The Eleventh Day: The Full Story of 9/11 and Osama bin Laden
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7 “Almost unanimously”: Kean & Hamilton, 113.
8 Bandar/“not Arabs”/“My God”: New Yorker, 3/24/03
9 Palestinians celebrating: There were numerous reports of Palestinians celebrating the attacks. It has been suggested, though, that some news footage of Palestinians supposedly celebrating 9/11 was a distortion—that it in fact showed celebration of something else. For more on the reaction to 9/11 across the Middle East, see Ch. 14, p. 154 (ed. Woods, 12)
10 “condemned”: statement, 9/11/01 cied in Cordesman, “Saudi Official Statements on Terrorism, After the Sept. 11 Attacks,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 11/01
11 Abdullah fumed/declined/snapped/“I reject”/Bush responded: WP, 2/10/02, New Yorker, 3/24/03, Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud, 241–, Online NewsHour: Inside the Kingdom, www.pbs.org.
12 Abdullah pulled: Atlantic Monthly, 5/03, Lacey, Inside the Kingdom, 232, WP, 2/12/02. Though Saudi Arabia at the time produced only some 18 percent of the crude oil consumed by the United States, it has what other oil-producing countries do not have—the world’s only surplus production capacity. It means that world oil prices are controlled by Saudi Arabia, according to its decisions as to how much oil to make available at any given time. It had used the oil weapon in 1973, after the Yom Kippur War, by joining with other countries in cutting off the oil supply and in 1990–1991—in reverse—by increasing supply when Iraqi oil was cut off during the Gulf War (Atlantic, 2/21/08, Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 2007, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 2007, 821).
13 15 were Saudi: Newsweek, 11/19/01, New Yorker, 3/24/03
14 “That was a”: transcript, Frontline: “House of Saud,” www.pbs.org
15 75 royals/Caesars Palace: Las Vegas to Counterterrorism, 9/25/01, FBI documents obtained under FOIA by Judicial Watch
16 One of OBL’s brothers: Unger, 7
17 more than 20: e.g., re International Flight 441 from Boston, 9/17/03, “Ryan Air folder,” B70, T5, CF
18 Prince Ahmed/yearling: Jason Levin, From the Desert to the Derby, NY: Daily Racing Form Press, 2002, 1, 15, Unger, 7, 255–
19 unable to charter/flight on 13th: MFR of Dan Grossi, “Dan Grossi, Tampa-Lexington Flight,” B70, T5, CF
20 “his father or his uncle”: ibid., Unger, 9
21 Bandar statement: press release, 9/12/01, www.saudiembassy.net
22 Bush appointment/welcomed/cigars: Unger, 7, William Simpson, 315, New Yorker, 3/24/03
23 assistant rang/Watson/Clarke: int. of Bandar, Meet the Press, 4/24/04, Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, 171–, MFR 04019823, 6/3/04, CR, 557, Shenon, 287
24 photo published: Woodward, State of Denial, facing p. 274
25 “not inclined”: corr. Jodie Steck, George W. Bush Presidential Library, 2011.
26 Florida/Kentucky flight: e.g., Unger, 7–. The confusion about the Tampa charter persisted in part because the FBI accepted, even after having been challenged by journalists, a secondhand report that Prince Ahmed’s son and his companions had driven to Lexington. The prince in question, Prince Sultan bin Fahd, had in fact been Ahmed’s nephew, and the group had flown. The FBI’s reports, moreover, reflected confusion as to when U.S. airspace reopened to charter flights (Final Draft of response to October 2003 Vanity Fair article, “Saudi Flights,” B68, T5, CF, The Saudi Flights—A Summary, “Saudi Flights,” B6, Dan Marcus Files, CF, CTD to Counterterrorism, 9/24/03, FBI 265A-NY-280350, serial 1234567890, Vanity Fair, 10/03).
27 after airspace open: FAA Notices to Airmen [NOTAM], 1/9817, 1/9832, 1/9853, www.aopa.org, corr. Laura Brown, FAA. The records show that U.S. airspace was open to almost all aircraft—including charter flights—as of 11:00 A.M. EDT on September 13. The exception was for “general aviation” flights—which, contrary to previous reporting, did not include charters such as the Tampa flight. In any event, the Tampa-to-Lexington flight took off at approximately 4:30 P.M.
28 on their way home: Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, 171–, 270n49/50
29 charter: Judicial Watch press release, 6/20/07, Counterterrorism to Boston, 9/21/01, FBI 265A-NY-280350, serial 1652
30 watchlist: CR, 558, n31
31 most not interviewed: CR, 557n28. It has been reported that one of those interviewed was Prince Ahmed, but there is no evidence of such an interview in FBI files thus far released (The Saudi Flights—A Summary, “Saudi Flights,” B6, Dan Marcus Files, CF). 407 agents interviewed family/Omar: FBI 302s of ints. Bin Laden family members 9/13–24/01 (inc. Omar Awadh), all in “Ryan Air folder,” B70, T5, CF.
