From Gaza to Jerusalem

by Stuart Hadaway

  The British had managed to bring up some artillery to this area during the day, by almost doubling the gun teams up to ten horses. In all, six 18-pounders and four 4.5in howitzers were dragged up during the day, but they arrived too late to have any effect on the attack. They were used the following day, 24 November, as 75th Division, already badly reduced in numbers by casualties, handed the task over to 52nd Division. The 155th Brigade attacked El Jib, while 156th Brigade attempted to sweep the Ottomans off the reverse slopes of Nabi Samwil. The attacks began just after noon, and after one hour 155th Brigade was pinned down, and within two hours so was 156th Brigade. The 157th Brigade, waiting to move between the two other brigades and advance up the valley, could only wait impotently. At 4 p.m. the attack was renewed, but within ten minutes it was called off completely. The 52nd Division had lost 630 men for no gain, 256 of them from 156th Brigade, which had only been 1,400 men strong to begin with.378

  To their north, the Yeomanry Mounted Division had already been told to cease offensive actions the previous day (the same day on which they received permission to send their horses back to the coastal plain, having requested this on 20 November). On the plains, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, with the1/4th and 1/6th Essex Regiment from 161st Brigade, had mounted a small attack across the Nahr el Auja, north of Jaffa, intended to draw off Ottoman reserves and prevent them from moving troops from this now-quiet part of the line in to the mountains. Orders had gone out from General Bulfin just after midnight on 24 November, and the attack had gone in at 10 a.m. after some incredibly fast staff work and planning. While some Australian Light Horse demonstrated further in land, the NZMR Brigade had crossed the river at its mouth, sweeping north-east, and covering the crossing of the infantry 3.2km (2 miles) inland at Jerishe. Both operations had been successful and met little resistance, and two pontoon bridges were quickly thrown across the river behind them. All of the units began digging in, but they were widely spaced and when the 3rd and 7th (OT) Infantry Divisions began a counter-attack before dawn on 25 November, the outlying cavalry posts were quickly forced back, and so later in the morning were the infantry. By dusk, the whole force was back south of the river, having escaped extremely lightly, and the Ottomans made no move to try and pursue them.379

  General Bulfin now ordered all attacks to cease, and reported that his depleted divisions could go no further. On 25 November, Allenby ordered that XX Corps should be brought up to relieve XXI Corps, who were to return to the coast to rest and refit. In fact, Allenby had anticipated this need several days before, and the 60th Division had already begun to arrive that day to relieve the 75th Division, although the 10th (Irish) and 74th Divisions were still four or five days’ march away. The advance on Jerusalem was, for now, halted. It had been a gamble by Allenby, and one that had substantially paid off. His troops had cleared a path deep into the Judean Mountains, to within a few miles of Jerusalem (in fact, from Nabi Samwil, literally within sight of the Holy City). They had faced and cleared some determined pockets of Ottoman rearguards on the way, and if the advance had been put off for even a few more days, these would have been all the more formidable. The advance had also allowed work to begin immediately on repairing the existing roads and building new ones, greatly improving the supply lines for the fresh troops who would be coming up to make the final attack against the Ottoman defenders.

  However, while Allenby and his army may have wanted to pause operations, von Falkenhayn had other plans. The British were granted 26 November in peace, but on 27 November a series of Ottoman counter-attacks were launched along the whole line. This line was now essentially two straight lines; one south to north facing Jerusalem, with the 60th (London) Division having taken over from the 75th Division and, by dusk on 27 November, the 52nd Division too. North of the Londoners, the Yeomanry Mounted Division held on, still waiting for relief and now reduced to around 800 men holding a line of scattered posts more than 6.5km (4 miles) long. Their left flank turned back at its tip, starting to run back north-westwards towards the coast. Next in line was the 54th (Lowland) Division, also running north-westwards, but due to poor coordination and confusion caused by inaccurate maps, a gap some 8km (5 miles) wide had been left undefended between the two divisions. This already dangerous situation was made even more so by the fact that the main supply road for the yeomanry ran parallel to and only just behind this gap.380

  The Ottoman counter-attacks landed all along this line, although problems in communications and their own poor maps meant that little coordination could be achieved. The most serious attack on the first day of the Ottoman offensive fell on the Yeomanry Mounted Division in the early afternoon, when the 24th (OT) Infantry Division, supported by elements of the 3rd (OT) Cavalry Division, swept over Zeitun Ridge. The 6th Mounted Brigade took the brunt, with a troop of the City of London Yeomanry on City Hill being pushed back, although an outpost of the Berkshire Yeomanry of three officers and sixty men held out at Sheikh Abu ez Zeitun. By dusk they were reduced to twenty-eight officers and men, and reinforcements were sent in of two troops, one each from the Berkshire Yeomanry and the Buckinghamshire Hussars, totalling around fifty men. However, the next dawn the position was revealed to be hopeless, and the garrison was withdrawn as the 22nd Mounted Brigade, on their left, was pushed back by the 19th (OT) Infantry and 3rd (OT) Cavalry Divisions.

