The Eleventh Day: The Full Story of 9/11 and Osama bin Laden

by Anthony Summers

  70 NEADS tracked: MFR 04016777, 10/28/03, Miles Kara, “Archive to the ‘Transponders & Ghosts’ Category, 9/11 Revisited,” www.​oredigger61.​org, Kara to Brinkley, 1/26/04, “Misc. Loose Documents re. Delta 1989,” B5, T8, CF, UA93 & Andrews Timeline, “Andrews AFB Logs—Timelines, UA93 & Andrews,” B4, Dana Hyde files, CF.

  71 only plane able to tail: NEADS had also been able briefly to pinpoint and track Flight 77, even though the FAA alerted it to the problem with the airliner only at 9:34, only some three minutes before it struck the Pentagon (Miles Kara, “Archive for the ‘Transponders & Ghosts’ Category, 9/11 Revisited, www.​oredigger61.​com)

  72 “land immediately”/“Confirm”/“unreliable”/Cleveland panic/pilots feared/“you’re a frip”/assured/“bomb area”/“bad movie”: Dave Dunlap (copilot) memoir, “September 11, 2001,” www.​3dlanguage.​net, DAL 1989 Order of Events, “FAA Subpoena Compendium, Delta 1989 Timeline,” B15, T8, CF, int. John Werth, MFR 04017313, 10/2/03

  73 Scoggins, “might not be”: 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 7,” B3, NYC files, CF, Summary [slugged as Timeline of Events of the Day], “Boston Center—Colin Scoggins,” B3, T8, CF, Farmer, 211.

  74 trying to get fighters: MFR 04016778, 1/22 & 23/04, MFR 04016771, 10/27/03, 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 2,” & ATCSCC Tape Transcription, “Channel 5,” B3, NYC files, CF, Staff Report, “The Four Flights and Civil Aviation Security,” 8/26/04, CF, 101n391. NEADS asked two additional bases to provide fighters—Selfridge, in Michigan, and Toledo, in Ohio. Contrary to reports at the time, it appears that they were unable to help during the Delta episode. The Selfridge Air National Guard fighters were in the air, but had expended all their ammunition on a training exercise. They did not land until 10:29. Two Toledo F-16s were to take off, but—according to Colonel Marr—only after the Delta 1989 episode was over and after United 93 had been shot down (“The Unthinkable Had Happened,” 2007, www.​candgnews.​com, The Wolverine, Fall 2006, Spencer, 178–, Toledo Blade, 12/9/01, MFR 03012970, 10/27/03).

  75 I believe: ATCSCC Tape Transcription, “Channel 5”

  76 NEADS told nothing: ibid., 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 2,” B3, NYC files, CF, MCC Log, “Miles Kara Trips,” B19, T8, CF, CR, 30

  77 controller heard/reported promptly: int. John Werth, CR, 28, FAA Memo, “Full Transcription: Air Traffic Control System Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer, East Position, 9/11/01,” B1, NYC files, CF

  78 Uh, do we want to think?/FAA staffer reported/“does not believe”: ibid., MFR 04018154, 11/24/03, CR, 461n167.

  79 NEADS knew nothing: MCC/T Log, “Miles Kara Trips—MCC Log,” B19, T8, CF. Ironically, this was the one time during the morning that U.S. forces might have been in a position to intercept one of the hijacked flights. In the words of Commission staffer Kara, “it was only because of a proactive error by Boston air traffic controller Colin Scoggins [suggesting that Flight 11 might still be aloft] … that the nation’s air defenders had any real chance to defend against Flight 93.” The flap over the nonexistent Flight 11 got fighters from Langley in the air, where they established a Combat Air Patrol over Washington by 10:00. It was a patrol at that stage, however—an impotent patrol. It had no rules of engagement, no knowledge of the real flight that was missing, United 93 (“Archive for the Andrews Fighters Category,” www.​oredigger61.​org)

  80 “we were always”: int. of Colin Scoggins (under his Internet name of Cheap Shot), “Q&A with Boston Center Air Traffic Controller,” http://​sites.​google.​com.

  81 “We believe”: Spencer, 286

  82 “watching United”: “Conversation with Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold,” www.​codeone​magazine.​com, 1/02.

  83 magical feat/no one reported: The FAA’s call alerting the military to United 93’s situation was at 10:07, and the airliner had crashed at 10:03. Seven minutes later, NEADS was told that the plane was down. (9/11 ATCSCC Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Transcripts Channel 5,” B3, NYC files, CF, MCC Tech logbook, “Miles Kara FAA HQ 3 of 3,” B19, T8, CF).

