The Eleventh Day: The Full Story of 9/11 and Osama bin Laden

by Anthony Summers

37 Atta/Hazmi stopped by police: Hijackers Timeline [redacted], 11/14/03, INTELWIRE, Mohamed Mohamed Elamir Awad Elsayed Atta, Enforcement Operations Division, Texas Service Center, Intelligence Division, INS, “Hijacker Primary Documents—AA11,” B51, T5, CF, & see Graham with Nussbaum, 36–

  38 “Every cop”: MFR of George Tenet, 12/23/03, CF

  39 “five or six weeks”: Staff Statement 16, CO, CR, 243

  40 “Salaam”: McDermott, 225.

  41 warnings: Chicago attorney David Schippers said soon after 9/11 that he had received information on a coming terror attack on Manhattan and that—“a month before the bombing”—he had tried to get a warning to Attorney General Ashcroft. He said he was never able to reach Ashcroft and was brushed off by Justice Department officials. Schippers’s sources, he said, included FBI agents and policemen. In the summer of 2001, Schippers was attorney for Chicago FBI counterterrorism agent Robert Wright, whose book—a “blueprint on how the events of September 11 were inevitable”—was to be suppressed by the FBI. Schippers had also become a vocal advocate for Jayna Davis, an Oklahoma journalist whose research on the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah building posits a Middle East connection to that attack (see Ch. 22). The warnings Schippers said he attempted to pass on were not just of a coming attack on New York City but also covered Davis’s research and information on the infiltration of the United States by the Palestinian group Hamas. The totality of his information, Schippers later concluded, was to lead people to think he was “crazy.” Schippers had earlier served as chief investigative counsel to the House Judiciary Committee during the impeachment probe of President Clinton (int. David Schippers, The Alex Jones Show, 10/10/01, www.​infowars.​com, Indianapolis Star, 5/18/02, Chicago magazine, 10/02, Jayna Davis, The Third Terrorist, Nashville: WND, 2004, Foreword).

  42 DGSE: “Motley Submissions—French Intelligence Passed to the U.S.—Moussaoui—Planes as Weapons Widely Known,” B10, T2, CF, “Oussama Bin Laden,” leaked DGSE report, 9/13/01, seen by authors.

  43 Russian FSB; AFP, 9/16/01’

  44 “20 al Qaeda”: 60 Minutes II: The Plot, CBS, 10/9/02.

  45 Muttawakil: Muttawakil’s information was given him, according to the emissary, by the head of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Tahir Yildash. The detail is relevant, for the earliest French intelligence information on bin Laden’s hijacking plans came from Uzbek contacts (see pp. 308–9). Following the U.S. rout of the Taliban regime that he had predicted, former Taliban minister Muttawakil surrendered in early 2002, was for some time held in American custody, then freed. His emissary, who told his story on condition of anonymity, stayed on in Kabul—apparently at liberty. U.S. diplomat David Katz declined to discuss the episode when contacted in 2002. The story was reported by the BBC and the British newspaper The Independent, based on an interview of the emissary by the journalist Kate Clark (BBC News, The Independent [U.K.], 9/7/02).

  46 plans postponed: CR, 259, 534n28

  47 “will still happen”: ibid., 260, 534n32

  48 Miller/“very spun-up”: FBI IG

  49 slow progress/“But the Principals’ ”: Testimony of Richard Clarke, 4/8/04, CO

  50 Bush vacation/“I’m sure”: ABC News, 8/3/01, AP, 8/6/01, USA Today, 8/3/01

  51 Cheney: Jackson Hole News & Guide (Wyoming), 8/15/01

  52 poll/“too much”: USA Today, 8/6/01, “Public Critical of Bush’s Vacation Plans,” 8/7/01, www.​gallup.​com, WP, 8/7/01. As things turned out, the president was to return to Washington a few days earlier than planned, on August 30 (Public Papers of the Presidents, George W. Bush, 2001, www.​gpoaccess.​gov, 1569)