32 Omar shared/briefly investigated: Coll, The Bin Ladens, 483–, 526–, Brisard & Dasquie, 176–, WP, 10/2/03. The group, of which Abdullah bin Laden was listed as president, was the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, or WAMY. The U.S. branch was operated by Abdullah, according to The Washington Post, until 9/11. Though it has been reported that Abdullah was on a flight with Saudis on board that departed on September 20—Ryan International 441—his name is not on the passenger list supplied by the charter company (Coll, 483–, WP, 10/2/03, passenger list in “Saudi Flights, FBI Docs., 3 of 4,” B70, T5, CF, Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, 272n94).
33 “Although”: NYT, 3/27/05
34 “there is the existence”: CNN, 9/4/03. The reference is to the brother of Adel al Jubeir, mentioned earlier in this chapter (Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, 11/07).
35 public relations firms/Another firm: The firms initially hired were Burson Marsteller and Qorvis Communications. Patton Boggs was used for the contacts with Congress. On one infamous occasion, Saudi PR maneuvers misfired. New York mayor Giuliani handed back a $10 million donation made to the Twin Towers Fund by Prince Alwaleed bin Talal in light of the press release the prince’s staff distributed following the presentation. It read: “We must address some of the issues that led to such a criminal attack. I believe the government of the United States of America should re-examine its policies in the Middle East and adopt a more balanced stance toward the Palestinian cause.… Our Palestinian brethren continue to be slaughtered at the hands of the Israelis while the world turns the other cheek.” This caused outrage in the United States. Prince Alwaleed, however, has also said: “You have to ask the simple question. Why fifteen Saudis? You can’t just say it happened by coincidence. Clearly, there’s something wrong with the way of thinking here [in Saudi Arabia], with the way people are raised” (PR firms: New Internationalist, 3/1/02, “Terrorism to End Terrorism,” fall 2001, www.prwatch.org, WP, 3/21/02, Washington Times, 12/9/04, Gold, 193; Alwaleed: Arab News, 10/14/01; Irish Times, 8/3/09, Giuliani, 374–).
36 “We feel what”: transcript, Larry King, CNN, 10/1/01
37 Abdullah to ranch/“Yes, I”: Lacey, Inside the Kingdom, 284–, Suskind, One Percent Doctrine, 104–, Remarks by the President After Meeting with Crown Prince Abdullah, 4/25/02, posted at www.globalsecurity.org, Fox News, 4/26/02.
38 “probably” stolen: BG, 9/15/01. The spokesman, Gaafar Allagany, was to say on September 19 that two men with the same names as those of two hijackers, a Salem al-Hazmi and an Abdulaziz al-Omari, had indeed had their passports stolen over the past few years. The two cases cited by Allagany turned out to be cases of mistaken identity—there is no evidence the passports of hijackers Hazmi or Omari had been stolen. On the issue of hijackers’ identity, see also Ch. 14 and its related Notes (WP, 9/20/01, 10/7/01, Telegraph [U.K.], 9/23/01).
39 “most people”: int. of Hatoon al Fassi for Frontline: “House of Saud,” www.pbs.org
40 “There is no proof”: Gold, 185, citing Al Hayat, 10/23/01
41 “another power”: NYT, 10/23/01
42 Naif/“The names”: USA Today, 2/6/02
43 “It is enough”: Lacey, Inside the Kingdom, 231
44 “Zionists”/“we put big”: AP, 12/5/02 citing int. Naif by Al Siyasa (Kuwait), ’Ain al Yaqeen, 11/29/02 citing same int.
45 “We’re getting”: LA
T, 10/13/01
46 “They knew”: New Yorker, 10/16/01
47 not allowed access: Philadelphia Inquirer, 7/30/03
48 “dribble out”: NYT, 12/27/01.
49 blocked attempts: U.S. News & World Report, 1/6/02, Suskind, One Percent Doctrine, 109. A State Department spokesman, Richard Boucher, had said in November that Saudi Arabia had been “prominent among the countries acting against the accounts of terrorist organizations … in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1333.” The following month, however, following a visit to Saudi Arabia by Treasury Department assets control chief Richard Newcombe, it was reported that the Saudis “had balked at freezing bank accounts Washington said were linked to terrorists.” Working with the Saudis had apparently been “like pulling teeth” (Boucher: State Department briefing, 11/27/01, http://usinfo.org; Newcombe: U.S. News & World Report, 1/6/02).
