Merchant of Death: Money, Guns, Planes, and the Man Who Makes War Possible

by Douglas Farah

  7 Los Angeles Times interview with Vladimir Sharpatov, March 27, 2002.

  8 Agence France Presse, August 11, 1995; Antonov and Ilyushin model histories, Russian Aircraft Museum, Aeromarket.ru.

  9 Daniszewski et al., “On the Trail”; Los Angeles Times interview with Sharpatov.

  10 Peter Andreas, “The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia,” International Studies Quarterly 48 (2004): p. 33.

  11 For a more complete look at the role of al Qaeda in Bosnia see Evan F. Kholmann, Al Qaida’s Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network (New York: Berg, 2004).

  12 Founded in 1987 in Vienna, Austria, the TWRA was run by Elfatih Hassanein, a Sudanese with a diplomatic passport accrediting him as a cultural attaché in Vienna, enabling him to travel unhindered around the region without being subject to customs or immigration checks. When the war broke out Hassanein, who had studied medicine in Belgrade in the 1970s, quickly turned the TWRA agency into an unofficial arm of the Bosnian government and its president, Alija Izetbegovic. The TWRA’s chief contact in the new Bosnian government was Hasan Cengic, a well-known radical Islamic Bosnian official who was primarily responsible for acquiring weapons for the Muslim forces and breaking the weapons embargo. Cengic, an imam frequently described as an Iranian intelligence agent, later served as Bosnia’s deputy defense minister. The United States would eventually place Cengic on the Treasury Department’s list of banned individuals because of his ties to Iranian intelligence and efforts to disrupt the Balkans peace process. For the most extensive research on TWRA see John Pomfret, “Bosnia’s Muslims Dodged Embargo,” Washington Post, September 22, 1996, p. A1. For designation reference see Office of Foreign Assets Control, “List of Designated and Blocked Individuals,” p. 65.Bout continued dealing with Cengic long after the Maribor shipments, as the imam guided TWRA and its successor agencies in the acquisition of weapons and aircraft. Over time Bout sold or donated several aircraft to Cengic and his air company, BIO Air. According to 2004 Bosnian intelligence reports, Bout, with the help of Cengic loyalists and family members, sent four aircraft to Bosnia after the Maribor shipments were discovered. The aircraft were not registered with the government customs office as having been legally imported. Two of those aircraft were then leased back to Bout from BIO Air. The report says that the intelligence services “suspect that Victor Bout in collaboration with Hasan Cengic is transporting weapons to Chechnya via Air Bosna pilots. Weapons are originating from a Bulgarian weapons plant.”

  13 According to Pomfret and others, another major donor was Wael Julaedan, a Saudi companion of bin Laden who was later designated a terrorist financier by the U.S. Treasury Department and the United Nations. One of those in frequent contact with TWRA and Hassanein was Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman, the blind Egyptian cleric now serving a life sentence for planning a series of terrorist attacks in New York. The 1993 plot, dubbed “Day of Terror,” was to be simultaneous strikes on the UN headquarters, the Holland and Lincoln tunnels, the George Washington Bridge, and other landmarks. Intelligence services had tapes of Rahman calling TWRA offices to discuss selling tapes of his sermons there.

  14 Pomfret et al., ibid.

  15 Author interviews with Western intelligence officials in the former Yugoslavia at the time of the transaction and Andreas, “Clandestine Political Economy.”

  16 “Joint Study of the Muslim Brotherhood,” November 15, 2005, p. 12, in possession of the authors. That pipeline was short-lived but vital. Due to internal political maneuvering, Croatia in October suddenly closed the smuggling routes through its territory after just four flights. A shipment of 10,000 assault rifles and 750,000 rounds of ammunition, rockets, and explosives, valued at $10 million, was left in a warehouse in Maribor and paid for by TWRA until Slovenian officials revealed the contents a year later. Cengic then publicly admitted that “we paid the Slovenian police in cash and with no records” kept for the weapons transfers through Maribor. Soon other pipelines, principally via Iran, were opened, and Slovenia continued to serve as a primary supplier of the Bosnian cause. At the same time Bout was dealing with Cengic, Cengic was dealing with envoys of bin Laden, who was helping to channel millions of dollars to TWRA.