  53 CBS re PDB/“bin Laden’s”: “What Bush Knew Before September 11,” 5/17/02, www.​cbsnews.​com

  54 Fleischer/“very generalized”: press briefing, 5/16/02, http://​georgewbush-​whitehouse.​gov

  55 Fleischer follow-up: press briefing, 5/17/02, http://​georgewbush-​whitehouse.​gov

  56 Rice/“not a warning”/“an analytic”/“hijacking”/“could have”: press briefing, 5/16/02, http://​georgewbush-​whitehouse.​archives.​gov

  57 “historical”: ibid., Testimony of Condoleezza Rice, 4/8/04, CO

  58 struggle: e.g. Report, JI, 1, Kean & Hamilton, 89–

  59 “the most highly”: press briefing by Ari Fleischer, 5/21/02, http://​georgewbush-​whitehouse.​gov

  60 CIA refused: Report, JI, 1

  61 several released: Thomas Blanton, “The President’s Daily Brief,” National Security Archive, 4/12/04, www.​gwu.​edu

  62 leather binder: Tenet, 31

  63 “top-secret”: Graham, with Nussbaum, 80

  64 “news digest”: Blanton, “The President’s Daily Brief”

  65 truly secret/dull: ibid., Shenon, 220

  66 Joint Inquiry pressed: Report, JI, 1

  67 Commission/“What did”: Kean & Hamilton, 89–, Zelikow to Kean & Hamilton, Proposal for Breaking PDB Impasse, 9/25/03, “Letters & Memos, Negotiations over Access to PDBs,” B6, Dan Marcus files, CF

  68 “blowtorch”: Ben-Veniste, 239

  69 heading had not read: The Washington Post had reported the correct headline as early as May 19, 2002, two days after Fleischer misstated it. The significance of the press secretary’s omission of the word “in,” however, got lost in the fog of the subsequent White House effort to minimize the PDB’s overall importance (“Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer,” 5/17/02, www.​gwu.​edu, WP, 5/19/02, Nation, 4/12/04).

  70 Aug. 6 PDB: released 4/10/04, “Withdrawal Notice re 4–12–04 memo re Aug. 6 PDB, Withdrawal Notice re 5–16–01 Daily UBL Threat,” B6, Dan Marcus files, CF. The PDB also referred to the fact that, as indicated by the attacks on the American embassies in Africa in 1998, bin Laden prepared operations “years in advance and is not deterred by setbacks.” The PDB also stated that the FBI was currently “conducting approximately 70 full field investigations throughout the U.S.” that it considered bin Laden–related. This last assertion turned out to be a CIA misunderstanding of a liaison call to the FBI. Some seventy individuals were apparently being investigated by the FBI (Testimony of Thomas Pickard, 4/13/04, CO, Zegart, 109).

  71 redacted: Fact Sheet on Aug. 6, 2001, PDB, Office of the Press Secretary, 4/10/04, www.​gwu.​gov

  72 “said nothing”/at own request: remarks by the President to the Travel Pool [Fort Hood, TX], 4/11/04, www.​whitehouse.​gov

  73 Bush/Commission meeting/Ben-Veniste account: Ben-Veniste, 293– & see Shenon, 291–, 340–, CR, 260–, Kean & Hamilton, 206–

  74 Clarke “in writing”: see CR, 255, 263, 535n5

  75 “I really don’t”: Testimony of Condoleezza Rice, 4/8/04, CO.

  76 nobody could have foreseen: Rice acknowledged in her 2004 Commission testimony that she had misspoken in her comment to the press in 2002 that “no one” could have predicted hijackers using planes as missiles. Given the Genoa situation, she said—and given that others had indeed foreseen the possibility—Rice said she ought to have said only that she could not have imagined an attack using planes in that way. By contrast, Louis Freeh—FBI director until June 2001—told the Commission that the possible use of planes in suicide missions had in his experience been part of the planning for potential terrorist events (misspoken/she could not: Testimony of Condoleezza Rice, 4/8/04, CO, Ben-Veniste, 251, Press Briefing by Condoleezza Rice, 5/16/02, http://​georgewbush-​whitehouse.​archives.​gov; Freeh: Testimony of Louis Freeh, 4/13/04, CO).