50 “It doesn’t look”: BG, 3/3/02
51 few fluent Arabic: Report, JI, 59, 245, 255, 336, 358
52 men believed to have helped: For information not particularly cited here, see Ch. 25 and its related Notes
53 Thumairy diplomat: Kean & Hamilton, 308
54 “in a Western”: MFR 04019254, 4/20/04
55 “uncertain”: MFR of int. Omar al-Bayoumi, 10/18/03, CF
56 Bayoumi’s income: Graham with Nussbaum, 167, int. Bob Graham
57 three-page section; Report, JI, 175–
58 Graham re payments: Graham with Nussbaum, 24–, 167–, 224–, int. Bob Graham.
59 payments originated embassy?: The 9/11 Commission was to report that it found no evidence that Mihdhar and Hazmi received money from Basnan—or Bayoumi. The public furor around the Basnan money centered on reports that it came to the Basnans in cashier’s checks in the name of Saudi ambassador Prince Bandar’s wife, Princess Haifa. The royal couple were predictably outraged by the notion that there could have been a link between the princess and terrorists. Such payments would have been in line, a Saudi embassy spokesman said, with her normal contributions to the needy. 9/11 Commissioner John Lehman surmised that the princess simply signed checks put in front of her by radicals working in the embassy’s Islamic Affairs office. Newsweek has reported that Saudi wire transfers amounting to $20,000 were made to an individual who was featured in another terrorist case, also in connection with medical treatment for the individual’s wife. Newsweek made no mention of Princess Haifa in that regard (Commission: CR, 516n24; furor: e.g., Newsweek, 11/22/02, 12/9/02, Washington Times, 11/26/02; outraged: Fox News, 11/27/02, LAT, 11/24/02, CounterPunch, 12/3/02, Lehman: Shenon, 185; $20,000: Newsweek, 4/7/04, Daily Times [Pakistan], 8/8/08).
60 Thumairy “might be”: CR, 217
61 Bayoumi attracted/“connections”/left country: FBI IG, Report, JI, 173
62 Basnan came up: Report, JI, 176
63 party: ibid., 177
64 did more for Islam: MFR 04017541A, 11/17/03, CF
65 “wonderful”: Newsweek, 11/22/02
66 contact with Binalshibh: MFR 04017541A, 11/17/03, CF.
67 agent or spy: Graham with Nussbaum, 11, 24–, 168–, 224–. At least five people told the FBI they considered Bayoumi to be some sort of government agent. According to Dr. Abdussattar Shaikh, in whose San Diego home future hijackers Hazmi and Mihdhar eventually rented accommodations, one of those who expressed that view was none other than Hazmi himself. In an early interview with The New York Times after 9/11, Shaikh said Hazmi and Midhar had been his friends, that their identification as hijackers was perhaps a case of stolen identities. Congressional investigators would later be startled to discover something Sheikh had certainly not revealed to the Times—and that the FBI initially sought to conceal from the investigators. Shaikh had long been an FBI informant, and had regularly shared information with a Bureau agent named Steven Butler. Butler had on occasion talked with Shaikh at home while Hazmi and Mihdhar were in a room nearby. According to the agent, Shaikh had mentioned the pair by their first names, saying that they were Saudis. That rang no alarm bells for him, Butler recalled, because “Saudi Arabia was considered an ally.” The FBI, backed up by Bush officials, refused to allow Joint Committee staff to interview Shaikh. A 9/11 Commission memorandum, identifying Shaikh only as Dr. Xxxxxxxxxxx Xxxxxx, makes it clear that 9/11 Commission staff did talk to Shaikh. The memorandum does not say whether Shaikh shared with Agent Butler his belief that Bayoumi, the man who had introduced the hijackers to San Diego, was a Saudi agent. Nor is there evidence that Commission staff queried Shaikh about inconsistencies in his story of how he first met the two future hijackers. Shaikh’s simultaneous relationship with both the two terrorists and the FBI just might have led to their being unmasked—an even more glaring might-have-been when one recalls that the CIA had early on identified both men as terrorist suspects, and known they had visas for travel to the United States—yet failed to inform the FBI (see pp. 379–80). Much remains to be explained. The former chair of Congress’s joint probe, former senator Bob Graham, accepts that the FBI may at first have tried to conceal its relationship with Shaikh simply because it was a “big embarrassment.” Graham also raised the possibility, though, that what the FBI tried to hide was that Shaikh knew something that “would be even more damaging were it revealed.” What, too, of the report in the press that Agent Butler’s interview with congressional investigators had been “explosive,” that he “had been monitoring a flow of Saudi Arabian money that wound up in the hands of the two hijackers”? Butler, an official was quoted as having said, “saw a pattern, a trail, and he told his supervisors, but it ended there.” As of 2009, Shaikh was still living in San Diego.