  17 A likely link is Nicolas Oman, a Slovenian weapons merchant who would give Bout at least a preview of the possibilities of the riches to be had selling weapons in Africa. He was also a pioneer in playing several different sides in a conflict. Oman, at the start of the Bosnian war, traveled to Liberia. At the time Liberia was under the rule of an illiterate sergeant named Samuel Doe. Oman talked or bribed his way into obtaining a Liberian diplomatic passport based on being named honorary Liberian consul in Slovenia, even though the countries did not have even minimal commercial or political ties. But Oman’s real business was the weapons-for-diamonds trade that Bout would later perfect. With a diplomatic passport, Oman was free to travel unhindered with millions of dollars in diamonds, arrange weapons deals, and inspect weapons around Europe. He often did business from an ancient castle on the outskirts of Bled, where he entertained Russian mobsters and ultranationalists, intelligence officials from different countries, and arms dealers. The history of Oman’s involvement is contained in the Italian investigation known as the “Cheque-to-Cheque Affair,” as well as numerous other intelligence and media reports in possession of the authors. In addition to his help in arming the Bosnian Muslims, Oman was involved in trying to procure, for $60 million, a “vacuum bomb” on behalf of Radovan Karadzic, a Serbian war criminal responsible for the massacre of thousands of Muslims through “ethnic cleansing” campaigns. The bomb was supposed to suck the oxygen out of the air, killing everyone. The bomb was never built and may not even have existed, but Oman appears to have cheated Karadzic out of $8 million in the deal. According to Oman associates and European intelligence officials Bout’s relationship with Oman endured for more than a decade. When Bout began flying weapons and ammunition into Iraq for the U.S. military in 2003, Oman was one of the providers.

  18 Pomfret et al., note 13.

  19 Ibid.

  20 Translated copy of Transavia Travel Agency license provided to the Los Angeles Times. The license was registered with the UAE Ministry of Justice on March 3, 1993, and renewed on July 11,1998.

  21 Los Angeles Times interview with Richard Chichakli, January 2002.

  22 The “Transavia Network” was designated by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control on April 26, 2005. The designated companies include NVtrans Aviation Network, aka TAN Group; aka Trans Aviation; aka Transavia Travel Agency; aka Transavia Travel Cargo. Transavia planes were still flying as late as May 2005, when the firm was chartered by the British Ministry of Defence to fly troops and armored vehicles from the United Kingdom to Baghdad.

  23 Los Angeles Times interview with Alexander Sidorenko, March 25, 2002.

  24 Los Angeles Times interview with U.S. diplomat, December 2001.

  25 Los Angeles Times notes for October 20, 2001, story on UAE.

  26 Andre Verloy, unpublished notes of interviews with Richard Chichakli, 2002.

  27 Andre Verloy, “Viktor Bout’s American Connection,” Center for Public Integrity, November 20, 2002. According to Verloy, Chickakli claimed to be a nephew of a former president of Syria. But Chichakli later denied that family connection. Also, Verloy notes of Chichakli interviews, ibid.

  28 Los Angeles Times, Chichakli interview.

  29 Verloy notes of Chichakli interviews. Chichakli later claimed in a fax to Treasury officials that he did not meet Bout in 1993 and that he only worked for the free-trade zone in 1995 and 1996. Chichakli has disavowed many of his earlier statements made in interviews. He turned down a request from the authors for a new interview.

  30 Office of Foreign Assets Control, “List of Specially Designated Individuals,” April 26, 2005.

  31 Verloy notes of Chichakli interviews.

  32 Group Audit Middle East, “Fraud Investigation Report: Saeed al Jabri (SAJ), Sharjah Branch, UAE,” De
cember 1999, in possession of the authors. See also Glenn R. Simpson and Erik Portanger, “U.A.E. Banks Had Suspect Transfers,” Wall Street Journal, September 17, 2003, p. A1.

