Lemon Tree: An Arab, a Jew, and the Heart of the Middle East

by Sandy Tolan

  The Israeli invasion of Lebanon, including numbers of weapons and casualties, the siege of Beirut, and the PLO resistance, is described in detail by Sayigh on pp. 522-43.

  Sharon's "razed to the ground" quote is from Schiff and Ya'ari, p. 211. The motives of the Israeli invasion are described by Shlaim on pp. 405-06. The departure of the Palestinian cadres is in Sayigh, p. 537. Arafat's boarding of the Greek ship is in Shlaim, p. 413. The "fifteen days" promises to Palestinian refugees in 1948, and their unrelenting desire, fifty-six years later, to return to their old homes, were conveyed to me many times during interviews in the camps in Lebanon.

  The Sabra and Shatilla massacres are detailed in Sayigh on p. 539 and in Loren Jenkins's account in the Washington Post, September 23, 1982.

  The "having disregarded" quote comes directly from the official findings of Israel's Kahan commission of inquiry of February 8, 1983. The Kahan report, which details the use of Israel Defense Forces flares to light up the Sabra and Shatilla camps, and describes the proximity of IDF officers to the camps, can be read in its entirety at http:// www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/kahan.html. The report also makes it www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/kahan.html. The report also makes it clear that defense minister Ariel Sharon explicitly approved the entry of the Phalangist militia into the camps on September 16, 1982.

  Bashir's "only solution is return" and "we demand" comments were quoted in news accounts in January 1988, including in me Jerusalem Post. Jabril Rajoub's candid "Salah paid" comments were made to me in an interview, after I had read him this section of the chapter. I half expected him to explode in anger or denial. Instead, he replied unflinchingly; perhaps he was relieved to acknowledge publicly, and indirectly to his old friend Salah, what had happened and why. After acknowledging Salah paid for his speech, Jabril looked at me and added: "I am embarrassed by that. I was a young man."

  The Al-Awda story was told to me in interviews with Bashir and with Hilda Silverman, a Boston peace activist who was in Athens and planning to board the ship back to Haifa. Additional details come from an October 1988 article by Alfred Lilienthal in the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs and by the Belgian journalist Mon Vanderostyne, who was in Athens to cover the story. The "criminals" quote comes from Vanderostyne's report.

  The assassination of Abu Jihad is described in Sayigh on pp. 618-19 and by Hiro on pp. 216-17. Ehud Barak's role in the assassination has been reported in various newspapers, including in Israel, and is documented on the Web site of the Jewish Agency for Israel (www.safi.org.il/education/jafi75/timeline7i.html). News accounts of that week, including an AP dispatch on April 16, indicate a surge in the intifada following Abu Jihad's assassination. The visit by Ghiath and Nuha Khairi to Dalia's hospital room on May 8, 1988, was recorded in Dalia's journal entry of May 9, and all description and dialogue from this section comes from that entry. The birth of Raphael was described in interviews with Dalia and Yehezkel.

  The increasing political divisions in the Palestinian movement are described by Hiro on pp. 187-90 and Sayigh on pp. 643-50; on pp. 650-53, he discusses the role of Hamas. Shlaim analyzes the same period from the Israeli political perspective on pp. 463-66. Abu-Sharif describes his political shift, from Habash to Arafat, on pp. 224-46. His "Dr. George" remark was recalled in an interview, as were memories of the fading cold war. Arafat's trip to Geneva is in Abu-Sharif s personal account on pp. 257-62.

  The continuing split in the Palestinian movement was described in interviews with Bashir, Abu Laila in Ramallah, and a former PFLP member no longer living in the Middle East.

  Bashir and Salah each recalled their Tunis exile in separate 2004 interviews. Dalia recalled her journey from Jerusalem to Ramla to meet with Michail Fanous. I interviewed both of them about that first meeting, and their memories corroborate each other's stories. Both Dalia and Michail recall their shared vision for the place they would call Open House; Dalia, indeed, recalled Michail looking at her and saying, "We can dream together."

  Chapter 12

  This chapter is based on interviews with Dalia and Yehezkel Landau and Bashir, Nuha, Ghiath, and Khanom Khairi; on original documents from the Oslo agreements; on firsthand accounts, investigations, and newspaper clippings describing the Oslo process and the "second intifada," which began in September 2000; and on my own reporting in the region, which began in 1994.

