The Eleventh Day: The Full Story of 9/11 and Osama bin Laden

by Anthony Summers

  23 device in theater: Reeve, 77, Benjamin & Simon, 493, Lance, 1000 Years, 236–

  24 Italian/bomb: Lance, 1000 Years, 237–, Reeve, 78–

  25 Murad bomb/Parker pen/“cause”: FBI 302 of int. Abdul Hakim Ali Murad

  26 United Flight 2: Philippine National Police (PNP), “After Debriefing Report,” 1/17/95

  27 11 airliners/terrorists: Reeve, 90–, 94–

  28 “TIMER”: WP, 12/20/01

  29 airlines alerted/grounded: Richard Clarke, 93–, MFR 04017178, 11/21/03, Lance, Triple Cross, 441

  30 4,000 could have died: Reeve, 90.

  31 “BOJINKA”: Khalid Sheikh Mohammed reportedly told CIA interrogators after 9/11 that bojinka was not a Serbo-Croatian word for “big bang,” as reported—just “a nonsense word he adopted after hearing it on the front lines in Afghanistan.” The authors have been unable to pin down a meaning for the word in Serbo-Croat, but there is a Croatian word bočnica, meaning “boom” (explosion: Time, 1/1/95; loud bang: WP, 5/19/02; big bang: www.​FrontPage​Magazine.​com, 5/20/02; boom: www.​eudict.​com; “a nonsense”: CR, 488n7).

  32 Yousef arrested: Katz, 162–, 186–, Reeve, 101

  33 cooperative Bhutto: John Esposito, Political Islam, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997, 150

  34 face trial: Reeve, 237

  35 Found guilty/“I am”: ibid., 242, CNN, 9/5/96, 11/12/97

  36 240 years: NYT, 4/5/03.

  37 helicopter/“See”: Coll, Ghost Wars, 272. This exchange has been described several times, with varying details. They are summarized by author Peter Lance in his book 1000 Years for Revenge, 298, 482n13

  38 prostrate: Lance, 1000 Years, 9–

  39 mastermind: Coll, Ghost Wars, 273, NYT, 4/12/95—citing Al Hayat

  40 leaders inspired: Coll, Ghost Wars, 272.

  41 “substantial”: Staff Statement 15, CO, Peter Lance, Cover-Up, NY: Regan, 2004, 209—the staff member was Douglas MacEachin

  42 camp: Corbin, 46–, Reeve, 120, Benjamin & Simon, 8, 503n14, Los Angeles Times, 9/11/02 & see Evan Kohlmann, “Expert Report I: U.S. v. Oussama Kassir,” 3/09

  43 “emissary”: Abuza, “Balik Terrorism”

  44 separatist: Time, 6/17/02, Reeve, 136, 156–

  45 manual: NYT, 1/14/01, 6/9/02, Lance, 1000 Years, 110

  46 calls: Reeve, 47–, Lance, 1000 Years, 234

  47 Beit Ashuhada: “Summary of Captioned Investigation as of 11/4/01,” PENTTBOM, 11/5/01, authors’ collection, Cooley, 102, “State Dept. Fact Sheet on Bin Laden,” 8/14/96 reprinted in Brisard & Dasquié, 169.

  48 “good friend”/“trenches”: transcript int. of OBL for ABC News, Frontline: “Hunting bin Laden,” www.​pbs.​org, Miller & Stone, 138–, 189. The separatist leader with whom Yousef had early contact in the Philippines was Abdurajak Janjalani, the founder of the extremist Abu Sayyaf group. As identified in a previous note, the companion refused admission was Ahmad Ajaj. The Yousef accomplice who had fought with bin Laden was Wali Kahn Amin Shah (Reeve, 136, 156–, CR, 59).