  33 Group Audit Middle East, p. 10.

  34 Ibid.

  35 Los Angeles Times interviews with Belgian and U.S. officials, April 2002; also open-access files of CleanOstend, a Belgian antiarms-trafficking group.

  36 Dirk Draulans, “De Criminele Verhalen van de Brave Soldaat Bout,” Knack, May 16, 2001.

  37 Los Angeles Times interview with Ronny Lauwereins, March 2002.

  38 Richard Newell, “Mujahadin Victory: The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,” Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1997; Agence France Presse news accounts.

  39 Los Angeles Times, Sharpatov interview; Agence France Presse news accounts; confidential cable from U.S. embassy in Islamabad, August 6, 1995, provided by National Security Archive, George Washington University.

  40 Los Angeles Times, Sharpatov interview.

  41 Holzman, diplomatic cable from U.S. embassy, Islamabad.

  42 Daniszewski et al., “On the Trail.”

  43 Los Angeles Times interview with Zamir Kabulov, April 13, 2002.

  44 Ibid.

  45 Los Angeles Times, Sharpatov interview.

  46 Los Angeles Times interviews with Sergei Mankhayev, March 2002.

  47 Los Angeles Times, Kabulov interview.

  48 Daniszewski et al., “On the Trail.”Agence France Presse news accounts.

  49 Los Angeles Times interview with Russian aviation executive, March 2002.

  50 Landesman, “Arms and the Man.”

  Chapter 4: Continental Collapse

  1 Lynne Duke, Mandela, Mobutu, and Me: A Newswoman’s Africa Journey (New York: Doubleday, 2003), p. 124.

  2 Thomas M. Callaghy, “Life and Death in the Congo,” Foreign Affairs, Spring 2002, accessed at: www.foreignaffairs.org/20010901fareviewessay5576/thomas-m-callaghy/life-and-death-in-the-congo.html.

  3 This account is based on interviews with the official involved, who cannot be identified by name because of his ongoing work in the intelligence community.

  4 Peleman interview that appeared in “Gunrunners,” Frontline/World, PBS, May 2002, accessed at www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/sierraleone/bout.html.

  5 John Reader, Africa: A Biography of a Continent (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), p. 686.

  6 Richard H. Shultz, Douglas Farah, and Itamara V. Lochard, “Armed Groups: A Tier-One Security Priority,” Institute for National Security Studies, U.S. Air Force Academy, Occasional Paper 57,2004.

  7 Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael Klare, “Small Arms and Light Weapons: Controlling the Real Weapons of War,” Arms Control Today, August/September 1998.

  8 “Arms and Conflict in Africa,” U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, July 1, 2001.

  9 William D. Hartung and Bridget Moix, “Deadly Legacy: U.S. Arms to Africa and the Congo War,” Arms Trade Resource Center, January 2000; Boutwell and Klare, “Small Arms.”

  10 Oxfam International, “Up in Arms: Controlling the International Trade in Small Arms,” July 2001.

  11 Stephen Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War, (New York: New York University Press, 2001), p. 72.

  12 European intelligence sources and report seen by authors; confidential government list of Bout planes provided to the authors; Los Angeles Times interview with U.S. official, April 2002.

  13 State Department fact sheet on Osama bin Laden, August 14, 1996.

  14 NATO working paper, “NDL and USA Joint Paper on the Muslim Brotherhood,” November 15, 2005.

  15 Eric Reeves, “Regime Change in Sudan,” Washington Post, August 23, 2004, p. A23.

  16 Written reply to the South African National Assembly by the Ministry of Home Affairs, October 4, 2002.

  17 Ofcansky interview that appeared in “Gunrunners,” Frontline/World, PBS, May 2002.

  18 On June 8, 2006, Gus Kouwenhoven, a Dutch national who supplied weapons to Taylor in Liberia in exchange for timber concessions, was sentenced in a Netherlands court to eight years in prison. See Africa Governance Monitoring and Advocacy Project, June 8, 2006, accessed at www.afrimap.org/newsarticle.php?id=504.