  84 Arnold concedes: Testimony of Larry Arnold, 6/17/04, CO, MFR 04016749, 2/3/04, Vanity Fair, 9/06 & see re officers conceding same MFR 04016769, 1/23/04.

  85 conflated Delta 1989: Miles Kara, “Archive for Delta 1989 Category,” 9/11 Revisited, www.​oredigger.​com—with which the authors concur, int. John Werth, & see MFRs 04016769, 1/23/04, 04016749, 2/3/04. Colonel Marr, the NEADS battle commander, also offered inaccurate information about NEADS and Flight 93. The Air Force’s official 9/11 history, published as Air War over America in January 2003, quoted him as saying he and colleagues called in fighters from the airbase at Selfridge “so they could head 93 off at the pass … get in there, close on him, and convince him to turn.” The request to Selfridge was made, however, at about 9:43, before NORAD knew anything about Flight 93. The request was made, rather, in connection with Delta 1989, which—as discussed in the text—had not in fact been hijacked (“so they could”: Staff Monograph, “The Four Flights and Civil Aviation Security,” 8/26/04, CF, 100n391; Selfridge request: 1989: 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Transcripts Channel 2,” B3, NYC files, CF, Staff Monograph, “The Four Flights and Civil Aviation Security,” 8/26/04, CF, 101n391).

  86 Sudoku/shoddy work: Miles Kara, “NORAD’s Sudoko Puzzle, a Failure to Tell the Truth” & “Archive of the ‘May 23, 2003 Hearing’ Category,” 9/11 Revisited, www.​oredigger61.​org.

  87 Marcus pointed: Marcus to Schmitz & Mead plus attachments, 7/29/04, “Referral of False Statements by Government Officials to FAA & DOD Inspectors General,” CF; Kara, for his part, told the authors that in his view the press release in question had been a “rush to judgment” by NORAD, that NORAD had simply wanted to “get out in front of FAA before the upcoming White House meeting to sort things out”; the tape malfuntion referred to, Kara said, did indeed occur (corr. Miles Kara, 2011)

  88 “didn’t get together”: Testimony of Ralph Eberhart, 6/17/04, CO

  89 “NORAD’s public chronology”/“whoever at FAA”: “Sen. Dayton’s ‘NORAD Lied’ Transcript,” www.​scoop.​co.​nz

  90 “At some”: Farmer, 4–.

  CHAPTER 13

  1 Wolfowitz: Online NewsHour, 9/14/01, www.​pbs.​org

  2 “horrendous decision”: Meet the Press, NBC, 9/16/01

  3 “I recommended”: Office of the Vice President Internal Transcript, Telephone Interview of the Vice President by Newsweek, “Farmer—Misc.,” B9, NYC files, CF

  4 “You bet”: WP, 1/27/02

  5 “emphasized”: CR, 40, 464n214

  6 2010 memoir: Bush, 129–.

  7 “The operational chain”: Dept. of Defense Directive 5100.1, 9/25/87. The authors have here referred to the directive effectuating the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the relevant law on 9/11. Other Defense Department regulations in force in 2001 stated—on the matter of military cooperation with civilian authorities (like the FAA)—that the defense secretary had to approve “any request for potentially lethal support,” and that “only the President” could request the use of the military to respond to domestic terrorism. It was “understood” in 2001, the 9/11 Commission stated, that a shoot-down order would have to come from the National Command Authority—“a phrase used to describe the President and the Secretary of Defense.” Dr. David Griffin, the prominent skeptic, has suggested that the military did not in fact require authorization—that they could act at once in cases requiring “immediate responses.” The authors’ reading of the regulation Griffin cites is that in certain circumstances and “where time does not permit” prior approval, the military could indeed take “necessary action.” The sort of action it could take, however, is very specifically described and does not include the use of force (“understood”: CR 17, 43; Griffin: New Pearl Harbor R
evisited, 265n12; regulation: DOD Directives, “Military Assistance to Civil Authorities,” 3025.1, 1/15/93, 3025.15, 2/18/97, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions, “Aircraft Piracy [Hijacking] and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects,” 3610.01, 7/31/97, 3610.01A, 6/1/01).

  8 generals understood/exercise: Testimony of Larry Arnold & Craig McKinley, 5/23/03, CO, CR 457n98

  9 “derelict balloon”/Only President: MFR 04016749, 2/3/04, Testimony of Larry Arnold, 5/23/02, CO, CR 457n98

  10 Cheney furious: Shenon, 267, 411–, but see Kean & Hamilton, 261

  11 clear hint: CR, 40–, 464n213–216

  12 “We just didn’t”: Shenon, 265

  13 “The official version”: Farmer, 255.