  49 Shaikha/“Imagine”: CNN, 11/24/04, 9/24/06, Bergen, OBL I Know, 46–, Wright, 97–

  50 “missionary”: “Mohammad Khalifa’s Network in the Philippines,” in ed. J. M. Berger, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, Vol. 1, INTELWIRE, 2007

  51 “philanthropist”: The Inquirer (Philippines), 1/22/07, Vitug & Gloria, 208, 213, 235–

  52 OBL Philippines: Ressa, 16

  53 spreading money: ibid., 27, 73, 107, 227n22, Christian Science Monitor, 2/1/02

  54 introduced Yousef: Ressa, 108

  55 left country/police report: Ressa, 10–, 16

  56 arrested: “Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support for Motion re Return of Property,” Mohammad Jamal Khalifa v. U.S., U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, Cr 95–, in ed. Berger

  57 phone book: U.S. v. Benevolence International Foundation, Inc. et al., U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 02 CR 0414, 4/29/02, in ed. Berger

  58 bomb factory: J. M. Berger, “Mohammad Jamal Khalifa: Life and Death Secrets,” 1/31/07, INTELWIRE

  59 explosives/weaponry: “In the Matter of Mohammad J. Khalifah, Respondent,” U.S. Dept. of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, A29–457–661, 3/10/95, in ed. Berger; Khalifa, entry for OBL: U.S. v. Benevolence International Foundation, Inc., et al.

  60 card in suitcase/Khalifa alias: U.S. v. Benevolence International Foundation Inc., et al.

  61 co-conspirator: ed. Berger, Khalifa, iii.

  62 “alleged financier”: JI, Report, 128. The “alleged financier” reference also appears in a post-9/11 FBI report. A CIA investigation, the BBC was reportedly told by an agency interviewee in 1998, indicated that bin Laden was “Yousef’s principal financial backer.” The overall story of the way Khalifa was handled by U.S. authorities in 1995 remains complex and unsatisfactorily explained. His U.S. visa had been withdrawn on the ground that he had “engaged in terrorist activity,” not in the United States but in Jordan, where he had been convicted in absentia in connection with a bombing campaign. Khalifa was subsequently deported to Jordan, retried, and acquitted—though he admitted that he had known the bombers and sent them funds. Khalifa was then allowed to leave for Saudi Arabia. He claimed in interviews after 9/11, in the face of all evidence to the contrary, that he and bin Laden had been estranged since the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Khalifa was killed by unknown assailants in Madagascar in 2007—days after Interpol had forwarded a bulletin on him to U.S. agencies. Relevant Interpol documents are heavily redacted. (“alleged financier”: “Summary of Captioned Investigation as of 11/4/01,” PENTTBOM, 11/5/01, authors’ collection; “Yousef’s principal”: Vitug & Gloria, 234; “engaged”: Mohammad Jamal Khalifah v. U.S., Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Return of Property, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, CR 95–, 3/6/95; in absentia/​retried/​acquitted: ed. Berger, Khalifa, ii–; admitted: John Doe v. Al Baraka Investment & Development Corporation et al., Complaint, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia; estranged: e.g. CNN, 9/2/07, Wright, 113; killed/Interpol: J. M. Berger, “U.S., Interpol Tracking Khalifa in Days Before Madagascar Murder,” 2/16/07, INTELWIRE).

  63 never charged: ed. Berger, i.

  64 clues/“Zahid”: Miller & Stone, 137, McDermott, 162.

  65 Zahid uncle: Reeve, 48. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed has long been described as Ramzi Yousef’s uncle. The most informative account, by journalist Terry McDermott and colleagues at the Los Angeles Times, concludes that he is the brother of Yousef’s mother, Hameda. Author Steve Coll writes that the CIA concluded that Mohammed is not only Yousef’s uncle, but that the two men’s wives are sisters. Absent documentation, the exact nature of their relationship remains elusive—Arabs sometimes use the word “uncle” loosely. Both men were apparently born in Kuwait to immigrant families from the Baluchistan region of southwest Pakistan. “I am Palestinian on my mother’s side,” Yousef told an Arab newspaper in 1995. “My grandmother is Palestinian” (uncle: e.g. Corbin, 47, Reeve, 91, Time, 6/17/02; informative: McDermott, 107–, 128, & see Fouda & Fielding, 88–; wives: Coll, Ghost Wars, 326; “I am Palestinian”: int. Yousef by Raghida Dergham, Al Hayat, 4/12/95 & see NYT, 4/12/95).

  66 photos of OBL: Financial Times, 2/15/03.