  The Oslo "accords" refer to a series of agreements, beginning with the "Declaration of Principles" (DOP), that grew out of secret discussions between Israeli and PLO negotiators in the Norwegian capital beginning in 1992. Rabin's and Arafat's exchange of letters was part of the DOP, cited in Documents on Palestine: Vol. LL, published by the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA), p. 142. The text of the DOP is on pp. 145-50. Polls showing the early popularity of Oslo among Palestinians, and the early measures of sovereignty, including Palestinian stamps, are part of the PASSIA timeline in Documents on Palestine, pp. 371-98. The description of separate wings and jurisdictions and the "remains responsible" quote come from the "Gaza-Jericho Autonomy Agreement of May 4, 1994," Annex I, Article X.

  The planned new Israeli housing units and bypass roads come from my own observation in the region in 1994 and after and are listed in the PASSIA timeline, pp. 371-88.

  Baruch Goldstein's massacre of Palestinians is mentioned by Benny Morris on p. 624 of Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist Arab Conflict, 1881-2001. The link between Goldstein's attack and subsequent civilian attacks by Hamas was made in two analysis pieces by Danny Rubinstein in Hadretz, September 28 and October 23, 1998. The suicide attacks are documented in the PASSIA timeline and in "Major Palestinian Terror Attacks Since Oslo" at www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/Terror Attacks.html. Hamas's claims that these attacks were in response to Israeli attacks on Palestinian civilians is documented by Amira Hass in a March 22, 1999, article in Ha'aretz.

  House demolitions are documented by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in periodic reports; see, for example, its note of February 19, 1996. Human Rights Watch's documentation of sleep deprivation and other practices was made periodically, including in a written statement to the commission on March 15, 1996.

  The roundups of Palestinians by Palestinian police are mentioned in numerous news articles during the period and are cited in the August 1995 B'tselem report "Neither Law Nor Justice: Extra-judicial Punishment, Abduction, Unlawful Arrest, and Torture of Palestinian Residents of the West Bank by the Palestinian Preventive Security Service." For more on the Palestinian Authority's censorship tactics, see "Critique of the Palestinian Press Law of 1995" by the Palestinian Center for Human Rights www.pchrgaza.org/files/S&r/English/studyl/Section2.htm). Said's "Vichy" remark comes from his scathing essay "The Middle East 'Peace Process,'" published in his Peace and Lts Discontents: Essays on Palestine and the Middle East Peace Process, p. 159.

  The anger at Arafat and contrasting images of rich and poor were documented in large part from my trips to Gaza beginning in 1994; additional details in this paragraph, including the "profiteers" quote, is from David Hirst's article "Shameless in Gaza," which appeared in the Guardian Weekly on April 27, 1997. (I was in Gaza at the time, and the article caused a stir—officials were infuriated and many others elated; there was also a sense among some Palestinians that it was "too early" to be airing the Palestinians' dirty laundry to the world "while we are still under occupation.")

  The October 1995 poll, showing plummeting approval for Oslo among Palestinians, was conducted by the respected Jerusalem Media and Communication Center and is cited on p. 387 of Documents on Palestine, only 23.7 percent "strongly" supported the agreement.

  Yehezkel Landau discussed the atmosphere of Israel during the Oslo period and recalled Rabin's remarks about "Bagatz and B'tselem."

  The Netanyahu quote is cited in dozens of articles, including the June 2004 piece "Israel's Wayward Prime Ministers" by Daniel Pipes, posted at the online magazine Amer
ican Daily, www.americandairy.com/article/2547.

  The doctored posters depicting Rabin in a Nazi uniform and the attacks on Rabin by the religious and political Right were recalled vividly by Dalia and Yehezkel, who also recalled the use of the word rodef. More details are mentioned in Righteous Victims, pp. 634-35. Dalia recalled her feelings of outrage at the depictions of Rabin during interviews in the summer of 2005. She and Yehezkel recalled the challenges of "the whole coexistence approach" during this period.

  The particulars of the rally during which Rabin was killed come from Yehezkel and are corroborated by Morris on p. 635. Additional details of the assassination are in Shlaim's The Iron Wall, pp. 548-50. Dalia's recollection of Rabin saying, "Enough of the struggle for war," may have its origins in a speech Rabin gave to the Knesset on October 5, 1995, in which he said, "We can continue to fight. We can continue to kill—and continue to be killed. But we can also try to put a stop to this never-ending cycle of blood. We can also give peace a chance."

