Into the Fire: A Firsthand Account of the Most Extraordinary Battle in the Afghan War

by Bing West

  0650-0700 Westbrook hit; Garza and reporter, who has rejoined the group, help him; Garza concussed; Afghan interpreter killed; Williams nicked; Swenson applies first aid to Westbrook.

  0655 Fabayo and Swenson continue to cover short retreat sprints over dirt furrows; Lt. Rhula shot in groin/upper thigh.

  0700 TOC battle captain asks Tech Sgt. Matzke, a JTAC, what CAS is available, but tells Matzke not to open air TIC.

  0702 Last comm with Team Monti.

  0703 Swenson alerts Shadow he will send nine-line helo medevac for Westbrook.

  0707 Shadow relays Swenson’s request to TOC.

  0709 Dog platoon reports its limit of advance to TOC.

  0710 CCA approved by Task Force Mountain Warrior (brigade level).

  0710 Shadow takes fire from the south, calls for immediate suppression fire mission 957 493 1 kilometer to their rear on higher ground.

  0715 Swenson alerted that helos are inbound.

  0720 Werth/Hooker investigation: Team Monti estimated as “likely dead” by this time.

  0720 Shadow fire mission request is posted in TOC.

  0721 A-Bad PTDS (blimp cameras) reports muzzle flashes at 983 511.

  0723 Two Kiowas test-fire their guns into Kunar River as they approach Ganjigal.

  0725 Dog platoon ASV (30,000-pound Army security vehicle) has slipped off road; platoon leader leaves Meyer, returns to trail to CCP, and calls for a wrecker to come forward from Camp Joyce.

  0730 A-Bad PTDS reports enemy at 983 511.

  0730 Swenson (Highlander 5) directs Kiowas that provide covering fire as Command Group pulls back.

  0738 Chosin TOC receives nine-line medevac request for two wounded in action (WIA).

  0739 Dog platoon reports limit of advance at 969 519.

  0740 Fabayo sees Rodriguez-Chavez and Meyer pull in front of Command Group to provide suppressive fire.

  0745 Command Group is out of the wash, away from direct fire.

  0745-0845 Pale Horse delivers ten close combat attacks (CCAs).

  0746 Pale Horse (Kiowas) make contact with Meyer.

  0746 TOC does not respond to Kiowas on Common Air-to-Ground (CAG) net; Pale Horse decides to take his directions from Highlander 5 (Swenson) and Fox 3-3 (Meyer).

  0747 Senior officer in TOC talks directly to neither Shadow 4 nor Dog platoon, although both are in direct voice communications with TOC.

  0748 Shadow repeats request for air medevac at 953 518—one U.S. (Westbrook) and one ANA.

  0749 Shadow again requests medevac.

  0750 Dog platoon reports ASV rolled over twice and landed on its wheels at 954 518; no injuries.

  0755 Dog platoon reports green on all personnel.

  0800 SWT 1 (Kiowas) breaks station over Meyer to escort medevac.

  0800 Capt. Richardson takes over as watch officer in ops center, but is junior to battalion commanding officer (XO) and S-3, who are both in TOC.

  0800 Swenson puts out air panels at CCP; Fabayo does the same.

  0810 Shadow no longer taking fire.

  0810 Dog platoon reports mass casualty situation—six killed in action (KIA), ten WIA; sets up mass casualty evacuation point.

  0812 Rodriguez-Chavez and Meyer are swarmed inside wash by about ten enemy.

  0822 Blackhawk lands under fire to evacuate critically wounded Sgt. Westbrook.

  0824 Pale Horse Kiowas leave to refuel at A-Bad.

  0830 Swenson and Fabayo drive into wash as Meyer and Rodriguez-Chavez drive out.

  0830-0910 Swenson, Fabayo, Meyer, Rodriguez-Chavez, and Hafez make repeated short runs into wash, picking up dead and wounded.

  0833 Dog platoon reports soldier has rib and pelvic pains from rollover of ASV.

  0838 Three wounded Askars arrive at Joyce in a Ranger.

  0845-1135 Two Kiowas continuously on station along the wash; expend 1,800 rounds of .50-cal and fifteen HE rockets.

  0845 No U.S. quick reaction force (QRF) has departed Joyce; XO later said he didn’t keep a QRF on alert.

  0846 Afghan Army at Joyce dispatches a QRF.

  0848 From Asmar, 12 kilometers north, Afghan Border Police dispatch a QRF.

  0856 Dog platoon ASV self-recovered.

  0900 Col. George, brigade commander, departs Jalalabad Air Base, picks up Afghan 2nd Brigade commander, Col. Asval.

  0905 Three more Askar wounded sent by Ranger to Joyce.

  0910 Rodriguez-Chavez and group drive to ORP and get a truck with a working machine gun.

  0910 Swenson asks Dog platoon to help him; platoon leader responds that he has three times asked TOC to send a wrecker and Humvees, and has been told to remain in place.

