From Gaza to Jerusalem

by Stuart Hadaway

  Logistics remained the defining feature for the rest of the advance. On 9 November the DMC was supposed to carry on their advance, but only the A&NZ Mounted Division was in a position to move. Both the Australian Mounted Division and the newly arrived Yeomanry Division needed to spend the day in watering their horses. The following day all three cavalry divisions were on the move, heading north, as were the 52nd (Lowland) and 75th Divisions, despite the rising of another khamsin to again make the day’s march even harder. The 54th (East Anglian) Division remained at Gaza still, and now passed all of its transport across to keep the more northerly divisions moving. The Ottoman forces were still managing to keep one step ahead of the British, and as the next major objective came in sight it became increasingly important to keep the pressure up.

  Junction Station now lay only 16–24km (10–15 miles) from the most advanced British positions. This aptly named depot was on the Ottoman railway system, at the point where the main line from Syria split into two, heading south towards Gaza and Beersheba and also east towards Jerusalem. Taking it would not only potentially deny the Ottomans the valuable supplies held there, but also cut the principal line of communications between the 7th and 8th (OT) Armies. Once the line at Junction Station was cut, the next closest railway that ran east-west was at Nablus, around 65km (40 miles) further north. The roads in the Judean Mountains were mostly barely worthy of the name, and were often unmade animal tracks at best. Once the railway line was cut, the garrison of Jerusalem and the defending army around it would be reliant on supplies being brought to them by camel or mule from the railway at Nablus, or a slightly longer distance from the line at Amman, across the Jordan Valley.

  The Ottomans knew the importance of the station too, and had begun to re-form the 8th (OT) Army on a long, sweeping line to the west, south-west and south of it. Approximately 15,000 men had been dug in along a series of strong, well-sited positions, using hill-or ridge-top villages, many of which were surrounded by dense cactus hedges or other natural barriers. Other, smaller forces were dug in on equally well-chosen sites to keep slowing the British advance down as they continued north, giving the new defensive line more time to prepare. On 11 November, rearguards had to be dealt with, in cost of time and lives, along the banks of the Nahr Sukereir, and on the high ground at Burkah. The former were ousted by the 1st ALH Brigade, and the latter by the Scottish infantry of 156th Brigade, 52nd Division. These in particular had a rough time of it, taking the positions around Burkah and on the nearby Brown Hill. The 4th Royal Scots Fusiliers (RSF), already depleted by casualties and sickness, suffered very heavily taking and then losing Brown Hill. Near dusk, the 2/3rd Gurkha Rifles, from the neighbouring 74th Division, passed by the battalion headquarters. Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell appealed to them for aid. According to the regimental history:

  An invitation to fight was a temptation that the Gurkhas never tried to resist, and they promptly despatched two companies to aid the Royal Scots.351

  Unfortunately, when the Gurkhas reached the Scots, it was discovered that none of their officers spoke English. Only because one of the RSF’s remaining officers, Captain Bolton, had been in the Indian Civil Service and knew some of the native languages could even very basic communications be established, and in the end the Gurkhas and the remained sixty or seventy Scotsmen coordinated their final, successful assault on the hill after dark with a mixture of sign language and a shared offensive spirit.352