  67 no sign of either brother: KSM’s brother Zahid spent much of the 1990s in the United Arab Emirates, until being deported in 1998 for involvement with the Muslim Brotherhood. He was working as a business executive in Bahrain as of 2010 (New Yorker, 9/13/10).

  68 Yousef many calls: Miller & Stone, 137, NBC News, 10/18/00

  69 call to KSM: CR, 147, 488n6

  70 Tiffany Mansions: McDermott, 144

  71 bar girls/phone: Ressa, 18–

  72 “Abdul Majid”/met in Pakistan/electronics business/“must have”: FBI 302 of int. Abdul Hakim Ali Murad, 5/11/95, “Various Interrogation Reports,” B24, T1, CF, CR, 147

  73 “I was”: “Verbatim Transcrip
t ISN 10024”

  74 “idea”: “Substitution for the Testimony of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,” U.S. v. Zacarias Moussaoui; target CIA/WTC: CR, 153, 491n33.

  75 “plan”: Philippines National Police, “After Debriefing Report,” 1/20/95. A 1995 FBI memo refers to Murad’s statement about attacking CIA HQ, but cites him as saying he would fly a plane filled with explosives into the building” (WP, 6/6/02, Coll, Ghost Wars, 278–, Lance, Triple Cross, 188, Appendix XI).

  76 Mendoza: CNN, 9/18/01. Former CIA official and deputy director of the State Department’s Office of Counterterrorism, Larry Johnson, has characterized Mendoza’s assertions as “bullshit.” Contemporary Philippines police reports on the Murad interrogation, Johnson asserted in 2006—publishing copies of some of them—do not reflect questioning of Murad by Mendoza. Nor, he said, do they contain any reference to talk of flying airliners into buildings other than the CIA. Johnson wrote that author Peter Lance, who gave credence to Mendoza’s account in his books on 9/11, had been “sold a bill of goods.” Johnson, however, is himself a controversial character, said to have been instrumental in spreading a smear story about President Obama’s wife, Michelle. He has been mocked for having written a New York Times piece stating that “terrorism is not the biggest security challenge confronting the United States”—two months before 9/11 (Larry Johnson, “Peter Lance’s Flawed Triple Cross,”12/6/06, www.​huffingtonpost.​com, David Weigel, “Larry Johnson’s Strange Trip,” 6/24/08, www.​prospect.​org, Larry Johnson, “Whitey Tapes,” 10/21/08, www.​noquarterusa.​net, Time, 6/12/08).

  77 “The targets”: “Investigating Terror,” CNN, 10/20/01, Ressa, 32—citing 9/16/01 int. of Tiglao.

  78 Garcia/“selected targets”: Village Voice, 9/25/01, Rafael Garcia, “Decoding Bojinka,” Newsbreak (Philippines), 11/15/01, Fouda & Fielding, 99, Lance, Triple Cross, 185 & see “Authorities Told of Hijack Risks,” AP, 3/5/02. In other versions of his account, Garcia recalled that the computer file also named the Pentagon as a proposed target. “Murad,” Garcia wrote, “was to fly the plane that would be crashed into the CIA headquarters.” The subject of the computer, and other evidence on it, came up at Yousef’s trial in 1996. Defense attorneys sought unsuccessfully to challenge the evidence on the computer, alleging tampering (“Murad”: Rafael Garcia, “Decoding Bojinka,” Newsbreak [Philippines], 11/15/01, Village Voice, 9/25/01, Fouda & Fielding, 99; tampering?: NYT, 7/18/96, WP, 12/6/01).

  79 “claims”: CR, 491n33

  80 FBI “effectively”: JI, Report, 9, 101–, 210

  81 “We shared”/“I believe”: Portsmouth Herald, 3/5/02, CNN, 3/14/02

  82 Mendoza insisted: Lance, 1000 Years, 282

  83 “We told”/“I still”: WP, 12/30/01.