Because of agencies’ iron rules about the protection of informants—whatever the full story of Shaikh’s relationship with the hijackers or with the FBI—there is little likelihood of learning more about him anytime soon. He is virtually invisible in the Commission Report, not even named in the index.
Much the same applies to the Report’s handling of Ali Mohamed, a truly significant figure in the sorry story of U.S. agencies’ understanding—or lack of it—of al Qaeda. “No single agent of al Qaeda,” the author Peter Lance has written, “was more successful in compromising the U.S. intelligence community than a former Egyptian army captain turned CIA operative, Special Forces advisor, and FBI informant” than former Egyptian army major Mohamed. “Mohamed succeeded in penetrating the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, while simultaneously training the cell that blew up the World Trade Center in 1993. He went on to train Osama bin Laden’s personal bodyguard, and photographed the U.S. embassy in Kenya—taking the surveillance pictures bin Laden himself used to target the [1998] suicide truck bomb.”
Though beyond the scope of this book, there is much more to this labyrinthine tale. While the August 6, 2001, CIA brief delivered to President Bush did not mention Mohamed by name, it was shot through with references to him. He was that summer due to be sentenced for his crimes, having pled guilty to multiple terrorist offenses, including his role in the embassy bombings. FBI agent Jack Cloonan, who interviewed Mohamed in prison after 9/11, had the eerie sense that he “knew every detail” of the attacks, in spite of having been in custody for years. As of 2006, though reportedly still a prisoner at an unknown location, Mohamed had yet to be sentenced. There is just one reference to him in the 9/11 Commission Report—and no mention of his relationship with U.S. intelligence agencies (Hazmi view: MFR [unnumbered], 4/23/04, CF; Times interview: NYT, 10/24/01; investigators startled: Graham with Nussbaum, 159–, ints. Bob Graham, Eleanor Hill; informant/Butler talked: FBI IG, Report, JI, 162, “Conspiracy Theories: The Intelligence Breakdown,” www.cbc.ca; “ally”: Report, JI, 162; FBI refused: Joint Inquiry, Report, 3, Graham with Nussbaum, 162; Bush officials: “Bush Should Cry Uncle and Release Saudi Info,” 6/28/03, www.opednews.com, Report, JI, 3; Commission memorandum: MFR [unnumbered], 4/23/04, CF; inconsistencies: CR, 517n28; might-have-been: Report, JI, 19–; “big embarrassment”/“did know”:
Graham with Nussbaum, 166; “explosive”/“monitoring”: U.S. News & World Report, 11/29/02; Shaikh 2009: Miriam Raftery, “Abdussattar Shaikh, Co-Founder of San Diego’s Islamic Center, Honored for 50 Years of Service Promoting Religious Tolerance,” 10/8/09, www.eastcountymagazine.org; “No single”: “A Conversation with Peter Lance,” 12/06, www.internetwritingjournal.com & see Wright, 179–, Bergen, OBL I Know, 142–; Aug. 6 brief: J. M. Berger, “What the Commission Missed,” 10/4/06, www.intelwire.com; “knew every”: ibid.; pled guilty: J. M Berger, ed., Ali Mohamed Sourcebook, INTELWIRE, 2006, 311; unknown location/yet to be sentenced: Bergen, OBL I Know, 433, Scott, 348n28, 157, 159; one reference: CR, 68 & see Staff Report, “9/11 & Terrorist Travel, CO, 57).
68 “incontrovertible”: Report, JI, 395. The document, which Graham dated as August 2, 2002, is partially cited in Congress’s Joint Inquiry Report in a passage about a CIA memo that cited “incontrovertible evidence that there is support for these terrorists [words redacted].” The Report goes on to state that “it is also possible that further investigation of these allegations could reveal legitimate, and innocent, explanations for these associations.” Senator Graham cast doubt on an FBI finding that Bayoumi and Basnan were neither agents nor accomplices in the 9/11 plot. Former Saudi ambassador Bandar, for his part, described reports that Bayoumi was a Saudi agent as “baseless” (Graham with Nussbaum, 169, 224–, 11n, Bandar press release, “Bayoumi is not a government agent,” 7/23/03, www.saudiembassy.net).
69 Commission interviews: e.g., MFR 04019365, 2/24/04
70 Thumairy “deceptive”/denied/prompted/second interview/“say bad”/“implausible”: Snell, De, & Jacobson to Zelikow, 2/25/04, MFR 04019362, 2/23/04, CF