From Gaza to Jerusalem

by Stuart Hadaway

  On 2 November, the 53rd Division were dug in around Abu Jerwal, about 13km (8 miles) north of Beersheba. From here, the plan was to swing to the west as part of the general British advance towards the Sharia positions, while the A&NZ Mounted Division screened the area to the north. However, to block the Ottomans more effectively, the infantry would need to advance 4.8 or 6.5km (3 or 4 miles) to the north, further into the hills and more in line with the cavalry piquets. The move began on 3 November, with the division marching over harsh terrain that made every mile on the map expand into several on the ground. They met the Ottoman forces dug in on a line of hills that formed a ridge around Khuweilfeh. These hills commanded the local area, and 53rd Division immediately began to attack several points of the line in an attempt to push the Ottomans back and use the ridge as their own defensive line. The 7th Mounted and 2nd ALH Brigades meanwhile occupied a second commanding height, Ras el Naqb, nearly 4.8km (3 miles) to the east, to protect their flank. During the afternoon these two brigades were forced to withdraw to water their horses, but were replaced by the 5th Mounted Brigade of the Australian Mounted Division. The gap between Ras el Naqb and the 53rd Division was screened by the Imperial Camel Corps.

  There followed a scrappy and confused battle spread over several days, with the jumbled terrain and lack of decent maps making the course of events hard to trace at the time as well as now. Conditions in the hills were grim for the infantry, whose water still needed to be brought up from Beersheba, 18 or 19km (11 or 12 miles) to the south. On the night of 4/5 November, the resupply convoys became lost, and the food, artillery shells and, most importantly, water, in them was many hours late in arriving at the front. One Welsh officer recalled:

  Hard days these. Very little water, never enough for a wash; bully beef and biscuits unvaried, no mails … We wore ‘tin hats,’ and the intense heat of the sun on them made our heads feel like poached eggs … We had about three pints [of water] for forty-eight hours, which included a long march up the stifling, winding ravines of the Judean foothills, followed by incessant fighting, the temperature, thanks to the Khamsin, which prevailed, being that of August. It was real hell. A lot of men went nearly mad with thirst.317

  After a concerted effort on 6 November, 158th Brigade took the main hill in the chain, usually known as Khuweilfeh Hill or Tel Khuweilfeh. They lost it again shortly afterwards to an Ottoman counter-attack, but retook it again and then held it against five more attacks. During this bitter fighting Captain John Fox Russell RAMC (attached 1/6 RWF), who had already been awarded the Military Cross for saving the wounded under fire at the 1st Battle of Gaza, was killed doing the same here. He was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross. In all, the brigade lost thirty-six officers and 584 men killed or wounded.318 In the early hours of the following morning the Ottoman forces began to withdraw, although skirmishing continued until the 10 November. However, by now any chance of the Ottomans restoring the situation by retaking Beersheba had now been lost.

  Shortly before dawn on 6 November, the delayed break-out from Beersheba had begun. Water had been the problem; even with the Beersheba wells at full estimated production, the army would have had to have spent several days on short rations, but the amount available had been over-estimated, while the coming of the furnace-blast of the khamsin wind had increased demand. More time had been needed to secure other local wells, and even then some the Australian Mounted Division had needed to be sent back to Kharm to water their horses. Over the night of 5/6 November the army finally moved into position. The Yeomanry Mounted Division had swapped placed with the Australian Mounted Division, moving up from Shellal to support the flank of the 53rd (Welsh) Division fighting around Khuweilfeh while the other division had withdrawn to Shellal to cover the 15-mile gap between XX and XXI Corps. The remaining three infantry divisions of XX Corps then drew up in a north–south line, some 13 or 16km (8 or 10 miles) north-west of Beersheba and facing west towards Sharia. Furthest north was the 74th (Yeomanry) Division, with the 60th (London) Division on their left flank, and then the 10th (Irish) Division at the southern end of the line.

  To their west stood the main Ottoman defensive systems along the Gaza–Beersheba road, and the defences at the Sharia logistics hub. A railway ran south through Sharia and on down to the main defensive line before turning east. To the east of this railway the Ottoman defences were fairly thin and scattered, a 5.5km (3.5-mile) long line of trenches and positions, not connected into any coherent system and without barbed wire. Most faced south, and had been sited with the assumption that an attack would come from that direction. While they could support each other against anyone advancing from the south, they could easily be picked off individually by an attack from the east. Beyond the railway the defences were much more formidable. Three large trench systems had been built on a line running north-west to south-east and covering a front of 6.4km (4 miles). Just west of the railway was the Kauwukah System, with the Rushdi System to its north-west, and then the Hureira Redoubt north-west of that. These were far more serious defences, with layers of interconnected and mutually supporting trenches and strongpoints, each protected by aprons of barbed wire. However, again they were mainly constructed in the expectation that the attack would come from the south.