  84 Defense Dept. panel/“Coming”/“It was”: WP, 10/2/01 & see re not in published version “Terror 2000,” www.​dod.​gov.

  CHAPTER 21

  1 “You need”: NYT, 11/14/09—agent was Daniel Byman

  2 “manager”: “Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source on Al Qa’ida,” CIA, 7/13/04, released 2009

  3 “Khalid”/born Kuwait: JI, Report, 30, New Yorker, 9/13/10

  4 imam/washed bodies: Fox News, 3/14/07

  5 Palestinians: McDermott, 109

  6 “so smart”/theater: Financial Times, 2/15/03, New Yorker, 9/13/10. KSM studied first at Chowan College, in Murfreesboro, then at North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University in Greensboro. Also attending the latter college was Ramzi Yousef’s brother (New York to Counterterrorism, Charlotte, 6/10/02, FBI 265A-NY-252802, INTELWIRE, CR, 146)

  7 Palestine/​prayers/​reproach: New York to Counterterrorism, Charlotte, 6/10/02, FBI 265A-NY-252802, INTELWIRE, CR, 146, McDermott, 115–

  8 “racist”: KSM, “Preeminent Source,” McDermott, 114–

  9 1987/Afghan conflict: CR, 146. During the war, KSM became aide to Abdul Rasool Sayyaf, a former Kabul theology professor and an adherent to a form of Islam similar to the creed practiced in Saudi Arabia. Sayyaf, who lived for some time in Saudi Arabia, had links to bin Laden (Fouda & Fielding, 91)

  10 one brother/two killed: CR, 488n5, Financial Times, 2/15/03

  11 KSM relatives: e.g. “KSM: Preeminent Source,” Staff Report, “9/11 and Terrorist Travel,” CO, Time, 5/1/03, Reuters, 2/1/08, WP, 4/13/07, across world/Bosnia: CR, 488n5, Fouda & Fielding, 97, Al Jazeera, 5/5/03, McDermott, 175

  12 short/balding: Fouda & Fielding, 88, Los Angeles Times, 9/1/02, “Khaled Shaikh Mohammad,” information sheet for Rewards for Justice program, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. Dept. of State

  13 employment: NY to National Security, Bangkok et al., FBI 265A-NY-252802, 7/8/99, INTELWIRE

  14 Thani: CR, 147–, 488n5

  15 indictment: ibid., 73.

  16 tipped off/assisted flying out: The circumstances in which KSM was allowed to escape have been told in some detail by former CIA case officer Robert Baer, drawing on information given him in 1997 by former police chief Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem bin Hamad al-Thani, then in exile in Syria. The Qatari fiasco has also been described by Richard Clarke, and—more circumspectly—by former FBI director Louis Freeh (Baer: Robert Baer, Sleeping with the Devil, NY: Three Rivers, 2003, 18, 190–, Robert Baer, See No Evil, NY: Three Rivers, 2002, 270; Freeh: Statement & Testimony of Louis Freeh, 4/13/04, CO & see CR, 147, 488n5, Staff Statement 5, CO, Bamford, Pretext, 164, Coll, Ghost Wars, 326–, 631n35).

  17 anger: Richard Clarke, 152–

  18 $5 million/“Armed”/lookout: “Mohammad,” information sheet, FBI, INS Lookout Notice, 2/13/96, “KSM, FBI-INS Misc. Info.,” B11, T5, CF.

  19 “al-Balushi”: CR, 276–. E.g., KSM’s nephew Ammar al-Baluchi (also of Baluchi nationality and otherwise known as Ali Abdul Aziz Ali) was allegedly involved in transferring al Qaeda funds to the 9/11 hijackers; another example is senior al Qaeda military commander Abu Faraj al-Libi (the Libyan Mustafa al-’Uzayti). Both were among the group of U.S. captives known as High Value Detainees (“Detainee Biographies,” www.​defense.​gov)

  20 visa/alias: Staff Report, “Monograph on Terrorist Travel,” CO

  21 “recruiting”: CR, 255

  22 “Based on”: Statement of Eleanor Hill, 9/18/02, JI.

  23 “failure”: Executive Summary, “CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks,” Office of the Inspector General, CIA, 6/05. Though a summary was made public after congressional pressure, the full inspector general’s 2005 “Report on CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks” has not been released. (“Executive Summary,” Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Inspector General, 06/05, www.​cia.​gov, NYT, 10/5/05, AP, 5/18/07).

