Donovan's Devils

by Albert Lulushi

  The next day, March 24, Lagaxo left the house at 0800 hours to go fishing. He saw the two Americans climbing from the sea toward the house. When he reached the rocks on the shore, Lagaxo noticed some fishermen gathering material under the direction of a local Fascist, Vittorio Bertone. The evening before, a villager by the name of Gaetano Oneto was returning home in his boat when he noticed the bright orange rubber boats nestled among the rocks. The OGs had camouflaged them well not to be seen from the hills and from the railway embankment, but they had not been careful to cover them from the sea. Oneto went ashore to look at them and found demolition equipment in boxes with explosive marked on them. Upon returning to Bonassola, Oneto reported his findings to the Fascist secretary Giobatta Bianchi. In the morning, Bianchi sent Bertone with Oneto to investigate. They uncovered the three rubber boats and were in the process of inspecting them when Lagaxo happened to go by.

  Instead of fishing, Lagaxo returned home and found the two Americans waiting for his mother near the door. He asked them whether they had left any materials on the rocks and told them that the Fascists were taking it in a boat. “Yes,” they answered and said that they were leaving the area because they were causing too much trouble. Lagaxo’s mother came out with some bread and jam, which the Americans took and returned to the stable. Out of curiosity, Lagaxo went down a mule trail that led to town and saw a group of Germans and Fascists coming up. Lagaxo ran to the little stable to warn the Americans and for the first time saw that there were several of them. Lagaxo returned home taking another path and encountered the Fascists Bertone and Giovanni Ferri, who asked him if he had seen anyone. Lagaxo said “No” and continued toward his house where he saw a group of German soldiers and Fascists who had just arrived. They dispersed and began searching the area.

  Shortly after, Lagaxo saw two Fascists, Giobatta Bianchi and Bertone, about fifteen yards from a grove where the two Americans he knew were hiding. Bertone noticed them and yelled, “What are you doing here, you ugly pigs?” The Americans answered, “We are Italians.” Bertone replied, “You are traitors,” and asked where the others were. “It’s just us. There are no others,” the Americans said. Bertone knew that more than just two soldiers must have come to require three rubber boats. He took from his pocket a whistle, which he had found in one of the rubber boats, showed it to the captured soldier, and said, “Do you want to see how, if I blow this whistle, the others will come out?” Then he blew the whistle. At the sound, the rest of the American soldiers who had been hiding in a vale about one hundred yards away jumped to their feet and began firing their weapons. There was an exchange of grenades and fire from automatic guns and rifles, but only for a short time. At approximately 1030 hours, the Americans surrendered and were quickly disarmed. During the brief fight, Lieutenant Russo was slightly wounded.

  Lagaxo saw the group of Americans coming toward his house with their hands raised and surrounded by Germans and Fascists with pointed guns. They were locked in the storehouse. Two Germans and two Fascists guarded them while the others continued to search the area. Around 1100 hours, being satisfied that they had caught everyone, the Germans and the Fascists returned, took away the Americans imprisoned in the storehouse, and marched them to the Fascist headquarters at Bonassola. The Fascist prefect of Bonassola, Commissario Guglielmini, was the first one to interrogate the two officers, Lieutenants Russo and Trafficante. He was able to learn the following:

  Following orders received from higher headquarters in Naples, they had left Corsica on a PT boat and when they neared the Italian coast they had been transferred to three rubber boats [with which] they landed about 0200 hours on 22 March [sic] at the point where the boats were found. Their mission was to blow up the portion of railroad from Bonassola to Framura. Having landed they went up the mountain and took lodging in a stable which they found empty and abandoned.

  Writing to his superiors, Guglielmini took care to highlight his role in the events of that day. He asked Russo if he, the son of an Italian, did not feel ashamed to carry arms against his fatherland. “He lowered his head, became red, and did not answer but gave me the impression that my words struck home,” Guglielmini wrote. As for the local Fascists who had taken part in the action, their work “was beyond any eulogy. Their initiative and courage deserve vivid recognition and I hereby inform the head of the Province of their spirit of sacrifice and their devotion to duty,” he wrote.

