Orders to Kill

by Amy Knight

  Markelov had been a lawyer for the families of victims of the 2002 Dubrovka Theater hostage crisis. He also had acted on behalf of Mikhail Beketov, editor-in-chief of the paper Khimkinskaia pravda, who was brutally beaten in 2008. Beketov, who died in 2013 as a result of injuries he never recovered from after the beating, had campaigned against the plans of authorities to build a highway through the Khimki Forest to connect Moscow and St. Petersburg. In addition, Markelov, working with Politkovskaya, was instrumental in the conviction of Sergei Lapin, a special-forces officer in Chechnya who tortured to death a twenty-six-year-old Chechen man and was sentenced to eight years in prison for the crime.

  Significantly, Markelov also represented the Kungaev family, whose daughter Elza, an eighteen-year-old Chechen, was kidnapped, raped, and murdered in March 2000 by a Russian military officer serving in Chechnya, Iurii Budanov. Budanov, the commander of the Russian 160th Tank Regiment, was, by all accounts, drunk when he and his soldiers entered the Kungaev home and abducted Elza Kungaeva, claiming that she was a sniper. Back at his encampment, Budanov interrogated Kungaeva alone and ended up strangling her to death after he raped her.

  The Budanov case created a sensation in Russia, polarizing the Russian military/security establishment against human-rights activists. Budanov was immediately arrested after the murder but was not charged with rape, much to the outrage of many Chechens, who consider rape a worse crime than killing. His trial did not begin until a year later, March 2001, and lasted until July 2002. Clearly, the Russian military was reluctant to prosecute a senior officer at a time when it was waging a bitter struggle against Chechen separatists. Budanov’s defenders claimed that he was “temporarily insane” at the time of his crime and had acted under the stress of combat.5

  A temporary judgment exonerating Budanov of murder was reached by a Russian court, with the recommendation that he undergo psychiatric treatment. In December 2002, Budanov was acquitted of murder charges. As a result of pressure from lawyers for the Kungaev family, human-rights groups, and Russian democrats, the Russian Supreme Court overruled the verdict and a new trial was convened. Budanov was convicted of murder in July 2003 and given a sentence of ten years’ imprisonment. He was released on parole on January 15, 2009 and two years later was shot to death on the streets of Moscow.6

  Assassination

  On January 23, 2009, just days after Budanov’s release, Markelov gave a press conference, where he spoke out against Budanov’s parole and vowed to bring charges against him before the European Court of Human Rights. The conference was attended by members of the Kungaev family. Markelov added that he had more facts about crimes Budanov had committed in Chechnya. After Markelov left the conference, accompanied by Anastasia Baburova, a young intern at Novaia gazeta, he was walking to his car when he was gunned down on the street, just a short distance from the Kremlin, and died on the spot. Baburova was also shot and died later at a Moscow hospital.

  Iurii Budanov claimed that he had nothing to do with the murders of Markelov and Baburova, but many observers considered the assassinations to be directly tied to the Budanov affair. According to Amnesty International, Markelov had received a text message on his mobile phone a few days earlier. The message read: “You brainless animal … again sticking your nose into Budanov’s case.??!! Idiot, you couldn’t find a calmer method of suicide???”7

  Amazingly, no one in the Kremlin spoke about the murders of Markelov and Baburova for over a week, although there was a huge public outcry with several street demonstrations. (In the city of Grozny, the capitol of Chechnya, more than three thousand people gathered to protest the murders and demand that the killers be brought to justice.) Finally, on January 29, the Russian president at the time, Dmitri Medvedev, met in the Kremlin with the editor-in-chief of Novaia gazeta, Dmitri Muratov, and expressed condolences to the families of the two victims. He explained, feebly, that the delay in the Kremlin’s response was due to the fact that it did not want to influence the investigation.8 But one wonders whether the security services and the Kremlin were simply in disarray over how to represent this terrible crime to the public.