  0911 Swenson curses platoon leader.

  0915 Meyer talks with Garza and Williams at CCP.

  0921 Dog reports indirect fire being walked toward their position near CCP and so are moving back.

  0928 Dog reports four U.S. advisors and an Afghan squad are missing.

  0930 Tech Sgt. Matzke on own initiative calls 4/4 Brigade TOC to request an air TIC to receive fixed-wing air support.

  0930 Williams, Garza, and reporter leave for Camp Joyce.

  0935 Pale Horse (Silano) orders Meyer not to walk alone back into wash; Meyer halts, with Pale Horse hovering above him.

  0937 Another platoon from Dog and a platoon from Alpha/Attack Co. start toward Ganjigal Valley.

  0938 Swenson, Rodriguez-Chavez, Hafez, and Fabayo drive from ORP to CCP, pick up Meyer, and drive back into wash, with Pale Horse Kiowas in extremely close support (fifteen feet over their heads).

  0945 Swenson and Meyer work with Kiowas to spot and retrieve Askars, who are placed in Afghan vehicles.

  0948 Two F15Es are on station (Dude 01) but refuse to drop bombs because they cannot identify targets.

  0955 Col. George (TF Mountain Warrior) and Col. Asval (ANA brigade commander) arrive TOC at Joyce; neither proceeds forward to battlefield.

  1000 Afghan Army QRF arrives Ganjigal and follows Swenson/Meyer Humvee up wash; no U.S. forces follow.

  1005 U.S. Attack and Dog platoons link up but stay off the battlefield.

  1012 Another platoon from Dog arrives at Joyce.

  1015 UAV on station.

  1045 Afghan border police QRF arrives Ganjigal and joins battle.

  1047 Pale Horse Kiowas heavily engaging Taliban (AAF—Anti-Afghan Forces) at grid 983 511.

  1050 CJTF ops center contacts ISAF Joint Command (IJC Corps Command) to declare “personnel recovery”; DUSTWUN (Duty Status—Whereabouts Unknown); Special Operations forces en route to Ganjigal.

  1056 Williams and Garza arrive at Joyce.

  1100 Special Operations Force Blackhawk on station at Ganjigal; encounters heavy fire when throwing out smoke; cannot land a recovery team.

  1110 Pale Horse hovers over trench line and identifies Team Monti.

  1120 Meyer and Swenson find four U.S. (Team Monti) and one Afghan KIA.

  1202 Meyer and Hafez arrive at Joyce with two bodies.

  1220 Meyer and Bokis prepare the bodies for movement to the rear.

  1300 Sgt. Maj. Carabello tells Meyer to wash the blood from his face.

  1335 Four bodies of Team Monti flown from Joyce.

  1400 Eight bodies of Afghan soldiers driven to A-Bad or kept at Joyce for relatives to claim for burial.

  1416 Swenson, Kaplan, and seven Marine advisors arrive back at Joyce.

  1530 Special Forces prepare to sweep Ganjigal.

  1600 Meyer prepares two Askars for burial, visits the wounded Askars, and eats dinner on the roof with Hafez and several Afghan soldiers.

  FRIENDLY FORCE

  Thirteen Marine and two Army advisors plus Capt. Kaplan, plus sixty Afghan National Army and thirty Afghan border police, plus one U.S. Army platoon in reserve, plus sixteen U.S. Army scout-sniper soldiers on northern observation post.

  VERSUS

  Forty-five to sixty enemy, mostly from Pakistan, with some aid from about a hundred villagers.

  LOCATIONS AND CALL SIGN
S

  South OP (Kaplan—Chosin 2, Cpl. Norman—Fox 2): grid XD 970 516.

  Scout-sniper South OP (Sgt. Summers—Shadow 4): grid 954 510.

  North OP (Miller, Valadez—Fox 7): grid 970 523.

  In the valley (Williams—Fox 6, Fabayo—Fox 3, Garza—Fox 9, Swenson—Highlander 5, Meyer—Fox 3-3, Rodriguez-Chavez—Fox 3-2): center grid 972 520. Ganjigal village: grid 978 520.

  Schoolhouse: grid 973 517.

  CCP: grid 955 519.

  ORP: grid 949 521.

  Team Monti: found at grid 974 519.

  Reported enemy positions (thirteen) at grids 972 517, 982 522, 981 521, 973 516, 971 516, 972 518, 975 516, 968 526, 975 520, 985 490, 983 532, 975 521, 957 493 (this indicates the enemy were mobile and trying to close on the patrol).