  Yigal Amir's "I acted alone" remark has been widely quoted. Shlaim, on p. 549, adds this from Amir: "When I shot Rabin, I felt as if I was shooting a terrorist. '

  The account of Camp David is pieced together from numerous sources. A large part of it comes from an exchange of Camp David "versions" published in the New York Review of Books, from Barak through Benny Morris (June 13, 2002) and from Robert Malley and Hussain Agha (June 27, 2002). Also important in my telling here is Charles Enderlin's Shattered Dreams, which reconstructed the summit "through accounts, filmed during the weeks following the meeting, as well as the notes that several participants, Israeli and Palestinian, took in real time." Another valuable account is Clayton E. Swisher's The Truth About Camp David: The Untold Story About the Collapse of the Middle East Peace Process, which is based on extensive interviews with parties from all sides. Other sources include Dennis Ross's The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace; Madeleine Albright's Madam Secretary; the diaries of Saeb Erekat, one of the principal Palestinian negotiators; and "The Camp David Papers" by Akram Hanieh, another member of the Palestinian team and editor-in-chief of the Palestinian daily Al-Ayyam, and the diaries of Saeb Erekat, one of the principal Palestinian negotiators, as given in a speech in Bethlehem which was translated and posted at http://homepages.stmartin.edu/Fac_Staff/rlangill/PLS%20300/Camp%20 David%20Diaries.hitm. Erekat, in personal correspondence with me, confirmed the authenticity of the diaries.

  The accounts vary in tone and ascribing of blame for Camp David's failure, depending on the perspective of the narrator. Small details also vary, with one narrator recalling a yellow portion of a map where another remembers it being brown. The quotes are taken verbatim from the sources cited, but they are not likely exact, as the participants recalled the conversations after the fact. Occasionally there is slight disagreement on the dates certain conversations took place, though it is also possible similar conversations were repeated ad nauseam over the fourteen days of Camp David. I have used quotes only when there is more than one source for a conversation.

  Ross's "same old bullshit" comment comes from his memoir, p. 669. Clinton's outburst at Abu Ala is quoted by Enderlin (p. 202); slightly different versions appear in Ross, p. 668, and Albright, Madam Secretary, p. 488, where the "got drenched" quote also appears. Clinton's banging his fist on the table comes from Barak's account to Morris in the New York Review of Books article. Arafat's response comes from the Erekat diaries. Clinton's appeal to Arafat on the eve of his departure for the G-8 summit is documented by Enderlin on p. 239, by Albright on p. 490, by Ross on p. 696E, and by Swisher on p. 299, where Clinton's "price you have to pay" quote also appears, attributed to the recollection of Sandy Berger. Arafat's pointed response to Clinton after his return from Okinawa, including the "small island" and "I will not sell Jerusalem" quotes, are from Hanieh's Camp David Papers. Arafat's famous invitation to attend his own funeral is quoted in various forms in nearly every account. His "revolution is easier than peace-making" comes from the Erekat diaries.

  The exact percentage of the West Bank and Gaza discussed at Camp David as the basis of a solution remains in dispute, in part because few if any written offers were made and because sections of East Jerusalem and other areas were not considered in the calculation. According to Malley and Agha, "The ideas put forward at Camp David were never stated in writing, but orally conveyed." Some estimates of what was actually on the table are as low as 80 percent. See Naseer Aruri's Dishonest Broker: The US. Role in Israel and Palestine. Others insist the figure was as high as 95 percent.

  The "most contested" status for Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount is one of the few undisputed things about it. The importance of the site to Muslims, not only in the Middle East, was brought home to me on a visit to a Muslim slum on the island of Mindanao in the Philippines, where families had tacked pictures of the Al-Aqsa Mosque on their walls and where, upon hearing of my reporting in the Middle East, they launched into discussions of the importance of Jerusalem to Muslims.

  The figure of 1,500 police comes from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (mfa.gov.il). The events of September 29 are described in the final report of the impartial Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, better known as the Mitchell Commission after its chair, former U.S. senator George Mitchell. The report indicates the Palestinian demonstrators did not fire weapons on September 29, citing U.S. State Department findings. More details can be found in Amnesty International's October 19, 2000, report.