  In the afternoon, German soldiers arrived with a truck and drove the American soldiers to La Spezia, at the headquarters of Colonel Kurt Almers, commanding officer of the 135th Fortress Brigade that controlled the area. Colonel Almers included the news of the capture of the fifteen Americans in the afternoon status report that he sent to his commanding officer General Anton Dostler at the 75th Army Corps headquarters.

  * * *

  Oberleutnant Wolfgang Koerbitz, staff officer in the 135th Fortress Brigade headquarters responsible for anti-partisan and intelligence issues, learned about the capture of American Commandos during a meeting with prefect Guglielmini in La Spezia in the afternoon of March 24. He headed straight for the brigade headquarters located at a castle in Carozzo, a small hillside town overlooking La Spezia, about three miles to the northeast of the town center. He arrived there between 1800 and 1900 hours and saw the fifteen American soldiers dressed in field uniforms standing in front of the staff building. Koerbitz asked an orderly to get water, bread, and straw for the Americans and send them to a small building above the staff quarters that served as a prison. Hans Bertram Baumgarten, the officer in charge of the prison, received them and searched them for identification papers, weapons, and personal items. He turned over to Koerbitz four watches, several nail files, and 29,500 lire found in the pocket of one of the Americans. Baumgarten put the two officers in separate cells and split the rest of the men in three cells.

  At Carozzo, Koerbitz found Corvette Captain Friedrich Klaps, head of the German Navy intelligence office in La Spezia, who had come to interrogate the prisoners. Klaps spoke some English but not well enough to conduct the interrogations himself. Therefore, he called Lieutenant Georg Sessler, one of his subordinates who spoke fluent American English, to come to the Almers headquarters. Because Koerbitz did not know English well either, Sessler conducted all the interrogations on behalf of both the army and the navy for the next day and a half.

  Sessler began the interrogation with the infantry officer Lieutenant Trafficante, who refused to divulge anything beyond his name, rank, and serial number. Next, Sessler interrogated two enlisted men who simply stated their names, ranks, serial numbers, and that they belonged to an engineering company. These initial interrogations lasted two hours, but Sessler, Koerbitz, and Klaps did not learned much. They took a break and briefed Colonel Almers on their lack of progress. Around 2200 hours, a teletype message arrived from the 75th Army Corps headquarters requesting the results of the interrogation. Headquarters were particularly interested in “tactical questions” on whether the Allies were preparing for a landing from Corsica. Klaps, Sessler, and Koerbitz conferred on a strategy to get some answers to these questions. They decided to interrogate Lieutenant Russo next. Before bringing him in, Klaps suggested they use a stock interrogation ruse to trick Russo into believing that the other three Americans had talked.

  When Russo came in the interrogation room, Sessler began by telling him that they had standing Führer’s orders to shoot saboteurs and members of commando-raiding teams. The only way he could save himself was by giving a full account of his mission so that Sessler could verify that it was a military mission and treat them as prisoners of war. “I told Lieutenant Trafficante the same thing and he provided us the information,” Sessler said pointing to a few sheets of papers on his desk. Then Sessler said, “I know you came from Bastia and first I want to know the time you left.” He had only guessed that they had come from Bastia, since it was the closest port to the landing point. Russo gave him the time. Sessler, pretending to look at the papers in front of him, s
aid, “Lieutenant Trafficante gave me a different time.” Russo replied, “Well, the time I gave you is the time. It is the only time I remember exactly.” “OK, continue,” Sessler said, and Russo began to tell him how they left Corsica in the PT boats and then the rest of their ill-fated mission.

  Based on this information, Klaps prepared the first interrogation report stating that the group of prisoners had landed from American gunboats for a military mission against the Bonassola railway tunnel, that they were American soldiers in uniform, part of a headquarters company based in Corsica, commanded by a Colonel Livermore, and with regimental headquarters somewhere in North Africa. The report was composed as a teletype at 0030 hours and was dispatched to the headquarters of the 75th Army Corps at 0215 hours.

  Sessler continued with the interrogation of two other enlisted men. Both refused to discuss their mission and gave only their names, ranks, and serial numbers. Although Sessler tried to use the information he had gathered from Russo, the two men did not fall for his bluff. It was close to 0400 hours when Klaps and Sessler stopped the interrogations and left for La Spezia to refresh themselves for a few hours before returning to continue questioning the remaining OGs.