  Meanwhile, relief was on its way; the 7th Mounted Brigade and Australian Mounted Division were both under orders to move up and take over from the yeomanry, but when news of the fresh attacks arrived both formations began a night march to arrive as soon as possible. Such was the nature of the country, the 7th Mounted Brigade appears to have passed within 600m (660yds) of the 19th (OT) Infantry Division in the dark, with neither noticing the other. By now it was also apparent just how large the gap was between the yeomanry and the 54th Division, and the nearest infantry, the 52nd Division who were just pulling back from opposite Jerusalem, where immediately ordered to redeploy to cover the hole. Unfortunately the move was slightly too late, as Ottoman forces advanced into the gap, and the Smalls Arms Ammunition Section of the Yeomanry Divisional Ammunition Column was caught by surprise on the main road and virtually wiped out in the mid-morning of 28 November. The arrival and counter-attack of the 155th Brigade helped to block the hole, but significant forces had already slipped through over the previous day.381

  Some of the Ottoman force that had made use of the gap attacked west, into the 54th Division. On 27 November at the German colony of Wilhelma, between El Yehudiye and El Tire, the 1/4th Northamptonshire Regiment stood firm as their flank was turned by the 16th (OT) Infantry Division, some posts literally holding on to the last man. (Elsewhere on the 54th Division front the 20th (OT) Infantry Division, fresh troops who had so far seen no fighting, were wasted as they floundered around failing to find any significant British forces to engage.) However, most ran directly into the 52nd Division, who dug in and held out tenaciously, despite their exhaustion. The line flowed backwards and forwards for some days, until a final Ottoman attack, utilising the ‘stormtrooper’ battalion of the 19th (OT) Infantry Division, almost broke the Australian Mounted Division line at El Burj on the night of 30 November to 1 December. The Ottoman stormtroopers used the latest Western Front tactics to infiltrate the line in small groups, ‘bombing’ their way forward by lobbing hand grenades into trenches, sangars and posts. Two companies of the 1/4th Royal Scots Fusiliers were rushed forward in the middle of the night to the top of a ridge to block the break through, and at dawn began to ‘bomb’ their own way forward, taking on the stormtroopers at their own game. At least some of the Scots seem to have taken the action more personally than usual, one being heard to shout (as he threw repeated grenades):

  They mairched us a hunner miles! (Tak’ that, ya —!) An’ we’ve been in five fechts! (Anither yin, ya —!) and they said we wur relieved! (Tak’ that, ya —!) and we’re oot oor beds anither nicht! (Swalla that, ya —!)382

  One of the RSF officers, Second Li
eutenant Stanley Boughey, led his bombing party with aggression and skill down the forward slope of the ridge, rolling back the Ottomans as they went. Near the bottom, he personally took the surrender of some twenty-five or thirty Ottoman troops, before being shot in the head. He died of his wounds three days later, but received a posthumous Victoria Cross for his bravery and skill. Most of the Ottoman stormtrooper battalion, the best equipped, best trained and fittest men in their division, were killed or captured in the attack.383