  24 KSM capture: Fouda & Fielding, 181–, Tenet, 251–. Questions were raised as to the circumstances and timing of the arrest. The family of one of the men detained with KSM denied that the fugitive had been in the house. Some reports suggested he had been captured by Pakistani forces acting alone, others that it had been a joint U.S.-Pakistani operation. There were differing claims, too, as to who had custody of the suspect in the immediate aftermath. Red Cross staff and KSM’s own defense team, however, who interviewed the prisoner, have not apparently raised questions as to the timing and circumstances of the arrest. The most reliable account of the hunt for and capture of KSM is almost certainly the 2012 book The Hunt for KSM: Inside the Pursuit and Takedown of the Real 9/11 Mastermind, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, by Terry McDermott and Josh Meyer, which reached the authors as this edition went to press—too late for detailed analysis (NY: Little, Brown, 2012) (questions: e.g., Sunday Times [London], 3/9/03, NYT, 3/3/03, The Guardian [U.K.], 3/3/03, ABC News, 3/11/03, Fouda & Fielding, 181– & see Paul Thompson, “Is There More to the Capture of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed than Meets the Eye?,” 3/4/03, www.​history​commons.​org; Red Cross/defense team: Red Cross Report, 5, 20, 33–, “Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10024,” www.​defense.​gov)

  25 “Nothing like”: Tenet, 252

&
nbsp; 26 leads/$25 million: LAT, 3/2/03, Suskind, One Percent, 204–, Guardian (U.K.), 3/11/03, Tenet, 253; “wonderful”/“hard”: LAT, 3/2/03

  27 “This is equal”: Fox News, 3/3/03

  28 “No person”: Tenet, 250

  29 “disorient”/“break”: LAT, 3/2/03

  30 “crouched”: Der Spiegel, 10/27/03, New Yorker, 8/13/07

  31 Commission Report/211: authors’ analysis based on Robert Windrem, “Cheney’s Role Deepens,” 5/13/09, www.​thedaily​beast.​com

  32 “enhanced”: Special Review, “Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities,” Office of Inspector General, CIA, 5/7/04, www.​cia.​gov

  33 “dark side”: transcript, int. of Richard Cheney, Meet the Press, NBC, 9/16/01

  34 “certain acts”: “Memorandum for Alberto Gonzales from Asst. A.G. Jay Bybee,” 8/1/02.

  35 Red Cross monitors/asked in vain/“torture”/leaked/“suffocation,” etc.: FAQ, www.​icrc.​org, Mark Danner, “The Red Cross Torture Report: What It Means,” NY Review of Books, 4/30/09, “Report on the Treatment of Fourteen ‘High Value’ Detainees,” International Committee of the Red Cross, 2/07, www.​nyrb.​com. Measures defined as “torture” or “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment” of prisoners of war are illegal under the Third Geneva Convention (1949) and the U.N. Convention Against Torture (1984). To circumvent the treaties, and after advice from the Justice Department, President Bush formally determined in early 2002 that the 1949 Geneva Convention did not apply to the conflict with al Qaeda, and that the group’s detainees therefore did not qualify as “prisoners of war.”

  The Red Cross determined that—in addition to KSM—thirteen other prisoners, suspected of having been in al Qaeda’s “inner circle,” suffered mistreatment constituting torture. The authors here confine themselves to U.S. treatment of prisoners relevant to the 9/11 story, but the mistreatment extended to captives elsewhere—as at Abu Ghraib prison after the invasion of Iraq. As well as pertinent documents referred to below, there has been groundbreaking reporting by Seymour Hersh, Jane Mayer, and Mark Danner (“inner circle”: Summary of High Value Detainee Program, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 9/06, www.​c-span.​org; torture: Red Cross Report; pertinent documents: e.g. as excerpted in eds. John Ehrenberg et al., The Iraq Papers, NY: Oxford Univ. Press, 2010, 403–. In addition to the previously cited Red Cross Report, see also “The Treatment by the Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and Other Protected Persons by the Geneva Conventions in Iraq During Arrest, Internment & Interrogation,” Report, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2/04).