  In April 2011, at the end of a three-month trial, a jury handed down a guilty verdict against Nikita Tikhonov and his alleged accomplice Evgeniia Khasis for the double murder. Tikhonov, it was said, had intended only to kill Markelov, but also shot Baburina because he did not want her to identify him later. The evidence against them consisted of surveillance cameras, witnesses, and the murder weapon found at their home. Tikhonov had initially confessed to the shooting, saying he killed Markelov because “he defended Chechen women suicide bombers and got the Russian army officer Iurii Budanov convicted.” But he later retracted his confession, claiming he had been tortured. Tikhonov also supposedly had another motive: Markelov had been investigating Tikhonov’s role in the murder of an anti-fascist activist.9

  Though the case seemed clear-cut, questions remained. It was brought up in court that others were involved in the murder, including members of ultra-nationalist groups, yet no names were mentioned. Several jury members recused themselves during the trial, and one of them claimed that there had been attempts to “brainwash” him. Also, a key witness withdrew his statement and fled to Germany.10 More recently, in December 2013, the Investigative Committee of Russia announced that the so-called Combat Organization of Russian Nationalists, known under the acronym BORN, might have been the initiators of the Markelov–Baburova murders. The aim of the group, of which Tikhonov was a member, was “murder motivated by ideological and national hatred.”11

  But some observers expressed doubt that the murderers were neo-Nazis or right-wing radicals, so-called skinheads. The murder was too professional, in the view of former FSB officer Mikhail Trepashkin. And the weapon that fired the shot, a Makarov pistol, is banned from sale in Russia and is only available to the military or security services. The For Human Rights movement noted that the killing could have been a provocation by “those forces, who want to scare society, and justify the introduction of new, strict police powers.”12 As Pavel Felgenhauer, a columnist for Novaia gazeta, observed, “the Russian security services or rogue elements within these services are the prime suspects. The boldness of the attack, by a single gunman in broad daylight in the center of Moscow, required professional preliminary planning and surveillance that would necessitate the security services, which closely control that particular neighborhood, turning a blind eye.”13 Whoever organized and ordered the killings of Markelov and Baburova, these acts served the Kremlin well, sending a shock wave of fear throughout the community of Russian journalists and human-rights campaigners.

  Natalia Estemirova

  Natalia Estemirova, a representative of the human-rights group Memorial in Grozny, attended Markelov’s funeral on January 26, 2009, along with Luke Harding, to whom she said “I think criminals are comfortable with the kind of government we have now. It’s less comfortable for human-rights advocates.”14 Harding met up with Estemirova a month later, when both attended the trial of the four alleged killers of Politkovskaya. She told Harding that the trial was a farce: “We don’t have a killer. And we don’t have the people who are really behind it. This isn’t a real trial. It’s simply meant to give the impression of justice.”15 Five months later, Estemirova herself would be murdered, and her killers would never be found.

  Estemirova, a widow with a teenage daughter, was born in 1959 in the Sverdlovsk Region of Russia, to Chechen and Russian parents. After earning a degree in history from Grozny University, she taught at a local high school. In the meantime, she started working as a reporter for local newspapers and television stations and produced several documentaries. She joined the Chechen branch of Memorial in 2000 and devoted herself to gathering evidence about the brutalities committed against civilians in Chechnya. She also wrote frequently for Novaia gazeta and Kavkazkii uzel (Caucasian Knot), a Caucasian news website.16

  Estemirova received numerous awards for her journalism and human-rights work, inclu
ding the Swedish Right Livelihood Award in 2004, the Robert Schuman Medal from the Group of the European People’s Party in 2005, and the first Anna Politkovskaya Award by Reach All Women in War (RAW) in 2007.17 Freelance Russian journalist Shura Burtin met Estemirova in Chechnya two months before her death. This is how he described her: “Her character immediately caught the eye. A beautiful, statuesque woman, not hiding her figure, on high heels, without a headscarf and a clear sense of self-esteem in her movements. She stood out sharply against her background. An ordinary woman in today’s Chechnya is unnoticeable in a headscarf and a dark, formless dress.”18

  Abduction and Murder

  Estemirova was leaving for work from her apartment in Grozny on the morning of July 15, 2009 when she was abducted by several men in a white car. Neighbors heard her shouting “I am being kidnapped” as she was carried off. Her body was later discovered fifty miles away on the side of a highway in Ingushetia, a neighboring republic. She had been shot in the head and chest.19