  * * *

  Klaps and Sessler returned in the morning of March 25 to resume the interrogations. At the same time, an official from the SD arrived to take part in the interrogations. An SD truck stood by to take the prisoners away if it was so decided. The American enlisted men were transferred from the prison to a large barn-like building with stalls to be closer to the headquarters building where the interrogations would continue to take place. Between 0900 and 0930 hours, a telegram arrived from the 75th Army Corps with the words “The captured Americans are to be shot immediately. Dostler.” Colonel Almers and Klaps conferred about what to do next. Almers said that he did not interpret “immediately” to mean in the next half an hour. The case needed further consideration, and he was going to talk to General Dostler about it. In the meanwhile, Klaps and Sessler would continue the interrogations.

  Between 1030 and 2000 hours of March 25, Klaps, Sessler, and the SD official interrogated one by one all the Americans who had not been questioned the day before. The men refused to provide any information about their mission or outfit. Initially, all they would give were names, home addresses, ranks, and serial numbers. Toward the end of the day, some of them stopped talking altogether—two of them would not even give their home addresses although they were plainly visible on their dog tags. Sessler interpreted this complete reluctance to talk as an indication that the whole groups had discovered from their German guards that they would be shot in any case.

  Sessler recalled a curious incident that occurred around 1700 hours. He was questioning one of the Americans who must have been Joseph Farrell, given that Sessler described him later as “a person named Joe … of Jewish extraction.” For the first ten minutes, Farrell remained silent despite Sessler’s repeated questions. Then suddenly and heatedly he shouted, “Here’s mud in your eye!” as if raising a toast and saying “Here’s to you!” or “Cheers!” Sessler was taken aback and asked for an explanation. Ferrell told him that he had recognized Sessler as one of the naval officers of the Hamburg-American Line that provided transatlantic services to New York in the prewar days. Ferrell had worked as an ice delivery boy in 1936–1937 and had brought ice to Piers 84 and 86 where the Germans liners anchored. The conversation became friendlier and more personal with Ferrell talking about his family and personal life. Ferrell confirmed that the group knew that they would be shot rather than treated as prisoners of war. “My superior and I are doing everything we can to have you evacuated as POWs,” Sessler assured him. Then Sessler dismissed Ferrell and continued with the interrogation of the remaining Americans until 2000 hours.

  * * *

  Throughout the day, there was confusion in the Almers headquarters about what to do with the prisoners. Some suggested sending them away to a prisoners-of-war camp; others thought they were spies who had to be shot according to Hitler’s order, the Führerbefehl, on dealing with commandos and sabotage units; and others suggested to turn them over to the SD and let them deal with the problem. At 1600 hours, Klaps held a conference with Sessler, Koerbitz, and the SD representative. He asked whether they thought the Americans were members of a commando unit or whether they were soldiers. Based on the results of the interrogations and based on everyone’s impressions of the Americans, the consensus was that they were not members of commandos. At this point, Klaps advised Koerbitz to submit a report to his superiors summarizing this opinion to avoid the shooting of the Americans by mistake.

  Koerbitz made his report to Almers, who called the 75th Army Corps in an attempt to have the execution order postponed or delayed. Almers first talked to Colonel Kraehe, Dostler’s chief of staff, and told him that the Americans were in uniform and it was impossible to execute them after capture. On the other end of the line, General Dostler took over the conversation. He said curtly, “Almers, we cannot change anything. You know the Führerbefehl. The execution is to be carried out. You know that the Führerbefehl contains a clause according to which officers who do not execute the order are to be tried by courts martial.” Further arguments by Almers did not change Dostler’s mind and the conversation came to an end.

  Next, it was Klaps who tried to get a withdrawal or postponement of the Führerbefehl. He called Dostler’s headquarters at about 1900 hours and spoke with Kraehe, who said the execution was to be carried out and a report made to General Dostler by 2400 hours. Klaps asked Kraehe to request Dostler to postpone the execution for twenty-four hours. One hour later, Kraehe called and told Klaps that the postponement of the execution had been approved until 0700 hours the next morning. Klaps insisted on speaking with Dostler personally to explain the case.