  14 “My recommendation”: 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 2, B3, NYC files, CF

  15 Nasypany began asking: Vanity Fair, 9/06

  16 “I don’t know”: 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 4,” B3, NYC files, CF, FAA Memo, Full Transcript, Aircraft Accident: UAL175; New York, NY, 9/11/01, “AAL 11, UAL 175: FAA Produced documents, Transcripts used in interviews,” B2, NYC files, CF

  17 Rumsfeld movements from 9:37: see Ch. 5

  18 NMCC looked: CR, 37–

  19 “outrageous”: Cockburn, 3–

  20 “one or more calls”: Testimony of Donald Rumsfeld, 3/23/04, CO

  21 “tried without success”: Goldberg et al., 131

  22 “Are you okay?”: ibid., 131, 240n6. The assistant was Major Joseph Wassel, who set up the call. Wassel was interviewed for the Defense Department’s “Pentagon 9/11” report, but not by the staff of the 9/11 Commission. Wassel described an initial attempt to call the President through the White House Situation Room—a call he came to believe did not go through. Sometime later—Wassel could not pinpoint the time, but placed it as being when Rumsfeld was back in his Pentagon office, having returned from the crash site—the President called the defense secretary from Air Force One (Goldberg et al., 131, 240n6, AF News, 3/8/01, Fenner to Campagna & attachments, 12/21/03, “DOD Documents Produced,” B22, T2, CF, int. of Joseph Wassel by Alfred Goldberg, 4/9/03, B115, GSA files, CF).

  23 “brief call”/“just gaining”/10:35/There’s been; CR, 43–, 465n234, Farmer, 230, “Dana Hyde Notes of Air Threat Conference Call,” released to authors under Mandatory Declassification Review 2011. The text of this conversation is taken from the Defense Department transcript of the “Air Threat” teleconference that began at 9:37 A.M., a key document in the context of establishing the time of the actions and knowledge of senior officials. The Defense Department and Commission staff held that the transcript had a three-minute margin of error. The authors obtained the release of Commission staffer Dana Hyde’s detailed notes on the Air Threat call, which support the timeline in the Commission’s Report. The transcript of the teleconference remains classified as of this writing (CR, 37, 462n194, Levin to Zelikow, 8/22/03, “Air Threat Call,” B1, Daniel Marcus Files, CF, “Dana Hyde Notes of ATC Call,” CF, corr. Kristen Wilhelm, 2010).

  24 “had come”/“Technically”/testimony/withheld: “Interview with Donald Rumsfeld, 12/23/02,” B7, T2, CF, Goldberg et al., 131, testimony of Donald Rumsfeld, 3/23/04, CO, corr. NARA’s Kristen Wilhelm, 2010. The defense secretary’s full testimony on the point was: “In the National Military Command Center (NMCC), I joined the Air Threat Conference call in progress. One of my first conversations during the Conference Call was with the Vice President. He informed me of the President’s authorization to shoot down hostile aircraft coming toward Washington, D.C.” In the 2011 memoir, Rumsfeld said Cheney told him there had been “at least three instances” of reports of planes approaching Washington—“a couple were confirmed hijack. And, pursuant to the President’s instructions, I gave authorization for them to be taken out” (Rumsfeld, 339).

  25 “Very little”/“To a person”: Hyde to Front Office, 3/2/04, “Daniel Marcus,” B8, T8, CF

  26 White House keeps track: Shenon, 265

  27 notes by individuals: CR, 464n216

  28 sought to limit/record unreliable: Hyde to Front Office, 3/2/04, “Daniel Marcus,” B8, T8, CF

  29 teleconferences/“In my mind”/cell phones: CR, 36–, 463n190, int. Anthony Barnes, int. Joseph Wassel by Alfred Goldberg, 4/9/03, B115, GSA files, CF, Sunday Times (U.K.), 9/5/10.

  30 logged in 9:58: Hyde to Front Office, 3/2/04, Dan Marcus Files, CF. Much-publicized recollections, particularly those of former transportation secretary Norman Mineta, appear to suggest that Cheney was moved to the PEOC before 9:30 A.M. According to the authors’ analysis, they are in error. Mineta himself, moreover, was not logged into the PEOC until 10:07.

  31 disputed call: CR, 40. Cheney had also called Bush minutes earlier, from a wall phone in a tunnel on the way to the bunker. In that call, he said, they discussed principally the matter of whether the President should return to Washington. Cheney’s aide, Scooter Libby, who arrived in the tunnel during the call, thought the gist of it was “basically conveying what was happening.” Neither he nor Mrs. Cheney, who was also there, heard any discussion of the shoot-down issue. It is evident from a Defense Department transcript that a White House official requested a Combat Air Patrol over the capital at about that time, but made no mention of a shoot-down order. Counterterrorism coordinator Clarke, moreover, was still talking of “asking the President for authority to shoot down aircraft.”