  77 follow up/discussed with Ashcroft?: The job of making contact with domestic agencies, Bush told Commissioner Jamie Gorelick, was not Rice’s but that of White House chief of staff Andy Card. This assertion was impossible to check because the commission was bound by yet another condition, not to raise questions arising from the Rice or Bush-Cheney interviews with other White House officials. (Ben-Veniste, 303).

  78 Rice in Texas?: A contemporary Washington Post report of the President’s activity on August 6 stated that he “held a 45-minute meeting with
four senior officials here and talked by telephone with National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice about Macedonia.” (authors’ italics) (WP, 8/7/01, USA Today, 8/6/01, 10:24 P.M. update)

  79 doubt/“asked for it”: Ben-Veniste, 300, remarks by the President to the Travel Pool, [Fort Hood, TX], 4/11/04, www.​whitehouse.​gov

  80 “All right”: Suskind, One Percent Doctrine, 1–, Ben-Veniste, 300, additional information gathered by authors, not for attribution

  81 “no formal”: Tenet to Kean & Hamilton, 3/26/04, “PDB—letter from Tenet re Aug. 6 PDB,” B6, Dan Marcus files, CF

  82 “none”: Ben-Veniste, 391.

  83 “current”/“pay more”: Shenon, 379, 437n. This account of the August 6 PDB episode is intended by the authors to be not an assessment of the document’s quality but a summary of its content—in the context of the way President Bush, National Security Adviser Rice, and press secretary Fleischer described its contents. Author Amy Zegart severely criticized the quality of the PDB in her book Spying Blind, on the CIA and the FBI and their role prior to 9/11. She judged it a “tragically shoddy piece of intelligence.” Former CIA counterterrorism chief Cofer Black, however, characterized it as a “place-marker” or “reminder” that bin Laden’s ultimate objective was “to strike hard against the United States” (Zegart, 108, Testimony of Cofer Black, 4/13/04, CO).

  84 “had written”: Ben-Veniste, 301–.

  85 manager alerted/Moussaoui/“goal”/“I am sure”/$6,800: Stipulation, 3/1/06, U.S. v. Zacarias Moussaoui, 3/1/06

  86 “joy ride”: “Moussaoui, Zacarias, IT—Other,” 8/19/01, U.S. v. Zacarias Moussaoui, Exhibit 692

  87 string of questions/detained/“martyrs”/“unambiguous”/“convinced”/: CR, 273–, FBI IG, MFR 04019350, 3/18/04, CF, Report, JI, 22–

  88 KSM would tell/“problematic personality”: KSM SUBST, CR, 247, 531n162

  89 met Binalshibh/$14,000/telephone number: Staff Report, “Monograph on Terrorist Financing,” CO, MFR, 04019350, 3/18/04, Indictment & Exhibits MN00601, MN00601.1, MN00601.2, U.S. v. Zacarias Moussaoui, CR, 225, 520n54.

  90 agents knew nothing: Had agents been cleared to examine Moussaoui’s possessions, they would have discovered letters purporting to show that Moussaoui was acting as consultant in the States for a company called “InFocus Tech.” The signature on the letters was that of Yazid Sufaat, the owner of the Kuala Lumpur condominium in which the terrorist meeting—attended by Mihdhar and Hazmi—had been held in January 2000. The FBI had been aware of that meeting at the time, so—had the Bureau’s system been adequately coordinated—discovery of the letters in timely fashion would immediately have linked Moussaoui to al Qaeda. (Report, JI, 26, Exhibit OK01043, U.S. v. Zacarias Moussaoui).

  91 appeals/70 messages: Statement of Eleanor Hill re “The FBI’s Handling of the Phoenix Electronic Communication and Investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui Prior to Sept. 11, 2001,” 9/24/02 [as updated 10/17/02], JI, USA Today, 3/2/06, Newsday, 3/21/06, LAT, 3/21/06

  92 “spun up”/“take control”: FBI IG.