  On 12 November, von Falkenhayn unleashed his counter-attack into the British eastern flank and rear. As the advance on the coast proceeded much faster than the advance through the mountains, the British flank became increasingly open and vulnerable, although Allenby saw this as a calculated risk. The Australian Mounted Division was screening this area, spread into small sub-units over a 19km front, when the 8th (OT) Army launched four divisions down the railway line from El Tine. The 54th (OT) Infantry Division on the right and the 53rd (OT) Infantry Division in the centre ran into British and Australian cavalry units pushing north in the opposite direction. The 28th and 16th (OT) Infantry Divisions, on the left and in reserve respectively, met less resistance. Although impressive on paper, the Ottoman attacking force was only around 5,000 men in number, with all units being greatly reduced by the previous fighting and marching. They were also very tired from their earlier moves, and the long night marches to bring them into place. Witnesses on both sides agreed that the mehmetçik attacked without their usual spirit and dogged courage. Even so, the outlying troops and squadrons of Lighthorsemen and Yeomen fell back before the superior numbers. The Royal Gloucestershire Hussars were most exposed, north of the railway station at Balin, and the QOWH and Warwickshire Yeomanry rushed to help their brigade-mates. All three regiments were then forced to fall back as Ottoman infantry curled around their flanks. Balin was abandoned, much to the alarm of the brigade field ambulance, who no one had informed of the move, and who were forced to run or gallop to safety as the Ottomans poured in just a few hundred metres away.353

  Eventually, a new line was stabilised some 4.8–6.5km (3–4 miles) back from where the division had begun, and with good use of machine-gun strongpoints and supporting riflemen, the Ottoman advance was stopped. For their part, the Ottoman forces began to dig in along their new line at dusk. The Australian Mounted Division had only lost around fifty men, although most of these were from the 5th Mounted Brigade. Already under-strength from the previous fighting, including the charge at Huj, this brigade would shortly afterwards be withdrawn from the division and replaced by the 7th Mounted Brigade.354

  The Ottoman counter-attack had not distracted Allenby in any way from his overall plan or diverted any troops, and preparations had continued for the attack on the Junction Station defences. The 75th Division was to attack the southernmost group of defences, piercing the main lines at Mesmiye El Gharbiye, and then advancing north-east. This would bring them across at an angle north of El Tine, threatening to cut off the four Ottoman divisions that had attacked the Australian Mounted Division and (with an attack by the latter) force them to retreat. Both divisions would then advance on Junction Station from the south-west. Meanwhile, the 52nd Division would attack from the west and north-west, sweeping up the outposts at Beshshit before tackling the strong positions around Qatre and El Maghar. The Yeomanry Mounted Division would be on their left, swinging around the Ottomans’ northern flank, while the A&NZ Mounted Division screened the army’s open left flank. The plan, drawn up by Major General Bulfin of XXI Corps, had no set timetable beyond the start time and showed a flexible and adaptable approach, and Allenby approved it without change before leaving Bulfin to implement the plan while he kept himself engaged with the bigger picture across the whole front.355

  The attack began on 13 November, and it proved a long, hard day. The 75th Division faced solid resistance at Mesmiye El Gharbiye, crossing open ground before assaulting the village, which was on a ridge and surrounded by thick cactus hedges. It fell at around noon to 233rd Brigade, although snipers remained an active distraction in the thick hedgerows until late in the afternoon. The advance then continued across a series of ridges, each taking time to clear, until the left-hand brigade was held up by long-range fire from the Ottoman positions at Qatre. On the right, the 234th Brigade had faced stiff resistance around Mesmiye esh Sherqiye, but with support from the Australian Mounted Division had finally taken the village near dusk. The brigade then began to advance up the railway line from El Tine towards Junction Station.356

  The 52nd (Lowland) and Yeomanry Mounted Divisions had also faced hard fighting on the left flank. Beshshit had fallen easily to 155th Brigade in the morning, which then advanced on the villages of Qatre and El Maghar. These sat on top of a ridge either side of a steep defile where the Wadi Qatra ran between them. To the north of the defile, El Maghar was at the southern end of a long, fairly low but steep ridge that ran off to the north-east. Along this ridge, and at Qatre just to the south, were the remains of the 3rd and 7th (OT) Infantry Divisions,
perhaps 3,000 men, well dug in and with the two villages as bastions. The two villages were already in strong positions and well-ringed with cactus, while the area immediately west of the ridges was flat and wide open. Now trenches and machine-gun posts were added to make them into formidable redoubts.