  19 UN Panel of Experts, UN Report on Sierra Leone, December 2000, para. 293.

  20 “Final Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola,” S/2000/1225, December 21, 2000, para. 36; Interpol red notice for Victor Bout, February 28, 2002.

  21 “Final Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola,” para. 37.

  22 Ibid., paras. 32-38.

  23 Ibid., para. 119.

  24 Peleman interview, “Gunrunners.”

  25 Ibid.

  26 European intelligence reports in possession of the authors.

  27 Interpol red notice for Victor Bout, February 28, 2002.

  28 This account is based on the following: Susan Schmidt and James V. Grimaldi, “The Rapid Rise and Steep Fall of Jack Abramoff,” Washington Post, December 29, 2005, p. A1; Wikipedia entry: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jonas_Savimbi; Danny Schechter, “Jack Abramoff ’s White Man’s Burden,” Common Dreams News Center, February 16, 2006 (www.commondreams.org/views06/0216-21.htm).

  29 “The Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions against UNITA,” S/2000/203, March 10, 2000; author interviews with weapons dealers. The timing of Bout’s arrival on the scene in Angola and Zaire was fortuitous. For several years Savimbi had relied on a South African arms dealer, Ronnie De Decker, who went by the alias “Watson,” to provide his war matériel. However, by 1994 De Decker was having difficulty procuring the types of weapons Savimbi wanted, including sophisticated surface-to-air missile systems. Savimbi was gearing up for a major offensive, and was desperate to acquire weapons that would allow him to defend his diamond-rich enclave against government jets and tanks. Bout had both the access to weapons and the airlift capacity to undercut the prices of the competition.

  30 “Final Report . . . UNITA,” paras. 33-34.

  31 “Addendum to the Final Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola,” UN Security Council, S/2001/363, paras. 22-32.

  32 Bout’s use of EUCs from Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso is detailed in several of the UN Panel of Experts’ reports on Liberia and Sierra Leone, including Report of the Panel of Experts concerning Liberia, S/2001/1015, October 26, 2001, and Report of the Panel of Experts in Relation to Sierra Leone, December 2000, paras. 204-206.

  Chapter 5: At a Crossroads

  1 Banele Ginindza, “Couriers Air Cess Sets Up Shop in Swaziland,” Business Day, October 9, 1997.

  2 Los Angeles Times interview with Johan Peleman, March 2002. During his travels in Africa in 2001, Peleman said, Bout was often accompanied by a Russian who owned Stealth Telecom, a telecommunications firm in Sharjah. According to Peleman, the firm provided satellite phones for mobile use and also for offices and hangars. A Belgian Senate report issued on February 20, 2003, asserted that Stealth Telecom provided communications equipment to Bout and his associates and also to Bemba and his forces.

  3 A 2001 South African secret intelligence profile of Viktor Bout, “Profile of Victor Butt,” marked “Secret,” NIA, February 5, 2001, noted another interesting link: Ward was the ex-wife of a man named Peter Farquar, who owned another airline, Metavia Airlines. Farquar, the report said, “has a long history of smuggling from Mozambique and was also a supporter of UNITA.” In August 1997 Farquar presented a proposal to sell Metavia Airlines to Bout and Ward, and Bout accepted. Through Ward he bought all of Metavia Airlines Pty, changed its name to Metro D Pty., and used it under the name Norse Aircharter.

  4 This account is based on European and South African intelligence reports in possession of the authors; International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, Making a Killing: The Business of War, (Washington, D.C.: Public Integrity Books, 2003), pp. 150-151.

  5 Los Angeles Times in
terview with Richard Chichakli, May 2002.

  6 “Final Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola,” S/2000/1225, December 21, 2000, paras. 127-128.

  7 “Victor Bout in South Africa,” European intelligence analysis in possession of the authors.

  8 “Profile of Victor Butt.”

  9 Andre Verloy interview with Chichakli, February 21, 2002.

  10 Andre Verloy notes.

  11 European intelligence summary in possession of the authors; International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, Making a Killing, p. 143.