  93 “That’s not”: Statement of Eleanor Hill. The headquarters failure to respond positively on Moussaoui was to lead to protracted outrage and regret. The wrangle had centered on the complex matter of how legally to get access to Moussaoui’s possessions. The options available were either a criminal search warrant or a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance (FISA) warrant—permitted, in this context, if it can be shown that the subject is an agent of an international terrorist group and is engaged in terrorism on behalf of that group. The case agent in Minneapolis, concerned that there was insufficient probable cause for a criminal warrant, favored the FISA option—only to be confronted by legalistic hurdles thrown up by headquarters. The go-ahead was given only on September 11, after the two strikes on the World Trade Center. Evidence and detainee statements were eventually to link Moussaoui to KSM and Binalshibh, and he is now serving a life sentence for conspiracy to commit acts of terror and air piracy. As of this writing, only two other people have been convicted of conspiracy in connection with the 9/11 attacks. One is Syrian-born Imad Yarkas, alleged to have been an al Qaeda member linked to Mohamed Atta. The conviction relating to 9/11, however, was quashed on appeal. The other is Mounir Motassadeq, who is serving fifteen years in Germany. Motassadeq, an associate of the Hamburg-based hijackers, was accused of helping the hijackers prepare for the 9/11 operation. In a lengthy prison interview, Motassadeq told the authors that—while he had certainly been an associate and friend of the future hijackers in Hamburg—he had had no knowledge whatsoever of what they were plotting. The authors came away from the interview doubting that he was guilty as charged (warrant options: e.g., Graham with Nussbaum, 51; go-ahead: FBI IG; evidence/sentence: Indictment, U.S. v. Zacarias Moussaoui, 12/01, AP, 5/4/06, CNN, 4/23/05; Yarkas: Guardian [U.K.], BBC, 9/26/05, www.​cbc.​ca, CNN, 2/8/08; Motassadeq: NYT, 1/9/07, Der Spiegel, 1/12/07, Economist, 9/3/02, CBS News, 10/22/02, ints. Motassadeq, Udo Jacob, 2009).

  94 second development/New information/Wilshire reconsidered/“Something bad”: CR, 266–, FBI IG. In the 9/11 Commission Report, and in a 2004 review of the FBI’s handling of pre-9/11 intelligence information issued by the Justice Department’s inspector general, relevant CIA and FBI personnel are referred to by pseudonyms. True names of many of the individuals were revealed in evidence prepared in 2006 for Moussaoui’s trial. Others have been asserted by independent writers, notably Lawrence Wright and Kevin Fenton, and the authors have used these identifications in the text. The CIA officer named here as Tom Wilshire is “John” in the official reports. The FBI analyst Margarette Gillespie is “Mary” in reports, while the FBI analyst Dina Corsi appears to be identical with “Jane” in the Commission Report and with “Donna” in the inspector general’s review. Steve Bongardt is “Steve B.” in the Commission Report and “Scott” in the review. Robert Fuller is “Robert F.” in the Commission Report and “Richard” in the review (CR 267–, & 537n63 et seq., FBI IG, McNulty to Troccoli 3/1/06, U.S. v Zacarias Moussaoui, Exhibit 952.B, Wright, 311, 340–, 352–, 425n, Kevin Fenton, “Aliases of 9/11 Figures Revealed,” 7/15/08, http://​hcgroups.​wordpress.​com).

  95 Wilshire suggested to Gillespie: Lawrence Wright’s The Looming Tower reads as if it was not Wilshire but CIA supervisor Clark Shannon who assigned Gillespie to this task. Wright’s New Yorker articles, however, also in 2006, say Wilshire assigned the work. So do other relevant sources (Wright, 340–. CR, 269–, New Yorker, 7/10/06, Substitution for the Testimony of “Mary,” U.S. v. Zacarias Moussaoui, Exhibit 940)

  96 “It all clicked”/“watchlist”: CR, 266–, FBI IG

  97 not in U.S./FAA not informed: Report, JI, 15, Staff Report, “9/11 & Terrorist Travel,” CO, 42, Staff Statement 2, CO

  98 Corsi sent email/red tape/misinterpretation: FBI IG

  99 “Disneyland”: Wright, 353–

  100 “Someday”/Fuller: FBI IG

  101 “assigned no”: CR, 538n77.