  At 5 a.m. on 6 November, 74th Division began its attack, crossing 3.5km (about 2 miles) of open ground before reaching the first enemy trenches. The assault was fast moving over broken ground, and they soon outran their supporting artillery, while increasingly coming under fire from Ottoman guns around Sharia. Even so, by 8.30 a.m. the division had advanced approximately halfway along the line, although it then had to pause to re-form its units, which had become scattered and mixed up in the rapid advance through the tangled trenches. Once proper control had been re-established, the advance resumed and by 1.30 p.m. the whole line as far as the railway was in British hands. Now it was the turn of the 60th and 10th Divisions, who had been shadowing the 74th to the south. Their artillery had already begun a bombardment on the barbed wire of the Kauwukah System, and at around 12.15 p.m. the assault began, much to the inconvenience of some. Private C.R. Verner of the 2/21st London Regiment recalled:

  This was unfortunate, because we had just started investigating our rations – eating them was difficult because of the intolerable thirst – and we had no time to put them away again. We fell in, extended to five paces, and doubled off over the crest of the hill.

  All the Lewis Gun ammunition was dumped some way back, which made things easier for us, but we must have been an odd looking crowd because we were carrying tins of bully, tins of jam, biscuits and slabs of crushed dates in our arms. Our rifles were slung.319

  This was harder going against deeper and more complex defences, but even so by 2 p.m. the Kauwukah System was in Irish and London hands, and the Rushdi System fell by 3.30 p.m. Orders now came for the 60th Division to turn north, ready to advance on Sharia Station, where warehouses, a hospital and other buildings were clustered. Then the division was to move beyond, crossing the Wadi Sharia and assaulting the final objective, the height of Tel esh Sharia which dominated the area.320

  Tel esh Sharia was supposed to fall by the end of the day, but by the time the 60th Division had reorientated itself there was only an hour of daylight left. Even so, the advance began, and ran immediately into heavy Ottoman fire. Verner:

  So far we had caught no shell fire worth speaking of … but directly we moved from the railway embankment we were spotted and the fun began. A sudden burst of shrapnel right on top of us drove us headlong to cover, which was luckily near in the shape of a steep dip in the ground … and then for about fifteen minutes the Turkish batteries worked at high pressure and the air shrieked with shrapnel.

  Shell after shell cracked just above us, but the aforesaid dip proved wonderful cover. The shrapnel drove up clouds of sand just behind us, and hissed a few feet above our backs. I took one mighty thump on the back which proved to be a stone.321

  The fighting continued after dark, becomin
g increasingly confused and disjointed. British troops advanced to within 460m (500yds) of the station, but at around 7 p.m. one of the warehouses, full of ammunition, began to explode. The troops were rapidly pulled back away from the danger as the fire and explosions spread to other buildings. Progress along that route was now blocked, and so the advance was halted and orders issued to resume the advance at 3.30 a.m. on 7 November.

  This gave the Ottomans the chance to commit their last reserves, a scratch force, known as the Zuheilika Group, of around a thousand men gathered from divisions all along the front. This was pushed in to positions around Tel esh Sharia, supporting the 48th (OT) Infantry Regiment. Meanwhile, Kress von Kressenstein had finally accepted the inevitable and had ordered the start of the evacuation of Gaza, moving the artillery back first, although at the same time he began preparations to use the troops from Gaza in a counter-attack to the north-east of the city.322 However, any such plans were immediately upset as the British resumed their attack.

  The original starting time of 3.30 a.m. was put back to 5.30 a.m. as it took longer to move the attacking brigades into position. They were moving over broken and unfamiliar ground in the dark, and a general lack of landmarks impeded progress. At dawn the artillery began a covering barrage, to which the Ottomans replied in kind. Colonel ‘Bosky’ Borton of the 2/22nd London Regiment experienced this barrage somewhat closer than most, after inadvertently moving too far north during the night:

  There was no time to reconnoitre and we started in the pitch dark, over the most difficult country you can imagine, deep nullah after deep nullah. Everyone lost touch and it became so hopeless I halted until the moon rose (2 a.m.) when I found that my direction was right – I had only got one Company and no sign of any other Battalions. I decided however to push on and walked slap into the Turk in force. The first I knew was 5 Machine Guns opening on me at about 100 yards. It did not take me long to realise that this was no job for one Company, so I fell back slowly and just before dawn ran into my other 3 Companies and again went forward and shoved the Turk back.

  As the light grew better I found we were in a devilish awkward fix – we were swept by machine-gun fire from both flanks, and behind their artillery put down a barrage on top of us and if it had not been that the light was so bad – would have been wiped out in a matter of minutes. It was impossible to stay where we were, and hopeless to go back, so to go forward was the only thing to do –

  And we went –

  One of the men had a football. How it came there goodness knows. Anyway we kicked off and rushed the first guns, dribbling the ball with us. I take it the Turk thought we were dangerous lunatics, but we had stopped for nothing, not even to shoot and the bayonet had its day. For 3,000 yds.[2.7km] we swept up everything finally capturing a field battery and its entire gun crews – The Battery fired the last round at us at 25 yards.323

  For his actions in leading his men from the front at Sharia, and at Beersheba, Borton received the Victoria Cross.