  Human-rights groups worldwide condemned the Estemirova murder, along with many world leaders, including members of the U.S. Helsinski commission, the U.S. State Department, the UN secretary-general, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Rallies attended by several hundred people were held in both Grozny and Moscow on July 16. Human Rights Watch director Kenneth Roth observed that “it seems to be open season on anyone trying to highlight the appalling human-rights abuses in Chechnya.”20 For Estemirova’s daughter, Lana, it was of course a devastating personal loss. She told Luke Harding, when he visited Grozny a few days after the murder, that Anna Politkovskaya and Stanislav Markelov had often stayed at her mother’s flat when they came to Chechnya and that they and her mother would talk animatedly late into the night. She had lost the three most important adults in her life.21

  In October 2009, I attended a memorial service for Estemirova in New York City, sponsored by the PEN American Center and several human-rights groups. The large auditorium was filled to the last row. Salman Rushdie spoke and read Estemirova’s seminal piece that she wrote for Novaia gazeta in April 2007, titled “Wild Garlic Gatherers.” The subject of the piece was the Chechen women, “tired with weather-beaten faces,” who go into the forests to pick wild garlic to sell in the markets. The forests are strewn with landmines, and on one particular occasion there were Russian troops with submachine guns who fired on the women, killing teachers from a local elementary school.22 Such was the nature of the everyday tragedies Estemirova recorded in her chilling, evocative prose.

  Further Reactions

  The presumption of most observers from the outset was that Estemirova was killed for her professional activities in Chechnya. In the weeks before her death, she was documenting several high-profile cases, including a public execution of alleged Chechen rebel Rizvan Albekov by members of Ramzan Kadyrov’s police force in the Kurchaloi region, the burning of rebel homes, sometimes with inhabitants inside, and abductions of innocent civilians. She passed all this information on to the media, human-rights organizations, and the MVD. The execution of Albekov was particularly significant, because Estemirova, along with Tanya Lokshina, went to his village to investigate what had happened, and then Estemirova gave an immediate interview to the online media outlet Caucasian Knot.23

  Not surprisingly, Estemirova’s reports put Kadyrov into a fury. She had already sparked anger in him in March 2008 when she spoke on REN-TV about the compulsory wearing of women’s headscarves in Chechnya, saying that it was a violation of women’s rights. The mayor of Grozny called Estemirova to his office after her television appearance. According to Lokshina, “Ramzan Kadyrov entered the room and immediately began to talk with her in a raised voice. He called her an indecent woman, told her he knew where her relatives lived, grabbed her by the arms, and said obscene things. He demanded an end to all that she was doing, in the interests of her family.” Fearing for her life, Estemirova went to London with her daughter and stayed for several weeks.24

  Not long before Estemirova’s death, the “human-rights ombudsman” in Chechnya, Nurdi Nukhazhiev, summoned the head of the Grozny office of Memorial and told him that Kadyrov was very angry at the group and that he was “afraid something might happen.” Svetlana Gannushkina, head of the non-governmental organization (NGO) Citizen’s Assistance, was told by a Chechen official close to Kadyrov that the “chief is in a rage,” especially at Estemirova.25

  The chairman of Memorial, Oleg Orlov, had no doubt that Kadyrov was behind the killing and said so publicly:

  I know, I am sure, who is responsible for the killing of Natalia Estemirova. We all know that man. His name is Ramzan Kadyrov, president of the Chechen Republic. Ramzan already threatened Natalia, insulted her, believed her to be his personal enemy. We do not know whether it was Ramzan himself who ordered to kill Natalia or his close associates, to please their ruling authority. And President Medvedev seems satisfied to have a murderer as head of one of Russia’s republics.26

  Orlov added that shortly before Estemirova was killed, Kadyrov had a private meeting with her and told her: “My hands are indeed covered in blood. And I am not ashamed of it. I killed and will kill bad people. We fight against enemies of our republic.”