  102 Tenet fishing: Breitweiser, 193

  103 Tenet directed: Tenet, 159

  104 Tenet briefed/Aug. 23: ibid., CR, 275

  105 seriously/“If this guy”: Tenet, 202–

  106 “brow furrowed”/“no one ever”: Ben-Veniste, 301

  107 “I didn’t see”/lied: Testimony of George Tenet, 4/14/04, CO, Shenon, 361–.

  108 Harlow re Aug. 17 & 31: Salt Lake Tribune, WP, 4/15/04. Probably because of an informal exchange Bush had with reporters the following day, it has been suggested that Tenet also met with the President on August 24. The wording of one of his answers could be taken to indicate to the press that there had been a Tenet visit on the 24th. The sense Bush intended, however, is not entirely clear and could equally refer to the visit of August 17 (exchange: Public Papers of the Presidents, George W. Bush, 2001, www.​gpoaccess.​gov, 1037; suggested: e.g. Robert Schopmeyer, Prior Knowledge of 9/11, Palo Alto, CA: Palo Alto Publishing, 2007, 512, corr. Robert Schopmeyer, 2011).

  109 “to make sure”: Tenet,
159

  110 “not recall”: CR, 262.

  111 “The question”: Newsweek, 5/25/02

  112 “I do not believe”: Testimony of Condoleezza Rice, 4/8/04, CO

  113 “an appalling”: Vanity Fair, 2/09

  114 “There was no”: Ben-Veniste, 307– & see 265.

  CHAPTER 28

  1 Hello Jenny: With a few minor changes to ensure verbatim translation from the German, the “Dear Jenny” message is as reported by Al Jazeera reporter Yosri Fouda, drawing on his encounter with Binalshibh in Karachi in 2002 (see pp. 243–45). Binalshibh dated the message as having been sent on or about August 21, 2001. According to Fouda, Binalshibh produced the message “on a floppy disk” and showed it to him “on screen.” The 9/11 Commission Report does not reproduce the “Dear Jenny” message, but refers to coded August “communications” between Atta and Binalshibh that were recovered when KSM was captured. These messages included a discussion of targets dated as having occurred on August 3. In a related note, the Commission quotes Binalshibh as claiming that the words “law” and “politics” were both used to refer only to the Capitol—though the reference was surely in fact to two separate targets (Fouda & Fielding, 138–, The Australian, 9/9/02, Sunday Times [London], 9/802, CR 248–, 531n 165/166).

  2 August 29 call/Atta riddle: Reporter Fouda, who learned of the puzzle in 2002 from Binalshibh, rendered it as reproduced in the text. The Commission Report referred to it as “two branches, a slash, and a lollipop.” A factor in choosing the date September 11, according to a note found on KSM’s computer following his capture, was that the U.S. Congress would be in session in the Capitol by that time (Fouda & Fielding, 140, CR, 249, Staff Statement 16, CO).

  3 Binalshibh passed on: The Commission Report, drawing on reports of the interrogations of KSM and Binalshibh, states that KSM was informed of the date by Zacaria Essabar, an associate Binalshibh used to carry the message from Germany to KSM in Pakistan. KSM said Essabar brought him the date in a letter, while Binalshibh has said he entrusted Essabar only with a verbal message. Binalshibh has also claimed that he called KSM on the subject. The fact that information was extracted from the prisoners under torture may account for the seeming contradictions. As of this writing, Essabar’s whereabouts are unknown (CR249, 531n173, KSM SUBST, Wanted Notice, Bundeskriminalamt Wiesbaden, 2008).