  Elsewhere, other Londoners were also coming under heavy artillery fire as they advanced. William Hendry of the 2/14th (London Scottish):

  Away we went from our cover, quite in day light. They instantly spotted us, about a mile away. We got into artillery formation (commonly known as blobs) and quickly advanced through a din of splitting shrapnel. It was a splendid sight to look back and see all the blobs moving steadily forward, with shrapnel bursting overhead, and as if nothing was happening, and the German gunners which the Turks had, desperately trying to stop our advance by firing hundreds of shells into the air. It was really astonishing the number of shells that burst right above us, and caused so few casualties … We were getting near the front of the hill now, when I noticed blood on my tunic and found my chin bleeding. I dropped into a crack in the ground, broke my iodine bottle and well spread it over my chin, putting a bandage on. While I was doing this the bullets were raining down on the ground around, but only my legs were exposed. I jumped up quickly and ran on to catch up the company, when I suddenly felt a sharp pain in my arm and blood was trickling into my hand, but I did not stop this time and caught my platoon at the foot of the hill. Up we went firing at any slight object ahead. Our machine gunners got going also and covered our advance firing from the flank. When we arrived at the top we found the Turks had fled from their trenches, which we occupied firing hard at the retreating Turks.324

  The Londoners swept through the station, across the wadi and over the Tel, the last Ottoman defenders falling back before them. The 60th Division established a new line north of the Tel, and the fighting died down apart from the occasional exchanges of shell-fire. It was a chance to rest for the infantry, and their supporting artillery. Gunner J.W. Gough wrote in his diary:

  Nov. 7th Open fire on Turkish trenches about six, fired about 250 rounds, Johnnie falls back, we cease firing. There are only occasional bursts about now – miles from our position. I suppose it will mean another advance for us. I hope we can squeeze a little rest before hand it is now 52 hours since I slept last, a wash wouldn’t do the troops any harm.325

  Some relief came with the arrival of water. Private Verner:

  We were somewhat cheered during the afternoon by the announcement of the fall of Gaza, but the great sensation was caused by the appearance of camels on the crest of the hill behind … and we knew that water was coming. The Turks saw them too and tried to stop them with a barrage, but after the NCO in charge had stopped panic amongst the camel drivers with his fists we saw them (the camels) winding their way down to the railway cutting to a point where water could be issued in safety.

  We restrained ourselves with difficulty from charging down on the camels and helping ourselves, and presently an order arrived that one man from the Lewis Gun team should bring the water-bottles of the rest. This man was me. I started off with a good load, and my pace was accelerated by a machine gun while crossing the open ground.

  I found a sergeant major having great difficulty in keeping order among the crowds of thirst-maddened men around the Fantassies … [Back at my position] I handed around the bottles … and as long as I live I shall never forget that drink.326

  A little while earlier the 10th Division had also resumed its advance, taking the Hareira Redoubt soon after dawn.327 Earlier still, in the early hours XXI Corps had resumed the attack on Gaza, rapidly discovering that the defences had been abandoned and pushing on, into the ruined town. At 7 a.m. on 7 November, Ali Muntar was occupied.328 For the assaulting troops, it was an immense relief not to have to face these still-formidable defences. Captain Harry Milson of the 1/5th Somerset Light Infantry recorded:

  Accordingly we were on the move again just as it was dawn. A wonderful sight greeted us, we were abreast of Gaza close on our left, the country was interlaced with trenches and dense cactus hedges, also bushes and trees grew plentifully, all affording excellent cover, especially for machine guns, but not a shot was fired at us and we advanced, unopposed, finding a vast quantity of ammunition and bombs left in the trenches.329

  The British had obtained their breakthrough. Most of the Ottoman front line had now been taken, apart from the Beer, Atawine and Tank trench systems just east of Gaza. These would all fall on the following day, 8 November, as the 10th and 75th Divisions closed the gap between the two British corps, although not before the bulk of the Ottoman garrisons had slipped away to rejoin the main force. Apart from the far right, where the 53rd Division was still embroiled around Khuweilfeh, the Ottomans were out in the open and in retreat. With the loss of Sharia, a gap had opened between the 7th (OT) and 8th (OT) Armies, who had also lost communications with each other, only re-establishing links on 9 November.330 There were no more reserves to push in to stem the British advance. On 8 November, Kress von Kressenstein had to report to Falkenhayn that the Ottomans were ‘incapable of offensive movements’.331 Any chance of stopping the British now depended on the endurance and courage of the poorly fed, badly equipped and generally exhausted mehmetçik who had already fa
ced a week of combat.

  Notes

  * This force included the cruiser HMS Grafton, the French coastal defence ship Requin, the monitors HMS Raglan, M.15, M. 29, M.31 and M.32, two British and five French destroyers, two motor gunboats, three seaplane carriers and a range of trawlers, launches and drifters. Some were used to screen the force from submarines rather than shelling Gaza, and not all were present at once, as ships returned to Port Said to refuel and take on more ammunition.

  * Lieutenant Colonel T. Gibbon gives an excellent account of attempting to control his battalion in these circumstances in With the 1/5th Essex in the East.