  The 155th Brigade began their attack soon after 11 a.m., crossing over 2.7km (3,000yds) of open ground before even reaching the ridge. The Ottoman positions were too well sited, and the defenders too determined. At 1 p.m. the divisional commander, Major General Hill, called off the attack. He instead conferred with his artillery commanders, and visited the commander of the Yeomanry Mounted Division on his left, Major General Barrow. Between them it was agreed that a short, intense bombardment would be laid down at 3.30 p.m., during which the infantry and cavalry would both advance on Qatre and El Maghar. The Yeomanry Mounted Division had already advanced in a broad sweep on 52nd Division’s flank, taking the village of Yibna and coming up on Wadi Janus, which the Wadi Qatre joined after emerging from the defile and turning north. The 6th Mounted Brigade was already poised on the Wadi Janus and had reconnoitred as far as possible the ground between themselves and the enemy-held ridge. The 22nd Mounted Brigade was coming up on their left, and would also provide support. As the Wadi Janus ran north and the ridge veered north-east, the 6th Mounted Brigade would have over 3.7km (2.3 miles) to cover, the last 900m (0.5 miles) or so up the steep slope, while the 22nd Mounted Brigade would have even further to go. The attack would therefore go in mounted, at the gallop, the whole way.

  At 3 p.m., the cavalry began their advance, trotting out of the Wadi Janus in open, artillery order. The Queen’s Own Dorset Yeomanry rode on the left while the Royal Buckinghamshire Hussars wason the right, closest to El Maghar, and each was in three lines of a squadron each. Behind, the Berkshire Yeomanry was in reserve. The lines quickly spurred into a canter, crossing the open ground between the wadi and the ridge as quickly as possible, while over their heads the guns of the Royal Horse Artillery and the brigade’s machine-gun sections gave covering fire. It was a long way to ride, and over rough terrain. Cohesion began to be lost, and the formation was well dispersed by the time it struggled up to the crest of the ridge. The Bucks Hussars arrived first, charging their blown horses over the lip of the ridge and in among the Ottoman trenches. Lieutenant Cyrus Perkins recalled:

  As we neared the ridge swords were drawn and very soon we were breasting the rise with their gun blasts feeling like pillows hitting one’s face. Then in seconds they were all around us, some shooting, some scrambling out of slit trenches and some sensibly falling flat on their faces. It had taken us, I suppose, a bit over five minutes.

  Blown and galloping horses are hard to handle one handed while you have a sword in the other – so hindered by the clutter of rifle butt and other equipment troopers found it nearly impossible to get at a low dodging Turk … By then, those of us who had got there still mounted were among a seething mob – literally like mounted policemen in a football crowd – shouting at them to surrender.357

  As more troopers rode over the crest, or dismounted to charge over on foot, the Ottoman force north of El Maghar village fell back in disarray. The Dorset Yeomanry, with further to ride, arrived moments later and added to the rout. The 6th Mounted Brigade lost sixteen men killed and 114 wounded in the charge, while 265 horses were killed or injured. However, they had broken through the main Ottoman defensive line, and several hundred prisoners and a dozen machine guns were captured.

  The infantry attack on El Maghar and Qatre began as the cavalry had started their advance, the brigade commander, Brigadier General John Pollock-McCall, himself snatching ‘up a rifle and bayonet, shouted to the Borderers to follow him, and dashed out into the open’.358 The men of the 4th and 5th King’s Own Scottish Borderers who had taken cover around the Wadi Janus/Wadi Qatre surged forward with him, taking advantage of the lull in Ottoman fire as the defenders of El Maghar turned their rifles and machine guns onto the yeomanry. The infantry also charged up the hill and poured into the Ottoman positions, slowly clearing out the enemy at bayonet point among the cacti and the houses, before emerging from the far side of the village to link up with the cavalry. Meanwhile, the 5th RSF assaulted Qatre under cover of a fifteen-minute artillery bombardment, and by 4 p.m. that village too was in British hands.359