  The "grand plan" quote comes from Barak in the interview with Benny Morris in the New York Review of Books, and the sentiment is corroborated by Israel's statements to the Mitchell Commission. The commission was among the fact-finding teams which determined that most of the early demonstrations did not involve "deploying children to stand in front of" armed men. The commission did, however, criticize the statement in June 2000, four months before the Al Aqsa intifada began, by Abu Ali Mustafa, a PLO and PFLP leader: "The issues of Jerusalem, the refugees and sovereignty will be decided on the ground and not in negotiations. On this point it is important to prepare the Palestinian public for the next step, because without doubt we shall find oursevles in conflict with Israel in order to create new facts on the ground." Mustafa added that any future conflict "will be more violent" than the first intifada. Fifteen months later, he was assassinated by Israeli security forces.

  The crisis, Israel concluded, was "an armed conflict short of war," a claim the Palestinians said was only an excuse "to justify its assassination policy, its collective punishment policy, and its use of lethal force."

  Statistics on early casualties come from investigations by human rights groups, including the Israeli group B'tselem, which found in a December 2, 2000, report that 264 Palestinians had been killed in the occupied territories since September 29, 204 of them civilians "killed by IDF forces, of them 73 minors aged 17 and under." During the same period, twenty-nine Israelis were killed, sixteen of them members of the security forces. The figure of ten thousand injured comes from the same B'tselem investigation, which concluded: "Israel did not develop non-lethal methods to disperse demonstrations or train its soldiers to confront such demonstrations." B'tselem reported that "according to IDF figures, 73 percent of the incidents [from September 29 to December 2, 2000] did not include Palestinian gunfire."

  The death of thirteen Israeli Arabs is documented in the U.S. State Department's "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices" of February 23, 2001. According to one respected Israeli pollster, by 2002, 46 percent of Israelis supported "transfer" (expulsion) of Palestinians from the occupied territories, and 31 percent supported "transfer" of Israeli Arabs. See "Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2002" by Asher Arian, director of the National Security Policy and Public Opinion Project at Tel Aviv University. Rehavam Zeevi's "transfer" position was widely known. See, for example, "Israel Mints Ultranationalist Hero," Christian Science Monitor, October 10, 2002. The U.S. State Department "Country Report" of February 28
, 2005, referred to Israel's investigation and findings into the deaths of the Israeli Arabs: "The Orr Commission of Inquiry (COI) was established to investigate those killings. It recommended a number of measures, including criminal prosecutions. The Cabinet adopted those recommendations in June."

  The Israeli anger over the death of the two soldiers in Ramallah, perhaps more than anything, contributed to a shift to the right in Israel after 2000. According to the Mitchell report, "For Israelis, the lynching of two military reservists, First Sgt. Vadim Novesche and First Cpl. Yosef Avrahami, in Ramallah on October 12, reflected a deep-seated Palestinian hatred of Israel and Jews."

  The New Year's Day bombing in Netanya was mentioned in a Reuters article of Januaty 2, 2001: "Barak Doubts Clinton Can Forge Mideast Peace Deal." Barak's "deep doubts" comment comes from this article.

  Progress in the talks at Taba was considered genuine by analysts on both sides and by independent observers. One European diplomat sought me out in 2001 to underscore this. He cited the findings of Miguel Moratinos, the EU envoy who was a party to the talks at Taba. In February 2002, Haaretz published the Moratinos Document, which can be viewed online at www.arts.mcgill.ca/MEPP/PRRN/papers/moratinos.html. Seen through Moratinos's eyes, Taba represented substantial movement toward a comprehensive settlement, with progress on Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem, including some religious sites in the Old City and, for the first time, limited Israeli acknowledgment of UN Resolution 194 and the Palestinian right of return, which had now been on the table for more than fifty years. Barak's remark, made to Morris in the New York Review of Books article of June 13, 2002, after his defeat to Sharon, is unyielding on right of return, yet the Moratinos Document clearly states that the Israeli delegation at Taba, ostensibly led by Barak, declared otherwise. It is not clear whether this discrepancy says more about the negotiations at Taba, the accuracy of Moratinos's document, or Barak's own personal and political considerations at the time he made the remark.