  According to Gannushkina, Kadyrov, not surprisingly, was unnerved by the accusations and called Orlov that same day, declaring his innocence: “It seems as though Kadyrov called Oleg to find out what evidence he had.”27 Kadyrov also gave a television interview in which he defended himself. He soon was reassured by the Kremlin. President Medvedev immediately condemned the crime publicly and acknowledged that Estemirova was killed because of her professional activities. He vowed that authorities would apprehend the killers. But he also insisted that Kadyrov was not involved in the crime, thus ensuring that the Chechen president would be protected by the Kremlin and not held accountable.28

  As for Prime Minister Putin, he showed his loyalty to Kadyrov by traveling to Grozny on August 24, 2009, just hours before a demonstration in honor of Estemirova took place in Moscow and at the exact time that mourners gathered in Grozny to mark the traditional forty days since her death. Together with Kadyrov in a much-publicized ceremony, Putin laid flowers at the grave of Kadyrov’s father, the ruthless former Chechen president, Akhmat Kadyrov. Tanya Lokshina and journalist Elena Milashina were at Estemirova’s gravesite. They knew, as they recounted later, that Putin would not come to the site because Estemirova, like Politkovskaya, was a personal enemy of both Kadyrov and Putin.29

  Kadyrov later filed a civil defamation suit against Orlov for accusing him of being responsible for Estemirova’s murder, and won. He then went on to file a criminal complaint against Orlov, seeking a three-year prison sentence. After a nine-month trial, Orlov was acquitted by a Moscow court in June 2011. During the trial, Kadyrov was asked to testify via video link from Chechnya. He had this to say about Estemirova: “I did not see anything saintly or useful to the Chechen people in her work. She did not protect human rights. She gabbed and talked, but did not protect rights.”30

  Investigation of the Estemirova Case

  Aleksandr Bastrykin, chief of the Russian Investigative Committee, should by now be a familiar character to the reader. A master at spin and deception, he took the case of Estemirova under his personal control, appointing Igor Sobol’ as the senior investigator, who led a group that included employees of subordinate investigative committees in both the Chechen and Ingushetia republics. But, as it turned out, the very people in Chechnya who were giving operational support to the Estemirova investigation were those who were under suspicion for her murder—Chechen police.

  Deputy Russian MVD chief Arkady Edelev, a close associate of Kadyrov, was the point man in the case until he was dismissed in February 2010. Edelev initially put out several possible versions for the killing: rebel bandits wanting to discredit the Chechen leadership and law-enforcement agencies; robbery (Estemirova allegedly received “foreign funds” on behalf of Memorial); and a possible “failed personal relationship.�
� A vendetta against Estemirova by Kadyrov or his police was not even considered. This despite the fact that the car of rebel bandits who seized Estemirova would have had to pass through several checkpoints and show I.D. to get into neighboring Ingushetia—a virtual impossibility without police complicity.31

  By January 2010, an official version of the murder had evolved and was put forward as definitive. A Chechen rebel named Alkhazur Bashaev, who allegedly led a jihad group (jamaat) in the village of Shalazhi, had murdered Estemirova. The investigators based their findings on the claim that the weapon used to kill Estemirova had been found in an empty house belonging to Bashaev, along with a forged police identity card with his photograph. The motive for the murder was said to relate to a visit Estemirova made with a colleague to Shalazhi to investigate a kidnapping and robbery by Bashaev’s group of militants, and three subsequent reports about Bashaev’s recruitment of young men to “go into the forest” to fight the Chechen regime that were posted on Memorial’s website. According to this theory, the crime was committed in revenge for the reports. Bashaev was, by the official version, conveniently dead. He had allegedly been killed in November 2009 during a “special operation,” an airstrike carried out by Kadyrov forces, which resulted in the death of several militants.

  In February 2010, police authorities discovered a vehicle in an underground garage in Grozny that they traced to Bashaev. In the car, they found a gun silencer that they claimed had been used in Estemirova’s murder because it matched a rubber fragment found at the crime scene. Forensic examiners also said that they discovered plant material underneath the car that matched plants where the murder had occurred. This was presented as conclusive evidence against Bashaev. The case was closed.

  A Human-Rights Team Takes On the Case