  Appendix 2

  MEDAL OF HONOR CITATION FOR

  CPL. DAKOTA L. MEYER, USMC

  The President of the United States in the name of The Congress

  takes pleasure in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR to

  CORPORAL DAKOTA L. MEYER

  UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

  For service as set forth in the following:

  For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving with Marine Embedded Training Team 2-8, Regional Corps Advisory Command 3-7, in Kunar Province, Afghanistan, on 8 September 2009. Corporal Meyer maintained security at a patrol rally point while other members of his team moved on foot with two platoons of Afghan National Army and Border Police into the village of Ganjgal for a pre-dawn meeting with village elders. Moving into the village, the patrol was ambushed by more than 50 enemy fighters firing rocket propelled grenades, mortars, and machine guns from houses and fortified positions on the slopes above. Hearing over the radio that four U.S. team members were cut off, Corporal Meyer seized the initiative. With a fellow Marine driving, Corporal Meyer took the exposed gunner’s position in a gun-truck as they drove down the steeply terraced terrain in a daring attempt to disrupt the enemy attack and locate the trapped U.S. team. Disregarding intense enemy fire now concentrated on their lone vehicle, Corporal Meyer killed a number of enemy fighters with the mounted machine guns and his rifle, some at near point blank range, as he and his driver made three solo trips into the ambush area. During the first two trips, he and his driver evacuated two dozen Afghan soldiers, many of whom were wounded. When one machine gun became inoperable, he directed a return to the rally point to switch to another gun-truck for a third trip into the ambush area where his accurate fire directly supported the remaining U.S. personnel and Afghan soldiers fighting their way out of the ambush. Despite a shrapnel wound to his arm, Corporal Meyer made two more trips into the ambush area in a third gun-truck accompanied by four other Afghan vehicles to recover more wounded Afghan soldiers and search for the missing U.S. team members. Still under heavy enemy fire, he dismounted the vehicle on the fifth trip and moved on foot to locate and recover the bodies of his team members. Corporal Meyer’s daring initiative and bold fighting spirit throughout the 6-hour battle significantly disrupted the enemy’s attack and inspired the members of the combined force to fight on. His unwavering courage and steadfast devotion to his U.S. and Afghan comrades in the face of almost certain death reflected great credit upon himself and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

  Notes

  The Central Command posted online a redacted but full account of the investigation by Cols. Werth and Hooker on November 25, 2009. The citations from the online documents list the exhibits by alphabetical reference; e.g., Exhibit N. The hard copy of the Werth/Hooker account lists the statements by unit and alphanumerically; e.g., Members of 1-32 Task Force Chosin, Exhibit A.1. Wherever possible, I have given both citations.

  The sworn statements from the Medal of Honor packets are cited separately by an indication of the alphabetical tab reference for Meyer’s packet and the appendix reference for Swenson’s packet. All references to exhibits refer to the Werth/Hooker Investigation.

  INTRODUCTION: ALONG THE AFGHAN-PAKISTAN BORDER

  1 Staff Sgt. Kenefick and Lt. Johnson: For the sake of Marine traditions, let me set one thing straight. On our advisor team, I never called my seniors by their first names. That is done in the SEALs and Special Forces teams, but usually not in Marine advisor units. When I write about the lieutenant and the staff sergeant in this book, sometimes I use their first names because the four of us were friends, but each of us knew his position in the chain of command.

  2 Battalion 1-32, tasked with preventing enemy infiltration from Pakistan: The battalion, called Chosin, was from the 10th Mountain Division and working in Afghanistan as part of a brigade called Task Force Mountain Warrior.

  3 Afghan battalion that we were advising: At Monti, we were advising the 3rd Coy (Company) of the 2nd Kandak, 215th Corps. The kandak/battalion’s headquarters was at Camp Joyce.

  4 “Kunar people like Americans,” he told each new team of advisors: Eshok conversation with West on several occasions, including 17 Oct. 2009 at Joyce.

  5 Joyce would focus on straightening out the screwed-up Afghan logistics: As Maj. Williams explained at Joyce to West on 17 Oct. 2009, “For instance, we supplied the kandak with plastic water jugs. Now the Afghan S-4 [logistics officer] says they’re gone—disappeared—and he wants us to come up with more. No, that’s the wrong request. He has money from his own chain of command; he buys replacements or he finds the jugs he lost. I don’t have any I’m going to give him.”

  CHAPTER 1: FINISH THE GAME

  1 “If you make it through, you can become a grunt”: Every year, between 7 and 10 percent of all recruits drop out of boot camp. Aline O. Quester, Marine Corps Recruits: A Historical Look at Accessions and Boot Camp Performance (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2010).

  CHAPTER 2: THE MARINE YEARS

  1 he killed more than five hundred Russian soldiers: Tapio A. M. Saarelainen, The Sniper: Simo Hayha (Tampere, Finland: Apali, 2008), 135 pages. (Saarelainen cites a figure of 542; others put it at 505. Several sources agree the number was above 500. Hayha after the war became a champion moose hunter.)

