and shorts as soon as possible after it began, as protection from the winter weather.264
A larger change came in identifying Beersheba as an important, even vital, objective to be seized directly rather than just threatened into submission. As the plans evolved the water at Beersheba grew in importance, and it became obvious that the town had to be taken on the first day of the offensive so as not to give the Ottomans time to destroy them. To take it meant deploying a larger force than previously envisaged on that flank, straining the accessible water supplies. Therefore it became doubly important to take the town on the first day, in order to supply the men of the attacking force.265 The supply of water would become an all-pervading obsession for the planners, and rightly so. Even a single brigade required 20,000 gallons (91,000 litres) of water per day, not including the 9,000 gallons (41,000 litres) required for their camel transport train.266 To keep the army fighting fit and able to advance, water had to be the overriding concern.