  Neither Libby’s notes, however, nor Mrs. Cheney’s, reflect contact with Bush at the time mentioned by Cheney. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice did tell the Commission she heard Cheney’s end of a conversation with the President at that time. While she recalled a reference to a Combat Air Patrol, however, she did not hear Cheney recommend the shoot-down of hijacked airliners. A separate statement by Rice, moreover, mightily diminishes her credibility. She told ABC News that shoot-down authority was “requested through channels, by Secretary Rumsfeld, Vice President passed the request, the President said, ‘Yes.’ ” Far from requesting shoot-down authority, Rumsfeld—as reported in the text—learned of the shoot-down order only after the fact, from Cheney (Cheney called: CR 40, 464n211/213, Interview of Scooter Libby by Newsweek, 11/16/01, & Interview of Mrs. Cheney by Newsweek, 11/9/01, “Farmer Misc.,” B10, NYC files, CF; transcript: CR 38, 463n201; “asking”: CR 36, 463n191, MFR 04018415, 12/16/03, CF; Libby/Cheney notes/Rice: CR 40–, 43; “requested”: “9/11,” ABC News, 9/11/02, transcript at http://​s3.​amazonaws.​com, Farmer, 259).

  32 staff received/Kurtz: CR, 36, MFR 04018415, 12/16/03, CF.

  33 suspect aircraft: The reports of inbound aircraft originated, as Mrs. Cheney’s notes suggest, as information from the Secret Service’s Joint Operations Center (JOC), which was in turn getting its information directly from the FAA. The incoming aircraft was likely United 93, which the Secret Service and its FAA contact were tracking on a screen that showed its projected path. Both were unaware that, as of 10:03, the flight that appeared on the screen to be approaching the capital had in fact already crashed. Within a minute or so of the confusing reports about Flight 93, the fighters out of Langley—just arriving over Washington—were also briefly mistaken as a threat (CR, 40–, Staff Statement 17, CO, Miles Kara, “9-11: Rules of Engagement,” www.​oredigger61.​org).

  34 Mrs. Cheney noted: notes, “Office of the VP Notes,” B1, Dana Hyde files, CF. The content of Mrs. Cheney’s notes come from a handwritten digest done by Commission staff, which was released in 2009. Mrs. Cheney’s original notes, like those of Scooter Libby, have not been released at the time of writing, nor has the Commission staff’s record of its interview of Josh Bolten. Bolten has disputed the way he was reported in the Commission Report. According to Cheney biographer Stephen Hayes, he said “he suggested Cheney call Bush not because the Vice President had overstepped his authority, but as a reminder that they should notify the President.” In his November interview with Newsweek, Libby would say, “I wouldn’t be
surprised that there were—that there had already been discussion with the President about getting CAP [Combat Air Patrol] up.… I’m almost certain that they had already had discussions … as I say, I was not on those phone calls.” (Mrs. Cheney’s notes: “OVP Notes,” B1, Dana Hyde files, CF; Cheney/​Libby/​Bolten notes: corr. NARA’s Kristen Wilhelm, 2010; Bolten disputed: Hayes, 546n20; “I wouldn’t”: int. Libby by Newsweek, 11/16/01).

  35 “I’m talking”: int. Anthony Barnes. According to Barnes, it was not he who warned Cheney of an approaching aircraft. That information reached the Vice President from someone else. The Commission Report identifies the source of the “aircraft 80 miles out” report only as a “military aide.” The aide could perhaps have been the Vice President’s military aide, Douglas Cochrane, who was also in the PEOC at some point (CR, 40–).

  36 Libby/“Yes”: int. Libby by Newsweek, 11/16/01

  37 lt. col. “confirmed”: CR 42, 465n227

  38 “pin-drop”: MFR 04020719, 4/29/04

  39 Libby note: CR, 465n220

  40 “wanted to make sure”: CR, 41.

  41 Fleisher kept record: Ari Fleischer, Taking Heat, NY: William Morrow, 2005, 141, transcript 60 Minutes, CBS, 9/11/02. The note Fleischer made on 9/11, which firmly timed the President’s comment as having been made at 10:20, remains classified. The press secretary’s memoir—published after the Commission’s Report came out—refers to the timing of the authorization only vaguely, as “shortly after we took off” (classified: corr. Kristen Wilhem, 2010, “shortly”: Fleischer, 141)