  As the gap on the British northern flank was closed, so too was the increasingly dangerous gap that was developing as the Yeomanry Mounted Division was scattered and depleted. Elements of the 52nd and 74th Divisions and the Australian Mounted Division began to arrive on 28 November, and the following day the yeomanry were officially relieved. It was not a smooth process, as again vague or inaccurate maps hampered movements and the relief of particular posts. The 231st Brigade of the 74th Division got particularly scattered on the night of 29/30 November, as it moved forward to take up positions west of Foqa. In the dark, ‘D’ Company of the 25th Royal Welsh Fusiliers under Major J.G. Rees managed to stumble into Foqa itself, arriving outside the village just before dawn. Faced with the options of either withdrawing and being caught in the first light of dawn in the open by the Ottoman garrison, or attempting to take the village by surprise and storm it, he chose the latter course. After a brief fire-fight, Rees’ company of around eighty men took the surrender of the 450-strong Ottoman garrison, who had been caught mid-breakfast. He was then faced with the question of what to do with his prisoners, and eventually sent them back towards the rear with an escort of just twenty men. Along the way the column came under long-range fire from Ottoman positions, obviously mistaking them for British troops. Some of the prisoners were killed and others took the opportunity to escape, but just over 300 were brought safely into British lines. Unfortunately, the rest of Rees’ company fared less well. Just after dawn they held off an Ottoman counter-attack, but at 8.30 a.m. were surrounded and were forced to break out back towards their own lines. This then created a gap that the attackers used to turn the flank of the 10th Shropshire Light Infantry, forcing them also to retreat. Although the line was later stabilised, the shoddy maps available made the British counter-attack on 1 December a difficult and confused affair, and although they could not retake Foqa they did manage to re-establish the front line.384

  While the fighting had raged across the northern and north-eastern parts of the British line, repeated heavy attacks had also been made against Nabi Samwil. The Ottomans still held the reverse slopes of the hill, and infiltrated snipers and patrols into the village on top, while the crest of the hill was dangerously exposed to Ottoman artillery. The 2/17th and 2/19th London Regiment had taken over the positions on the hilltop on 25 November, and they came under heavy and prolonged artillery fire and repeated infantry attacks. Khalil Sakakini, a Christian Arab living in Jerusalem, could see the village from his house, and recorded in his diary:

  Tuesday 27 Nov 17 … Heavy shelling continued until the morning hours from various directions. At 3 p.m. the shelling reached an unprecedented intensity. The shells fell like drops of rain on the mosque of An-Nebi Samwil and its surroundings, and at 4 p.m. the minaret fell down, after having withstood so remarkably. Later shells started coming down on the mountain from its beginning to its end, on its sides, at its feet, and in the wadis around it, until it resembled an erupting volcano. At sunset the shells exploded with blinding flashes. Later the shooting of the guns subsided, then stopped entirely and it became silent. God knows the number of dead and wounded on both sides. Undoubtedly it is enormous.385

  For those on the hill the experience was indeed very grim. The 2/20th London Regiment replaced the 2/19th on the night of 28 November, and one of their officers described the scene in the village:

  A roofless mass on the top of a hill standing in the moonlight. No minaret, and great holes in the walls. Scattered all around are dead Turks, dead Gurkhas, dead English, and dead animals; rifles and equipment all over the place; sniper’s bullets cracking continually overhead; soldiers picking their way quietly along the sheltered corners of the debris, and, in places where there is no cover, running the gauntlet for ten, twenty, thirty, or forty yards in the open – silent groups of eager, alert men along a very artificial line in the village watching the windows and corners of houses, in some places only twenty yards away. Sometimes you crawl through the inky darkness of the inside of a ruined house and scramble over you know not what …386

  The 2/20th then stood the brunt of the heaviest Ottoman attack, on 29 November, the artillery barrage for which started at 8.30 a.m.:

  [On 29 November] the bombardment increased in fury throughout the morning, and at 1.30 p.m. it became intensive … Soon after 1.30 p.m. a large body of Turks made a rush into the mosque, doubtless expecting to find our posts evacuated after the bombardment. Our men were all ready and waiting … Met by the full fury of Lewis guns, rifles, bombs, and Stokes mortars, the Turks stood for a moment, drew back, rallied, advanced, and then, in terrified disorder, rushed back and vanished over the brow. Twice that afternoon the enemy came to the assault, assisted by a continuous intensive artillery barrage. He gained not an inch.387

  Both sides suffered heavily; ‘C’ Company of the 2/20th in particular took severe casualties, with one outpost completely wiped out, and one platoon, already down to sixteen men (from an official strength of fifty), was reduced to just two men. The following day, the battalion was relieved by the 2/22nd, under Colonel Borton VC.388

  This was the last major Ottoman assault on Nabi Samwil, and after 1 December all of the attacks along the line petered out. Limited British counter-attacks were mounted, but after a failed attempt to take Foqa on 3 December, General Chetwode (whose XX Corps had officially taken over control from XXI Corps at midday on 28 November) called a halt to any further local, limited offensive operations. Instead, the army was to prepare itself en masse for the next attempt to take Jerusalem.389