  While the infantry were clearing their way through the villages, another cavalry attack had occurred on the left flank of the 6th Mounted Brigade. The 22nd Mounted Brigade had advanced on this northern flank about half an hour after the first charge. They had also rapidly crossed the open ground and then ridden up and over the ridge, but resistance here had been lighter and the yeomen had carried on, becoming increasingly disorganised and scattered; they had passed over the ridge and carried on to Aqir, about 4.8km (3 miles) north-east of El Maghar, and the site of the headquarters for the XXII (OT) Corps. Here a small party of yeomen from ‘A’ Squadron, East Riding Yeomanry, under Major J.F.M. Robinson had taken the village and cut the main road that ran through it. Unfortunately, they were too few in number to hold the village in such isolation, and they and the rest of the 22nd Mounted Brigade were forced to withdraw. The 6th Mounted Brigade and 155th Brigade were in no fit state to move forward and support them, being preoccupied with reforming their own ranks, collecting their casualties (the infantry had suffered eighty-four killed and nearly 400 wounded), and rounding up over a thousand Ottoman prisoners. No advance on Junction Station could be made from that direction that evening, but the Ottoman defensive line had been decisively broken.360

  To the south, though, the 234th Brigade was still advancing up the railway line towards Junction Station, with orders to seize it if possible, but at the very least infiltrate a demolition party to blown a bridge to the north of the junction, to prevent any more rolling stock or supplies being rescued by the retreating Ottomans. After fighting several confused skirmishes with stray Ottoman units, the brigade finally halted in the early hours to await for daylight. When the demolition party was called forward, it was discovered that the pack horse carrying the charges had panicked and bolted during one of the brief fights, and could not be found, so that plan had to be abandoned. This allowed at least one more train to escape Junction Station heading north before dawn; it contained Kress von Kressenstein, commander of what was left of the 8th (OT) Army.361

  At dawn a detachment from the 12th Light Armoured Car Battery caught up with 234th Brigade, and, with the support of two of their armoured cars, patrols pushed forward into the depots and warehouses around the junction. The Ottomans had left in a hurry, and much valuable material had been left behind unscathed. Food and equipment that the Ottomans could scarce afford to lose was left neatly packed in the warehouses, although of greater value to both sides were the two locomotives and sixty wagons, which the British could put to use on the railway back down to Gaza. The most crucial capture was beyond doubt the steam-driven pumping station, in full working order, that tapped deep underground water sources. In effect, this gave the British the ability to pump clean water rapidly from an almost limitless source.362

  Notes

  332 Wavell pp. 142–5

  333 Thompson Chapter 21

  334 Dalbiac pp. 132–3

  335 Falls Vol. 2 pp. 117–124

  336 Crombie QOWH(Y)M (Pritchard Collection)

  337 Teichman p. 184

  338 Mercer quoted in Falls Vol. 2 p. 123

  339 Haydon QOWH(Y)M (Pritchard Collection)

  340 Gibbons p. 105

  341 Elliot p. 123

  342 Scott IWM 5743

  343 Allenby p. 104; Dalbiac pp. 136–40

  344 Allenby p. 96

  345 Allenby p. 101

  346 Allenby pp. 101 & 102

  347 Thompson pp. 401–2

  348 Dudley Ward 74th Division p. 106

  349 Dalbiac pp. 130–1

  350 Preston p. 97

  351 Ewing p. 524

  352 Thompson pp. 406–8; Ewing pp. 522–5


  353 Teichman gives an excellent description of this in his diary for 11 November 1917

  354 Falls Vol. 2 pp. 146–54 & 174

  355 Falls Vol. 2 pp. 156–8

  356 Falls Vol. 2 pp. 158–62

  357 Quoted in Hounslow p. 119

  358 Thompson p. 420; Gillon pp. 274–7

  359 Falls Vol. 2 p. 170

  360 Falls Vol. 2 pp. 170–1

  361 Falls Vol. 2 pp. 162–3

  362 Falls Vol. 2 pp. 162–3