  2 Chris Kyle, a SEAL, recorded 160 kills: Chris Kyle, American Sniper (New York: Morrow, 2012), p. 5.

  CHAPTER 5: COMING TOGETHER

  1 The border meant nothing to the tribes: Paul Overby, Holy Blood (New York: Praeger, 1993), p. 162. Overby described fighting alongside the mujahideen stationed at Dangam in 1988. He had walked across from Pakistan.

  CHAPTER 6: OUT OF THE SMOKE

  1 Lt. Johnson calmed down the driver: Lt. Johnson report, “Report on Rocket Attack at Monti, 6 September 2009.” “I left the tower,” he wrote, “to coordinate an LTV [a Ford] pickup of the wounded soldier. Once the LTV pulled up to the guard tower, Cpl. Meyer picked up the wounded soldier and under indirect and direct fire carried him down two flights of stairs to the truck.”

  CHAPTER 7: GANJIGAL

  1 pay for a tribal militia that would stop the rockets: West notes from meeting with Ganjigal elders, together with Lt. Cols. Ayoub and O’Donnell at ABP base next to FOB Joyce, 9 July 2009.

  2 “They owe you nothing for your bad behavior”: West notes from meeting with Ayoub, Lt. Col. O’Donnell, and the Ganjigal elders, 9 July 2009.

  3 “with zero status inside the village”: Capt. Kaplan conversation with West, 1 Dec. 2011.

  4 “pro-U.S. and supportive of the Afghan government”: Dept. of the Army, AFZC-BCT-AD, 25 Sept. 2009, Subject: AR 15-6 Investigation, Cols. R. D. Hooker, USA, and J. F. Werth, USMC, Exhibit N (E.1).

  5 Taliban had not sprung ambushes from inside villages: Memo for Record, 25 Nov. 2009, CJTF-82, AR 15-6 Report of Investigation re Operations in the Ganjigal Valley, 8 Sept. 2009.

  6 Gal Rahman, a border police chief: West conversations with Kerr and Swenson at Joyce and Monti, July and Oct. 2009.

  7 soft American target: Swenson email to West, April 18, 2012.

&nbs
p; 8 “Three-070 is the Undo KE, correct?”: Swenson email to West, 23 Jan. 2012. 81 “we could put smoke on the deck for screening”: Maj. Castro AR 15-6 Investigation, 21 Sept. 2009, Appendix S.

  9 “KE 3070”: Swenson briefing to Bing West at FOB Joyce, 13 Oct. 2009.

  10 Battalion 1-32 believed Williams was in charge: Memo for Record, 25 Nov. 2009, CJTF-82, AR 15-6 Report of Investigation re Operations in the Ganjigal Valley, 8 Sept. 2009, Section II: Findings and Recommendations.

  11 Maj. Talib, the operations officer of the Afghan battalion, was in command: Memo for Record, 25 Nov. 2009, CJTF-82, AR 15-6 Report of Investigation re Operations in the Ganjigal Valley, 8 Sept. 2009, Section II: Findings and Recommendations.

  12 equipment density list: Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit BH. Note: Fabayo (BH) and Swenson (BI) gave extensive statements of what happened and what they believed went wrong. Both statements were included in the Werth/Hooker report yet not listed in index.

  13 thirty-two fighters were moving from Pakistan to reinforce Ganjigal: Mirc Chat, 2356 Zulu, Actions in Contact, Appendix c4 of Swenson packet, report from ODA received previously at 1728Z; see also MIRC Chat time, Cpl. Dakota L. Meyer, Medal of Honor packet, Tab C.

  14 two kilometers north of Ganjigal village: See entries in Meyer packet, Tab C. Also see Mirc Chat, 1909 Zulu, Actions in Contact, Appendix c4. Times for enemy movement are given in Zulu: 1727Z, 1909Z, 1922Z.

  15 Fabayo knew nothing of these movements: However, Capt. Kaplan later testified that “reporting received and briefed immediately prior to the operation indicated the presence of 45-60 AAF (Anti-Afghan Forces).” Werth/Hooker Investigation, 25 Nov. 2009, Exhibit L (D.1).

  16 “stopping under cover and hesitating at all open areas”: Mirc Chat, 0005 Zulu, Actions in Contact, Appendix c4 (Swenson).

  17 perfect intelligence a day ahead of our movement: Rahman, a cleric, was the Taliban regional commander for Kunar and two other provinces. He led a hard-core group called JDQ, a branch of Al Qaeda that included Arab fighters and Chechens. See “Syed Saleem Shahzad, a Fighter and a Financier,” Asia Times, 23 May 2008.