  Notes

  363 See for example Robertson’s messages on 13 and 16 November 1917, quoted in Hughes, pp. 84 & 85–7

  364 Hüsnü p. 179

  365 Preston p. 104

  366 Mackie pp. 305–6

  367 Gibbons p. 108

  368 Wavell pp. 158–9

  369 Hatton pp. 174–5

  370 Gibbons p. 107

  371 5th HLI p. 177

  372 Falls Vol. 2 pp. 194–6; Wavell pp. 160–1

  373 QOWH(Y)M Hampton

  374 Hatton pp. 185–7

  375 Falls Vol. 2 p. 198

  376 Falls Vol. 2 pp. 202–4; Thompson pp. 441–4

  377 Falls Vol. 2 pp. 205–6

  378 Falls Vol. 2 pp. 208–11

  379 Falls Vol. 2 pp. 213–16; Wilkie Chapter 22; Nicol Chapter 27; Powles & Wilkie Chapter 6

  380 Preston p. 112

  381 Falls Vol. 2 pp. 220–5; Preston pp. 112–14

  382 Thompson p. 471

  383 Falls Vol. 2 pp. 221 & 234–6; Gliddon pp. 165–7; Thompson pp. 458–74

  384 Falls Vol. 2 pp. 321–34; Dudley Ward RWF pp. 162–4

  385 Quoted in Kedar p. 110

  386 Lieutenant Colonel A.C. Temperley quoted in Elliot p. 130

  387 Lieutenant Colonel A.C. Temperley quoted in Elliot p. 132

  388 Dalbiac pp. 149-51; Eames pp. 87–92

  389 Falls Vol. 2 pp. 228 & 235–6

  15

  JERUSALEM

  THE NEW OFFENSIVE was to start on 8 December 1917. In the meantime, the army prepared on all levels. The replacement of XXI Corps by XX Corps was completed and the line adjusted accordingly. The 74th (Yeomanry) Division took over the Nabi Samwil positions from 60th (London) Division, which shifted south. The dividing line between the two divisions now ran 3.2km (2 miles) south of Nabi Samwil, with the 60th below that line and the 74th Division above. To the north-west of the 74th Division the 10th (Irish) Division had now entered the line, and to their north-west the A
ustralian Mounted Division filled the gap between them and the 54th (East Anglian) Division, and to their west the A&NZ Mounted Division carried the line on to the sea. The Yeomanry Mounted, 52nd (Lowland) and 75th Divisions were held in reserve behind the line on the coastal plain.

  On the south-east of the line, the 53rd (Welsh) Division had been brought up from the Beersheba area, travelling north through the Judean Mountains along the main road to Hebron. On 1 December, No. 7 Light Car Patrol had successfully driven the length of the road from south of Bethlehem, down through Hebron and to Beersheba. They confirmed that it had been damaged or destroyed in places, and that there were no Ottoman forces beyond small patrols.390 Coming the other way a few days later, the Welsh found this report to be accurate, and resistance was light. On 4 December they had reached Hebron, and Major General Mott entered the town to take formal possession. Among his guard was Corporal C.C.M. Millis (on his horse Jim) from the corps cavalry regiment, the 2nd County of London (Westminster Dragoons) Yeomanry:

  On 4 December we made our official entry into Hebron with as much pomp & circumstance as we could muster. Considering the ghastly time we had endured with lack of water & food & continually on the march, the procession which was formed up to make the formal entry was quite impressive. The General headed the column & then followed in order his ADC, Staff Officers, then myself poshed up as well as I could under the circumstances & carrying for the first time in the formal entry of a capitulated town, the General’s Pennant with lance. With tin hat at a rakish angle, sword, rifle & full equipment I found myself almost puffing with pride. So did ‘Jim’ who had been well groomed & whose saddlery had had a special clean for the occasion.391

  The division was supposed to move into position on the south-eastern flank of the 60th Division, just north of Bethlehem. In the event, the condition of the road and heavy rain slowed the advance and by 8 December they were still some miles south of their intended position.392

  The other divisions were ready for the general advance to start, although by now the term was relative. Few units in the 60th and 74th Divisions (or the units they had replaced from the other two corps) would have been at more than 50 per cent strength, and the men were tired, cold, wet and hungry. At least these divisions had received some level of re-equipment during their time on the plain, receiving greatcoats and at least some items of thicker serge uniforms, and replacing some of their worn out equipment. The divisions of XXI and the Desert Mounted Corps were now going through the same process on the plains, receiving among other things new boots to replace those shredded on the rough mountain terrain, and socks and puttees to replace the ones used to bind the worn-out boots to hold them together.393