  When Dostler came on the phone, Klaps tried to use code words since the line was not secure. “It is about the fifteen guests who have arrived,” he said. “They are harmless and not as bad as we assumed at the beginning.” Dostler answered what sounded to Klaps like “I have received other reports,” or “I am of a different opinion.” The conversation became heated. According to Sessler, Dostler was very angry at the whole proceedings and threatened to break Klaps if he interfered with his order and the Führerbefehl. Finally, he told Klaps to explain the case by cable and state the basis on which he asked for postponement of the execution. At the same time, he told Klaps to conclude interrogations by 0700 hours of the next morning, which Klaps understood to mean that the fifteen American prisoners would be shot at that time unless an order to the contrary was issued. Dostler ended the call by saying, “I expect you to carry out my orders. This will be confirmed by telegram which is now on its way to Almers.”

  Immediately after the call, Klaps wrote a cable with the following content:

  Please postpone execution of Führerbefehl, because it has not been established whether the 15 Americans belong to Commandos, or whether they are cases coming under Führerbefehl at all. There is a possibility for repercussions against German prisoners of war. Further interrogation necessary. It should also be determined whether there are threads leading from the Americans to Italian civilian population or partisans.

  Klaps prepared a second copy of the cable for the headquarters of Field Marshall Albert Kesselring, the commander in chief of all German troops in Italy, hoping that he would intervene in stopping the execution. Koerbitz took both cables personally to the cable desk and ordered the soldier on duty to send the cables as soon as possible. “Fifteen lives depend on it,” Koerbitz said. After about an hour, around 2300 hours, the soldier reported that he had sent both cables and had received confirmation of their arrival at the intended destinations.

  Klaps left the Almers brigade and returned to his quarters in La Spezia hoping that the cables had reached their destinations and the fifteen Americans would not be shot. Around one o’clock in the morning of March 26, he called for a status update, but no one at the Almers headquarters
could give him any information. Klaps then called the headquarters of the 75th Army Corps and asked several staff officers whether Dostler had received his telegram. Nobody knew exactly whether the general had seen it. It was now between 0400 and 0430 and Klaps asked to speak with Dostler. The telephone connection was bad, and Klaps was hard of hearing from his days as an artilleryman during World War I. He could not hear Dostler’s voice on the phone, but a telephone operator repeated the sentences for him.

  Klaps asked Dostler to ask for his cable in case he had not seen it. Through the operator Dostler said he would do so. Then Klaps said he wanted to add to the content of the telegram. He said that people in La Spezia were talking about the case of fifteen Americans who had landed near their town. Using code words, Klaps told Dostler that if the Americans were shot, the enemy would certainly have a way to learn about it. Dostler became rather harsh, threatened him with a court martial for talking about secret matters over the phone, and terminated the call. Shortly after, Almers called Klaps and told him not to make any more phone calls. The execution of the Führerbefehl could not be avoided. “You know how this order is handled. Officers who do not comply with orders come before a court martial,” Almers said.

  * * *

  Despite the reluctance that Colonel Almers and his staff officers had expressed in carrying out the execution order and despite their efforts to convince higher headquarters to rescind it, everyone felt they had no alternative but to comply with the order. Around 1100 hours on March 25, Almers ordered Koerbitz to make the necessary arrangements for the execution. According to Hans-Bertram Baumgarten, the officer in charge of the prison, Koerbitz ordered him by telephone to prepare a grave for fifteen men, but Baumgarten said he would not obey. Koerbitz then reached out to Lieutenant Rudolph Bolze, commanding officer of the First Company, 905th Fortress Battalion, and ordered him to prepare a grave for the fifteen Americans. Later in the day, again according to Baumgarten, Koerbitz ordered him to locate a separate cell in the prison where it would be possible to shoot the prisoners with a pistol. Baumgarten refused again and they argued for half an hour, with Koerbitz threatening to punish him for not providing the cell he had requested. Because Baumgarten did not budge, Koerbitz called Bolze again asking him to identify a spot suitable for the execution in his area. In the meanwhile, Colonel Almers ordered Captain Rehfeld, commanding officer of the 906th Fortress Battalion, and Lieutenant Seidenstuecker, commanding officer of the First Company of this battalion, to select an execution squad from this company.